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As I started working at the Africa Department of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,1 Dutch public debate on Africa was dominated by a book written by a colleague 
Roel van der Veen: What went wrong with Africa.2 This book followed Africa works, 
by Chabal & Daloz,3 as a critical analysis of the problems of Africa, which clashed with 
politically correct approaches to representing Africa’s problems. For me these books 
made uncomfortable reading, initially because the key messages of these books 
challenged my youthful idealism. But more importantly, because I realised these books 
presented cynical and exaggerated views of the complexities of African reality, which 
did not fully correspond with the Africa I thought I knew from earlier visits and field 
work in Tanzania, Togo, Ghana, Kenya and Zambia. This spurned me to undertake this 
research project, the result of which is now before you. 
In the introduction to the doctoral dissertation which Van der Veen wrote to com-
plement his book, he paints a picture of a formerly elegant African colonial building, 
crumbling as a consequence of poor maintenance. What remains is a mere façade, a 
skeletal remnant of its former glory. The building has since been appropriated for new 
functions. Rooms are occupied by entire families. Extensions have been added, con-
structed from crude materials. The veranda is used as a market stall. Trees are growing 
through the roof. In short, the building is undergoing a process of Africanisation until 
eventually even the façade will crumble away.4 
This image may reflect an aspect of African reality, though like all metaphors it has 
its limitations. No doubt this image will resonate with the impressions held by those 
who have visited Africa. In fact, in my own travels to Africa in the late-1990s and the 
beginning of the twentieth century, in places such as Bagamoyo, the former German 
administrative town in Tanzania or the older, rougher neighbourhoods of Accra I did 
indeed see the once splendid façades of formerly glorious colonial buildings. These now 
                                                 
1  In this dissertation, the first person singular will be used to refer to the author’s personal experience. 
‘We’ will be used in a narrative stylistic manner to take the reader along in the narratives and analyses 
presented here. Occasionally, the first person plural will refer to personal experience of the author to-
gether with a research assistant.  
2  Van der Veen, R., Afrika: Van de koude oorlog naar de 21e eeuw (Amsterdam, 2002; English version: 
Van der Veen, R., What went wrong with Africa (Amsterdam, 2004)). 
3  Chabal, P. & J.P. Daloz, Africa works. Disorder as a political instrument (Oxford, 1999). 
4  Van der Veen, R.J., ‘The disintegration of states in Africa: The interaction of politics, economics, 
culture and social relations, 1957-2003 (PhD thesis, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2004). 
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seemed run-down and on the verge of collapse. When I set off to do field work in 
Zambia to explore the paradigm of the African façade state, I searched for comparable 
images. What I saw, however, did not correspond to what I was looking for. Indeed 
many old façades in Lusaka or on the Copperbelt apparently retained little of the 
perhaps quaint colonial style that they may have had in bygone decades. Old, ornately 
carved wooden balconies had been replaced by sturdy concrete once they had worn 
away. Brick and mortar had been plastered over and painted in the gaudy colours of a 
Kuwaiti mobile phone company. And finely crafted lanterns had been replaced by bare, 
glaring fluorescent tubes. Perhaps in earlier years I might have encountered Van der 
Veen’s image, especially in the urban decline of the Copperbelt.5 Alternatively, in the 
old colonial towns in the Congolese interior or in shell-struck Mogadishu, I might have 
seen such a sight. But in Zambian towns in 2006, 2007, and 2008, the colonial struc-
tures that had not been replaced by larger and more modern buildings had been given a 
new lease of life – albeit not always in the style or preference of their former colonial 
architects. 
However let us for the sake of the argument assume that indeed I did encounter such 
a building. Such a façade would just be part of reality. To reveal more of this reality, 
however, one must look not only look behind but also beyond the façade. The current 
use and appearance of the building is meant to satisfy the needs of the current 
occupants, according to their logic, priorities, resources, and capacities. Not far from the 
building lie shantytowns, or what in Zambian colloquialism are still called ‘high density 
compounds’.6 Most houses there will have started as rickety shacks. It was only a matter 
of time before many of them got concrete floors and walls, corrugated iron or asbestos 
roofing – maybe even roof tiles. Built by their occupants brick by brick. Beyond the 
compounds lie markets, bustling centres of activity. Stifling competition minimises 
profits, but supply and demand grow – albeit slowly. The range of products, local and 
foreign, is larger than it was. A growing number of services are available, from small 
loans or the filling out of forms to charging or repairing mobile phones. Further to the 
centre lie shops and offices. Many enterprises are owned by foreigners or those of 
foreign extraction. Still, it is a business area, where ordinary people earn a living. Near 
towering structures, some half-built by politician-businessmen – now out of favour and 
out of business – lie branches of international banks. There, an emerging middleclass 
cash their paycheques before taking a minibus home. Just out of the centre there are 
many more sights to describe, four-star hotels and ministries. Along busy roads, plied 
by four-by-fours and battered lorries, lie Parliament, State House,7 embassies, NGOs 
and consultants’ offices, and churches. In all these edifices, modest deeds are done, in 
pursuit of lofty words.  
In short, beyond the façade lie many sights and much that is hidden. At times it is not 
a pretty picture, especially if one could see it through the eyes of the former colonialists 
who have long since left, been chased away, or have adjusted to the changing status quo 
– perhaps reluctantly. But what lies beyond the façade works. It may not be as had been 
planned or expected, and it is certainly not without contest or friction. Yet, if the con-
                                                 
5  Dealt with in Ferguson, J., Expectations of modernity: Myths and meanings of urban life on the Zam-
bian copperbelt (Berkley, 2001). 
6  A euphemism inherited from colonial bureaucratic discourse. 
7  The presidential office and residence. 
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ditions are right – which they not always have been – human activity multiplies and 
expands, thus causing more problems to arise and more solutions to be needed.8  
Van der Veen’s metaphor of a worn-down, re-appropriated colonial building can be 
applied to the post-colonial African state. Seen from this perspective, a Western state 
model was transplanted to Africa by the forces of colonialism and over decades hap-
hazardly reinforced by development co-operation. New entities were created on arti-
ficially drawn borders. These were given the formal trappings of modern statehood, 
such as constitutions, parliaments, ministries, and courts. These institutions of the state 
were subsequently and gradually re-appropriated and reshaped to local political prac-
tices and logics. The legitimacy and professional competence associated with the ideal 
of a modern bureaucracy were gradually eroded. After all, to the ruling elite the use-
fulness of the state is greatest when its institutionalisation is minimal. The fewer checks 
and balances, the greater the prospect of appropriating the resources that are provided 
by the state. This process is fuelled by the elite, acting as gatekeepers,9 monopolising 
control over external contacts and sources of income, such as royalties from natural 
resources, tariffs, taxes, and aid. From this perspective the process of Africanisation has 
left the skeletons of state institutions, mere façades or décor masking underlying re-
alities of informalised and personalised politics.10  
While this perspective will, to those acquainted with Africa, no doubt sound as 
familiar as the image of the dilapidated colonial mansion, here too one must look 
beyond the façade. Let us zoom in on the African state, focus on a specific sector where 
people act to transform money into services and policies. In the ward of a provincial 
hospital, some patients lie on mattresses on the ground. Many have delayed their 
coming, having first tried the services of a witchdoctor or first saved enough money to 
be able to afford medical care. Other ill people prefer not to come at all, considering 
hospitals places to die rather than places to get better. In the corridors, family members 
flock in attendance bringing extra food and caring for the needy. The walls bear posters 
teaching the ABC of sexual health beside hand-written posters professing the values of 
public service. Nurses enviously eye the director’s new Pajero and complain that their 
allowances have not yet been paid. Some patients are vexed by the nurses’ rudeness and 
complain that drugs are out of stock. The doctor has not shown up today; maybe she has 
gone to moonlight at a private clinic or is attending a workshop, earning something 
extra, as money is never sufficient. From time to time the nurses are mobilised by the 
union to demand higher salaries and extra allowances from government. Meanwhile the 
laboratory technician checks blood samples and compiles horrific statistics, relieved that 
this month he has received the proper reagents. In the evenings, he studies. Perhaps his 
correspondence course will bring him the qualifications to move on to a better life in 
South Africa or beyond. In a distant rural health centre one can see a health worker, 
over-worked, under-funded, and yet still showing up to work, immunising children and 
supervising deliveries, while a cleaner is screening patients and giving them drugs. The 
limited resources government provides are inventively stretched as far as possible. Fur-
                                                 
8  The vexingly congested roads and exorbitant ‘rentals’ (to use a Zambian colloquialism) faced by con-
temporary urban Zambians are a clear case in point. 
9  Bayart attributes the coining of this phrase to General Obassanjo in the 1970s. See Bayart, J.F., The 
state in Africa: The politics of the belly (London, 1993), 80. 
10  This perspective reflecting Van der Veen’s central thesis combines what Chabal & Daloz term the 
paradigm of the transplanted state, the paradigm of the hybrid state, and their own notion of the in-
formalisation of politics. 
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ther away, a radio transmits the voice of an opposition candidate. She curses the 
government for incompetence and corruption and promises better education and afford-
able health care. 
All these individuals have various motives. Their primary motives are the same as 
anyone’s: Ensuring one’s survival, one’s future, and perhaps that of one’s family. They 
are rooted in society and increasingly part of a global village. Social networks provide 
them with opportunities but also lay claims. With poverty and unemployment ubiquit-
ous, those with employment are seen as a conduit for money or jobs. Failure to respond 
to expectation could risk inviting bad rumours, sabotage, or witchcraft. Nevertheless, 
these people have a job to do. Conditions of service are poor. Salaries do not reflect the 
cost of living for a family and other dependents, and the materials to carry out one’s 
work are often below standard. At any rate, others working elsewhere earn more. 
Despite this, do these individuals strive to uphold a certain measure of professionalism? 
Are they driven by the satisfaction of doing their job? Or is their job merely a source of 
income? These individuals and their families are actors on the stage set with the décor 
of government institutions. The script is improvised. Their primary motive is their 
livelihood. Ask them and they will complain about government, about ridiculous taxes, 
low wages, and appalling services. They will complain about corruption and selfish 
politicians. But they will comment on something that is real, as if the state was more 
than merely a façade. 
Problem description  
W(h)ither the state?11 
Academic literature, particularly around the turn of the millennium, has painted a bleak 
picture of Africa. Books such as Africa works12 and Criminalisation of the African 
State13 describe weak states succumbing to patronage and corruption.14 Their authors 
argue that service delivery in many parts of Africa is slipping, while political elites lack 
a developmental agenda and prefer to serve patrimonial interests. Conflicts have erupted 
or are sustained, in some cases leading to collapse of government and state failure. In 
the Netherlands, public debate and policy on Africa in the early years of the twenty-first 
century have been influenced by the book, What went wrong in Africa.15 Its author 
argues that African states are undergoing a debilitating process of Africanisation or 
traditionalisation, and he does not expect any halting of this trend.  
The state of the African state has been problematised by many authors, both those 
from the continent itself and overseas. By and large they share the conclusion that the 
contemporary African state fails, to a greater or lesser extent, to deliver development 
and democracy and to uphold the rule of law – aims and principles which within recent 
history have developed into major policy objectives with near universal acceptance.16 
The neo-patrimonial paradigm offers a compelling conceptual framework for attempting 
                                                 
11  Chabal & Daloz, Africa works, 3-16. 
12  Chabal & Daloz, Africa works. 
13  Bayart, J.F., S. Ellis & B. Hibou, Criminalization of the state in Africa (Oxford, 1999). 
14  Meridith, M., The state of Africa, (London, 2005) contributes a popularised, journalistic account of the 
history of the post-colonial African State.  
15  Van der Veen, R., What went wrong. 
16  This is well illustrated by the discourse contained in various international policy statements, such as 
African Union, The constitutive act of the African Union (Addis Abeba, 2000).  
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to understand the state of the African state. From this perspective, contemporary African 
states and societies are influenced by two coexisting yet contradictory logics. One is the 
essentially exotic logic of the rational-legal state that can be said to have been imported 
into Africa together with the bureaucracies of the colonial era. This logic has since been 
constantly reinforced by African professionals trained along Western curricula and the 
forces of development cooperation. Another logic, termed patrimonialism, is seen to 
stem from primordial or traditional sources. This logic is represented by the ‘big man’ 
who ‘eats’17 and who gives to his clientele to sustain his power. It is based upon the 
personalisation of power and the use of kinship ties and patronage for the redistribution 
of social and economic resources.18 As seen from the neo-patrimonial paradigm, the 
African state is a hybrid state. Formal structures and the rules and laws of the state are 
twisted to suit the patrimonial interests of the ruling elites. Informal patrimonial prac-
tices such as nepotism, clientalism, and rent-seeking hamper state structures from 
delivering what government policies ostensibly aim to do: Deliver development and 
democracy and uphold the rule of law. 
 
Donors and the neo-patrimonial state 
Problematising the African state implies problematising the endeavour of development 
cooperation which is dependent on the African state. Multilateral development agencies, 
such as the various United Nations agencies and the international financial institutions, 
must work with and through African states, which are among their members. For bi-
lateral agencies, states are their natural partners, as development cooperation is often an 
extension of diplomatic relations.19 Foreign aid donors have been actively collaborating 
with African states for decades, though the manner in which they have done so has 
shifted considerably.20  
Initially cooperation focussed on distinct social or economic projects of which the 
African states may have been the beneficiaries, but that were controlled by the 
delivering agencies. Throughout the 1980s, however, the state itself became the target 
of interventions, particularly with the aim of restoring macro-economic stability and 
states’ capacity to service their debts to international lenders. The structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) initiated by the IMF and World Bank aimed to roll back and 
downsize the state. Into the 1990s, democratic and economic reforms were propagated 
by both bi- and multilateral development agencies and coupled with aid packages and 
technical assistance to facilitate these reforms. In most African countries, these reforms 
have been pushed through only partially. Reforms such as trade liberalisation and fiscal 
and monetary policy reforms can be argued to have more or less achieved their policy 
objectives. However, reforms dealing more with the structure and effectiveness of the 
                                                 
17  This ‘eating’ is a common African metaphor for appropriating government resources.  
18  See for example, Médard, J.F., ‘The underdeveloped state in tropical Africa: Political clientelism or 
neopatrimonialism?’ In: Clapham, C., ed., Private patronage and public power (London, 1982). 
19  However, even the approaches of development cooperation that do not directly deal with the state, 
such as humanitarian aid or direct poverty alleviation, still depend on state authority to operate. 
Taxation and the issuing of permits offer states instruments for control and possibilities for generating 
resources both directly and indirectly.  
20  Many works have been published dealing with the shift in approaches to delivering aid. Examples 
include Groves, L. & R. Hinton, eds, Inclusive aid (London, 2004) and L. Schulpen, ed., Hulp in ont-
wikkeling (Assen, 2001). 
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public sector, such as civil service reforms, have booked less progress and have 
stretched over the better part of two decades.21  
Nicholas Van de Walle attributes what he calls the ‘syndrome of partial reform’ to 
the fact that neo-patrimonial elites have instrumentalised the reform process for 
patrimonial interests.22 They are locked into a macabre dance with donors in which they 
occasionally placate donors with reformist gestures to keep aid flowing.23 Meanwhile, 
they keep a stranglehold on power by feeding their patronage systems and outman-
oeuvring and silencing potential competition.24 Another reason that donor-driven reform 
programmes have been only partially successful at best, can be attributed to the design 
of these reform packages. SAPs have been broadly criticised for being donor-driven, 
dogmatic, one-size-fits-all blueprint prescriptions for reform, aimed at a narrow policy 
objective: Shaping up public finances and ending unsustainable debt accumulation.25  
Indicative of the flaws of reform programmes is the incremental readjustment and 
redesign of such programmes in response to experienced shortcomings and critiques 
from many sides. As such, SAPs have towards the end of the twentieth century been 
replaced by country-specific strategies linked to poverty-reduction strategy papers or 
national development plans. The discourse accompanying this altered approach is one of 
government ownership, civil society participation, and donor harmonisation.26 In large 
part, this is a change in discourse, which raises the question to what extent this changed 
discourse is reflected by altered practice. Cynically, one could ask if it is any more than 
‘old wine in new bottles’.27 What is perhaps more relevant for this dissertation is that 
the aid approaches associated with aligning to country-led development strategies and 
country systems presume political will on the part of recipient government to reduce 
poverty and strengthen democracy and the rule of law. In fact, such political will is seen 
as a prerequisite for effective development cooperation.28 However, if one takes the 
conclusion to its extreme – that neo-patrimonial African states are not developmental, as 
argued by Chabal & Daloz and others – it poses a serious contradiction in view of this 
assumption of political will.  
                                                 
21  Kiragu, K., ‘Improving service delivery through public service reform: Lessons of experience from 
select Sub-Saharan Africa countries’; paper presented at the Second Meeting of the DAC Network on 
Good Governance and Capacity Development (Paris, 2002); Van de Walle, N., African economies and 
the politics of permanent crisis 1979-1999 (Cambridge, 2001). 
22  Van de Walle, African, 60-63. 
23  Kanbur, R., Aid, conditionality and debt in Africa in foreign aid and development: Lessons learnt and 
directions for the future (London, 2000). 
24  Hibou, B., ‘The ‘social capital’ of the state as an agent of deception’. In: Bayart, J.F., S. Ellis & B. 
Hibou, eds, Criminalization of the state in Africa (Oxford, 1999); Chabal & Daloz, Africa works.  
25  See for instance, A. Olukoshi, ‘The elusive prince of Denmark: Structural adjustment and the crisis of 
governance in Africa’. In: Mkandawire T. & C. Soludo, eds, African voices on structural adjustment 
(Dakar, 2003); J. Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents (New York, 2002). 
26  A series of conferences and high-level forums were held in Monterrey (2002), Rome (2003), Paris 
(2005), and Accra (2008), which progressively codified this new discourse at the international level 
and translated it into measurable agreements.  
27  Or worse: Seshamani, V., ‘The same old wine in the same old bottle? Content, process and donor con-
ditionalities of the PRSP’; paper presented during conference on ‘Political Dimensions of Poverty 
Reduction – the Case of Zambia’ (Lusaka 2005). 
28  This was, for instance, the case in Dutch development policy in the early 2000s, in which ‘a certain 
measure of good governance’ including political will was considered a prerequisite for effective aid 
delivery. See: Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation, Aan elkaar verplicht (‘Mutual 
Interests, Mutual Responsibilities’) (The Hague, 2003), 19. 
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The inconvenient – for donors – notion that the interests of recipient governments 
might not align with the professed objectives of poverty reduction and good governance 
spurred at least sections of some aid agencies to take the political reality29 into account 
in the preparations of their development strategies.30 Initially, many developmental 
analyses had only touched on the issue of neo-patrimonialism and patrimonial practices 
incidentally. The focus of these analyses was on positive notions of capacity and ac-
countability, while patronage and corruption were seen as system failures or external-
context factors.31 This could be explained by the fact that a frank assessment of the 
political context of developing countries is an extremely sensitive issue, and it would be 
tantamount to accusing partner governments of condoning illicit and illegal behaviour. 
Also it would be tantamount to admitting the likelihood that aid monies may be diverted 
by corrupt officials, which could undermine donors’ legitimacy among their domestic 
constituencies. Nevertheless, from about 2004 onwards the notion of neo-patrimonial 
states figured more and more prominently in various analyses; however, owing to their 
inconvenient conclusions, for donors and recipients, they rarely entered the public realm 
but rather continued to be circulated by bureaucrats on a ‘for your eyes only’ basis.32  
This dissertation is a response to this increasing problematisation of the African state 
and donors’ increasing concern for governance. It was conceived as part of a research 
programme aimed at straddling the gap between policy and research in the field of 
development cooperation focussed on the African state. This study will use the neo-
patrimonial paradigm as an entry point for its analysis and will attempt to reconcile this 
paradigm with an empirical case, that of the Zambian health sector. In doing so, it will 
at the same time follow donors’ shifting approach to engaging with government. How 
do they (within the confines of the chosen case) react to partial reform and to cases of 
grand corruption?  
Theoretical framework 
The next section will present the theoretical framework for this thesis. First this dis-
sertation will be grounded in the tradition of studying and theorising the African state, 
originating from the nebulous, heterogeneous, multi-disciplinary field of African Stu-
                                                 
29  Which in analyses derived from the field of economics – often via the sub-discipline of New Insti-
tutional Economics – is often referred to as the political-economy.  
30  For an overview of the various governance assessments used by various donors, see: 
www.oecd.org/dac/governance/govassessment (accessed July 2010). 
31  Examples of such analyses and approaches are the World Development Report 2004 of the World 
Bank, titled ‘Making services work for the poor’, and a series of analyses performed by the European 
Centre for Development Policy Management on capacity development.  
32  Examples include Saasa, O.S. & N. Simutanyi, Zambia, Power and change analysis, commissioned 
by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Lusaka, 2007); Taylor, S. & N. Simutanyi, 
Governance and political economy constraints to World Bank CAS priorities in Zambia: A diagnostic, 
commissioned by the World Bank (Lusaka, 2007); Thompson et al., Zambia Country Programme 
Evaluation, commissioned by NORAD (Oxford, 2008); Duncan, A., H. Macmillan & N. Simutanyi, 
Zambia: Drivers of pro-poor change. An overview, commissioned by DFID (Oxford, 2003); Booth, D. 
et al., Drivers of change and development in Malawi, commissioned by DFID (London, 2006). It 
should be noted, however, that the Drivers of change analyses get published online. However, the 




dies.33 In very broad strokes we will follow the evolving debate on the African state, 
which has its roots in the Africanist tradition of the colonial era. Subsequently, this 
section will reflect on the neo-patrimonial paradigm which has gained prominence in 
the analysis and description of the workings of the African state. The decision to pursue 
this neo-patrimonial paradigm in our study is, however, based on a resolution not to be 
drawn into the cynical strain of theorising that exaggerates the patrimonial side of the 
neo-patrimonial coin and prophesises stagnation and decline. Having introduced the 
neo-patrimonial paradigm, an attempt will be made to operationalise the paradigm by 
describing the behaviours that distinguish the neo-patrimonial continuum along the axis 
from rational-legalism to patrimonialism. This will, however, be done with the under-
standing that this is a gross simplification of a complex reality.  
Finally, a few more steps must be taken in order to complete our conceptual frame-
work and prepare the notion of neo-patrimonialism for an encounter with an empirical 
research object. The neo-patrimonial paradigm is a macro-level theory, yet it makes 
assumptions about human behaviour. Moreover, it is people who at a micro-level shape 
and renegotiate the state through their words and actions. Therefore, to conclude our 
theoretical framework, we will zoom in on the human factor and use sociological 
theories to prepare neo-patrimonial theory for empirical analysis, not just in the national 
political arena but also at the shop-floor level. In doing so, we will also focus on the 
notions of discourse and practice which form the media through which people shape the 
state and society. At the same time, these notions of discourse and practice generate the 
fuzzy data on which our imperfect understanding of the Zambian health sector will be 
based.  
 
The state in Africa 
Research on the state in Africa hails from a tradition that has been developed since the 
first ethnographers tried to fathom Africa. As the Orientalist in the ‘East’, the Africanist 
has tried to unlock the mysteries of the ‘dark continent’. Understanding of exotic people 
and societies aided the forces of imperialism and (neo-)colonialism in their subjugation 
of the non-Western world.34 This has been, and too often still is, a tradition of the 
outsider looking in. Focus and scope are thus by definition limited. Moreover, as the 
observant outsider possesses a frame of reference influenced by ideology, societal 
values, and scientific discipline, this Africanist tradition is coloured by shifting shades 
of perspective.35 However, starting from ethnography, various disciplines have con-
tributed to the study of African societies and states. This tradition thus offers a toolbox 
of concepts, perspectives, and paradigms that has undergone constant refinement, re-
plenishment, and adaptation. In this thesis a constant effort will be made to approach the 
subject with optimal objectivity, repeatedly checking assumptions. However, it would 
                                                 
33  For a reflection on the Dutch tradition of Africa Studies, see L. J. de Haan, ‘Perspectives on African 
studies and development in sub-Saharan Africa’. Africa Spectrum, 45: 1 (2010), 95-116. 
34  In Saïd, E., Orientalism (New York, 1978); Saïd argues how the ‘Occident’ creates an image of the 
‘Orient’ out of a prejudicial and racist perspective. Bayart similarly approaches the Africanist tradition 
– from which he hails, but from which he tries to emancipate himself – in Bayart, African State, 1.  
35  Over the years, African scholars have been making increasingly significant contributions to this body 
of literature, both by their critique of Africanist perspectives (see for instance, Mamdani, M., Citizen 
and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism (Oxford, 1996)) and by their re-
search and analysis.  
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be vain not to acknowledge the fact that this thesis is also one of an outsider looking in 
and thus partly tainted by ideological, paradigmatic, and normative perspectives. 
In the Cold War period, Africanist research was heavily influenced by the com-
petition between the ideological perspectives of modernisation and dependency. Mod-
ernisation attempted to understand human progress. Dependency theory drew attention 
to the constraints to progress emanating from external forces and the inequitable power 
structure of society. These perspectives have over time been confronted with criticism 
as they reflected only part of reality. Moreover, as with all paradigms, they were often 
employed too dogmatically. Modernisation often assumes a linearity of processes and a 
mechanistic character of human interaction. Dependency, on the other hand, assumes 
devious oppression and subjugation of the weak by outside forces, thus under-appre-
ciating the agency of Africans and their institutions.  
Subsequent theorising reflects emancipation from this past. Bayart moved beyond the 
‘paradigm of the yoke’, which has dominated dependency theory, by emphasising 
African agency and its rationality. He also demonstrated that Africa and its state have 
their own historicity, in all its dynamism and pluriformity. The state is not static but a 
product of its own evolution over the longue durée.36 Mamdani, however, warns against 
the use of the theme of agency as a straightjacket. Stretching African agency too far out 
from under historical constraints would be tantamount to perversely describing ‘modern 
imperialism … as the outcome of African initiative’.37 
In Criminalisation of the State in Africa, Bayart, together with Ellis and Hibou, 
shone light on the underbelly of the African state.38 The book set forth the author’s 
argument that criminality is an integral aspect of African society. It brought to light how 
contemporary kinship relations give certain groups of Africans a competitive advantage 
within international crime circuits. The authors also illustrated the instrumentalisation of 
aid and reform for personal objectives. In short, they focussed on aspects of African 
reality that most practitioners, policymakers, and politicians have long preferred to 
ignore. However, there is no use in denying that the hidden and the ugly are an integral 
part of any reality. Bayart, Ellis & Hibou, however, went further than merely high-
lighting an aspect of reality: They suggest that Africa is ‘returning to Joseph Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness’.39  
With their arguments on the informalisation of politics and instrumentalisation of 
disorder, Chabal & Daloz, subsequently, have had a profound influence on thinking on 
and policy towards Africa. In Africa works, they convincingly challenge the simplistic 
assumptions of modernisation and developmentalism that underlie much of the theory 
and practice of the development industry.40 They describe how elites use violence and 
chaos and instrumentalise the state civil society, laws, and religion for their own inte-
rests and those of their clientele. As such, they highlight a real and endogenous aspect 
of African politics that has too often been ignored or, at best, reluctantly taken as an 
exogenous variable to be accommodated in developmentalist equations. Notwithstand-
                                                 
36  Bayart, The State, 2; 270. 
37  Mamdani, Citizen,10. 
38  Bayart, Ellis & Hibou, Criminalization. 
39  See, for critical reviews Wiseman, J.A., ‘Book review: Africa works: The political instrumentalization 
of disorder, the criminalization of the state in Africa’. In: The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37: 
3 (1999), 560; Martin, G., ‘Book reviews’ in Africa today, 47: 3/4 (2000), 177-181; Reno, W., ‘Book 
review: Africa works: The political instrumentalization of disorder, the criminalization of the state in 
Africa’. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 38: 1 (2003), 90. 
40  Chabal & Daloz, Africa. 
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ing the merits of their contribution, Chabal & Daloz reduce the complexity of the 
African reality41 to a mere analytical abstraction. What they consider the perennial core 
of contemporary African politics is arguably merely an important aspect of reality. 
Daloz & Chabal present their book as an innovative break with the ‘existing intellectual 
sloth’ of past thinking on Africa and Africa works has been received in various policy-
making circles as a breakthrough in understanding Africa.42 Critics in academic circles, 
however, fail to be convinced of the innovativeness of this approach, placing it squarely 
in the orthodoxy of the neo-patrimonial paradigm.43  
An alternative view on the woes of the African state is what Erdmann and Engel 
describe as the ‘radical political economy school’,44 or what Osaghae calls the ‘second 
liberation school’.45 From this perspective, the neo-patrimonial paradigm is part of the 
neo-liberal project pushed by the Bretton Woods institutions, used to explain why 
Western interventions in Africa have not worked. The reasons for the failing or even 
failure of both democracy and the developmental role of the state are rather sought in 
external factors than in the assumption that the ‘pathologies of the state are originally or 
even naturally African’.46 It is argued that the authoritarian and anti-democratic nature 
of African states is a remnant of their colonial past as a tool of exploitation and 
oppression,47 a nature which was subsequently reinforced by Cold War machinations. 
The scarcity of developmental states48 in Africa is in part attributed to the onslaught on 
the state by structural adjustment, combined with a global capitalist system that is 
essentially skewed to Africa’s detriment. What is needed, it is argued, is a second 
liberation and an appropriation of the state by popular forces rather than an externally 
oriented elite.49 
As we shall see later, this dissertation will attempt to contribute to the literature on 
the African state by making a case study of one specific state, Zambia, and trying to do 
justice to its own historicity in all its dynamism and pluriformity. However, a con-
ceptual framework is required to guide this endeavour – not to predetermine the 
narratives and analysis that will be presented in this dissertation, but rather to find a 
language to describe and attempt to understand the Zambian state in all its complexity. 
Let us now move to the neo-patrimonial paradigm to explore some of the concepts that 
will allow us to do so. 
 
The neo-patrimonial paradigm 
Patrimonialism is a term that is derived from the works of Max Weber, who laid much 
of the foundations of modern scientific thinking on the state. The term and its relevance 
                                                 
41  And, admittedly, much of the elaborate preceding research and literature on this field. 
42  As evidenced by the manner in which Dutch policy maker Van der Veen picks up this Afro-pessi-
mistic theme in What went wrong with Africa and strong people, weak states: Dutch policy on Sub-
Saharan Africa for the long term, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003.  
43  Refer to the earlier footnote listing critical reviews.  
44  Erdmann, G. & U. Engel, ‘Neopatrimonialism revisited – beyond a catch-all concept’. Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, 45: 1 (2007), 95-119. 
45  Osaghae, E.E., ‘The state of Africa’s second liberation’. Interventions 7: 1 (2005). 
46  Ibid. 
47  See, for instance, Mamdani, Citizen, 285-287. 
48  Mkandawire argues that these states have indeed historically existed and presently exist on the conti-
nent. T. Mkandawire, ‘Thinking about developmental states in Africa’. Cambridge Journal of Eco-
nomics, 25 (2001), 289-314. 
49  Osaghae, ‘The state’. 
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for the study of the African state has been much criticised and discarded by many 
analysts,50 but it has been staunchly defended and refined by Jean François Médard 
throughout his career51 and has played a major role in the analyses of Michael Bratton 
and Nicholas van de Walle.52 Originally, the term denoted a phase in the unilinear 
model of the development of the state from the patriarchal household, through patri-
monialism (and sultanism) and feudalism, and towards the ideal-typical modern ra-
tional-legal state. Gradually, however, it has come to be used as a factor or a logic 
observable in all real-life political systems, to greater or lesser degree.53 It is fair to 
argue that patrimonialism and its constituent practices, such as patronage, cronyism, 
nepotism, and corruption, are also present in so-called developed societies. However, 
one could argue that in such settings it is more checked and constrained by the formal 
and informal institutions that these states have developed over generations than it is in 
the relatively young states of Africa.54 
Patrimonialism is characterised by the personalisation of power. Authority is attri-
buted to an officeholder rather than the office he holds. Furthermore, authority is main-
tained through personal patronage rather than through ideology or law. This leads to 
confusion between the public and private spheres. Daloz & Chabal (1999) argue that in 
most African countries the state is not emancipated from society. The logic and practice 
of the personalisation of power imbues a system with a certain measure of subjectivity, 
changeability, and unpredictability. This logic thus contradicts the objectivity and pre-
dictability characterising the principles of the rule of law and limits the effectiveness of 
a bureaucracy.55 
The prefix ‘neo’ is used by Médard in conjunction with patrimonialism to distinguish 
between the ‘ideal type and a mixed type of patrimonialism’. He refers to a neo-
patrimonial state as a ‘kind of hybrid of patrimonialism and bureaucracy’. This hybrid 
results from either a ‘resurgence of an ancient phenomenon or a simple transition be-
tween patrimonialism and modern conceptions of the state’.56 Erdmann and Engel57 
criticise various authors such as Daloz and Chabal for over-emphasising patrimonialism 
rather than neo-patrimonialism. This denies the importance of the rational-legal aspects 
of African bureaucracies. Although in practice the distinction between public and priv-
ate spheres is not always observed, formally the distinction is made. In fact, in public 
rhetoric, African leaders often emphasise the rule of law and the value of consti-
                                                 
50  This includes even those analysts who point out similar patterns, factors, and aspects of the African 
state that could be referred to as patrimonialist, such as Bayart, The State. 
51  Médard, ‘The underdeveloped state’, and J.F. Médard, ‘Patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism and the 
study of the postcolonial state in Sub-Saharan Africa’. In: Marcussen, H.S., ed., Improved natural re-
source management – the role of formal organisations and informal networks and institutions (Ros-
kilde 1996), 76-97. 
52  Bratton, M. & N. van de Walle, ‘Neopatrimonal regimes and political transitions in Africa.’ World 
Politics, 46: 4 (1994), 453-489; and Bratton, M. & N. van de Walle, Democratic experiments in Africa 
(Cambridge, 1997). 
53  Brinkerhoff, D.W. & A.A. Goldsmith, Clientalism, patrimonialism and democratic governance: An 
overview and framework for assessment and programming (Cambridge, 2002), Médard, The under-
developed state, and Bratton & Van de Walle, ‘Neopatrimonal regimes’. 
54  The fact that patrimonial behaviours may be checked and constrained by formal and informal insti-
tutions does not prevent such behaviours from being adapted to the institutional setting to allow actors 
to seize privately profitable opportunities.  
55  Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, Clientalism. 
56  Médard, ‘Patrimonialism’. 
57  Erdmann & Engel, ‘Neopatrimonialism’. 
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tutionality, as evidenced by, for example, the importance placed on constitutional 
debates in countries such as Kenya and Zambia. The essence of neo-patrimonialism is 
thus that it captures the dualistic nature of African states and societies in which two 
interwoven logics – a patrimonial logic and a rational-legal logic – co-exist, compete, 
and interact.  
Bratton and Van de Walle, in their comparative analysis of the political changes that 
swept through Africa in the early 1990s, rely on the notion of neo-patrimonialism to 
characterise specific regimes.58 The focus in this analysis is the transition of various 
types of neo-patrimonial regimes towards democratic governance. The difficulty in 
thinking in terms of transition from certain regime types towards an a-historical 
idealised end-state of democracy, modernity, and rational-legal bureaucracy is that it 
presupposes a unilinear process and masks the continuities evidenced in real-life 
processes of change. Mahmood Mamdani (1995) severely criticised most Africanist 
research of the African state he encountered for its unilinear evolutionary perspective. 
Developments in Africa are often discussed in analogy with idealised and romanticised 
epochs in European history. He condemns most Africanists for implying ‘that African 
reality has meaning only so far as it reflects a particular stage in the development of 
[European) history’. This practice of attributing universal validity to specific European 
historical experiences is blatant Eurocentrism.59 From such a perspective, any deviation 
from this expected unilinear process is denoted as a pathological dysfunctionality and is 
rejected as incomplete democracy or state failure. 
Most concepts from social science are relative and fluid, even though people tend to 
use them with a sense of absolutism. In the tradition of modern scientific thought,60 
dichotomies are popular models for representing perceived reality. A dichotomy poses 
one concept as opposite to another: One universal, one residual.61 The shortcoming of 
dichotomies, however, is the implicit assumption of exclusivity. One tends to employ 
them as either one or the other, black or white. In human reality things are rarely so 
absolute. Some scholars such as Mamdani and Olukoshi rightly criticise the rigid use of 
dichotomisations, arguing that in real-life situations in Africa62 various categories ‘inter-
penetrate one another in an organic relationship that is at once complementary and con-
tradictory’.63 Actors, organisations, and practices thus possess many facets and aspects. 
They can even possess the seemingly contradictory, opposing aspects of a dichotomy. 
Paradoxically, one can be both good and bad, happy and sad, modern and traditional. 
This is the strength of the concept of neo-patrimonialism, as it represents exactly this 
greyness, this dualism of (African) reality.64 
On the other hand, as most things are relative, concepts are shaped by their context. 
Concepts are not only defined by describing what they are but also by what they are not. 
Dichotomies are useful in that they provide the counterpoint to a concept. This offers 
contrast and contours to a concept and allows for comparison. It could be argued that 
patrimonialism merits its applicability as a concept to its being essentially a reflexive 
                                                 
58  Bratton & Van de Walle, Democratic experiments. 
59  Mamdani, Citizen, 12. 
60  Some would add the adjective ‘Western’, although this label would merit much discussion or dispute.  
61  Mamdani, Citizen, 9. 
62  Although one can rightly argue that this applies to human reality everywhere. 
63  Olukoshi, ‘The elusive prince’, 241. 
64  The argument here reflects the reconceptualisation that Giddens makes of dualisms or oppositions into 
dualities. In particular, Giddens reconceptualised the dualism of the individual and society into the 
duality of structure and agency (Giddens, A., The constitution of society (Berkley, 1984)). 
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term or counterpoint itself. Olukoshi argues that neo-patrimonialism65 is abused to ex-
plain why policy objectives (usually those of donors) such as structural adjustment or 
democratic reforms have not been achieved as planned. Anders places the concept of 
patrimonialism within a socio-pathological paradigm that risks stereotypically present-
ing ‘African bureaucracies and bureaucrats as pathological deviations from the Web-
erian ideal-type of Western rational-legal bureaucratic order’. It could be thus argued 
that patrimonialism is useful insofar as it describes that which does not fit with or 
detracts from the idealised rational-legal ideal of bureaucracy or the state. Is patri-
monialism thus merely ‘not rational-legal’? How, within a neo-patrimonial setting, do 
rational-legal logic and patrimonial logic relate? 
 
 
Table 1.1  Continuum of administrative systems 
Neo-patrimonial        
 
Rational-legal bureaucratic 
Administrators are recruited and promoted as 
reward for personal connection with personal 
leaders 
 Administrators are recruited and promoted in 
competitive processes that judge their merit 
and expertise 
Administrators can be dismissed for no reason  Administrators can only be dismissed with 
cause 
There is an unspoken hierarchy with an unclear 
division of labour, little specialisation of output, 
and uncertain reporting channels 
 There is an authorised hierarchy with a clear 
division of labour, specific standards for 
output, and well-defined reporting channels 
Important orders may be given orally  Important orders are put in writing 
Administrators supplement their salary with 
bribes and kickbacks 
 Administrators are prohibited from 
supplementing their salary 
System is decentralised allowing wide 
discretion on the job 
 System is centralised with little room for 
discretion on the job 
Administrators’ actions are arbitrary, based on 
subjective reasoning, and follow ad hoc 
procedures 
 Administrators’ actions are predictable, 
based on objective methods, and follow 
uniform procedures 
Rules are applied with partiality, and some 
citizens get preferential treatment 
 Rules are applied with neutrality, and all 
citizens get equal treatment 
Verbal agreements are used in government 
procurement and sales 
 Binding legal contracts are used in 
government procurement and sales 
Internal controls are lax  Internal controls are strict 
Documentation is spotty, with sensitive matters 
left off the books 
 Thorough records are maintained and 
regularly audited 
Subjects have little recourse for poor service  Citizens have appeal channels if given poor 
service 
Source: Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith (2002) 
 
 
Nicholas van de Walle argues that ‘the rational-legal order can be thought of a public 
good on which (neo)patrimonial interests attempt to free-ride’. The formal rules in a 
neo-patrimonial setting, which are in general observed, create possibilities for personal 
gain through corruption and rent-seeking. This patrimonial instrumentalisation of 
rational-legal order has its limits, however, as ‘excessive free-riding destroys the public 
                                                 




good’.66 This perspective illustrates the inter-linkage between rational-legal logic and 
patrimonial logic. It presents patrimonial practice within a neo-patrimonial setting as 
dependent on more or less effective rational-legal systems. This backs up the critique of 
Erdmann and Engel of authors such as Daloz and Chabal not to ‘minimise the legal-
rational bureaucratic aspect and push the concept (of neo-patrimonialism) too far to-
wards patrimonialism’. Bureaucracy in neo-patrimonial settings is thus ‘more than a 
rational-legal façade’; it is a formal system that is penetrated by informal personal 
relations67 evidenced by patrimonial practice which follows patrimonial logic. 
To further operationalise neo-patrimonialism, it might be useful to disaggregate 
patrimonial and rational-legal aspects of reality. In the table above, Brinkerhoff and 
Goldsmith focus on various aspects of administrative systems. It is, however, important 
to note that these represent idealised situations. The difficulty with this idealised re-
presentation of neo-patrimonial versus more rational-legal bureaucratic systems is the 
problematic distinction between the formal and the informal. On the one hand, a 
bureaucracy might be formally structured along lines reflecting a rational-legal system, 
but this says nothing about how and whether such formal rules are observed. And as 
was argued above, the essence of neo-patrimonialism is that informal politics invade 
formal institutions. In addition, formal rules are used either as tools for particularistic 
interests or as a refuge for competing clientalistic demands,68 as formal rules are often 
applied and enforced in an ad hoc manner. The challenge in analysing neo-patrimo-
nialism is thus to take account of actual practice and behaviour rather than merely 
formal rules of discourse. 
Different authors use the concept of neo-patrimonialism in describing different 
aspects of the state. Bratton & Van de Walle focus specifically on the political arena 
when describing processes of democratisation. Other authors discuss patrimonialism 
within the context of bureaucracy or administration. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith make a 
distinction between politics and administration, linking the former to clientalism and 
explicitly reserving the use of patrimonialism for the context of administration. As 
counterpoints to clientalism and patrimonialism, they use democratic governance and 
rational-legal bureaucracy respectively. Erdmann and Engel, on the other hand, con-
ceptualise the notion of clientalism together with patronage as part of neo-patrimo-
nialism. Clientalism refers to a personal relationship between a patron and a client in 
which individual goods or favours such as jobs, promotions, or possibilities to attend 
workshops are exchanged for support. The essence of clientalism is, however, the 
asymmetry of this relationship in terms of power. Clientalism is arguably not delimited 
to the political arena. Rather, clientalist networks permeate society and thus also enter 
bureaucracy.  
In Erdmann and Engel’s theorisation, patronage refers more to the distribution of 
collective benefits by members of the elite in exchange for collective support. Erdmann 
and Engel explicitly differentiate between patronage and clientalism on the basis of 
whether an exchange relationship is collective or individual respectively. However, this 
distinction is not always made, leading to some confusion in common use. The benefits 
often associated with patronage include the distribution of goods – public and private – 
such as free public services, ‘no-show’ jobs, vehicles, food, and campaign goodies. In 
contemporary Africa this distributive behaviour can be witnessed in electoral cam-
                                                 
66  Van de Walle, African Economies, 128. 
67  Erdmann & Engel, ‘Neopatrimonialism’.  
68  Ibid.  
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paigns, either referring to the handing out of food, cash, fertiliser, or clothing or to the 
targeting of development projects to electorally strategic areas – what Brinkerhoff & 
Goldsmith refer to as ‘pork barrel spending’.69  
Another issue often associated with patronage is the control of the distribution of 
positions, as an instrument of power. This behaviour does not reflect the collective/-
individual distinction per se referred to above. It can refer to the placing of a client in a 
particular position or to expecting loyalty and clients’ services from those placed in 
return for the placement. Those who are critical, indiscreet, or disloyal risk losing their 
jobs. This means, in a neo-patrimonial setting, that formal human resources’ policy can 
be instrumentalised for controlling a network of power.  
This distributive behaviour of positions echoes the term ‘prebendalism’, for which 
Richard Joseph is often referred to. Prebends are benefits that come with a position 
besides a salary, such as commissions or kickbacks for functions such as awarding 
procurement contracts or delivering services, or the possibility to benefit from a client 
network. Joseph describes the use of prebendal offices:  
To obtain and keep clients, one must gain a prebendal office; and to be sure that in the distribution of 
prebendal offices an individual and his kin have a reasonable chance of procuring one, clients must be 
gathered together to make their collective claims as well as to prove that the aspirant patron (or po-
tential holder of prebendal office) is a person of consequence whose cooptation would be rewarding to 
the political entrepreneur.70 
From this perspective a bureaucracy could be seen as a hierarchical network of 
prebendal offices, linking patrons or ‘big men’ to clients outside the system through 
sub-patrons and middlemen.  
‘Corruption’ is also a term that is closely associated with patrimonialist logic. 
Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain, thus reflecting the confusion between the public and private spheres in the 
(neo-)patrimonial paradigm. This definition thus makes a clear distinction between the 
public and private. This definition lacks precision in that it does not refer to the formal 
legality or the informal acceptance of a corrupt practice. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, on 
the other hand, do explicitly state that ‘corrupt methods break the law or firmly estab-
lished custom’.71 This reflects the highly normative character of corruption as a popular 
concept. Meanwhile, however, the usage of corruption becomes subjective and reflects 
the confusion between the formal and the informal. This complexity makes questions 
about what constitutes corruption especially interesting as questions about social accept-
ance of what is perceived to be corrupt practice. 
Rent-seeking is a term derived from economics to describe a type of behaviour 
linked to the neo-patrimonial paradigm. It reflects the capture of economic benefits 
flowing from a sub-optimal market situation caused by government regulations and 
other institutions. It often implies the creation of monopoly positions, thus blocking 
competition and creating huge profits for businessmen, who are usually tied up with 
politics or are prebendal officeholders themselves. Rent-seeking need not be illegal per 
se, as it is usually formal legal frameworks that allow for rent-seeking opportunities. 
Nevertheless, explicitly illegal and corrupt practices can accompany rent-seeking – for 
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instance, in terms of bribing legislators and policy makers to shape these legal frame-
works to the businessman’s advantage.  
As we saw above, the concepts of patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism are con-
tentious. As elastic concepts, they may lack the precision some analysts aspire to. At the 
same time, they contribute to a conceptual framework that gives a place to some of the 
behaviours that have too often been left out of analyses or narratives set in the context 
of an African state. The concept neo-patrimonial will be used to refer to a context in 
which rational-legal logic is strongly influenced or subverted by other competing logics. 
These ‘other’ logics may be referred to as patrimonial. The difficulty here is that the 
rationale of the actors involved is difficult for an outsider to determine. If a clerk 
conveniently overlooks a procedure, does he do that to help another in view of a favour 
in return, to serve his political master, or simply to make life easier? Labelling this as 
patrimonial will thus be imprecise. If such labelling of behaviour is done in this dis-
sertation, it will thus be with some reluctance. As an alternative, the notion of instru-
mentalisation will often be used. This forgoes implicit labelling of the motives driving 
an actor’s behaviour. At the same time, as the aim of this dissertation is to confront the 
neo-patrimonial paradigm with an empirical case, it will not be possible to avoid 
analysing empirical data in the language of neo-patrimonialism.  
Having surveyed contending viewpoints for a frame of reference set by the neo-
patrimonial paradigm, it would be useful to determine the scope for this research. To 
what level will the lens of neo-patrimonialism that we have crudely constructed be 
zoomed? So as to gain understanding, scope must be delimited to allow us to access a 
certain subject matter. In this thesis we will follow the neo-patrimonial perspective 
while zooming in on the human factor. 
 
Zooming into the human factor 
In the preceding section, we have discussed the neo-patrimonial paradigm at a very 
broad and general level, as is usual in the literature framing this paradigm. The debate 
on neo-patrimonialism and the analysis of neo-patrimonialism often take place at a 
meta- or macro-level and employ a structuralist focus on regimes or the state at large.72 
The risk of such theorisation at the macro-level is that one may end up suggesting stasis 
and determinism, and neo-patrimonialism may, paradoxically, be conceptually con-
strued as a similar ‘yoke’ to the one Bayart considered dependency theory to be. We 
thus need to move beyond macro-level discussions and give due attention to the agency 
of the individuals shaping the reality this research aims to study. Are they caught in the 
straight-jackets of tradition, convention, and static political and cultural patterns, or is 
there room to make autonomous decisions that have the potential to change the system? 
Gerhard Anders in his analysis of civil servants in Malawi takes a distinctly micro-
approach to analysing issues of governance. While he is cognisant of the neo-patri-
monial paradigm, he prefers to work up from ‘the state’s “shop-floor level”’ and civil 
servants’ everyday life, rather than deducting from theoretical concepts at meta- or 
macro-level.73 As this research will attempt to look ‘beyond the façade’, it will be 
necessary to look beyond analysing the state at a macro-level. This dissertation will also 
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move to the shop-floor level, but with the intention to make sense of meta- and macro-
level concepts such as neo-patrimonialism. The neo-patrimonial paradigm makes 
assumptions about agents’ behaviour and how this may undermine rational-legal order. 
Thus, in order to critically examine the neo-patrimonial paradigm in practice, it is 
important to begin with this behaviour; this means zooming into the human factor of the 
state. It is humans who shape, operate, and even subvert the state in their quest for 
power, in their pursuit of public goods, and in their need to create a secure livelihood.  
Sociological and anthropological theory has been shaped by a debate on structure 
versus theory, which has shed light on how people relate to institutional power struc-
tures such as the state. Is it rules, laws, and culture that determine people’s behaviour? 
Or are people free to ignore or even rewrite the rules in practice with their agency. 
There is a general consensus that this structure/agency dichotomy is false, as both 
individuals and institutions matter.74  
A nearly constant dissatisfaction seems to characterise the interaction between in-
dividuals and complex institutional networks such as the state. Citizens are concerned 
the state does not deliver what they voted or paid for. Politicians may be worried that 
their manifestoes and policies do not deliver the expected results. Why is it that the sum 
of people’s actions does not equal the sum of their expectations? The sociologist 
Giddens provides an explanation: Whereas humans are knowledgeable agents, their 
knowledgeability is bound by unconscious, unacknowledged conditions and unintended 
consequences.  
The flow of action continually produces consequences which are unintended by actors, and these un-
intended consequences also may form unacknowledged conditions of action in a feedback fashion. 
Human history is created by intentional activities, but is not an intended project; it persistently eludes 
efforts to bring it under conscious direction. However, such attempts are continually made by human 
beings, who operate under the threat and promise … that they are the only creatures who make their 
history ….75  
This conclusion on humans’ imprecise contribution to their own history resonates with 
concerns in neo-patrimonial literature on partial reform and state failure. The outcome 
of a reform process or a process of state formation can fail to produce the outcome 
intended, as unknown or unacknowledged factors play a role leading to unintended 
consequences. One often unacknowledged factor is that various competing interests are 
at play in shaping such a process. Different actors have different objectives which may 
not overlap with, or may even compete with, formal objectives. A reform process or the 
process of state building is thus an arena in which different actors may compete to 
pursue their interests of accumulating power and assets. From a neo-patrimonial per-
spective, one could label any interests which compete with formal, rational-legal ob-
jectives as patrimonial interests. Alternatively, one draws a distinction between private 
or public interests. In human reality, however, it is difficult to narrow down agents’ 
objectives to fit under one or the other label. Moreover, interests are difficult to observe 
as a social scientist. Pronouncements about actors’ interests can be made only after an 
implicit or explicit analytical process, taking into account what can be observed or 
recorded about agents’ behaviour: Practice and discourse. 
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In order to understand human behaviour within a seemingly elusive structure such as 
the state, anthropologists have taken to study practice and discourse.76 These are factors 
that mediate between structure and agency and form the cultural processes that give 
meaning to the state from the perspective of both those within the state, such as officials 
and health workers, and those outside the state, such as patients and taxpayers.  
Routine and repetitive everyday practices are one of the primary ways in which the 
state is culturally constructed and reproduced.77 Examples of such practices include 
registration and application procedures: Filling out forms, stamping, and forwarding. 
Also included are practices of legislation and parliamentary debate. Of course, such 
practices are not fixed, as agents may have opportunities to deviate from or improvise 
on formal procedures. As such, actors can instrumentalise formal rational-legal proce-
dures in order to create opportunities for private benefit. For instance, in a registration 
procedure, a clerk can frustrate a client by being excessively proceduralistic in the hope 
of a bribe to speed things up. Equally informal practices may be routinely used instead 
of formal procedures, while the formal rules may then be used to cover up or legitimise 
the actor. Whereas it is clear that, as argued before, such a setting can be labelled neo-
patrimonial, labelling behaviour patrimonial is more ambiguous. It is credible that in 
practice bending a few rules need not be patrimonial behaviour, but mere pragmatism. 
Formal rules can be arcane and mutually contradictory, creating a situation which may 
be legal but is neither rational nor logical. Moreover, actors may be likely to hide in-
formal practice behind formal practice because rule-breaking, particularly if done for 
private gain, may be considered illicit. As such, their actual practice lies behind the 
façade of rational-legal acceptability. Beyond the methodological problems this creates 
– which will be addressed later – this means that others have to rely on verbal accounts 
to understand such hidden practice. In short, this means looking at discourse. 
Discourse is the written and oral language that people use to represent their socio-
cultural and institutional context. This refers to stories, rumours, and speeches related 
by people, or the documents, plans, and programmes they write to convey their mes-
sages. For groups, organisations, and networks of people, discourse creates legibility 
and contributes to a common understanding of social practice and the socio-political 
environment. Discursive tools that serve this function include mission statements, myths 
of creation, graphs, plans, and statistical yearbooks. This functionality creates a demand 
for discourse to be reflective of reality. Discourse, however, not only represents reality; 
it is also used as a medium to influence reality. As such, orders, directives, circulars, 
proposals, advisories, policy statements, and strategic plans aim to shape bureaucratic 
and other social practice. 
At the same time, like practice, though perhaps to an even greater extent, people can 
manipulate words to represent ‘reality’ in a way that suits their objectives. People can 
bluff, flatter, or even lie. This need not be malevolent per se. People are cultured to 
follow norms about what one can or cannot say. At the same time, people tend to pursue 
their interests and are thus not inclined to incriminate themselves, as well as the fact that 
they will portray themselves (or a group they belong to) in a better light. Discourse is 
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thus subjective and can be used to hide realities or suggest something is real when it is 
not.  
When applied to the neo-patrimonial paradigm, discourse can thus be seen as an 
important contributor to the notion of the façade. Lip service can be paid to rational-
legal principles and documents, while hidden informal practice gives shape to a whole 
other reality. Furthermore, while the above suggests that rational-legal discourse is a 
bad proxy for reality, patrimonial discourse – accusations of corruption and patronage – 
also cannot be fully trusted to represent reality. As corruption is discursively linked to 
legitimacy, charges of corruption can be used to attack the state and its represent-
atives,78 or alternatively rivals or disloyal clients. Patrimonial discourse is thus instru-
mentalised to negotiate an actor’s or a group’s relations to the state. These comprise, for 
instance, power relations as well as duties and entitlements. This argument on in-
strumentalising patrimonial discourse also has a more general validity: Discourse is 
used by actors not only to represent the message they want to convey about ‘reality’, but 
also to shape reality and renegotiate social, cultural, political, and economic realities – 
albeit in an imprecise manner.  
At a later stage we will discuss what the reflections on discourse and practice above 
will mean for the methodology of this research. Let us now conclude this theorising on 
the human factor by zooming out again and reflecting on what this implies for our 
concept of the state. Focussing on the human factor has shown that the state is ‘a 
multilayered, contradictory, translocal ensemble of institutions, practices and people in 
a globalised context’.79 Through their practice and discourse, ‘actors contribute to the 
reproduction of institutionalised practices, which shapes structure’ – in this case, the 
state. However, this process does not involve a closed system but is linked up to far-
flung connections.80 This process is one of struggle, conflict, and compromise in various 
arenas of negotiation. As such, people write history as an unintended project. This 
history as Giddens cautions, does not have an evolutionary shape.81 Ferguson poses that 
rather than have a linear path, the trajectory of human development with its myriads of 
paths and branches forms a bush.82 Progress and regression are both at play. Based on 
innumerable and context-specific factors, this can either be a withering bush or one 
growing with vigour. From time to time the structural context undergoes seismic shifts 
of institutional change. Examples include the creation of a new state following colonial 
rule, the transition to multi-party politics, or the establishment of a new service delivery 
agency. These ruptures change the arena in which people negotiate the state. While this 
is a new reality to which actors have to adapt, it need not, however, fundamentally alter 
the political and cultural repertoires of discourse and practice which people employ 
within that arena. Thus, while context changes as history unfolds, history may be seen 
to repeat itself.  
Let us now move to the specific context that is the focus of this dissertation, to see 
the arguments proposed above reflected in empirical reality. Let us confront theory with 
an empirical object: The Zambian health sector.  
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Empirical object of study 
Whence and w(h)ither Zambia? 
The decision to focus on Zambia was arbitrary in the sense that practical considerations 
were dominant. As desk officer for Zambia at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, I was in a convenient position for familiarising myself with the political context 
of the country. Moreover, through my contacts with the Netherlands Embassy in 
Lusaka, which had years of experience as a donor in various sectors, I had a convenient 
network and point of access to a sector of the African state. Beyond pragmatics, 
however, there are various arguments to justify the choice to focus on Zambia as a 
setting in which to explore the neo-patrimonial paradigm.  
By 2005 – at which time the decision was made to focus this dissertation on Zambia 
– Zambia did not fit the picture drawn by some of the literature framing the neo-
patrimonial paradigm of a collapsing African state. Rather, Zambia looked as if it was 
emerging from the ‘permanent economic crisis’83 which seemed to have characterised 
the country throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Table 1.2). Following decades in which 
the country’s growth rate fluctuated wildly between negative and positive rates, it 
appeared that Zambia had found a stable path of growth (which has endured up to the 
time of writing). In addition, the inflation rate had come down to around ten per cent 
compared to rates above one hundred per cent in the early 1990s. These results had 
followed generations of structural adjustment programmes, privatisation of the copper 
mines, and a process of conditional debt relief which resulted in relief of 92 per cent of 
Zambia’s international debt. Significantly, the mines had been finally privatised at a 
moment when copper prices were buoyant due to high demand for copper, particularly 
in emerging economies such as China.  
 
 
Table 1.2 Historical growth and inflation rates 
Year: 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
GDP 
growth 6.6 -2.9 -1.1 -1.7 1.2 1.7 1.5 9.3 -3.7 -0.6 
Inflation 14.0 12.5 19.7 20.0 37.4 54.8 47.0 54.0 128.3 109.6 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
GDP  
growth -0.7 2.1 -0.1 -13.3 -2.8 6.9 3.3 -1.9 2.2 3.6 
Inflation 97.7 165.7 183.3 54.6 34.9 43.1 24.4 24.5 26.8 26.1 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GDP  
growth 4.9 3.3 5.1 5.4 5.3 6.2 6.2 5.7 6.4 7.6 
Inflation 21.4 22.2 21.4 18.0 18.3 9.0 10.7 12.4 13.4 8.5 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
 
 
In addition, in the realm of politics Zambia appeared to have been somewhat trans-
formed compared with the authoritarian one-party state of the Kaunda era. Disaffection 
over bread-and-butter issues at the end of the 1980s had contributed to a popular 
movement challenging the political status quo. Changes in the geo-political context – 
the collapse of various authoritarian socialist regimes, tacit support amongst donors for 
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political change, and the illusion of the Kaunda regime that it could defuse political 
unrest by being seen to partially accommodate demands – contributed to a chain of 
events that saw Kaunda lose power in multiparty elections. The electoral victory of the 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), supported by civil society groups and 
activists, led to an opening up of the political space. Not only were political parties and 
civil organisations free to be formed but also media outlets critical of government. In 
fact, a civil society campaign in combination with defections by ruling party politicians 
and donor concerns thwarted an attempt by Kaunda’s successor Chiluba to alter the 
constitutional framework so as to extend his tenure past ten years. Whereas the 1996 
and 2001 elections had been marred by substantive accusations of vote rigging, the 2006 
elections were seen more as an accurate reflection of public opinion. Although Mwa-
nawasa and his party, the MMD, won these elections, they were effectively challenged 
by Michael Sata, who ran a populist campaign based on nationalist-developmental 
issues resonating strongly with the urban population. After the elections, some of the 
policies proposed by Sata were adopted by government.84 This suggests that the multi-
party electoral system provided an arena for debate about policies and the articulation of 
policy alternatives.  
Equally in the area of corruption, it seemed that Zambia had embarked on a new 
trajectory, apparently departing from the logic of impunity for grand corruption char-
acteristic of neo-patrimonial settings. Mwanawasa had apparently been handpicked by 
Chiluba as his successor in the expectation that Chiluba could continue to wield 
influence as party president. Mwanawasa responded to public concerns and donor con-
cerns about grand corruption, which had been widespread under Chiluba. In July 2002, 
Parliament lifted Chiluba’s immunity from prosecution and by the end of 2003 a trail 
began, to indict Chiluba for corruption.  
The images framed above suggest several dramatic shifts in how the Zambian state is 
managed. Indeed, these images are real reflections of the history that Zambia has 
undergone in the 1990s and early 2000s. This could implicitly suggest that Zambia’s 
path of development increasingly reflected rational-legal order rather than patrimonial 
logic. That is, however, not a point that this dissertation can argue, as the above merely 
represents a selective framing of aspects of Zambian history. A closer reading of history 
rather suggests that, whereas seismic shifts have taken place in Zambia’s institutional 
structure, influencing Zambian actors’ political practice and their political discourse, 
there are enduring patterns of behaviour. In other words, Zambian history reflects both 
changes as well as continuities. Within a changed institutional structure, actors have 
adapted existing repertoires of political practice.  
In the early 2000s a number of analyses critically reflected on the political and 
economic reforms of the Chiluba era. Rakner analysed the dual economic and political 
reforms of that period. This analysis clearly presents Zambia’s reform experiences as an 
empirical example of Van de Walle’s syndrome of partial reform. While there was 
considerable convergence between government policies and donor conditionalities, 
Rakner concludes that domestic interest groups were marginalised in these reform 
processes and did not profit from the reforms. Rakner concedes that the foundations for 
a shift from a state-led to a market-oriented economy were laid in this period. Examples 
are the implementation of a cash budget, the establishment of the Zambia Revenue 
Authority, and the abolition of exchange-rate controls. However, while there appeared 
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to be a genuine commitment to stabilisation, there was little commitment to structural 
public service reforms, and the liberalisation of the mines suffered from procrasti-
nation.85 In the political realm, Rakner built on other analyses, which stated that due to 
enduring patterns of formal institutions and informal practice and their influence on 
political behaviour, there were significant continuities between Chiluba’s tenure and the 
past.86 Examples of such continuities are the role of presidentialism in the Zambian 
context and the pressure to form a maximum coalition to hold onto or to gain power. 
One effect of these continuities was that the MMD formed a dominant party system 
with striking similarities to the UNIP one-party system.      
These continuities provide arguments for other analysts to stick the neo-patrimonial 
label on Zambia. One of the first robust ‘neo-patrimonial’ analyses focussing speci-
fically on Zambia, by Erdmann and Simutanyi, declared Zambia a ‘hybrid regime’. 
They argued the persistence of neo-patrimonial rule was a constraint to the ‘permanent 
institutionalisation and consolidation of democracy’, despite the transition Zambia had 
undergone. They questioned whether Mwanawasa’s ‘new deal’ government would be 
able to dismantle the predominant pattern of politics with its anti-corruption drive. They 
argued that this would be inconsistent with the logic of forming a maximum coalition, a 
logic central to Zambian politics, pointing out that the political elites have been so-
cialised in a neo-patrimonial setting. Going further, Erdmann and Simutanyi even asked 
whether the prosecution of Chiluba may even have been a tool in a neo-patrimonial 
power struggle.87 Politicians implicated in corruption from the Chiluba era, such as 
Vernon Mwaanga, Katele Kalumba, and Michael Mabenga were retained or rehabili-
tated by Mwanawasa, suggesting selective application of the law.88 Another analyst 
using the neo-patrimonial frame of thought saw Mwanawasa employing patrimonial 
strategies such as patronage in his attempts to broaden his power base by co-opting 
opposition politicians into his cabinet and broadening his power base beyond Chiluba’s 
Bemba coalition, which had brought him to power.89  
At the same time, however, Mwanawasa’s government was seen to be dismantling 
some institutional tools of Chiluba’s patronage system, such as the presidential 
discretionary ‘slush’ fund and the presidential housing initiative.90 In addition, some 
institutions were seen to perform relatively well in a continued neo-patrimonial context. 
This can be illustrated by the most concrete attempt yet to apply the neo-patrimonial 
paradigm to a concrete case in Zambia. In an analysis of the Zambian Revenue Auth-
ority, Von Soest concurred with the conclusion that neo-patrimonial continuities persist 
in Zambia. This, he argued, was evidenced by the abuse of state resources, the con-
centration of political power, and the awarding of political favours. At the same time, he 
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found that the effectiveness of tax collection had increased. This conflicted with Von 
Soest’s initial hypothesis that neo-patrimonial politics would undermine effective tax 
collection,91 or the broader notion that neo-patrimonialism necessarily undermines the 
efficient operation of institutions.  
Zambia’s recent history thus reflects the contradictions of neo-patrimonialism. In the 
dynamics reflected above, we can see that rational-legal arrangements were strengthen-
ed, and neo-patrimonial arrangements institutionalising patrimonial logic were abolish-
ed. At the same time, however, it can be argued that certain patterns of political practice 
endure, albeit in reshaped institutional structures. However, to add historical depth to 
this context analysis, let us look further back to the origins of the Zambian state, to see 
if we can determine the origins of these enduring patterns or continuities.  
Before colonial times, Zambia as a political entity did not exist.92 The territory which 
is now Zambia has long been populated by a continuum of Bantu peoples, trading and 
settling across what are now Zambia’s frontiers. These peoples, conveniently and im-
precisely labelled by colonial ethnographers as 72 tribes, had experienced various de-
grees of state formation. Some like the Tonga were not organised into hierarchical 
political institutions above the family level. Others had the political office of clan-
chiefs; some like the Bemba had paramount chiefs ruling over numerous clans. In 
Western Province the Lozi had developed a kingdom, based on aristocracy and a proto-
bureaucracy of officials. The Lozi, like other peoples such as the Bemba, held other 
ethnic groupings in tributary dependency. However, it was only under the authority of a 
private British company that these peoples were cast together into a larger political unit.  
The British South Africa Company administered two territories in what is now 
Zambia: North-West Rhodesia and North-East Rhodesia. Here the company pursued 
commercial objectives in areas such as mining and agriculture. In 1911 these were 
merged, and in 1923 Northern Rhodesia became a British Colony under the Colonial 
Office when London did not renew the British South Africa Company’s charter. To 
cover the costs of administration and to mobilise labour, the company taxed the native 
population. Administration was also kept to a minimum by applying a system of 
indirect rule, which was further institutionalised when the Colonial Office took over 
authority in the colony. 
Under indirect rule, chiefs were appointed to lead native authorities. These were not 
always those people who were recognised as leaders by their communities; for some 
groups of people, the institution of chief had not even previously existed. Native 
authorities were supervised by native commissioners (later district commissioners) who, 
besides relying on chiefs, made use of African policemen to enforce their orders. Chiefs 
continued to deal with civil disputes among the population and were seen as inter-
locutors between the native commissioners and the population. They also played a role 
in tax collection. Later their functions expanded to cover government programmes in 
areas such as public health and agriculture. The historian Chipungu described how 
chiefs and their assistants contributed to the creation of a boma-class, a local bureau-
cratic elite who had accumulated wealth and status from their positions. Chipungu even 
described how members of the boma-class at times instrumentalised their authorities 
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and access to the Native Treasury to aid this accumulation.93 This suggests that patterns 
of instrumentalising bureaucratic processes for private gain also occurred in earlier 
episodes of state formation in Zambia. 
In the period after the Second World War, as the notion of self-determination of 
peoples began to conflict with colonial realities, a greater investment began to be made 
in what was called ‘native affairs’: The socio-economic welfare of the African popu-
lation. Up to that period, health care and education for the native population had been 
mostly left to missionary activity. Meanwhile, for the European population, primarily in 
towns and the Copperbelt, a different grade of public services was being provided by 
the colonial state. The settler population, moreover, increasingly advocated for self-rule, 
making them less politically dependent on London. This led to a process of negotiation, 
leading to the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. During the 
period of the Federation, African nationalist politicians became increasingly vocal and 
successful in articulating a challenge against the legitimacy of both colonial control and 
minority rule.      
As in many parts of Africa, the process towards independence had the historical 
momentum of an avalanche. While some technocrats planned a gradual process towards 
majority rule, independence was granted faster that these plans foresaw. Within a very 
short period the institutional structure of the ‘North-Rhodesian State’ was carved away 
from the Federation and launched into independence. In the early years of the Feder-
ation, two categories of civil service existed: A European civil service to fill senior 
grades and an African civil service to fill other grades. Only in the last two years of the 
Federation, as independence for Northern Rhodesia seemed imminent, were these two 
integrated. A major challenge was to ‘Africanise’94 the public service by gradually 
replacing the Europeans, who made up a third of the entire workforce of the Northern 
Rhodesian public service and nearly all of the senior management. Problematically, 
however, the education system for Africans was by no means sufficient to supply the 
number of qualified graduates needed to fill the public service.95  
At independence, the UNIP government embarked on a path to implement a state-
driven, nationalist development agenda, which among other things depended on ex-
panding the provision of education and medical services to the population. As a result, 
the colonial state as it was inherited was expanded and in part redesigned to respond to 
this agenda. Between 1964 and 1972 the Zambian public service grew from 72 de-
partments and 14 ministries to 102 departments and 16 ministries. The total personnel 
meanwhile grew from 22,561 in 1964 to 51,497 nine years later.96 Various training 
institutions were established to attempt to fill these numbers, especially in the face of a 
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disorderly and abrupt exodus of expatriate staff. However, demand by far outstripped 
the increase in supply, leading to the conclusion that ‘by 1972 the Zambian public 
service was composed of relatively young, under-educated and inexperienced person-
nel’.97  
The redesign of the post-colonial state reached a high point in 1973, when the one-
party state was introduced, but in effect was a gradual ongoing process. The implicit 
aim of the reforms that were implemented during the Kaunda era was to increase 
political control over the state. This meant that, even though rhetorically the notion of 
one-party participatory democracy was espoused and programmes of administrative 
decentralisation were launched, in effect power was centralised in the presidency. In 
addition, the state and the ruling UNIP party were increasingly fused.98 This had an 
impact on the appointment of civil servants. Whereas formerly (but also since the 
reintroduction of multi-party politics) civil servants could not be politically active, by 
the late-1960s/early-1970s, civil servants were required to be party members or at the 
very least loyal to UNIP, especially in middle and senior posts. This particularly applied 
to the post of Permanent Secretaries, who in the British system, as the most senior civil 
servant in a ministry, were supposed to be non-partisan and politically neutral, but who 
had since the early Kaunda years been directly appointed by the president. Such 
appointments at times involved distinguished technocrats but equally reflected the 
function of political patronage – of rewarding political supporters.99 This was much to 
the chagrin of Valentine Musakanya, the first head of the Civil Service in post-colonial 
Zambia, who complained about liberation heroes being given positions regardless of 
their competence and qualification.100 This led the scholar of public administration, 
Lungu, to conclude that the relation between Africanisation and the merit principle was 
often not positive.101  
Long-time Zambia analyst Szeftel argued that in the Kaunda era the post-colonial 
state was thus transformed into a one-party patronage state. The centre of this state was 
formed by the presidency, which closely controlled state resources. Much of these 
resources were used to expand the state by creating jobs. As such, not only the state 
bureaucracy grew but also parastatal companies. Distribution of these jobs and other 
benefits of the state would favour political loyalists, thus institutionalising the slogan, ‘it 
pays to belong to UNIP’. Szeftel argued that access to the state led to possibilities for 
self-enrichment and redistribution through clients, which in turn contributed to a process 
of class-formation.102 
Notably, this institutionalisation of patronage was not equated with corruption or 
nepotism. Lungu noted that President Kaunda had on various occasions stated that he 
would not hesitate to use his power to appoint and disappoint to confront corruption, 
nepotism, and tribalism. Kaunda had repeatedly wielded what was popularly known as 
‘Kaunda’s Axe’ to fire – or more commonly, reshuffle – popular officials for violating 
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102  Szeftel, M., ‘”Eat with us”: Managing corruption and patronage under Zambia’s three republics, 1964-
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public service ethics.103 Publicly and discursively, patrimonial practices were morally 
denounced. Public service ethics (albeit adjusted to require partisan political loyalty to 
UNIP) were professed in public. At the same time, the readjustment of the state to allow 
for political patronage was justified by the ideological need to control the state and its 
resources to deliver on the humanist vision. From a neo-patrimonial perspective, this 
practical distinction between institutionalised patronage and patrimonial practices is 
remarkable, as a tendency exists among neo-patrimonial theorists to lump together 
issues such as patronage, nepotism, and presidentialism. The Zambian state had ap-
parently been shaped in a process combining both rational-legal and patrimonial logic, 
not least the desire to create a presidential patronage system by fusing the state and the 
party. At the same time, patrimonial practices by clients instrumentalising the state for 
personal gain were contested by their patron.      
The above presents an image of the Zambian state as a product of its own unique 
historical experience. Northern Rhodesia was not a transplanted Western state but rather 
the institutional legacy of commercial and colonial interests. This in turn was rene-
gotiated by a settler population without much attention to the interests of the native 
population. When this institutional heirloom was subsequently handed to a new political 
elite, it was thoroughly appropriated. It shows how the Zambian State is a sui generis, 
shaped in a process of contradicting logics of rational-legalism and patrimonialism. 
Throughout its history, elements of the state were renegotiated in an altered political and 
institutional arena: First the company, then the colony, then the Federation, then the 
first, second, and third Republic, and then the post-Chiluba era. These renegotiations 
and the process of reaffirming the state in daily practice was in part driven by 
patrimonial logic and self-interest on the part of the agents involved. At the same time, 
this process did shape both formal and informal rules and agreements, which are them-
selves up for subsequent renegotiation. Thus it becomes understandable that we can 
indeed see an evolution of the Zambian state – emphatically not in a unilinear or 
normative way – with evolving institutions, but along this path we can see recurring 
patterns of behaviour, including patterns associated with patrimonialism.  
 
The health sector 
As seen above, the state is a complex entity. The border between the state and society is 
blurred and subject to contestation by actors who interact with the state. Moreover, the 
state spans various professional domains from defence and justice to education and 
agriculture. To make the abstract and at times elusive character of the state more 
concrete, it is helpful to focus on a specific part of the state. For this research project a 
decision was made to narrow down on the health sector. Again, this decision was 
partially arbitrary, though justifiable. As my point of entry to the field and to data was 
the Netherlands Embassy in Lusaka. It made sense to focus on a sector in which the 
Netherlands was involved. Of these sectors, the health sector was the one that had the 
longest coherent history of Dutch involvement. Moreover, this sector reflected those 
changes that development policy and practice had undergone in nearly two decades.  
In Zambia, as in many countries, the health sector is a domain in which the state is 
heavily involved. This role of the state in the provision of health care is not self-evident 
from an economic theoretical perspective but very much the result of the process of 
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state formation since the colonial era.104 This role of the state in the health sector was 
reinforced and renegotiated by post-independence politics and international factors: The 
prominence of health in international development policy. From an economic theore-
tical perspective, health – particularly curative care – is not purely a public good. People 
with enough resources prove themselves willing to pay for health care, as they directly 
enjoy the benefits of these services. Also, it is feasible to exclude people from bene-
fiting from accessing a hospital or clinic; and when one person visits a doctor and 
receives a treatment of drugs, this rivals opportunities for someone else to do so. This 
explains why private hospitals and clinics can exist and be profitable. In the area of 
public health and disease prevention, the rationale for the state to be involved is 
stronger. These are more fully public goods, as it is not possible to exclude people from 
benefiting from, for example, a programme to eradicate sleeping sickness. And bene-
fiting from such a programme does not rival your neighbour’s ability to do so.  
Despite the fact that health care is not a pure public good, there are various 
considerations for the involvement of the state in playing a role in providing health care. 
From a moral perspective, it is considered objectionable that people, and especially 
children, could die of diseases that could easily and inexpensively be prevented. From a 
socio-economic perspective, the burden of disease impacts on productivity and 
consumption. Healthy people can do more work, and caring for the ill lays a claim on 
time and financial resources that could be spent otherwise. As such, health is linked 
with poverty. A heavy disease burden and lack of access to treatment aggravates 
poverty, while the poor are especially vulnerable to certain diseases. The above provides 
a strong justification for the international aid community’s involvement in supporting 
the state to provide access to health care over the past decades, particularly as access to 
health has been declared a human right.105  
Notwithstanding moral and political justifications for the state’s role in the provision 
of health care, this is also a result of the historical process by which the state was 
formed in Zambia. Colonial authorities – first the British South Africa Company, and 
later the colonial service – had three primary objectives for colonial health policy: First, 
to keep the European population healthy; second, to keep the African labour force in 
good condition; and third, to prevent the spread of epidemic diseases.106 The first 
medical services provided by the ‘state’ in what is now Zambia were the doctors and 
nurses employed by the company to ensure the health of company staff. These health 
workers were stationed at several administrative stations in the territories. Besides 
treating company staff, these doctors were free to practise privately among European 
settlers.107 Due to the moral considerations of making health care available to a popu-
lation suffering from disease, health care was an essential part of the mission civilatrice. 
This motivated missionaries to establish medical missions in what was to become 
Zambia, from the late nineteenth century onwards. Besides the moral considerations, the 
provision of medical care also had a functional role in supporting the objective of 
proselytising the native population. The perceived superiority of ‘Western’ medicine 
                                                 
104  As well as institutional and historical experiences in other parts of the world. 
105  World Bank, World development report 1993: Investing in health (Washington, 1993). 
106  Doyle, cited by Kalumba, ‘The practice’, 64; see also Lewis, M.J. & R.M. MacLeod, Disease, 
medicine, and empire: Perspectives on Western medicine and the experience of European expansion 
(London, 1988). 
107  Kalumba, ‘The practice’, 66. 
28 
 
vis-à-vis traditional medicine was, as such, a symbol of imperial power.108 Another 
provider of medical services were the copper mines, which needed to keep their labour 
forces productive.  
While initially the health care provided to indigenous Zambians was left mainly to 
missionary activity and the mines, gradually colonial authorities began playing a role in 
this realm. After Northern Rhodesia became a colony, the colonial authorities developed 
a Colonial Medical Service with a department initially located in Livingstone. This led 
to the formation of a fledgling bureaucracy as well as the development of health infra-
structure, which was further expanded during the period of the Federation. A notable 
characteristic of this infrastructure, however, was that it inequitably served the settler 
population and urban areas to the neglect of the indigenous population in rural areas. 
This, however, was the health sector that Kaunda’s UNIP government inherited at 
independence and rapidly expanded to serve its formal and informal objectives.109  
 Most of the academic literature on the Zambian health sector is understandably 
medical-technical in nature. This concerns itself with specific diseases and their effects 
on population groups or the effects of specific treatments. Social sciences can contribute 
by focusing on the behaviour of the target group of health policies, such as establishing 
why the population do or do not access health care.110 One area of special attention is 
the AIDS pandemic, its context and consequences, and strategies to fight the pandemic. 
The first cases of AIDS were recorded in Zambia in 1984111 and the disease quickly 
spread. By 1990 some 12.7 per cent of the population of reproductive age was estimated 
to be HIV-positive, and by 1995 this had grown to an estimated 15 per cent. In later 
years, this rate receded to 13.5 per cent.112 Due to the pandemic, debilitating, and deadly 
nature of the disease, particularly in the years before anti-retroviral treatments became 
available, the socio-economic consequences were enormous. Not only did AIDS lead to 
an extra burden on health facilities and people caring for AIDS patients, but 
professionals such as nurses, doctors, and teachers fell victim to the disease, leading to 
losses in capacity.113 For ordinary Zambians, of course, the consequences of the AIDS 
pandemic were horrific. This is illustrated by the average life expectancy, which 
dropped from 46 in 1990 to 40 by 2000, only to recover to 48 in 2009.114 In many 
families an entire generation died, leaving children in the care of other relatives such as 
grandparents who had limited assets and resources to adequately care for and school 
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these children.115 The social consequences of AIDS at the height of the pandemic in the 
mid-1990s were reinforced by the poor economic circumstances resulting from decades 
of economic crisis linked to a collapse of the mining industry and the privatisations 
resulting from structural adjustment. For the international community, the AIDS crisis 
was cause for an emergency response. By the beginning of the current century, a 
number of global and national vertical programmes were launched to tackle the disease 
either through or in parallel with Zambian AIDS initiatives and the health system. 
While ample scientific research has been undertaken in Zambia into diseases, treat-
ments, and their social linkages, less attention has been given to the political and public 
administration aspects of the health sector. One notable exception is a study done by 
Kalumba in the late 1980s into historical experiences with health reforms since colonial 
times, which will be dealt with in depth in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. As we will see 
later, this study and notably its author contributed to a process of health reform. As we 
will also see in more detail, this reform process generated considerable attention from 
international development agencies – in part because it reflected the neo-liberal para-
digm of new public management, which dealt with the question of which domain the 
state has a role in and which functions can be left to the market. Moreover, this body of 
thinking considered the introduction of market mechanics into state provision of serv-
ices. The health sector proved to be an appropriate object for this paradigm, in part due 
to the fact that health care is not a purely private good, as discussed above.116 Moreover, 
during the post-colonial development of the health sector, it was notably tertiary 
curative care that had received attention and resources at the expense of preventative 
and primary health care in rural areas. The health reforms were intended to address this 
and focus more on preventative and primary care, which have more public-good char-
acteristics.  
The interest of the international development community resulted in the Zambian 
health sector becoming one of the test laboratories for what was to become a new para-
digm in aid management: The sector-wide approach. This implied that donors would 
harmonise their support and align it to the systems of the recipient sectoral ministry, 
rather than running individual, isolated projects under the direct financial management 
of a donor-controlled, project-management unit. The innovation that made this possible 
was the district basket, a fund to which different donors contributed un-earmarked 
funds. These funds would then be allocated to district health offices to cover not only 
activity and investment budgets but also recurrent costs. For academics, these develop-
ments proved to be a relevant research object. One notable publication was very much 
inspired by the novelty of both the health reforms and the sector-wide approach.117 A 
newer study, however, focussed very much on the limitations in practice of the sector-
wide approach in the Zambian health sector. In particular, it concluded that the expected 
reduction in transaction costs, which was an argument to justify this approach in the 
first place, did not materialise, especially within the Ministry of Health.118  
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The health reform process sparked scientific attention, not least from health eco-
nomists and health anthropologists.119 A particular feature of these reforms that gener-
ated interest and critique was the issue of health-care financing. The reforms comprised 
an overhaul of the allocation of funds within the sector by directly allocating funds to 
districts. In addition, users would have to contribute to the costs of their health care, and 
user fees were charged at all levels where care was provided. Blas and Limbambala, 
however, demonstrated that these reforms, in the first two years of implementation, had 
a dramatic impact on patients’ attendance – which dropped considerably – at hospitals 
and clinics. However, the reforms did lead to a shift in services from hospitals to 
clinics.120 The impact of user fees on patients was also the focus of a qualitative study 
by Van der Geest et al. This study demonstrated that some patients resented having to 
pay fees while the ‘quality of care’, which was understood to comprise availability of 
drugs, did not improve. They echoed the conclusions of an earlier study121 advocating 
for a more humane user fees’ policy. While not disputing the concept of introducing 
cost-sharing as such, they did advocate for better exemption policies for those unable to 
pay, as well as requesting payment for tangible services rather than for registration.122 
This impression was confirmed by Lake et al., who in an exceptional contribution to the 
body of literature on the Zambian health sector and the health reform process concluded 
that while exemption policies were well developed to exclude children from paying user 
fees, schemes for excluding the poorest were not well developed. At the same time, 
Lake et al. concluded that the geographical distribution of resources in the health sector 
from hospitals to districts and clinics had improved.  
The remarkable element of the study of Lake et al. was the detailed and context-
ualised character of the study. Unlike other studies, this research gave attention to the 
different personalities who as ministers made their mark on the health reform process. 
Other studies focussed on the human aspects of the health sector, notably in the face of 
the so-called human resource crisis: The shortage of qualified health workers, com-
pounded by the out-migration of doctors, nurses, and other professionals. Two studies 
deserve mention here, one focussed on the motivation of nurses123 and the other carried 
out in the context of the research project, of which this dissertation is a result, focussed 
on motivation of health workers more in general.124 Studies employing the neo-patri-
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monial paradigm to look at the Zambian health sector and political-economic analyses 
looking at issues such as corruption and nepotism were, however, remarkably lacking 
from the public realm at the time of research. In addition, such studies beyond Zambia 
are also rare. In the 2004 World Development Report, ample attention was paid to 
patronage and clientalism in service provision. In the section on the health sector in this 
report, however, no explicit mention is made of patronage or clientalism as such. 
Attention is paid to bureaucratic failure to provide health services to the poor. This is 
attributed to technical, economic, and socio-cultural obstacles. One of these obstacles is 
the capture of public financing for health care by richer groups (‘elite capture’). The 
section is, however, ambiguous as to whether this refers to inequity in service provision 
(possibly connected with patronage) or rather diversion of resources for patronage or 
direct personal gain. This report is also more conceptual than empirical. For Uganda the 
World Bank did contract a politico-economic analysis of the health sector, but this was 
never publicly released. The literature study carried out for this research came across 
two notable incidental studies looking at patrimonial practices in the health sector. 
However, these were not labelled as such, as they were written before the neo-
patrimonial paradigm reached conceptual maturity. These include a study on corruption 
in the distribution of medicines in Cameroon, which pointed towards Daloz and 
Chabal’s notion of instrumentalisation of disorder even before the phrase was coined. 
This study talked about the efficiency of inefficiency, arguing that few drugs distributed 
by the government agency involved reached the intended beneficiaries. At the same 
time, through informal practices, they were redistributed or commercialised, meaning 
that many these drugs were used at the end of the day.125 The other is a study of social 
relations and practices in a district health service in Nepal,126 which will be referred to 
in Chapter 2. In short, the dearth of empirical studies following the neo-patrimonial 
paradigm into the health sector, particularly in Zambia, provides a justification for the 
dissertation before you.  
Methodology 
Having described the theoretical debate to which this dissertation aims to contribute and 
having broadly sketched the empirical terrain with which this research will confront the 
neo-patrimonial paradigm, let us now examine the methodology that will facilitate this 
confrontation. This dissertation is grounded in the social sciences; it will thus have to 
contend with the complexities, contradictions, fluidities, and falsehoods characteristic of 
human behaviour and discourse. This means, as was asserted by Chabal and Daloz, ‘that 
for the social sciences to seek to ape the method used in the physical sciences is illu-
sory’.127 This thesis will therefore not attempt to confront hypotheses with quantitative 
‘hard data’ to meet the test of predictability. Rather it will strive to eclectically collect 
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available qualitative data in order to meet the test of plausibility by means of inductive 
reasoning.128  
The rejection of a quantitative methodology for this research is not a brazen matter of 
preference or principle. Of course, there are studies that manage to obtain insight into 
peoples’ perspectives and understandings on the basis of questionnaires, which can lead 
to correlations proven to a certain measure of probability. However, such methods 
would not be suitable for the subject matter under study in this dissertation. To apply a 
quantitative methodology, a narrow research question would need to be formulated, 
based on a reductionist approach of simplifying complex reality to a few measurable 
factors; at the same time, other variables would need to be kept or assumed to be con-
stant – ceteris paribus. However, in human reality, caught up in the vagaries of history, 
ceteris are rarely paribus. Therefore, it was necessary to choose a broad methodological 
approach in order to do justice to the complexity of human agency within a dynamic 
socio-political context.129 
In the process of conducting this research, a conscious effort was thus made not to 
narrow down the scope of study prematurely. Rather, a broader incremental explorative 
approach was chosen to gradually zoom in on those areas relevant to the human face of 
neo-patrimonialism. The aim was not to implement a pre-designed research proposal but 
to embark on a learning process to build my own understanding as a student of African 
political bureaucracy. I thus departed from a study of the literature debating the nature 
of the African state. Subsequently, as justified above, I took a pragmatic decision to 
focus my attention on a single case-study of Zambia. Then I endeavoured to obtain a 
broad understanding of the context of the terrain by examining documents and literature 
in order to make sense of the actors and their behaviour within a real-life African state 
bureaucracy. In the process of familiarising myself with Zambia, the Zambian state, and 
development initiatives in Zambia, I took a decision to further focus on the Zambian 
health sector, while retaining an awareness of the broader political context. It was only 
following two initial field visits in July 2006 and June 2007 that a decision was arrived 
at to follow a two-pronged methodological approach, based on anthropological and 
historical methods respectively: The first to analyse the human factor in the health 
sector and the second to put people in a broader, political-historical context.130  
A further rationale for applying a loose and eclectic qualitative approach follows 
from the political sensitivity of the subject-matter involved. The conceptual framework 
at the basis of this study deals with issues, such as patronage and corruption, that are 
illicit or even illegal. How then can one measure such phenomena or collect data on 
this? This dilemma is directly connected to the tension between discourse and practice 
we dealt with earlier. Many of the oral and written data sources available about the 
health sector strongly reflect discourse reflective of the rational-legal side of the neo-
patrimonial coin, which can be at odds with actors’ actual behaviour. The data from 
sources central to sociological and historical methodologies may be sanitised to ignore 
the personal specifics of patrimonial practice. At best the symptoms of such practice are 
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addressed in generalised aggregated terms. If interviewed, people may not be willing to 
speak frankly but instead opt to reflect ‘political correctness’. Consequently, in order to 
look beyond the rational-legal façade of bureaucracy, it proved necessary to look be-
yond the official discourse of policy documents and formal interviews and take into 
account unconventional data sources such as informal interviews, rumours,131 and jour-
nalistic accounts.  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, at the same time oral and written sources that 
reflect the other side of the neo-patrimonial coin, such as rumours and allegations, can 
also be imprecise or even false. When one encounters discourse indicating patrimonial 
behaviour, this again need not be an accurate reflection of reality. Accusations of 
patronage and corruption may be tools of political manipulation, as such discourse may 
serve to discredit and de-legitimise political opponents. Equally, such discourse may 
provide an external explanation to disguise one’s own failings. In other words, de-
pending solely on data gathered from discursive sources could risk not being able to see 
reality beyond the rational-legal façade. Paradoxically, relying on discursive sources 
may also run the risk of being blinded by cynical political machinations exaggerating 
the patrimonial side of the neo-patrimonial coin.  
The limitations of discursive sources may suggest that in order to get a sense of 
reality, one should focus rather on observed behaviour. In other words, one should look 
at everyday practice rather than discourse.132 Participant observation is a key meth-
odology in ethnographic, anthropological research. As it was the intention of this re-
search to take an open, explorative approach to data collection, I attempted to create 
opportunities for participant observation.133 However, as the research progressed and the 
collected data were assessed and analysed, the contribution of these observations to the 
theme of this research appeared to be limited. This is due to an intrinsic limitation of 
participant observation: The practices central to our study of neo-patrimonialism are not 
readily observed. Acts of corruption or patronage are formally illegal;134 practitioners of 
such acts will in most cases thus make an effort to conceal such acts, particularly from 
external researchers. Moreover, part of this thesis focuses on historical-political and 
policy processes, and by their very nature these cannot be observed in retrospect. There-
fore, despite the limitations of spoken and written language, this dissertation will to a 
large extent have to base itself on discursive sources as ‘proxy indicators’ of reality.  
We can thus conclude that, by default and due to the choice of topic, there is no other 
option but to use imperfect data sources to further our understanding of the political 
economy of the Zambian health bureaucracy. By necessity, this research has had to 
adopt a second-best approach to study what would otherwise be left out of the frame of 
reference. This approach to collecting data is open and empathic, attempting to see the 
                                                 
131  The rumours aired on the metaphorical ‘Radio trottoir’ play an important role in Zambia and else-
where in Africa. This can be explained by oral traditions and the lack of reliable sources of inform-
ation. Such rumours shine a light on perceived reality behind the façade of sanitised official discourse. 
See S. Ellis, ‘Tuning in to pavement radio’. African Affairs, 88 (1989), 352.      
132  Focussing on everyday practice is seen as key to getting an anthropological understanding of the state. 
See for instance, Sharma & Gupta, ‘Rethinking’.  
133  This was in part inspired by the following prompt: ‘Good ethnography is dependent on standard 
techniques only to a limited degree, but it requires a sensibility to culture, an appreciation of the value 
of observation and intuitive empathy. These elements are sometimes referred to as the “anthropo-
logical eye”’. Van Donge, J.K., ‘Ethnography and participant observation’. In: Desai, V. & R. Potter, 
eds, Doing development research (London, 2006). 
134  Even if they might be tacitly seen as legitimate in some social contexts. 
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object of study – in this case, part of the Zambian state, the health sector – through the 
eyes, words, and concepts of the agents who create social reality through their practices 
and representations. The fieldwork underpinning this dissertation was not structured in 
such a way that it followed a predetermined set-up. Rather, on the basis of early ex-
ploration, plans were gradually made more concrete in reaction to opportunities for 
digging further and learning more. Frequently, barriers were encountered that could be 
overcome, circumnavigated, or even led to a change of path. As such, this approach 
could be characterised as opportunistic. 
However, following Chabal & Daloz, this need not mean that such a venture is 
unscientific. The scientific essence of this research is applied mainly through the in-
ductive process of ordering and analysing the data – in other words, the process of 
reasoning, writing, and concluding. Whereas the process of data collection has been an 
open, empathic process, in presenting and analysing the data it is essential not to take 
things at face value. Rather, to make sense of reality, I as an aspiring academic had to 
judge the data. By immersing myself in the context of the object of study, I aimed to 
develop a sense of perspective which would allow me to weigh arguments. The claims 
of respondents or authors required testing (or triangulating against) counter-arguments. 
Finally, an important element in this process is to attempt to deconstruct and reconstruct 
the motives a respondent or author has to make a certain statement, motives which are 
often grounded in a process of self-legitimisation.  
Having dwelt at length on the rationale behind the methodological approach used (in 
order to legitimise this approach), let us now move to the more practical side of 
explaining how I went about collecting this data.  
 
Collecting data 
As principal researcher I spent a total of 25 weeks in Zambia collecting data.135 This 
was divided over four periods: July 2006 (3 weeks), June 2007 (4 weeks), April 2008 (4 
weeks), and September to December 2008 (15 weeks). As justified above, this suc-
cession of visits was part of an explorative process that began with a rather broad scope 
and gradually narrowed down. In the course of conceiving this research project, I had 
the opportunity to interact with staff at the Netherlands Embassy in Lusaka as a result of 
my position as desk officer for Zambia at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
In the process, I discovered that the health reforms that unfolded throughout the 1990s 
would provide an interesting setting for research on neo-patrimonialism. In part, this 
was sparked by the description of the health sector as a patronage system by the 
embassy’s health advisor. 
My first field visit in July 2006 therefore had the aim to explore the health reforms. 
But also, as the Netherlands Embassy provided my point of entry into the health sector, 
the history of Dutch development support to the health sector provided a secondary 
point of attention. During this first visit, I interviewed several academics to explore the 
Zambian academic perspectives on the notion of neo-patrimonialism and also to identify 
possible partners for collaboration. In addition, I interviewed several health sector 
officials in Lusaka. However, in order to get a sense for the local realities and context of 
the health sector, short visits were made to three provincial towns: Solwezi, Mongu, and 
Livingstone. These visits exposed me to the views and perspectives of the various 
cadres of health workers on their careers and familiarised me with the professional 
                                                 
135  Besides this, time was spent in Zambia on my day-job as an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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cadres and structures of the health sector. A second area of data collection consisted of 
collecting policy documents, primarily through the archives of the Netherlands Em-
bassy. This would shine light on the changing donor involvement in the health sector, as 
well as policy ambitions and policy discourse.  
Just before this visit, I discovered another avenue for collecting data on the Zambian 
health sector and its political context. In the archives of the AllAfrica.com website, 
newspaper articles were available for the two major Zambian newspapers for the period 
1997 to date.136 Using various search functions, this allowed me to get a broad overview 
of the health reforms, general developments in the health sector, and key political 
figures. This provided a large body of material, but also left glaring gaps, not least since 
the period of the early 1990s was not covered, and other periods may not have been 
covered consistently.  
My second research visit to Zambia took place in June 2007. Again a major focus of 
attention was to interview health sector officials in Lusaka about the health reform 
process. A further aim was to get a sense of how this policy process fit into the political 
context gleaned from the media analysis referred to above. Two key informant inter-
views were particularly instructive for this aim, notably with a civil servant and a 
politician directly involved with the design and implementation of the health reform 
process. Another element of this research mission was a visit to two districts in the 
Western Province of Zambia to interview a broad variety of people, ranging from a 
guard to nurses and doctors, working in various health facilities from rural clinics and 
hospitals to district and provincial health offices. This further sharpened my insight into 
the organisational structure of the health sector. These interviews also provided insight 
into the temporal and spatial career paths taken by health workers and the organisational 
and social challenges they faced along the way.  
Following these first two research visits to Zambia, I decided to further pursue two 
distinct primary strands of investigation. The first would focus on the historical political 
context of the health reforms. Building on the media articles referred to above, this 
would mean further archival work to obtain a more complete impression of the time-
frame from 1991 to 2008. This would be complemented by further archival sources, 
such as policy documents and reports and evaluations as well as key informant 
interviews. The second strand of research would take more of an anthropological, actor-
oriented approach. This would thus depart from the context and perspective of health 
workers on the shop-floor of the health sector. By means of semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews with a broad range of health workers, it was hoped to obtain a perspective on 
health workers’ careers and social and work contexts as an avenue to glean data on 
patrimonial practices in everyday life. These interviews would be complemented by 
informal interviews, attempts at participant observation, and contextual insights from 
the first stand of investigation mentioned above. Moreover, interviews with actors on 
the shop-floor level also gave an extra perspective on the health reforms and the 
personalities and processes guiding the sector. For each strand of research, I would 
employ a research assistant to complement my own data collection. Following several 
unsuccessful attempts to identify a Dutch master’s student through my academic 
network, Paulien Boone, a student of international relations, was recruited to conduct 
the actor-oriented research. The fieldwork conducted for this research at the same time 
                                                 
136  Unfortunately, around that time The Post stopped submitting its articles to AllAfrica.com, in favour of 
its own website which underwent various changes with corresponding teething problems. This hin-
dered systematic searching for articles in later years.  
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provided material to be used for her own masters’ thesis on the human resources’ crisis 
in the health sector. To remedy gaps in her skill-set, additional methodological training 
was sought through Wageningen University.  
My third research visit to Zambia, in April 2008, aimed to prepare the ground for the 
research assistants I meant to employ, besides continuing to collect data through inter-
views (including two former ministers of health) and foraging for documents. One aim 
was to identify a suitable location for the research assistant who would undertake the 
actor-oriented research. One area of consideration was Western Province. This was an 
area the Netherlands had focussed on in its development programme throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. This had been the location of the Primary Health Care project and a 
region where scores of Dutch doctors had been deployed. The decision, however, fell on 
another part of Zambia, Luapula, in part owing to pragmatic considerations, in part 
owing to considerations linked to the area’s relevance for this thesis. The pragmatic 
considerations were linked to the time limitations during the remainder of my fieldwork. 
I had undertaken to visit Luapula Province as this was one of President Chiluba’s 
political-support bases. It was also where Katele Kalumba, former minister of health 
and an architect of the health reforms, had his constituency. Doing fieldwork in this area 
could thus inform the narrative I intended to write about the political context of the 
health reforms. As I could not at the same time travel to both Luapula and the Western 
Province of Zambia, the choice was made to use my trip to Luapula for both fieldwork 
and preparing my research assistant’s deployment. During my visit to Luapula, I also 
took the opportunity to experiment with participant observation by attending a perform-
ance assessment visit. In the end, this visit provided the opportunity for recruiting 
Carrington Siatontola, a recent graduate of the Department of History at the University 
of Zambia, to collect newspaper articles on the health sector for the media analysis.  
The bulk of my fieldwork was conducted in the period between September and 
December 2008. During this period I supervised my research assistants. Carrington was 
provided a digital camera and access to the National Archives, where he collected 
nearly 1000 photos of newspaper articles published over the period 1990-2001 in the 
Times of Zambia, The Post, and to a lesser extent the Zambia Daily Mail on the health 
sector and the key politicians involved in the health sector. The first several days we 
worked together allowing me to carry out quality checks. We started with the year 1990, 
which was of less direct relevance for the narrative of the health reforms. Thus, 
allowing for learning mistakes and allowing for adjustments to the approach, we did not 
risk creating significant lacunae. At the same time, this offered the opportunity to 
browse through the papers of the period just before and during the transition from UNIP 
to MMD, and this gave me a more textured insight into this very relevant part of 
Zambian political history. Towards the end of the period covered by Carrington, there 
was an overlap between his pictures and the articles captured online by myself. This 
gave a further opportunity to roughly check for completeness. 
During this period, Paulien ventured to Luapula after conducting introductory inter-
views and studying policy documents to gain a sense of the policy context. In the 
provincial capital Mansa, she was lodged at the nursing school, giving her the oppor-
tunity to interact with aspiring health workers. Following several days in which she and 
I together interviewed numerous health workers (23), she proceeded to interview health 
workers independently. For this she used an interview schedule. Health workers were 
selected randomly and opportunistically. However, deliberate effort was made to get a 
broad selection of cadres at a broad selection of health centres and hospital departments 
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both in the provincial town and rural parts of the district. In total she interviewed 73 
health workers at a general hospital and various urban and rural health centres. To 
complement the selection of interviews up-country, Paulien used her last week in 
Lusaka to interview health workers, particularly doctors at the University Teaching 
Hospital (UTH). This would serve to balance a generally up-country perspective in her 
data with the perspective of the doctors who managed to get positions in the city. 
Paulien also took notes of relevant informal conversations with students and other 
young health workers whose confidence she had gained. Notes were also taken on 
events she observed or participated in such as a graduation ceremony, a performance 
assessment mission, and a workshop for health centres. Finally, she set up two focus 
group discussions with female and male health workers, which we facilitated together. 
The questions posed to the participants related to career perspectives and work relations. 
However, owing to the interaction between participants, this led to animated discussions 
in which issues of patronage and corruption filtered through.  
As Paulien was interviewing health workers in Luapula and Carrington was collect-
ing data in the archives, I continued carrying out in-depth interviews and foraging for 
relevant documentation. This included conducting various interviews in Ndola to com-
plement the impressions and data gathered elsewhere. Meanwhile, I alternated the 
supervision of both research assistants while carrying out an initial analysis of the data 
each collected.  
 
Access, limitations and bias 
My entry point through the Netherlands Embassy provided a convenient way to gain 
formal access to the health sector. The IS Academy research programme137 and Dutch 
involvement in the sector provided legitimisation for the embassy to provide assistance 
in requesting the permanent secretary for permission for myself and Paulien to carry out 
the research. This was swiftly granted. Also, access to the embassy archives was un-
restricted. To further facilitate access, my ‘tribal network’ proved very convenient. A 
network of Dutch medical professionals still existed who either had worked or 
continued to work in the Zambian health sector. Their contacts and insights and ex-
periences either proved a valuable source of data in itself or brought me closer to useful 
data.  
At the same time, these entry points had drawbacks. One such bias is the Dutch bias 
my research may suffer from. While the archives of the Netherlands Embassy held 
documents reflecting the positions of other donors and stakeholders, Dutch views and 
positions are likely to have been dominant. Most of my informants on the donor side 
were also Dutch. This may have led to this dissertation overemphasising the Dutch role 
in the narratives presented on the health reforms. This Dutch perspective may also have 
reinforced my own cultural bias as a researcher and analyst. To stereotype the Dutch, 
post-Calvinist outlook, one could say it normatively values rational-legal order. At the 
same time, it has difficulty in normatively accepting a large gap between discourse and 
practice. Dutch culture tends to value ‘doing what you say’.138 If it is not feasible to 
adhere to formal rules as reflected in discourse, as they may be contradictory or in-
effective, the tendency is to pragmatically change the formal rules to reflect practice. 
                                                 
137  A research collaboration between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various academic research de-
partments. 
138  Refer to the Dutch populist politician Pim Fortuyn’s characteristic one-liner: “Ik doe wat ik zeg en ik 
zeg wat ik doe” (“I do what I say and I say what I do”). 
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Alternatively, formal discourse may be adjusted to reflect practice.139 This can explain 
the sense of unease that the Dutch may have with the neo-patrimonial paradigm, in 
which the greyness and contradictions between rational-legal and patrimonial and 
between discourse and practice are inherent.140 In this dissertation, I tried to be self-
reflective and aware of this Dutch bias in order to look beyond it.       
Another limitation of this research and my own role as a researcher concerns my 
affiliation to a development agency. For one this may impact on my having a develop-
mental bias towards unilinear progress, planned, externally induced change, and other 
simplistic paradigms that may be espoused by development agencies.141 This again can 
only be mitigated by self-reflection and awareness on my part. My affiliation to a donor 
agency, however, also has an impact on how I, and by extension my research assistant 
Paulien, were perceived by respondents. This may have led to people being inclined to 
give politically correct representations of reality. Such perceptions thus countered the 
advantages this affiliation may have provided me in gaining access. At times, I tried to 
counteract this by presenting myself as an independent researcher rather than a donor, 
which resulted in me opportunistically shifting two mutually conflicting identities to 
suit the context.142  
The greatest limitation in the field work relates to the political sensitivity of my 
research topic, which has already been touched upon earlier. This had implications for 
how I framed my research when I presented it to respondents or those that would 
provide access. As mentioning neo-patrimonialism, patronage, or corruption would be 
likely to elicit bureaucrats’ openness and facilitation, I highlighted rather the issues of 
health reforms and human resource management as my areas of interest. In my 
introduction before interviews, I stressed confidentiality and anonymity, which I have 
consistently followed in my dissertation. The only respondents named are those who 
held political office and could be considered directly responsible for the political out-
comes of their actions. Through open questions relating to human resource manage-
ment, I would see if respondents of their own accord would touch on issues relating to 
patrimonialism, while using indirect and probing questions to further tease out such 
issues.  
While formal access was relatively easy, real access to the reality behind the façade 
was more problematic. In arranging interviews, I encountered evasive behaviour, 
particularly from senior officials closer to the centre. One senior official repeatedly did 
not show up for agreed meetings, with his secretary being the gatekeeper denying 
access. Another senior official, cooperative at first, gradually denied further coopera-
tion. As I continued probing and prodding for issues of interest, he expressed his 
concern that my research methodology and objectives were unclear. He ordered his 
colleagues not to go beyond explaining the civil service guidelines in their responses to 
me. Yet another senior official flatly refused to be interviewed when I met him as 
                                                 
139  Resulting in the Dutch rational-legal phenomenon of gedoogen, which characterises Dutch soft-drugs’ 
policy and, until recently, prostitution policy. While formally illegal, it is pragmatically (though not 
necessarily socially) accepted and de-criminalised.  
140  Note: This may be a simplistic stereotype not based on deeper sociological research. It is also an 
idealised cultural representation. This does not discount a myriad contradictions and hypocrisies that 
exist in Dutch society.  
141  Perhaps this may even have an equally significant impact on how my peers perceive me and my work. 
142  This juggling of identities also resulted in an ambiguous physical appearance during my fieldwork: 
While dressed in a suit to show bureaucratic respect, I sported a moustache and goatee to look less 
diplomatic and perhaps more senior. 
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agreed, having sent him a list of questions. As is common when exploring the neo-
patrimonial paradigm in practice, it was difficult to attach meaning to such behaviour, 
let alone apply a label of patrimonialism or rational-legalism. On the one hand, it is 
fully consistent with rational-legal bureaucratic behaviour to hide behind official 
secrets.143 At the same time, this lack of transparency and openness raised my suspi-
cions that these prospective respondents were intent on hiding aspects of reality that 
could more easily be labelled as patrimonial practice.  
Others, however, did appear eager to talk and even reflect on the problems they 
perceived in the health sector. Some respondents needed to feel at ease by telling their 
story before coming with more sensitive reflections on others or on the system as they 
saw it. With others, the interesting accounts came during a return visit or informally 
over a beer. Generally, however, these were not the actors closest to the current centre 
of power within the sector. Rather, interesting accounts came from people at or past the 
end of their career, or people within the periphery of the sector who knew their career in 
the health sector would not advance much beyond their present station. Of course, as 
discussed above, such accounts require careful consideration and cannot just be taken 
simply at face value. Moreover, in the course of data collection and analysis, it appeared 
that more openness and more information could be gathered about past scandals and 
situations than about the more sensitive present.  
As discussed above, the hurdles and limitations encountered in the course of this 
field work justified the eclectic approach used. At the same time, it is important to be 
fully aware of the limitations this places on the validity of the analysis in this disser-
tation. The data and analysis are fragmentary and incomplete; some data and conclu-
sions drawn may thus even be speculative. This is, however, inherent to the object of 
research in relation to the political sensitivities that are at play within a bureaucratic 
context, neo-patrimonial or otherwise. It is therefore important to remain aware of what 
this dissertation has intended. The aim has been to attempt to understand a system, 
including the darker, hidden realities and the personalities that have shaped it and make 
it work. Empathically, the aim has not been to judge, accuse, or incriminate individuals 
or groups of people. The test of probability aimed for in this research should therefore 
not to be confused with the far more stringent test of guilt-beyond-reasonable-doubt 
used by courts of law.  
Reading guide  
Having come to the end of Chapter 1, the introductory part of this dissertation, it is time 
to recapitulate the research objective and present the structure for the remainder of this 
dissertation. In doing so, the research questions guiding this research will be put to the 
fore for each part and chapter of this dissertation. As described above, the aim of this 
research will be to confront the neo-patrimonial paradigm with the empirical case of the 
Zambian health sector. To do so, this dissertation has been divided into two parts: The 
Human Factor and The Health Sector.  
The Human Factor will explore the life-world of health workers. In the four chapters 
in this part we will see whether it is possible to distinguish patrimonial logic or be-
haviour in the accounts health workers present about their working lives. To do so, an 
attempt will be made to deconstruct what drives them in their career: Are they driven by 
                                                 
143  Weber, M., ‘Bureaucracy’. In: Sharma & Gupta, eds, Anthropology. 
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‘pre-industrial’ cultural values rather than the official goals of the health sector to 
deliver health care to the population? Chapter 2 will present a single case study of a 
specific health worker with the aim of familiarising the reader with the issues con-
fronting health workers at work. In this chapter we will take a first look at how the 
public-private conflict of the neo-patrimonial can manifest itself on the shop-floor level 
of the state.  
In Chapter 3 we will set off to explore the path taken by health workers to obtain a 
position in the health sector. This exploration will be based on health workers’ accounts 
of their working lives. The first question addressed is what has motivated people to 
become health workers: AWeberian vocation or the pursuit of a secure livelihood? Next 
we will see what makes someone successful in joining the health sector: Is it a matter of 
personal connections or merit? Finally, the chapter will explore the tension between 
health workers’ interests and the interest of the health system: How neutral and imper-
sonal are decisions to post someone in a remote location or to discipline errant health 
workers? 
Chapter 4 explores the possibilities for professional advancement open to health 
workers: Are health workers promoted on the basis of merit or patronage? In exploring 
this question, we will again explore the tension between private interests in self-
advancement and the official objectives of the health sector. Finally, having explored 
whether professional qualifications matter in the process of obtaining positions of 
power, the chapter will ask whether vertical linkages of affection and identity are indeed 
more important than horizontal linkages based on professional distinctions.  
In Chapter 5 we will explore health workers’ socio-economic situation. We will see 
if health workers are indeed struggling financially, as many claim they are. Do health 
workers limit their livelihood strategies to the official remuneration offered by their 
position or do they work ‘beyond the payslip’? Finally, we will then examine how this 
quest to make ends meet may impact on the system that employs them. Do the social 
and economic pressures facing health workers explain patrimonial behaviours? 
The second part of this dissertation, The Health Sector, will present a narrative of the 
Zambian health reform process from 1991 to 2008. This part of the research, which will 
shift focus from the human factor on the shop-floor of the health sector to the human 
factor in national political and policy arenas, will take a different approach from the 
preceding chapters. Rather than thematically organising issues per chapter, the five 
chapters are chronologically structured. Several research questions thus have a bearing 
on the second part of this dissertation in its entirety. These chapters will explore 
whether Zambia’s experience with health reforms reflect van de Walle’s ‘syndrome of 
partial reform’? Furthermore, I will analyse in which way these reforms and other 
aspects of the health sector have been instrumentalised by key actors in the sector. Was 
such instrumentalisation purely for private gain or did it serve a political rationale? 
Finally, throughout these chapters the question will be explored of how the collective 
interests of health workers shaped the process of health reforms as well as the structure 
of power and allocation of resources in the sector. 
Chapter 6 will explore where the ideas behind the health reforms originated. Like 
subsequent chapters, it will ask whether this was a Zambian process or donor-driven? In 
Chapter 7 we will explore the first steps in implementing the health reforms. Here we 
will explore how the initial ideas of health reforms were adjusted in the course of 
implementation. In order to do justice to the human factor in this process and to reflect 
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on the public–private confusion of neo-patrimonialism, this chapter and subsequent 
ones will explore which political actors played a role in shaping the reforms.  
In Chapter 8 we will explore how, paradoxically, the health reforms reached their 
zenith while at the same time the instrumentalisation of the process was most pro-
nounced. We will also see how the idea of creating a Central Board of Health surfaced, 
although it was not part of the original concept of the reforms. The chapter also again 
focuses on the role played by donors. What motivated them to shift their modalities 
from project support to a sector-wide approach in response to the health reform?  
Chapter 9 deals with an episode in which the health reforms stagnate. We will ex-
plore both the discursive rationale for this stagnation as well as the underlying interests 
at play. This episode is, moreover, marked by controversy over a corruption scandal. 
How did donors react to evidence of corruption and plunder? Moreover, we will see 
how in a period in which the government’s legitimacy was publicly challenged, donors 
managed to sign a document that would seal a new phase in cooperation in the health 
sector.  
The final chapter on the health sector examines how the health sector fared after 
Zambia had again changed its political leadership. Did the Mwanawasa era provide a 
‘New Deal’ for the health sector? Did this lead to a change in political and admini-
strative culture affecting the health sector? In this episode, key elements of the reform 
process were reversed. We will thus examine the discursive rationale for this reversal, in 
addition to analysing how considerations of power may have motivated these decisions.  
This dissertation will be concluded with a reflection on the tentative answers that the 
research questions above have generated. Here we will try to conclude concerning the 
extent to which it has been possible to label health workers’ ambitions and behaviour as 
patrimonial. Moreover, we will take stock of the health reform process and discuss what 
conclusions we can draw from this process to enhance our understanding of the Zam-























Introduction to the human factor 
In the preceding chapter we set the stage for what is to follow in this dissertation. The 
debate on the African state and the concept of neo-patrimonialism were explored, and a 
justification was given for focussing on the object of study: Zambia and particularly its 
health sector. Now, as was discussed in the theoretical framework, we will zoom in on 
the human factor that drives the Zambian health sector. In the chapters that will make up 
this part of this dissertation, we will look at the ‘shop-floor level’1of the Zambian health 
sector by examining the primary element that makes the health sector or any bureau-
cracy tick: Its workforce. This means looking at the strategies and behaviour of health 
workers: Doctors, nurses, administrators, and other staff required to deliver the out-
comes envisaged for the health system. We will, however, not only look at them as 
professionals, but rather as part of the socio-economic context within which they live. It 
is hoped that this will provide the insights needed to make sense of the historical, 
bureaucratic, and political processes analysed in greater depth in the next part of this 
dissertation. We will thus attempt to take a good look beyond the façades of the State 
and the sector at the human factor of the Zambian health system. 
As mentioned in the section ‘Zooming into the human factor’ of Chapter 1, the neo-
patrimonial paradigm makes assumptions about human behaviour. As such, the neo-
patrimonial paradigm suggests that in African bureaucracies there is little distinction 
between the public and private roles of those individuals holding a position. For the 
Zimbabwean health sector in the 1990s, one researcher drew the following bold con-
clusion:  
Health institutions and professions are based on rational-legal principles, but the behaviour of most of 
the health workers is underpinned by pre-industrial cultural values, such as valuing kinship over 
public interest. This gives rise to patrimonialism and other behaviours which are incompatible with 
professionalism as perceived from an Anglo-American perspective.2 
This statement represents well the dichotomous presumptions of the neo-patrimonial 
paradigm. It equates pre-industrial cultural values with patrimonialism and contrasts 
them with professionalism, which is implicitly labelled as a Western cultural value. A 
similar conclusion on the behaviour of health workers was drawn by Aitken in her 
analysis of the district health system in Nepal. She concluded that in contrast to the 
official theory, which sees the delivery of health services to the community as the 
                                                 
1  Anders, ‘Civil servants’. 
2  Mutizwa-Mangiza, D., The impact of health sector reform on public sector health worker motivation 
in Zimbabwe (Bethesda, 1998), 25. 
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purpose of the health system and its staff, implicit theory sees the provision of jobs and 
income to those within the system as its primary task. Whereas she does not directly 
employ the concepts of rational-legalism versus patrimonialism, she does evoke the 
well-known image of a façade by stating that many actions within the system that are 
phrased in terms of official theory have become ritualised and meaningless, as proce-
dures have been manipulated to serve the implicit theory.3  
In the next chapter we will explore the narratives presented by health workers to 
explore the factors that drive them and their behaviour. Indeed, we will see confusion 
between official theory and more implicit motivators. At a later stage we will further 
explore such conclusions to see to what extent they hold against the empirical reality of 
contemporary Zambian health workers. Is the pursuit of jobs and income indeed 
implicitly the primary goal for those in the health sector? Is this goal underpinned by 
‘pre-industrial values’ and patrimonial behaviour? Is the official theory of delivering 
health care to the population inconsequential in the face of the true motives of health 
workers?  
We will, however, begin this exploration with an example of a health worker and his 
account of some difficulties he has encountered both getting to work and being at work. 
This will familiarise us with some of the issues that are at play in health workers’ 
careers and at their place of work. The case is the anonymised account of a health 
worker I encountered a number of times. I interviewed him, spoke with his colleagues, 
and interacted socially with him while we bought each other beers. In addition, I 
observed the intervention on his behalf by a senior health official. The case presented is 
limited by the meagre information I was able to gather. Undoubtedly, some statements 
or even actions of those involved cannot simply be taken at face value: They are es-
sentially aimed at self-justification, presenting an optimal picture of one’s self. Never-
theless, this illustrative example will reveal issues relevant to the work and life-world of 
health workers and present the desires and ambitions expressed by them.  
The case of Ashley Mwansa4 
When I first met Ashley in April 2008, he was working at a zonal health centre, together 
with a midwife, support staff, and two young clinical officers. The clinical officer-in-
charge, Anton Chanda, was only twenty-five years old, but it was already the second 
health centre that he had headed. Both young men had only recently been transferred to 
this clinic. They recounted that they were facing some difficulties. There was no staff 
accommodation available at the health centre, so they had to walk four kilometres to a 
house they had to share. Moreover, Ashley had not been put on the government payroll 
even though he had been posted here five months earlier. This meant that he had had to 
leave his wife and three children behind in a small town in a neighbouring district. Over 
a beer, he told me that he was not sure how long he would remain working in the health 
sector. What kept him there was Anton and the other young clinical officer, who despite 
their age were doing good work.5  
                                                 
3  Aitken, J.M., ‘Voices from the inside: Managing district health services in Nepal’. International 
Journal of Health, Planning and Management, 9 (1994): 309-340. 
4  So as to protect the privacy of respondents, all the names presented below are fictitious.  
5  ML0804/15. 
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Ashley was a Zambian enrolled nurse.6 Although he was already in his mid-thirties, 
he had graduated from St. Paul’s school of nursing only in 2006. Ashley told me that his 
father and mother had not been married to each other. His mother came from North-
Western Province and his father originally came from Kaputa District in Northern 
Province. He explained that he had never known his father, who was working for the 
Ministry of Finance in Lusaka. His father had another family there and had passed away 
in 1994. Ashley said that he would have liked to get into contact with his father’s 
family, but suggested that he did not know how. His mother had brought him up in 
Solwezi, North-Western Province, until she followed a man to Luapula Province, a man 
whom she had met and later married. Ashley said his stepfather was a nursing officer 
with the district council and retired in 1993. He recalled that his mother was able to 
support him through secondary school, but that there was not enough money for further 
schooling. In the meanwhile, he had married a girl he met at school and started his own 
family. He supported the family by practising small-scale agriculture. In fact, he claim-
ed, he even managed to save money for further schooling. The plan had initially been to 
send his wife to nursing school. But she had told him, “No, you go”. “I have a good 
wife”, he proudly told me in a bar for all to hear. Later he explained that this decision 
was based on the fact that his wife’s school results were not good enough. In order to 
have a good chance of being admitted to nursing school, she would have to re-sit 
mathematics. That would take a long time and perhaps she would not pass.7 
Learning that Ashley had not been put on the payroll in the five months since having 
been posted was surprising. In recent years, payroll management had been partially 
decentralised to districts. The manager administration of a district health office would 
have to go to Lusaka with ‘inputs’ – a list of changes to be made to the payroll – and 
submit these to the Ministry of Finance. In an interview with the manager administra-
tion in question, when he was asked if there were problems placing people on the 
payroll, he was very vague and evasive in his response. He said it was not a problem to 
put people on the payroll. “You just go to Lusaka with the ‘inputs’”. He did, however, 
suggest that it was difficult to get hold of people at the human resources directorate at 
Ndeke House8 because there were so many people waiting.9  
A week after speaking with Ashley, I ran into him at the district health office in the 
neighbouring district. I happened to be there with a team from the provincial health 
office who were conducting a performance assessment. When asked, Ashley indicated 
he had come to fax his appointment letter to Lusaka, and he had to travel to this place as 
there was no fax machine in his home district. The manager administration was in 
Lusaka and needed this letter to put him on the payroll. After having said goodbye to 
Ashley, I asked the human resource manager from the province if she was familiar with 
this case. It turned out she was and appeared surprised that Ashley had had to come all 
this way to fax his appointment letter. She then went to her boss, the provincial health 
director, and told him of what she had just learned. She had earlier told me she does not 
understand why this procedure is a problem for the manager administration. “He goes to 
                                                 
6  An enrolled nurse is lower in the hierarchy of the health sector than a registered nurse, owing to the 
shorter training programme. See Annex IV for a list of professional cadres in the Zambian health 
sector. 
7  ML0804/15 and ML0811/14. 
8  Ndeke House is the modern, multi-storey building in which the Ministry of Health is housed. Former-
ly, the building housed the Central Board of Health. 
9  ML0804/17. 
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Lusaka often, but probably to do other business. He does not even go past the provincial 
health office on his way ... It should be simple, but perhaps it is because he is a nurse. 
He is forced to do these things even though he does not understand them”.10 
The provincial health director then grabbed his mobile phone, found the manager 
administration’s number, and called him. It seemed that this issue had come up when 
the team from the province visited earlier in the week. Also, the manager administration 
had been told how to prepare himself for the task of putting people on the payroll. “Why 
haven’t you brought the letter”, the director asked the manager administration. “Why 
are you rushing to Lusaka for reasons known only to yourself without preparing 
yourself properly? You are just chasing allowances while others are suffering. This 
young man travelled (here) to fax this letter. Do you realise the cost you are adding? 
This just reflects the shoddy work you have been doing. I’m sorry if I sound harsh, but 
if I hear one more thing like this, I’ll remove you from your post”. After hanging up he 
muttered under his breath, “No wonder they hate (the district health director)”.11  
In November of that same year I visited Ashley again. I had learned that both he and 
Anton had moved to a different health centre. Because of the accommodation issue, 
Ashley had gone to the district health office to insist on a transfer. He was not able to 
bring his family over and he had been maintaining two households. So some four 
months earlier he was moved from the zonal health centre to become the in-charge12 at 
this improved health post where he would work together with one classified daily 
employee (CDE), an older gentleman who cleaned, guarded, and assisted in carrying out 
the duties at the clinic. The health post that Ashley was running was just a small facility 
that had been recently opened. His predecessor, also a male nurse, had gone on study-
leave to upgrade from an enrolled nurse to a registered nurse. Anton had also left the 
health centre where I had found them in April. After Ashley had been transferred, Anton 
had gone to the district health office to say, “If you transfer Ashley, then I am leaving”. 
They thought he was joking, but then he arranged a transfer back to the district where he 
used to work. He went back to the same health centre where he was in-charge before, to 
take up the same position.13  
Ashley had since been put on the payroll. He received his back pay, which had 
allowed him to furnish the two-bedroom staff house that his family now occupies. In 
April he had been informed by someone that the provincial health director was in the 
district. He had then gone to the human resource manager to explain his problem. The 
human resource manager in turn took it up with the provincial health director. Then, 
after faxing the letter to Lusaka, the problem was soon resolved and since May he had 
been receiving his salary. However, Ashley suspected this issue has caused enmity 
between the manager administration and himself: They were not on good terms. The 
manager administration appears to think that what Ashley did, complaining to the 
provincial health director, was wrong. He had since been telling people in the district 
bad things about Ashley. This led Ashley to consider that people in the district now 
think he is a troublemaker. If he presented problems to the district now, they would be 
overlooked: The district would not help. He was currently thinking about complaining 
to the provincial health director to ask for a transfer out of the district. According to 
                                                 
10  Field notes VW06. 
11  Field notes VW06. 
12  The officer-in-charge of a clinic or department is commonly referred to as the in-charge. 
13  ML0811/14 and ML0811/08. 
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Ashley’s friend Anton, however, there had already been a soured relation between the 
manager administration and Ashley before this incident. 
When asked what type of problems he had presented to the district, Ashley men-
tioned that in the health centre where he was posted before he had been beaten. He was 
on night duty when a man arrived looking for his wife. His child was ill and had been 
admitted. The man went in to the ward and then came out and started beating Ashley. “I 
didn’t retaliate. That is against our ethics”. Ashley cannot give an explanation why he 
was beaten. He suggested that when he came for night duty, he just found the child 
there. When asked if something had gone wrong, he denied this. The only explanation 
he could give was that the father had probably been smoking dagga.14 Ashley suggested 
that he had brought the case to court, but has since decided to drop the case after the 
man’s relatives pleaded and he decided to forgive him. According to Ashley, the district 
did not know how the case was doing; he felt that at the district health office they were 
not concerned.  
Another issue in which the district health office, in Ashley’s view, had not supported 
him concerned the family of the nurse who was previously in charge at the health post. 
While the nurse was on study leave, his family still had the right to be accommodated in 
his staff house. Now, “the family behave as if they are workers at the clinic and the man 
even instructs them to insult me”. When Ashley arrived at the clinic, there were no 
bicycles there. During performance assessment, “the district asked us why we were not 
doing much on IMCI” (integrated management of children’s illnesses). He had ans-
wered that they did not have the bicycles needed for the outreach activities. The 
officials from the district then informed him that not too long ago bicycles had been 
delivered to the clinic. Ashley then learned from his colleague, the CDE, that the 
bicycles were kept at the home of the last in-charge. When they went to remove the 
bicycles to bring them to the clinic where they belong, the wife of the former in-charge 
phoned her husband. Ashley’s predecessor accused him of not knowing the regulations, 
and that he, the former officer-in-charge, had opened the clinic and that was why he was 
given the bicycles. Later, the family just came into the clinic to take the bicycles. “I 
don’t know why they behave like that”, Ashley exclaimed. “The family and the clinic 
are separate”. He has reported the issue to the district, but they have not done anything 
to help. The issue affects even Ashley’s own family. They are also insulted by his pre-
decessor’s family, who live in the adjacent staff house. The family have never en-
countered something like this before. At their previous home they got along well with 
their neighbours. After the district had failed to do anything about this issue, Ashley 
told his Neighbourhood Health Committee that he was planning to leave. The com-
munity, however, asked him not to go, promising that they would go to the district to 
talk to them.15  
Ashley’s friend Anton also reported that he had the impression that he was not 
supported enough by the district health office in the district he left. At the health centre 
where he was in charge, they were running a clinic dispensing anti-retroviral AIDS 
treatment. They wanted to set up a mobile clinic to follow up patients who were put on 
anti-retrovirals, but the district could not come up with the funds. Also, once he wanted 
to send blood samples for testing at the nearest hospital in the adjacent district. “They 
took three months and they still didn’t deliver”. When he went to complain about this, 
he was told, “We have been here for a long time. You have just been here for a few 
                                                 
14  Cannabis. 
15  ML0811/14. 
50 
 
months. You can’t tell us how to run the district”.16 Separately, concerning the same 
issue, Ashley told me, “They fail to find money for fuel to follow up people on ARTs 
(anti-retroviral treatment), but they find fuel to go to Mansa to do their business. You 
know with ARTs we're not helping people; we're killing them. They are interested in 
how many people we start on ART, but we don't have means to follow up. They could 
move or be anywhere”. As a further illustration of the management problems in the 
district, he listed the people who have left the district. “That must show we have a 
problem”.  
When asked if he still had job satisfaction, he replied that he felt very little enjoy-
ment in the work. This health post was, he argued, running like a larger health centre. A 
health post should just operate from 08.00 until 16.00, but here they would even admit 
patients. “We work throughout the day and at night there are emergencies. I only enjoy 
my due: My salary. The workload is very heavy”. Nevertheless, when prompted, he also 
admitted that there was gratitude from patients. Some come with gifts such as cassava. 
“Usually I don’t allow that”, he added. “In your country people might just offer a gift, 
but here that is different. Here they might give that to be favoured when you treat 
them”. Then he recounted how once when he was just about to travel, a difficult 
maternity case came and he had to delay his travels. He called an ambulance and 
accompanied the patient before he proceeded. Then when he returned, her family came 
to thank him and offer praise. “That does give enjoyment”. In fact, it is one thing that 
motivated him to become a nurse. Once Ashley’s son received a burn and he brought 
him to a clinic. There a health worker treated the child. That inspired Ashley to want to 
deliver services, he claimed.17  
When chatting over a beer, Ashley suggested that many people in the district man-
agement were not qualified for the positions they hold. The manager administration was 
trained as a midwife with little training in management and administration. Earlier I had 
learned from the manager administration himself that he had been a nurse who trained 
as a midwife in the early 1980s. Besides a few years working as a tutor at a nearby 
nursing school, he had spent most of his time working at rural health centres. He came 
to the district seven years ago, and after having worked as a health centre in-charge, he 
was made to act as an manager administration three years earlier. Now he was waiting 
for his retirement in two years’ time. Ashley then indicated that another member of the 
district management team was in service for just a short time before joining the district 
office. People such as this are afraid to speak out in support of those below them. They 
are insecure about their positions, so they stay quiet. He added that the district health 
director shows no concern for his workforce. He never comes to clinics, only to do his 
own business or if some staff member has to drop something off. Ashley was told that 
the previous director would just stop by to see how people are doing and if their family 
is well. Also he complained that “when you pass by the district health office, you’re not 
a welcome guest, but an intruder ... If you come with an issue, people do not take 
responsibility but push it to a colleague”.18  
                                                 
16  ML0811/08. 
17  ML0811/14. 
18  ML0811/14. 
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What does this case suggest? 
Ashley’s story has been related to identify some issues that will feature in the following 
chapters. It is the story of a young man who has dealt with poverty and adversity on his 
way towards joining the Zambian health service and who apparently struggled to get to 
grips with the reality of being employed in the health sector. It was interesting to note 
how Ashley claimed to have been working on the land to raise money for feeding his 
family as well as to send his wife or himself to college. He, like many other Zambians, 
was born into a situation in which it could not be taken for granted that there would be 
funds to send him through school. However, he apparently persevered and reached his 
goal of educating himself. We will examine the accounts of other health workers to get 
an impression of the socio-economic backgrounds of those entering the health sector in 
Chapter 3. We will see how, through the collective effort of parents, relatives, and the 
individuals themselves, they manage to go through school to get the qualifications 
needed to start off in the health sector.  
Also striking in this account is the ambivalence that is suggested by Ashley’s mo-
tivation for being a health worker. Apparently he had tried to send his wife to college, 
but as his chances for being accepted were higher than hers, or so he claimed, they had 
decided on his becoming a nurse. He, however, juxtaposed this motivation with an 
account of how he was inspired when his child was helped by a health worker. This 
raises questions about the motivations of health workers. Is it a strong intrinsic motiv-
ation, a passion, or a calling that leads young men and women to become a nurse or a 
doctor, or are they just looking for a job? This is an issue that we will examine further in 
Chapter 3. Equally, the difficulties recalled by Ashley about his working conditions 
conjure up an ambiguous picture about his job satisfaction and motivation. On the one 
hand, he claimed that he was motivated by the gratitude offered by patients and their 
relatives. On the other hand, after having finished a litany of the difficulties he en-
countered, he resigned himself in the statement, “I only enjoy my due: My salary.” 
As Ashley and Anton were posted, they were confronted with hardships that affected 
their private lives. Living conditions were, according to the two young men, not up to 
standard, There was no accommodation that would allow Ashley to be joined by his 
family, and he did not receive his salary for the first months of his posting – apparently 
owing to the incompetence of people at the district health office. Moreover, there were 
issues in the working relation Ashley and Anton had with the district health office, 
which made them dissatisfied. It was striking how they both showed their agency in 
securing a transfer elsewhere, which apparently was not very difficult. This agency or 
power of health workers vis-à-vis the bureaucracy that tries to manage them is 
remarkable. We will explore accounts of health workers on the transfers and the post-
ings they have undergone within their career in Chapters 3 and 4 to get an idea of their 
perspectives and how this agency can be explained.  
In the account presented above, there are various instances where the public interest, 
namely offering effective and efficient health services, and private interests do not 
converge and can even conflict. The understandable preoccupation of Ashley and Anton 
with their living conditions already suggests as much. Most illustrative in this regard, 
however, is the account Ashley gave of the attitudes of his predecessor and the 
predecessor’s family to the bicycles that were given to the clinic to conduct outreach 
activities. This account clearly shows the confusion between the public and private 
spheres of a health worker, which is so familiar to the neo-patrimonial paradigm. It 
shows that in the behaviour of Ashley’s predecessor, there is no separation made be-
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tween what is public, the property of the health post, and his own private social realm. 
The predecessor is even so brash as to use rational-legal discourse to defend his actions, 
accusing Ashley of not knowing the regulations. On the other hand, Ashley’s account of 
this incident also suggests that the instrumentalisation of one’s position to personalise 
public resources is not uncontested. He denounces the invasion of the public sphere of 
the clinic by his predecessor’s family. Of course, Ashley’s true views in this situation 
might remain closely guarded in his heart and mind. A cynic might suggest that he 
removed the bicycles to use them for his own private interests. At the same time, the 
exclamation, “The family and the clinic are separate”, reflects the rational-legal values 
inherent to bureaucracy. This anecdote thus suggests that the borders between public 
and private are the subject of contestation on the shop-floor of the health sector. From 
the perspective of the predecessor, one could argue that in this micro-example there is 
no emancipation of the state from society. Judging from the outcome of this particular 
struggle, however, in that the bicycles have been taken away from the family, the 
distinction between what is of the state and what is of society has indeed been defined in 
practice.  
This public–private confusion also came to the fore in the light this example shone 
on the practice of human resource management. Apparently the process of putting 
someone on the payroll was not as straightforward as it appeared. Were the problems 
encountered merely due to the incompetence of the manager administration involved, or 
because this official allowed private interests prevail over his official duty? The prov-
incial health director’s explanations suggest that both incompetence and the pursuit of 
private interests can be at play. He stated that this was shoddy work, caused by the 
manager administration’s “rushing to Lusaka for reasons known only to (him)self” and 
“just chasing allowances”, while at the same time arguing that he is a nurse who is made 
to do things he does not understand. In fact, according to Ashley’s accusations against 
those at the district health office, it is a trend that officials there are under-qualified and 
thus not responsive to the problems faced in the district. When Anton and Ashley point 
out these problems – or even worse, Ashley complains to his boss’ superior – they incur 
the district officials’ wrath for their disloyalty. As we will see later in this dissertation, 
this contributes to the argument that managing loyalty is more important than managing 
performance in a neo-patrimonial context. 
While Ashley’s story is inherently specific – specific to his context, his personal 
experiences, and his individual perspectives, values, and character – it does provide an 
insight into the reality of a health worker. It shines a light on the spatial mobility of 
health workers, being sent by a bureaucracy from one place to another to deliver 
services, though many such as Ashley and Anton manage to influence this process so as 
to align this public objective to their personal goals. It also shines a light on health 
workers’ social mobility, having struggled out of poverty on to a path that will allow 
them to further improve their lives and those of their families. We will now examine 




Getting (down) to work 
Having been introduced to the lives and careers of health workers from their own 
accounts through the analysis of Ashley’s story, let us now discuss the issues con-
fronting health workers in their career paths. We will begin by examining how health 
workers have started off in the health sector. First, we will look at why health workers 
chose a career in the health sector. What are the motivations that they recount when 
describing why they became a health professional? As was asked earlier, are health 
workers intrinsically motivated to work specifically in health or is it simply a path like 
many others to secure a livelihood? Subsequently, we will explore how they had been 
able to reach the health sector through schooling and earning qualifications. As it will 
appear, this is not a purely individual achievement based on someone’s talents, but more 
of a collective pursuit. We will thus examine the socio-economic environment of the 
health worker by asking who pushed them through school and, as such, onto a middle-
class road that may lead them out of poverty. Is the health sector an avenue for upward 
social mobility?  
The following section of this chapter will deal with health workers’ pursuit of quali-
fications. Having been put through school, most working in the health sector will need 
further qualifications in order to get a job in health. We will see what the competition 
for scarce education opportunities can lead to, when we examine health workers’ 
recollections of getting into college. In the subsequent part of this chapter, the argument 
on scarcity is reversed, however. In that section it appears that health workers them-
selves have become scarce commodities on the market of jobs in the government health 
system. We will see that this empowers health workers in their negotiation with the 
system that places them across the vast map of health centres, hospitals, and health 
offices throughout the country. We will thus be introduced to the great spatial mobility 
involved in working in the health sector and the agency of health workers in deter-
mining their fate. This chapter will conclude with a look forward to issues of how the 
health system manages its labour force, when we deal with the stories of health workers 
who are forced to move by disciplinary transfers. How does a system deal with deviant 
employees, when they are empowered by being a scarce commodity?  
In this chapter and the subsequent ones dealing with the human factor, arguments 
made will be illustrated by and based on extracts from interviews with health workers. 
Before beginning, a note should be made again about the validity of some statements. 
People’s perspectives will be presented which need not be reflective of the truth as 
others perceive it. Their interests, their values, and their conceptions of the interviewer 
are likely to have influenced what they chose to relate and what not. Nevertheless, by 
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critically analysing their accounts and by placing them next to others’ accounts, we 
should learn of issues, factors, and values influencing health workers’ behaviour.  
Struggling out of poverty 
For an average Zambian, getting a job essentially means an escape from poverty. 
According to Zambian government statistics, only 17 per cent of working Zambians are 
in paid employment.1 A job in the government health sector is one of the limited 
opportunities that provide an alternative to the default livelihoods of most Zambians: 
Subsistence agriculture, informal urban work, and dependence on relatives. Some health 
workers may profess lofty goals and motives behind their career choice, but a broader 
sample of health workers’ career motivations reveals much ambivalence. Health work-
ers often became health workers by chance: They were presented with a lucky opportu-
nity, having limited alternatives. Nursing or medicine is thus generally seen as a job 
rather than a vocation.2  
When talking to health workers about their profession and careers, one hears dif-
ferent explanations from different individuals as to why they became a nurse, a doctor 
or, for instance, a physiotherapist. Some put forward high and lofty motives, presenting 
themselves as selfless and idealistic. Various people claim to have chosen a job in the 
health sector “just to serve the people”.3 Some call it a passion or a calling, “to help 
people who are suffering”, or to “care for patients”. A number of people recount having 
had a suffering family member when they were young; others recall an experience when 
they were young and were treated by health workers. One nurse put is as follows: 
“When I was younger, I got sick, and I admired the nurses I saw, so that’s where I got 
the idea”.4 Another health worker, whom we will call Mr. Zulu, remembers that he had 
once gone to an urban clinic. The only health workers there had fallen ill, so people 
were sent away; only the most urgent cases were seen to. He still remembers the look of 
desperation on people's faces; he felt he had to assist.5 
It would be cynical to bluntly dismiss these representations of people’s motives as 
insincere. On the other hand, it is important to bear in mind that in interviews many will 
want to present themselves in the best light. Moreover, such idealistic, altruistic motives 
are just one factor among many that influence one’s career choice. A more complete 
palette of responses on why they chose their profession provides more ambivalence. 
Some are very frank in explaining the banality behind their decision to work in health. 
One nurse said, “It’s a calling. My father wanted me to be a teacher. But I just loved the 
white uniform”.6 For some it was a calculated decision, focussed very much on the 
financial motivators that came with the profession. A male nurse admitted that to him 
the Ministry of Health “seemed like a good employer, with the possibilities for work-
                                                 
1  CSO (2005) Labour Force Survey 2005 – Summary Report;  
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/nada/ddibrowser/?section=reports&id=32 (accessed on 9 February 
2009). The self-employed make up 43 per cent, unpaid family labour 38 per cent, and employers 1 per 
cent of employed Zambians.  
2  Weberian’s, A., idealised notion of rational-legal bureaucracy assumes, however, that a position in the 
civil service is a vocation (Beruf), characterised by duty (Pflicht), thus presuming that private interests 
are made subservient to the public good. See Weber, ‘Bureaucracy’, 51.  
3  PB0811/19, LB0809/19, LB0809/21, PB0810/02, and PB0810/08. 
4  PB0810/08. 
5  ML0811/15. 
6  PB0810/07. 
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shops and allowances”.7 Another interviewee, Mr. Phiri, wanted to study medicine. 
However, he did not get into medical school because of financial constraints. Still, he 
wanted to do something in the medical field but was discouraged from becoming a 
clinical officer “because it is a Zambian programme and difficult to go out of the 
country with that diploma”.8 So instead, Mr. Phiri settled for becoming a physiothera-
pist.  
For some, a career in health care was not a decision born out of deep passions or 
convictions; rather it was a second or third choice, influenced by social considerations. 
One doctor explained how as a child he wanted to become a pilot. But, “all my friends 
went to medical school, and I had been with them since primary school, and I also went 
to medical school with them ... It wasn’t peer pressure, we just got in as a gang”.9 As 
indicated by this example, someone’s social environment plays a large part in their 
career choice. Sometimes this is blunt parental pressure, based on engendered norms. A 
young nurse argued that she had no choice in deciding on a career. After school she had 
wanted to go into engineering or something similar, perhaps with computers. Her father 
objected, saying, “if you do what men do, what will men do?” One day she woke up and 
her father told her, “there are interviews today at St Paul’s; you should go there”. He 
had already signed her up. She did not want to go, but she went to please her father. The 
interview went well and a few months later she was accepted into nursing school to 
become an enrolled nurse. She reflected, “maybe this is what God wants me to do”.10  
But apart from blunt pressure, relatives can also be of indirect influence – for 
instance, by being a positive or a negative example. The male nurse cited earlier, who 
reckoned the Ministry of Health would be a good employer, grew up with an uncle who 
was a teacher. However, seeing the problems that teachers face, he decided to do 
something else.11 Others were inspired or convinced by role models, either doctors or 
nurses encountered when they went to hospital or family members who themselves 
worked in the health sector. Having a relative working for the Ministry of Health, 
however, can be more than merely an inspiration. One environmental health technician 
who has climbed up to hold a senior position in a district health office mentioned that 
the fact that his father was a health inspector was an important factor in his career 
choice: He was emulating what his father had done. However, when prompted, he 
admitted that having a relative in the health sector made it easier for people to be 
“pushed into college” by these relatives.12 In other words, it is not only inspirational but 
also instrumental.  
Of course, it is important to take into consideration that it is not always that a young 
person can just become what he or she chooses to be. This is true anywhere but more so 
in a country such as Zambia, where even among the emergent middle-class, resources 
and possibilities are constrained. A choice of studies is very much influenced by the 
employment possibilities a country has to offer. One man in his late forties remembered 
that he was encouraged by a cousin, who was a nurse herself, to try to go into nursing. 
“You can also be something other than a teacher or a miner”, she had said,13 referring to 
                                                 
7  PB0811/23. 
8  PB0811/26. 
9  PB0812/11. 
10  LB0809/23. 
11  PB0811/23. 
12  LB0809/03. 
13  PB0809/02. 
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two of the most common avenues in Zambian history for a career in formal employ-
ment. Similarly, a career in health is such an avenue. If one manages to get accepted 
into a health-related college or into medical school, one is virtually guaranteed (pro-
vided you complete the programme) a job for life.  
Getting into medical school, nursing school, the clinical officers’ programme at 
Chainama College, or another health-related programme could thus mean the difference 
between lifetime employment and struggling to get by in informal employment or 
small-scale agriculture. This can be illustrated by the account of a doctor, whose father 
was a spray painter at an engineering company in Lusaka. He remembered what the 
chances offered by education meant to him. He recounted that his parents tried their best 
to provide their love and care to him, but it was difficult to see him through secondary 
school. His parents were living in a compound14 on one side of Lusaka. He had to walk 
many kilometres to go to school on the other side of town in the industrial boots his 
father brought home from work. Even his teachers mocked him for the boots he wore 
because his parents could not afford other shoes. Later, his parents sent him to live with 
an uncle in a compound closer to school. Years later, he related, he was at school with a 
focus. On his locker he wrote “target UNZA”.15 Then, in Grade 12 as he sat for his final 
exams, he thought to himself, “This is the time.” He sat with tears in his eyes, thinking, 
“If I succeed I can go to university, become better, and help improve my family. 
Otherwise we will remain in this poverty.” He passed his tests with good results and 
was able to go to medical school. He spent all seven years of his doctors’ training on a 
public bursary. He did not repeat a single year. “Public investment produced me”. He 
had been motivated to succeed.16 On the one hand, this account is evidently a story 
aimed at glorifying the one who tells it by portraying himself as a focussed, hard worker 
who knows his duties to his family and his country. Besides that, however, this story 
also clearly presents a key motivator for people’s efforts to educate themselves and seek 
employment: Namely, to get themselves and their families out of poverty.  
Resources of course are a constraining factor. This need apply not only to the 
necessary fees17 that might be required for a specific educational institution, but also to 
the economic difficulties in getting a quality education to allow access to tertiary 
education. Mr. Phiri, who had failed to become a doctor and in the end became a 
physiotherapist, said that he had not achieved his goal because of financial constraints.18 
A male nurse who graduated in the mid-1990s provided a similar account; he recounted 
that initially he had wanted to do mechanics, but he had no money for college, so he 
applied for nursing, which was a free course at the time. Since then, however, he 
claimed that he had grown to like his profession “because it is life-saving and because 
you receive a lot of blessings”.19 
Being able to afford an education, however, is not enough to automatically get into 
school. Some did not get the grades to allow them to study what they wanted. In the 
Zambian education system, school results not only influence the possibility of getting 
into a college or university but also in which field of studies. The Mr. Zulu referred to 
                                                 
14  In the Zambian context, a compound refers to a high-density suburban area, where the lower and 
lower-middle class urban population lives.  
15  University of Zambia. 
16  ML0812/03. 
17  Both formal and informal fees, which we will examine further later.  
18  PB0811/26. 
19  PB0811/24. 
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above related that he had been accepted to university. He had initially been inspired to 
study engineering, but the results of his entrance exam simply were not good enough. 
Instead, he was assigned to do library studies. As this did not interest him, he decided to 
study to become a clinical officer instead. It was, he said, not much of a problem to get 
into Chainama because he had achieved good results in school.20 Others told of wives, 
daughters, nieces, or brothers who have completed Grade 12 but have had to re-sit 
certain subjects to get into college and who are in the meantime working in the house, 
on the field, and/or in other informal employment.21 As we will see later in this chapter, 
health workers’ accounts of the paths they took to and through their careers point 
towards the conclusion that qualifications and good marks matter. However, in order to 
get these qualifications, a child has to grow up in a social environment in which the 
resources are available to study. 
Who pushed you through school?  
For almost all the people interviewed, getting to and through college was a financial 
struggle, both for themselves and their families. Nominally, primary education is free in 
Zambia, but the same does not apply to the entire route one has to take to qualifying as a 
professional. In the Kaunda era, most public education had been free, but structural 
adjustment had put an end to this as it was considered financially unsustainable. 
President Mwanawasa had, in turn, in an election year and under the shadow of donor-
policies advocating universal access to education, announced the popular decision to 
scrap primary school fees. Moreover, quality is a serious concern with respect to Zam-
bian education. While remarkable progress has been made in the state-run education 
sector in raising statistics for children in schools,22 many Zambians who can afford it 
turn to private schools to educate their children. Public schools are often considered 
below standard. Nevertheless, getting a child educated to the extent that she can be 
accepted to a university is very costly. It involves – among other things – fees, school 
uniforms and materials, food, clothing, accommodation, and transport costs, as well as 
the opportunity costs of not being able to engage in informal labour while studying. 
Bearing these costs is not only an individual venture, depending on one’s own talents 
and resources, but also on one’s social capital; relatives’ abilities and preparedness to 
support a child’s educational career. Considering these costs, the motivation interview-
ees have expressed for education in their accounts is overwhelming. As will be seen in 
later sections, this applies not only to their own initial education but also their further 
education and the education of their children and relatives. 
Parents commonly played a large role in pushing future health workers through 
school. A very senior nursing officer in a provincial hospital spoke of how his parents in 
Mwinilunga in the North-Western Province of Zambia had, as “subsistence farmers”, 
grown pineapples to educate all their 12 children up to Grade 12 level, and some 
beyond.23 Out of 54 people interviewed and who spoke about their parents’ work or 
                                                 
20  ML0811/15. 
21  For instance, PB0810/02, PB0810/12, PB0810/17, PB0810/20, and ML0810/09. 
22  Net enrolment rates increased between 1990 and 2006 from 71 per cent to 96 per cent for boys and 
from 69 per cent to 98 per cent for girls. The percentage of children completing Grade 7, meanwhile, 
grew from 71 per cent to 91 per cent for boys and from 57 per cent to 79 per cent for girls. UNDP, 
MDG progress report 2008 (Lusaka, 2008). 
23  One can note that this was in the early Kaunda-era, when school fees were not an issue.  
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profession, just over 20 per cent indicated that at least one of their parents had been or 
were “just farmers”, usually peasant farmers or subsistence farmers. Evidently, more 
had parents who had been working in formal employment. Just under a third of these 
respondents had at least one parent (usually the father) working for the government and 
about the same proportion of respondents had a parent working in mining. These figures 
can be a bit confused, as parents often resorted to farming after retirement, and 
generally many Zambians farm in addition to their day-job. One young clinical officer, 
for example, mentioned that his father is a farmer on the plateau in Luapula. “Not on a 
large scale, but he’s got herds of cattle”. The father also grows a hectare of maize, a 
hectare of beans, a hectare of groundnuts, and some cassava. The respondent, however, 
then mentioned that his father used to be a miner in Mufulira on the Copperbelt before 
retiring and moving to Luapula. Originally the father had come from Northern Province 
but settled in the district where his wife came from, before moving to another district in 
the same province where he could get land for farming.24 For health workers it is also a 
common pattern to farm next to formal employment and after one retires, as we will see 
in Chapter 5.  
Whereas the figures presented above might lack statistical rigour or statistical sig-
nificance, they do give an impression of the social backgrounds of health workers. 
Apparently, a majority of health workers have parents in formal employment. While it 
certainly happens that the children of peasant farmers manage to complete school and 
college and then join the ranks of the lucky few with permanent jobs, the larger part of 
the health workers we encountered were at least the second generation of people in 
formal employment. This thus points towards a process of class formation, in which it is 
more difficult for the offspring of peasant farmers to progress to being employed in the 
government health sector than it is for the offspring of those already in formal employ-
ment to also gain the qualifications needed for a government job.  
It is striking to note the number of sons and daughters of miners encountered among 
health workers interviewed. Not only did almost a third of our respondents, such as the 
clinical officer mentioned above, have fathers who had been miners, but others had 
grown up on the Copperbelt with parents who were not directly involved in mining25. 
This is perhaps not so surprising, considering the extent to which the mining sector 
dominates Zambia’s formal economy. It is, however, an interesting finding in light of 
the gloomy picture painted by Ferguson about retiring miners on the Zambian Copper-
belt. He described how miners, in the shadow of a collapsing mining sector, went ‘back’ 
to rural areas to retire. If they were lucky, they would have the social and cultural assets 
to maintain relations with their rural allies and resume the life of a villager. If they were 
unlucky, however, they would be condemned to social isolation and poverty as they had 
failed to maintain what Ferguson calls a localist cultural style that does not offend rural 
values. In short, Ferguson paints a picture of a retirement of failed modernity for some 
Zambian mineworkers in the 1990s.26 It is then interesting to see ‘their children’ a good 
decade later, in whose education their mining fathers had invested. They are holding a 
                                                 
24  ML0811/08. 
25  Some had parents who were teachers or other government workers on the Copperbelt, and numerous 
respondents had brothers, uncles, or sons working in the mines.  
26  Ferguson, Expectations, 123-165. 
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job – perhaps ‘struggling financially’ but still making a decent livelihood out of formal 
employment.27 
It is also striking to note how many respondents were sons and daughters of 
government workers. This was roughly equal to the number of miners’ offspring. This 
number includes those whose parents were teachers or nurses. One respondent described 
how his father was one of the first African teachers, in fact one of the first Africans with 
A-levels. He went on to work at the Ministry of Education as an under-secretary.28 
Another respondent’s father was a medical assistant, which was the highest a black man 
could become in the colonial health sector. He rose to the rank of a provincial medical 
assistant before retiring.29 Others had parents with more modest careers, but neverthe-
less these individuals are the second generation (at least) of those in government 
employment. This is of course not surprising since the state is the largest employer in 
Zambia, as is the case in most African countries. It does, however, add to the argument 
that public employment contributes to forming an emergent middle-class. In fact, one 
could consider these as the direct descendants of what the Zambian historian Chipungu 
describes as the ‘boma-class’, those who made careers in the native administrations of 
the colonial era and through their accumulation and enterprise began to form a distinct 
class.30  
Of course, someone’s account of his father’s or mother’s line of work is only a weak 
indicator of the ease of getting a good education. It says little about their parents’ other 
financial obligations, other sources of income, or the circumstances that influenced their 
lives and careers. Family histories are pocked and scarred by deaths, divorces, and other 
influential events. Some respondents had elderly parents to care for; some had mothers 
and fathers that were still professionally active; others’ parents were active and pro-
ductive retirees. At least as many, however, were orphans or partially orphaned, which 
is not surprising taking into account the ravages of AIDS. In many personal histories, 
other relatives such as aunts, uncles, or siblings played an important role in supporting 
someone’s education. For example, one health worker, Mr. Chipumbu, described how 
he grew up in Chingola, on the Copperbelt. There he went to primary school. Then, in 
Grade 7, his father, who had been a miner, passed away. He then moved with his uncle 
to Northern Province to the town of Luwingu. Later he went to boarding school in 
Mbala, also in Northern Province. The uncle, who had been posted in Northern Province 
as teacher, had himself had been supported by Mr. Chipumbu’s parents until the father 
died. Taking the young son of Mr. Chipumbu and educating him was his way of 
repaying their hospitality.31 Another health worker, Mr Tembo, came from Eastern 
Province, where his parents were subsistence farmers. His father died when he was very 
young. Initially, his schooling was sponsored by his uncles; later, a brother (who was 
actually a cousin “who grew up at mum’s home”) took over sponsoring him. He had 
managed to get a job with an NGO in Lusaka and later started working with UNICEF. 
Mr. Tembo’s sister was not as fortunate as him and another brother, who had since 
                                                 
27  Of course, our limited sample does not include the accounts of miners’ children who may have ended 
up as destitute subsistence farmers. These tentative conclusions should thus be considered cautiously. 
This may provide, however, a tangent point for further research into social mobility and class forma-
tion in contemporary Zambia.  
28  ML0810/02. 
29  ML0811/02. 
30  Chipungu, ‘Accumulation’. 
31  LB0809/07. 
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become a teacher. The sister just did Grade 5 as the uncles had refused to sponsor a 
girl.32  
From these health workers’ accounts we can thus see that luck and circumstance had 
a large role to play in getting them educated. The people interviewed in this research 
were those who succeeded (in part) in getting qualified and getting a job. Beyond them 
there must be many more who failed. Nevertheless, the determination and perseverance 
demonstrated by these health workers is inspiring and is testament to the extent to which 
educational qualifications are important tools for struggling out of poverty.  
Qualifications matter 
Notwithstanding the struggle involved in completing secondary school, this is not 
enough to qualify as a health worker or to get a job in the government health sector. 
Following the logic of patrimonialism, one would assume that people’s recruitment to a 
job in the Zambian health sector would be in large part a ‘reward for (a) personal 
connection with personal leaders” rather than as the result of ‘competitive processes that 
judge their merit and expertise”.33 Strikingly, however, from health workers’ accounts 
about themselves and others, it appears that qualifications – which are attributes of 
processes – that judge merit and competence do matter, or are indeed essential. The 
health sector is characterised by the fact that various specific specialised cadres are 
employed, such as nurses, clinical officers, physiotherapists, environmental health tech-
nicians, and doctors. Without the prerequisite qualifications, one has next to no chance 
of getting a job in such a specialised profession, regardless of one’s family connections. 
At the same time, as we shall see, personal connections play an important part in de-
termining access to qualifications, which are a scarce and prized resource. 
Of course, in terms of the importance of qualifications there are differences between 
the ‘qualified’ cadres such as doctors and nurses and those less educated such as 
cleaners, watchmen, or office orderlies. In the Zambian health sector such ‘un-qualified’ 
staff are often called classified daily employees (CDEs). Some, especially at rural health 
centres, merely have a few years of secondary school, while others are school leavers. It 
is possible that among such groups personal connections can play a role in getting 
access to a job. When qualifications are less of a distinctive factor between two 
candidates for a job, other criteria might become more important. In fact, jobs for which 
minimal qualifications are needed are ideal instruments for clientalism.34 Notwithstand-
ing the opportunities that exist for clientalism, it equally appeared in the fieldwork for 
this research that for these cadres, qualifications can be also be relevant. This combi-
nation of both personal connections and formal qualification appeared to have been 
instrumental in the account casually offered by a security guard. While waiting for a 
medical superintendent to arrive at a district hospital, I was chatting with a watchman. 
He told me that he had previously been working as a guard for the electricity company 
in Lusaka. One night the facility he was guarding had been robbed by armed thieves, 
                                                 
32  ML0811/17. 
33  See Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, Clientalism. 
34  For instance, Anders, ‘Civil Servants’, 86-87 explained how the Civil Service Reform Programme in 
Malawi specifically targeted support staff for retrenchment, as there was a significant overstaffing of 
the lower ranks of the civil service. However, he also suggested that following the retrenchments that 
were part of this programme, many support staff were rehired in response to social pressure felt by 
superior officers, who related to the support staff as Bwanas (masters or patrons).  
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who took some vehicles. The company suspected the guards of colluding and withheld 
his pay. This prompted him to resign and to move somewhere away from Lusaka, where 
the job of being a watchman would be less risky. On his way to his ‘home village’, he 
stopped at some relatives in the town where I met him. His relatives had informed him 
that the hospital was looking for a guard. Because he had a guard certificate, which he 
had obtained from the police, he was hired. He mentioned that four out of six guards at 
that hospital were qualified.35 The personal connection this guard had to ‘relatives’ 
apparently was important as a source of information about a job opportunity. Possibly it 
was also useful as a recommendation for the guard. However, it appeared to be little 
more important than the fact that this respondent was a qualified and experienced guard.  
For others working for the health sector, however, such as pharmacy technologists, 
nurses, and clinical officers, a certificate and preferably a diploma or even a degree is 
required – as official proof of qualification as a result of attending a formal education 
programme. For many Zambians, even those who have managed to complete secondary 
school, this is difficult to manage. In casual contacts in Zambian towns or cities, one 
comes across numerous young people working in informal jobs, as waiters or shop 
assistants or apparently idling on the street, who tell you that they completed school and 
are hoping and trying to save up for college or to be accepted on a government bursary. 
Some are trying to improve their school results by re-sitting examinations, or are writing 
applications and waiting for responses, while others again are saving up or looking for 
relatives to sponsor them. We can recall the example of Ashley, who only at the be-
ginning of his thirties, while sustaining a family, had managed to raise enough money 
by ‘digging his field’ to pay for college for either his wife or himself.  
Some respondents matter-of-factly told us that getting into college was not difficult, 
though others painted a different picture. Again, lack of financial resources proves to be 
a barrier for education. One frank and outspoken young nurse, whom we shall call Tom 
Chansa, shone light on an issue which many other respondents chose to ignore. He 
recounted that he originally came from Kasama in Northern Province, but he grew up in 
Kabwe with an uncle who was a miner. Then, to Tom’s detriment, the mines closed and 
his uncle was out of a job. Tom had been supported to complete secondary school, but 
for college he was on his own. Fortunately, he managed to get a job at a Chinese 
garment company that assembled and sold clothes. With this he managed to raise funds 
for school. He had never thought of going into health, but his aunt was a nurse and 
advised him to do nursing. This, according to him, corresponded with his desire to help 
people. Besides, a friend of his went into nursing, which for him dispelled any stigma 
possibly associated with a male working in what could be seen as a female profession. 
Tom just applied across the board to a number of nursing schools. He received two 
invitations. For him it was a matter of first come, first served. He went to interviews at 
both schools and was accepted at both. The cost was about the same, but one school was 
three years, while the other lasted two. At the time he did not know the difference 
between becoming a registered nurse and an enrolled nurse. His aunt advised him that it 
would be better to go for registered nursing, so he did. After more than a year, however, 
he realised that the money he had raised was not enough for his out of pocket ex-
penditures, buying small things, and enjoying himself. Fortunately, a United-Nations 
agency, UNFPA, was offering sponsorship for nursing students on the condition that 
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one would be bonded in a specific province. He was thus sponsored for the last year of 
his programme. 
So far, Tom’s story did not seem remarkable: Yet another story of lack of resources, 
adversity, and perseverance as the key to success.36 Then, however, we began talking 
about Tom’s ambitions for further education. This sketched the reality of the importance 
of personal connections in accessing education. “I would prefer post basic (training), 
maybe to become a lecturer, but there is only UNZA and there you have to know 
somebody”. When I asked if he meant that you have to know someone to get into 
college, he gave the example of his own nursing school. “At (my nursing school), of the 
ten male students in my year, eight had relatives in the system. Just me and someone 
else didn’t. We were just there because I was first in the interviews and he was second. 
So number three and four were rejected because they didn’t have relatives in the system. 
It is people from the nursing school and people who decide on the list of people to be 
accepted. They just consider relatives”. Asked what he thought about this, he said that 
he did not like it, especially considering “us that don’t have anyone to push us”. He then 
went on to describe the impact of this practice: “Out of the 40 people in my year just 32 
made it. The rest were expelled or failed. These are the ones that were there through 
uncles. Academically they don’t do well; they have no interest for their studies”.37  
Others gave comparable accounts and went further by attesting that bribery can occur 
in such situations. From a casual chat with a student nurse, my research assistant re-
ported a similar story. “It’s a fifty-fifty game. You can come in in a fair way, but other-
wise you either know somebody or you pay somebody. It’s a problem. I applied (at 
another nursing school than the one where she was at the time) and my friend did as 
well. She was asked pay one million Kwacha (€ 192),38 and she paid seven hundred 
(thousand, € 135) because that was all she had”. Then the student nurse recounted that 
she was also asked to pay something. “But I was very confident that I would get in 
because I had all these ideas about nursing so I didn’t pay. When I didn’t get in, (the 
friend) laughed at me. I was very disappointed, but I thought that God might have other 
plans with me”. She went on to indicate that, at other colleges, “it’s even worse”. At one 
college an administration officer had been arrested because he had helped a number of 
people into college. It seemed he had been doing it for some years. She mentioned that 
the 10 to 20 students concerned were expelled. “They are making an effort to make the 
system transparent, but it’s poverty that makes people do these things. It’s selfishness; 
people never have enough”. On the extent of this happening, she estimated, “In general, 
50 per cent of the people are admitted this way: There are many ways to skin a rat”.39 
Another contact suggested how this had affected him. “I didn’t get into UNZA be-
cause of the corruption”, he said. “Rich people really want their kids to go to university, 
so they are willing to pay for it. The high officials just let everyone do the application 
and interview, but in the end they just pick those with the right relatives or those who 
                                                 
36  In fact, the personal adversity faced by Tom, with his uncle losing his job as a miner as a result of the 
economic crisis of the late twentieth century, resonates with the Zambia that is described in Ferguson, 
Expectations. However, the outcome of this particular story – namely that the respondent ends off 
with a better chance at success and the benefits of modernity – diverges from the accounts of Fergu-
son’s own respondents.  
37  ML0811/12. 
38  Currency calculations are based on the approximate exchange rate at the time of the interview 
(€ 1 = ZMK 5,200 is generally taken) or at the historical moment where relevant. Historical exchange 
rates derived from www.gocurrency.com. 
39  PB0811/36. 
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have paid. They ask around one million, because there are many people who are willing 
to pay. Maybe there are a few who get in based on their qualities, but most get in with 
money or relatives. I got into (a different instruction, referred to by the previous res-
pondent as being ‘even worse’) because it is a little less corrupt than UNZA”.40  
Yet another respondent even went as far as describing the possible mechanics of the 
process: “They just let you do the interview, but then they let you come over and pay, 
and they don’t tell you that you will have to do the aptitude test. They just let you get 
into a room and then suddenly you have to do the test. It’s difficult to get in, except for 
when you come from a rich family. It’s like a conspiracy”. He went on to say, “One of 
the officials would meet some applicants in one of the lodges in town, and then he 
would talk to them, seeing if they could do anything for him. That way, he could still 
change the marks for the ones that he would like to have as students but didn’t do well.” 
This, by his account, need not have negative consequences. “A girl I know is the 
daughter of a man who works for GNC (the General Nursing Council), and he marks the 
aptitude test for (a certain nursing school) ... She got in, and she turned out to be 
intelligent; she was the best in the year in surgical and medical”. He philosophically 
reflects that this is just the way the world is: “Money and intelligence are both forms of 
power, and you just need one of those forms of power to get in”.41 
Of course these accounts are subjective and it is all but impossible to prove their 
general validity. Assuming that bribery and nepotism do occur in the selection process 
for accepting students into college or university, it is not possible on the basis of such 
accounts to accurately reflect on the prevalence of its occurrence. Nevertheless, an 
account from another angle certainly lends credence to the assumption that it is widely 
prevalent. A respondent, who at the time was working in one of the colleges referred to 
above, conceded that the college indeed receives and responds to ‘special requests’ from 
directors or others with influence in the ministry. He did, however, stress that students 
do have to meet the minimal criteria for admission. They must, for instance, have 
completed secondary school and they have to come for interviews. He illustrated this 
with a rather shocking example. A few years before, the former permanent secretary, 
who had been sentenced to five years hard labour for corruption, was said to have 
managed to push his niece to the college, despite the fact that he had been convicted for 
corruption. In the subsequent year, she turned out to be failing dismally. She was then 
sent away from college and her uncle understood and accepted the fact. Finally, our 
respondent claimed that, paradoxically, this phenomenon can even be in the school’s 
interest. If the nephew of a director, for instance, goes to the school and complains to 
their relative about the conditions at the school, perhaps the school will get more 
resources to improve conditions.42 
It thus appears from the previous accounts that access to the scarce opportunities to 
achieve qualifications is manipulated to serve the private interests of some of those who 
control this access. On the other hand, the same accounts also show that it is neither 
ubiquitous nor fully accepted as legitimate. In particular, from those who do not benefit 
                                                 
40  PB0811/34. Of course, this testimony is speculative and cannot be taken as a complete reflection of 
the reality of the application process at the University of Zambia. In part, it is possibly an external 
justification of the respondent’s failure to be accepted. At the same time, it does illustrate perceptions 
that exist about the fairness of processes that have been designed to be rational-legal. It also illustrates 
the use of allegations of corruption to challenge the equity of such processes in practice.      
41  PB0811/35. 
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you can hear moral condemnation: It benefits the rich and is unfair to those who do not 
‘know someone’. The fact that this is not an issue many care to talk about also implies 
the practice is not considered socially to be virtuous or acceptable. Considering the 
account that “they are making an effort to make the system transparent”, one could even 
go as far as concluding that this practice is being actively contested. In addition, it can 
be deduced from Tom’s story and the account of the person working at the college, that 
some who are completely unfit to qualify as a nurse (or another health worker) do not 
get through the system, regardless of money or connections. Nevertheless, such corrupt 
practices are part of Zambian reality. A formal competitive process based on merit is 
thus instrumentalised by private interests based on personal connections or money. This 
resonates with the neo-patrimonial paradigm. However, it is important to note that these 
private interests merely manipulate the formal process and adapt to formal demands; 
they do not eclipse or obliterate formal institutions. Such accounts of nepotism and 
bribery in deciding access exemplify the instrumentalisation of order. Nevertheless, 
despite the efficiency losses and equity issues that come with this reality, the bottom 
line remains that one must obtain qualifications to occupy a professional post. In other 
words, in the Zambian health sector, qualifications matter.  
A first posting 
Now, having seen our health workers through college, let us look at the first pro-
fessional encounter between a health worker and the health system: The first posting. 
This topic is relevant for our analysis of neo-patrimonialism in the health sector as it 
touches on a conflict between personal interests and the public interests of a system. It 
also deals with the relative power of health workers to determine their own spatial mo-
bility; and this power or influence is significant. Whereas obtaining access to scarce 
opportunities for professional qualifications was a struggle for aspiring health workers, 
once they qualify this situation is reversed. Then they become the scarce resource, 
giving them significant leverage over the system.43 In 2005, in total there were some 
23,000 people working in the health sector, out of which roughly 12,000 were ‘profes-
sional staff’ (that is, qualified health workers as opposed to support staff). This contrasts 
with a recommended establishment of 49,360 positions (39,360 for ‘professional 
staff’).44 In rural areas, health workers’ scarcity is particularly pronounced, with many 
rural health centres with one or even no qualified staff. In subsequent accounts by health 
workers of their career paths, we will hear their perceptions on working in rural areas 
and gain an insight into the agency they have to escape from working in rural areas. As 
such, we will see how a seemingly structural phenomenon, the geographical allocation 
of human resources, is in essence a result of human agency and the power of individuals 
to decide for themselves.45  
                                                 
43  Then they become the insiders in the limited access order. See North, D.C. et al., Violence and social 
orders (New York, 2009). 
44  MoH (2005), National Health Strategic Plan 2006-2011. Of course, that is not to say that government 
had allocated the funds for so many workers. In 2006 the structure that was approved by the treasury 
amounted to 26,088 people, while the ministry has been authorised by Cabinet Office is let this grow 
to 51,414 in subsequent years (MoH, 2008: Ministry of Health Quarterly; issue no. 1). 
45  Kalumba’s, K. thesis ‘The practice of health care reform in Zambia’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Uni-
versity of Toronto, 1988), which will be discussed later, makes claims about geographically inequit-
able allocation of resources in the Zambian health sector being the result of a discursive policy 
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To get a feeling for the issues a young graduate can face on their first posting in the 
health sector, let us hear the account of a Mr. Zimba. He graduated as a clinical officer 
in 1991. Before his studies at Chainama in Lusaka, he grew up in Livingstone. His 
father had come from Eastern Province and had been working in a textile company. Mr. 
Zimba’s mother was an Ndebele from Zimbabwe. At his graduation, he and his fellow 
graduates were allowed to express a preference for two provinces where they could be 
placed. Mr. Zimba was posted to a very remote clinic on the plateau in Luapula. He felt 
bad; his two choices had been to be posted in either Southern or in Central Province. 
The four years he spent at this rural health centre were very challenging. “There was no 
road. You sometimes even had to move by canoe. There were no shops, so if you forgot 
to pack something, you were stuck. It would take four to five, or even six hours to cycle 
to the boma to collect salaries”. He recalls that it took all his passion to motivate him to 
stay there, not money. Imagine, moving from Livingstone, the tourist capital of Zambia, 
to the bush. “I thought, God must be trying to teach me something”. 
Mr. Zimba found the community very difficult to handle. “There was no community 
participation”. Once the VIP (ventilated improved pit-latrine) of the clinic collapsed. He 
called a community meeting to ask them to help rehabilitate it. However, they refused; 
only if they were paid would they help. “There was no partnership”. Coming from 
Livingstone, where Lozi is the lingua franca, and from a mixed Chewa-Ndebele mar-
riage, he had difficulties with the language. Lozi is not at all compatible with Bemba, 
and the urban Bemba words he had picked up in Livingstone turned out to be insulting 
or degrading. At the clinic, he would be explaining something and people would laugh 
or tell him “that word is an insult”. The local chief was not at all friendly. He would 
constantly insist that Mr. Zimba gave gifts such as bottles of kachasu.46 If Mr. Zimba 
failed to give a bottle for lack of money, the chief would insult him and threaten him 
with witchcraft. Being a Pentecostal, however, he claimed the witchcraft did not harm 
him. “I know my God; it’s impossible to bewitch me!”  
A further problem for Mr. Zimba was that social life in the village was boring. To 
this day he does not drink alcohol, so after finishing work he went straight home. The 
only time he could really breathe was when he was cycling to the boma. Fortunately, he 
had befriended some teachers with whom he started a literacy club to teach villagers to 
read and write. Besides that, he had a small project cultivating some of the fertile soil of 
the plateau. The medical work, however, Mr. Zimba found very satisfying. The com-
munity had never had someone young and newly qualified at the clinic before; it had 
usually been officers later in their careers who were less active. The job brought a lot of 
responsibility; he does not remember ever having referred a case. He did everything 
himself, even cases that would normally be treated in an operating theatre. Eventually, 
however, because of the problems he had with the chief, he requested a transfer. He 
could not continue like that. It was no problem to convince the district health office to 
give him a transfer. A friend from the Ministry of Agriculture, who stayed in the same 
village, even testified on Mr. Zimba’s behalf.47  
Mr. Zimba’s case provides insight into the issues facing a young graduate from town 
who gets posted to a part of Zambia they are not all that familiar with. As we saw in a 
previous section, a considerable number of health workers we spoke to grew up on the 
                                                 
strategy of ‘down-classing’. In my dissertation, however, I argue that it is more the result of individual 
agency: People choosing and scheming to work closer to the socio-economic centre of a country.  
46  A local, home-distilled spirit, sometimes erroneously referred to as a brew or beer. 
47  ML0811/15. 
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Copperbelt, while some others grew up in Lusaka or other towns. Many were thus 
progeny of an emergent, urban middle-class. This is thus the account of a clash of cul-
tures within contemporary Zambian society – a clash, if you will, between expectations 
of modernity and the claims of rural localism.48  
It is also an account of the struggle between a system and the individuals that are 
required to make the system work. The outcome of this struggle is inherently personal 
and context-specific. As we will see below, there are many variations in the career paths 
recounted by health workers and the influence they had over their fate. Mr. Zimba and 
other respondents had been given some influence over where they would be placed, 
although in Mr. Zimba’s case this was not honoured. Others claim to have had no 
influence on their posting. They were “just posted”. It is part of the public service ethos 
that a public servant should be prepared to ‘work anywhere’. In fact, the Terms and 
Conditions of Service for the Public Service states that an officer may be transferred to 
any duty station where his or her services are required.49 It seems that in the Kaunda era, 
it was a deliberate policy to post civil servants to parts of the country from which they 
did not originate. This would help the process of fostering “One Zambia, one nation”. 
One enrolled nurse, after graduating in 1988, was posted to a rural health centre in a 
remote part of Luapula. He would have liked to return to the Copperbelt, where he had 
been brought up and where it was familiar. He explained, however, that during nursing 
school he had signed a form that he could work anywhere. Therefore, he could not 
object to his posting. “They were forcing the students to go where is need”. His 
objections did not yield any results. “They said, you have no right to complain”.50 
Some just accepted this fate. An environmental health technician who also grew up 
on the Copperbelt received his first posting in Western Province in the early 1980s. He 
was not happy. “I wanted to go back to the Copperbelt. But I got used and things 
became normal; now I realise my thinking was just too childish”. In fact, he remained 
working in Western Province at various clinics and even married a Lozi wife, despite 
being a Bemba speaker. Only after more than seven years did he request a transfer to his 
“homeland”.51 A nurse from Eastern Province, who had grown up in Kabwe, was posted 
to a rural clinic. She remembered, “I was not happy; I was born in town, and it was my 
first time to go to a rural area. First it was hard, but then I got used.” 
Yet others did not even consider a rural posting as problematic. For example, con-
sider Mr. Pande, a clinical officer who since 1987 has served in rural health clinics. He 
                                                 
48  It is thus similar to the tension described by Ferguson when he deals with his retiring mineworkers 
(Ferguson, Expectations) or the description of the return of Paddy the townsman in N. Long, Social 
change and the individual: A study of the social and religious responses to innovation in a Zambian 
rural community (Manchester, 1968). What is striking, however, in this account and others like it is 
the lack of willingness to submit to local rural claims and realities. In this fieldwork, numerous such 
narratives emerged about the relation between health workers with an urban, cosmopolitan orientation 
and localised, rural communities. While it is beyond the scope of this research, such encounters could 
provide interesting objects of research, providing insight into how the state is socially constructed and 
renegotiated at the local level in the periphery of the state-run health sector. As the perspectives of 
local communities have not been collected, further analysis of such narratives is not appropriate here. 
49  Terms and Conditions of Service for the Public Service, Chapter II No. 29(a). 
50  PB0809/02. 
51  This account thus presented an idyllic picture resonating with Kaunda’s nationalist, ‘one Zambia, one 
nation’ discourse. “I got surprised; in each tribe people differ”. He claims his wife’s relatives and his 
have accepted: “When they visit they are free with my family”. This account, however, glosses over 
any difficulties that may have arisen for our respondent in Western Province, which may have driven 
him to ‘struggle’ for arranging a transfer back to Luapula. LB0809/07. 
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was the first-born of peasant farmers. When he was sent to a remote rural health centre, 
he “just accepted the posting; I was praying for helping people”. In fact, he even wanted 
to go to such a place despite coming from elsewhere, because he thought it would be 
cheap to look after relatives at a place like that.52 Apparently, for some like Mr. Pande, 
being posted to rural areas was preferable as it fitted with their goals and strategies.  
Others demonstrated more reluctance to accept their posting. Another health worker, 
who grew up in Kitwe on the Copperbelt, took a bit more convincing to move to a 
provincial capital. “It was quite shocking. I had been expecting to be posted in Kitwe, 
but they saw a shortage in Mansa. I was looking at a place that I had never been, and I 
had heard some negative stories about Mansa. I would be coming on my own; I had no 
friends or family there. I tried to object, but they said, ‘we don’t want people to be 
concentrated’. They were also looking at hard-to-reach places. This helped to convince 
me because in the end, the issue was not where I would be going, but if I could con-
tribute to people’s health. I shared my story with an old friend who had been to Mansa, 
and he said: You can still make the best out of it”.53 
Yet other health workers were effective in their opposition to a posting. One clinical 
officer was able to convince decision-makers of the fact that his family responsibilities 
required him to be posted somewhere different from what was intended. After he 
graduated, he was posted in Chipata in Eastern Province. However, he felt he needed to 
work somewhere closer to his family as it would be very expensive to work in Chipata 
and from there support his relatives in Luapula. So he convinced officials that he was 
the breadwinner and that he could not go to Eastern Province. “I just explained, and 
back then there were few students; they didn’t want them frustrated”. He does not 
remember who he convinced at the ministry, “but if you tell someone the truth, you can 
touch someone’s heart”.54 Of course it might have been easier to arrange a posting near 
his relatives in Luapula than it would have been in Kampala or Ndola, for example. 
However, others did manage to arrange postings in town – for instance, a nurse who in 
1993 was posted to Mbereshi Mission Hospital in Luapula obviously realised how 
scarce and valuable she was to the system. She recalled, “I didn’t like the bush. I was 
very young. I said, if you won’t post me to Mansa, I’ll stop”. She got her way and was 
posted from the mission hospital to the general hospital.55 To show how relative 
individual preferences are, someone else considered himself fortunate to be placed at 
the same mission hospital rather than a rural health centre. This nurse grew up in 
Solwezi, the capital of North-Western Province, and was placed at a clinic in a remote 
part of Luapula. He refused, saying that he would already be covering a long distance to 
visit his family. He preferred to stay in a hospital at least and was posted to Mbereshi 
Hospital instead.56  
Many of the preceding accounts are from those who were working in a rural province 
when we interviewed them. Some of these respondents had managed to negotiate a 
position at a specific rural posting they desired or perhaps a slightly less remote place. 
There were, however, according to our respondents also health workers who had 
avoided being posted in rural areas entirely. One nurse reported, “When we were posted 
after graduating, there were three of us who were posted to Luapula, but I was the only 
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one going. The other two went to work in a private clinic and in South Africa instead. I 
did go to St Paul’s, because I thought that maybe I could reduce the diseases. I 
developed an interest in public health”.57 The male nurse Tom, whose candid accounts 
were presented earlier, also had something to say about how others could deal with 
undesirable postings. “Posting is fairly straightforward. But when you get a letter, that is 
only tentative. Then people on an individual basis go and complain. They argue why 
they can't go to where they are posted. And maybe someone will squeeze them in 
somewhere. In my class only four have gone where they were posted”. The ones who 
had refused their postings were then employed by other districts. When I asked Tom if 
people actually pay in such cases, he said, “Bribery is done between individuals, so I 
can't say if it happens a lot. But Zambians have developed a funny language for it. They 
might say. ‘Here's some money for a drink’. Or ‘let's go and have a drink’ and they keep 
buying beers. Or when you're on a bus, they will pay for you. Then someone will 
remember, ‘he helped me with something’, and do something back. Only very few 
people actually bring brown envelopes”.58 
It appears thus that the interaction between a health worker and the human resource 
system is one of negotiation. A health worker’s scarcity improves his negotiating 
position. The formal procedure is relatively straightforward and follows a bureaucratic 
rationale; it is blind to the specific circumstances of an individual. However, if someone 
has a specific wish or intent to deviate from these formal procedures, it appears that 
there are possibilities to do so. Apparently in some cases, simple lobbying – or as one 
respondent indicated, telling the truth so you can “touch someone’s heart” – might 
suffice. However, it also appears that if one wants something more desirable, the 
process of negotiation might require a material transaction, though not necessarily in the 
form of a ‘brown envelope’. 
Transfers 
Health workers’ career trajectories are marked by considerable movement through the 
system; more often than not this is a matter of spatial mobility whereby they moved 
throughout Zambia. After a first posting, health workers will generally continue to ex-
perience various transfers, and from their accounts the logic behind these at times seems 
vague or arbitrary. In reality, however, these decisions are the result of the obscure, 
complex interplay between personal and organisational objectives. As we will see 
below, at times health workers ask to be moved elsewhere; at times it is because the 
system needs them elsewhere or simply moving them is the solution to problems at their 
work place. These decisions, of course, become a matter of negotiation and are in-
fluenced by the covert or overt interests of those involved. As we will see again later, 
this leads to the risk of informal interests and logics of individuals superseding the 
public interests or the interests of the health sector.  
In the past there was a deliberate policy of transferring people throughout the health 
sector. In other departments than health this policy still seems to the practice; under the 
Ministry of Finance, it is routine that accountants get ‘shifted’ every five years, an 
accountant told me.59 The formal rationale behind this policy is that people might 
become too connected to the community or too de-linked from the formal objectives of 
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the system if they ‘overstay’, as it is called in the discourse of Zambian public servants. 
One health official, for instance, gave an explanation for a reshuffle of a number of 
district health directors in a certain province: “Some people had overstayed and lost 
touch with the way things were going”.60 He explained that they had become un-
responsive to certain problems, which were gradually considered normal. A medical 
superintendent and his hospital administrator also once explained this formal organisa-
tional logic of transferring people. They said that if someone was be in the same post 
too long, “they become undisciplined” and “known to the community”. If, for instance, 
a nurse has ties with a patient, she might even insist that a doctor drops his other work 
and attends to the patient.61 While in my understanding of this account I was confused 
whether they thought the greater sin was the fact that a nurse told the doctor what to do 
or that some patients were offered preferential treatment at the nurse’s behest, it is clear 
that they felt that in such a situation a transfer was in order. At the same time, this 
bureaucratic logic was also echoed by a health worker himself. He explained that you 
perform better if you move from time to time. He cited the example of police officers: 
“If people get used you, then you can’t arrest them”. For health workers, he explained 
that if you get too well known to the community, “the ladies who come to deliver, they 
become shy and they don’t come anymore”.62 It is thus clear that from an organisational 
viewpoint, transfers are an instrument for ensuring that one’s loyalties lie with the 
organisation, and people do not get the chance to build social relations in their work 
environment that will threaten the organisation’s formal goals.63 
In recent years, however, owing to the reorganisations linked to the health reforms – 
which will receive ample attention in later stages of this dissertation – the practice of 
periodically transferring health workers was disrupted. One nurse explained that he had 
not been able to go to the Copperbelt as he had wanted. He explained: “Between 1992 
and 1994, all transfers out of the province were banned, but they also feared that we 
would run away. They said that we could only leave if we found someone to replace 
us”.64 As part of the health reforms, autonomous district health boards and hospital 
boards were formed which were delegated the responsibility to attract and retain staff. 
For certain positions, they advertised vacancies, held interviews, and appointed people. 
One former manager administration who had been hired this way reported that he had 
stayed in the same position in the same district for nine years. He overstayed, because 
the boards were given autonomy in 1995 and therefore he was not transferable unless 
the Central Board of Health in Lusaka and the employee would both agree. Certain 
district management teams in this period actively tried to recruit health workers to their 
district, even by ‘poaching’ staff from other districts. Districts also tried to distribute 
health workers within their district. For the rest, movement from the district and 
especially out of the province was restricted. At the time of conducting this fieldwork, a 
new restructuring exercise65 was ongoing and again transfers out of the province were 
banned. This thus reduced the spatial mobility that had been the norm earlier. Hospitals 
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and districts could only replace staff that left. Formally, the only ways to leave were by 
either by resigning or if one was a married woman.  
In women’s accounts of their career paths, ‘following your husband’ is a very com-
mon phenomenon. One nurse spoke of her first posting as an enrolled nurse in North-
Western Province. For her, language was a problem as she did not speak Luvale. She 
recounted that she had not been able to avoid being posted there because at the time she 
was not yet married. After seven months, however, she was transferred to a mission 
hospital in Luapula. In the meantime, she had gotten married and she could show her 
marriage certificate. Her husband was a teacher in Luapula, whom she thus followed. It 
was easier for her to be working in Luapula, because now she could use her mother 
tongue Bemba again.66 This formal arrangement, which incidentally does not apply to 
men following their wives, generally applies to public service workers. We spoke to 
health workers married, for example, to teachers, employees of the Ministry of Finance 
or Agriculture, and also to health workers married to other health workers. In fact, it is 
not unheard of to see a married couple running a health centre together.67 In one clinic, 
we noted that this had a distinct impact on staff composition. Whereas most rural health 
centres are lucky to have two or more qualified health workers, this one had one 
environmental health technologist in charge and three nurses. One nurse was married to 
a local teacher, and two nurses were married to each other.68  
In various accounts, health workers had left to join their husbands in Lusaka or the 
Copperbelt, thus adding to the skewed distribution of health workers. It seems, however, 
that in recent years it has become more difficult to ‘follow your husband’. One health 
worker in charge of an urban clinic reported that, a few years ago, “it was easier to 
follow your husband, because nowadays you have to apply and then you have to wait 
for a place. Transfers are a problem now. For example, here at (our) clinic, we got one 
nurse whose husband is in Lusaka. She is trying to go to Lusaka as well, and she had 
been given a place in Chainama but in the end she couldn’t go there. In this world of 
HIV/AIDS, it is a very bad thing to keep couples away from each other”.69 A newly 
posted nurse, whom I encountered at a provincial health office patiently and glumly 
waiting to be attended to, told a passer-by that her husband was still in Lusaka. At the 
Ministry of Health they had told her to choose between a career and marriage.70 This 
young lady was thus caught in the negotiation between her own interests and those of 
the system. As we shall see, within such negotiations there are opportunities and in-
centives for people to successfully defend their own interests; there is scope for lob-
bying for a desired transfer.  
Lobbying for a transfer 
From their perspective, there are various reasons for health workers to request a transfer 
from their current posting. From the accounts offered by health workers, it is often 
difficult to determine which factor is decisive or to uncover the hidden motives besides 
those readily proffered. By and large there are two general categories of reasons given 
to justify a transfer. First, there are motives related to the working atmosphere, such as 
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the facilities and relations with superiors and colleagues; then there are socio-economic 
reasons related to health workers’ private situation. Such issues can include family 
considerations, such as proximity of children’s schooling or a spouse’s work, living 
conditions, or the possibility to supplement one’s livelihood by moonlighting or farm-
ing. As indicated by the skewed distribution of staff in the health sector described 
above, there is a general preference for transfers to urban areas over rural areas. Some 
respondents mentioned, for instance, that in towns they would be closer to stores or 
Internet or the other trappings of middle-class modernity. Other respondents, however, 
explicitly remarked they would prefer to remain in rural areas because of the cost of 
living and the quietness of rural life.  
Both in the case of Mr. Zimba above as well as of Ashley and Anton, we saw how 
living and social conditions can be unfavourable to health workers in some places, 
which can drive them to take action. Lack of proper accommodation was an issue for 
Anton and Ashley. They had to walk four kilometres to a house they had to share. 
Ashley could not bring his family to join him and had to maintain two households 
because of this. Anton also complained to me that from the place where they were 
posted, “the distance from the market was very big”. He had to go to a town two 
districts further, travelling more than 150 kilometres, in order to collect his salary. So 
after his friend and colleague Ashley had arranged a transfer, he did too as things there 
were not working according to expectation. He thus went to the people at the district 
health office in the district where he had been posted earlier. He talked to them and 
“then (he) had to come to process the papers”.71 The management team of the district he 
left were not happy to see him go. Anton had been running a recently opened anti-
retroviral clinic and the district was already understaffed. Anton, however, had already 
arranged the transfer to a district where they were happy to see him return. Then when 
Anton had arranged a vehicle “to pick his things” to move them to his new location, he 
passed by the health post where Ashley had been posted to say goodbye. Coincidently, 
the planning manager of the district was there. Ashley recounted how the planning 
manager said, “How come you come by to say goodbye to (Ashley), but you don’t come 
to the district to say that you’re going?” Anton was said to retort “I did come, but you 
didn’t listen”. Then, according to Ashley, “He put his chin up and left”.72 Obviously, 
Anton’s concerns about his living conditions were interlinked with his disaffection with 
the management of the district health service. Most importantly, however, he had an 
alternative, which empowered him.  
These stories strengthen the argument that owing to their scarcity, health workers 
have a certain power over their own careers, which can challenge the power of the 
bureaucracy which aims to control them as valuable human resources. To elaborate this 
argument, let us look further at the conditions under which people can be transferred 
and can arrange transfers. In two cases, we came across accounts of health officials 
picking up on the fact that health workers were de-motivated at a rural clinic and 
apparently felt that the system did not use them to capacity. One health worker spoke of 
how he was at a workshop and met someone working for the ministry in Lusaka. The 
health worker mentioned to the official that he was wasting his time at the remote clinic 
where he was posted and that he wanted to move. Following that, he was transferred to 
a less remote health centre in the district. He recalled that moving was a relief because 
he was starting to get into an argument with the district, partly because the district was 
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not delivering on promises regarding transport. They were promised motorbikes, but 
these never came. He felt that the place where he was “was more like a punishment”.73 
Another health worker was visited at his clinic. One day, he recalled, provincial health 
officers came by during lunch, and there were no patients there. They said that the 
health worker was being under-utilised and that it would be better for him to work in a 
busy centre. The gentleman was told to put this in writing and the province acted on it. 
“They sent me a vehicle and picked me up. I had no objections; I agreed because I was 
only doing some community work. I was happy to go and practice my profession”.74 
Although from these accounts one cannot get a complete sense of the decisions made 
and the factors at play,75 it is clear that these respondents had a desire to leave. In order 
to achieve their goal, they may well have used the arguments that they were being 
under-utilised to the detriment of the system. It seems fair to consider the subjective 
experience on the part of health workers that they are suffering from rural hardship (that 
is, being isolated and far from town life), which we have seen above and will encounter 
in later stories, to be legitimate. On the other hand, one can also wonder whether simply 
transferring health workers away is the best option for the health system, rather than 
investing in the possibilities for the health workers to be effectively utilised in serving 
the needs of rural communities. This is an issue that we will pursue later.  
Family matters have, as we have seen a few times already, an important influence on 
health workers’ posting preferences. One nurse told my research assistant that she had 
only worked for about a month in her present station. She had received a transfer to this 
clinic, which was closer to her parents, who lived in a nearby district. Her father, who 
used to be a miner, had had an accident and was no longer able to take care of himself. 
As the eldest in the family, the nurse had taken responsibility and asked for a transfer.76 
Let us also recall the nurse whose family was in Solwezi and who, after influencing his 
initial placement, was posted to Mbereshi Mission Hospital. After two and a half years 
he still felt the distance to Solwezi was too long and requested a transfer. He was 
subsequently posted to Mansa, which is a few hundred kilometres closer.77 Another 
respondent even lobbied her way from Lusaka to a remote province, as she wanted to be 
closer to her widowed mother. The nurse wanted to assist her mother in building a 
house. From her current location, she could easily bring cement and other building 
materials to her mother’s home. She also wanted a change of place. She said that getting 
the transfer was easier for her because she had a brother working at Cabinet Office in 
Lusaka.78 Someone else, however, said that in general it is much easier to get a transfer 
from town to a more rural place, than the other way around. Without that brother at 
Cabinet Office, this lady might well have secured her transfer anyway, though it might 
have taken longer. 
The formal route to getting a transfer process is a long one, as yet another health 
worker casually recounted. He was planning to leave Luapula for Central Province 
because of family issues. He had assumed a position of responsibility in his family. 
“The chair(man) of my relatives died. I am now the administrator for three different 
                                                 
73  LB0809/13. 
74  PB0811/21. 
75  It is conceivable that in these situations private interests played a bigger role than the professional 
arguments put forward by the respondents. These latter arguments, however, are perhaps more accept-
able discourse to present to a foreign researcher with a notebook. 
76  PB0811/06. 
77  LB0809/19. 
78  PB0810/07. 
73 
 
families. I need to be there to get the rentals. Kabwe already agreed, and I’m cleared by 
district health office and the provincial health office. Now all that remains is getting 
permission from Ndeke House, after the Cabinet (Office) works on it”.79 One has to 
convince a number of people in that chain to agree with a transfer, although there are 
apparently short cuts. One man reported that his wife was working for a bank. So he 
went to the ministry in Lusaka to see if there was a vacancy somewhere where that bank 
had a branch, and there was one in Luapula. He had heard negative stories about 
Luapula, but, being from an area where fish is traditionally eaten a lot, he thought, 
“There is a lot of fish; I’ll come and enjoy. As long as there are patients, it’s ok”. He 
came to Mansa in 1996. He remembered that back then, the boards had not started and 
the transfers were handled by headquarters. So he went there and talked to the chief 
nursing officer. It appeared as if she would not grant him the transfer, but “deep down 
her heart she had said yes” because a week later he received a letter with the transfer.80 
Often the process of arranging a transfer is not easy. As we saw, reorganisations have 
impacted on the routine practice of transferring staff. In addition, the scarcity of health 
workers provides a strong incentive to the system to raise barriers to prevent people 
from leaving. Concerning this, one respondent said, “You have to fight real hard to get a 
transfer because of staff shortages. My colleague had to fight really hard. He is now in 
Kabwe”.81 One district health officer recounted that he was once transferred to the most 
remote part of the province. He “wasn’t happy” about that so he contested the decision 
and wrote a letter to the boss at the provincial health office. He argued that he had 
already worked in that district and therefore had served his time in a remote area. Six 
months later he was then transferred to the provincial hospital, to work under a former 
colleague. “The hospital was like a punishment” as he was “put under someone junior 
so that you get depressed”. Later, for reasons he did not mention, the provincial health 
office reconsidered and moved him to the district health office. When he was asked if 
that means that one has to lobby, he replied. “Lobby? Yes, sometimes you have to fight 
for your rights”.82  
Another officer took his protests literally to the highest level. In 1988 he was trans-
ferred from a provincial capital to a very remote district. At first he had resisted moving 
there, but the provincial health director had convinced him, promising that he would be 
able to return after the retirement of another officer. The next two years he stayed at that 
remote district. Then it turned out that someone else had been posted to the job he was 
promised. In the meantime, the provincial health director had left and his successor had 
given the job to someone else. The officer complained about this; there was a lot of 
writing. He even went to see President Kaunda, who issued a directive, and he event-
ually got promoted and went to another district. During his career this man resigned 
three times, but each time he was called back and he returned. “I wouldn’t like to dis-
appoint the boss”.83 In yet another case an enrolled nurse was posted to be in charge of a 
remote health centre. He did not want to stay, however, but according to him the district 
health office saw that he was doing a good job and asked the provincial health office to 
keep him there. “I wasn’t ready to accept at first. I wouldn’t be helping my children by 
going to (that district)”. He made an agreement with the district and the province, how-
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ever, that he could leave his children in school in the provincial capital and that the 
office would pay for the house they lived in. In the end, however, “they only paid it for 
three months, and I have been paying for the house from my own salary the rest of the 
time”. He remained at the remote health centre for three years. Again he resolved to 
leave the district but the district health director refused to sign the papers that would 
enable him to leave. Then, during a performance assessment visit, he talked with the 
most senior health official in the province and told him about the situation: “This is the 
way I’m being treated”. So he went to the provincial health office and the director 
signed the papers so he could return to a post closer to town.84 
As is common in processes of negotiation, the struggle over transfers is a process of 
give and take, and at times compromises are reached that are acceptable to both sides. 
An enrolled nurse reflected on the many transfers he had had in his long career. Most 
memorable was a transfer he once made from an urban clinic to a rural area. The rural 
clinic had been left without qualified staff after the person who was working there had 
been “beaten by the community”. The nurse did not want to leave the urban clinic. “It 
was the first urban centre for me; I would enjoy”. Besides, he was building a house. “I 
resisted a bit before going there, but a doctor pleaded with me. He said, you simply have 
to go there”. At the end a compromise was found. “When they transferred me away ... 
they gave me two months to finish building my house. I did it. What else could I have 
done? I got help with moving”. Years later he looked back on this and other postings 
with mixed feelings. “Most transfers have been prompt. Even if I plead, they also plead. 
Some day they will send me into hot soup. What if I had failed to settle in (the rural 
centre)?”85 
The previous accounts indicate that there is a seemingly constant struggle between 
health workers and the health system. Health workers want to assert what they consider 
to be their rights, fighting for their interests. At times, officers in the health system try to 
be firm in enforcing the interests of the system – that is, to have an appropriate dis-
tribution. Sometimes they are convincing; some times they make deals to persuade 
health workers. But in a number of cases we have seen above, they managed to be 
convinced by the arguments and circumstances put forward or they were over-ruled by 
someone more susceptible to such arguments with more influence in the system. In 
short, despite the fact that some health workers in their accounts make a transfer sound 
matter-of-fact and others evoke images of powerlessness against a system in which they 
are trapped, there seems to be a good deal of influence and agency that health workers 
have over their fate. However, it is good to remind ourselves that this need not always 
be the case. This came to the fore in what one clinical officer, who made it to hospital 
official level in Lusaka, said about ending his rural posting: “I worked there for two 
years, but I had to run away. They forget about you. I resigned and applied at UTH in 
1987, because friends had told me they were recruiting”.86 
Let us look at the account of one lady in an extremely remote location, who was 
nearly ‘forgotten about’. After graduating and working at a mission hospital and later a 
rural health centre, she requested a posting to Kilwa Island in Lake Mweru, which is 
nearer to Congo than to the Zambian mainland. She said she had wanted to go there 
because the health centre there had no qualified staff at all and she wanted to assist. She 
planned to go there for six months. “I got used there, and I forgot to ask for a transfer 
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from the island. I was just staying with the villagers. Then, after four years my thatched 
house collapsed, and I had no accommodation anymore. I went to the (district health 
office) to ask for a transfer back to St Paul’s, and they came to inspect my house on the 
island. When they saw it had indeed collapsed, they transferred me”.87 It thus appears 
that there is a good reason that people look out for their own interest and lobby de-
cision-makers for favourable postings; if they do not, they risk being ‘forgotten about’. 
Now, having examined the influence health workers have in soliciting a transfer, let us 
look at what they have to say about situations in which people are forced to move. 
Disciplinary transfers  
Transfers are not only initiated by health workers themselves, but are also an instrument 
for management to deal with problems at the workplace. In fact, it even appears that it is 
one of the few tools at the disposal of management to discipline people, as culture, 
procedures, and the scarcity of health workers appear to make other measures difficult 
to apply.  
Most people do not like to talk about their own failures, especially not to a strange 
outsider with a notebook. It is thus difficult to expect someone to talk about having been 
fired or having received a disciplinary transfer. One respondent, when asked about why 
he was transferred from one place to the other, was very cryptic. “Witchcraft becomes 
difficult to prove. The headman created a transfer. It was not for the rest of the com-
munity, but he said there was a quarrel between me and a colleague. We couldn’t argue 
against it. We had fear. The district office never came to our place, but we found a letter 
of transfer”.88 He was not prepared to elaborate more on this issue. The colleague in 
question, whom we had interviewed before we learnt of his involvement in this case, did 
not even touch on this transfer when we spoke to him.89 Later, however, I read the 
minutes of a human resource meeting in which this matter was discussed. According to 
the minutes, the headman had indeed reported to the district director of health that the 
two officers fought while on duty in the rural health centre. The two officers had been 
asked to write letters to exculpate themselves, which they did. The minutes then an-
nounced that, ‘In accordance with Terms and Conditions of Service for the Public 
Service, Chapter IV No. 54, requires officers to maintain the highest standard of con-
duct, efficiency and personal behaviour. Fighting while on duty warrants a written Final 
Warning”. The management then decided to write the officers final warning letters and 
transferred them to different centres.90  
This description is of course very sketchy and its accounts conceal a whole complex 
of social relations, incidents, and human reactions. It is unfortunate that I have not been 
able to construct a more revealing picture of this incident. It could have involved a 
simple work dispute between colleagues that attracted unwelcome attention from the 
community. Alternatively, it could have been the result of deeper, perhaps more sinister 
conflicts. A situation may have arisen similar to the one which faced Mr. Zimba and his 
unfriendly chief. On the basis of the little we know, however, it would be careless to 
speculate about what actually occurred. Nevertheless, this account does highlight the 
difficulty of revealing the reality of labour conflicts and attempts to discipline staff. 
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Moreover, it shows that on occasion, complaints about health workers’ conduct lead to 
the proverbial book being thrown at them – in this case the Terms and Conditions of 
Service for the Public Service. It also shows a preferred instrument for disciplining: 
Transferring the alleged wrongdoer. 
Various respondents spoke about predecessors or other colleagues having been 
transferred because they were creating problems at their place of work. In one case, a 
senior enrolled nurse explained one of his transfers. A colleague was transferred away 
from a clinic. Someone at yet another clinic replaced him and the respondent had to fill 
that gap. He explained that the colleague had cheated on his wife after she had fallen ill 
and was hospitalised. This angered the community, “partly because one of the women 
involved was a married woman”. The chief then reported to the district health office and 
the man was transferred.91 Another health worker spoke of how he filled a vacancy 
caused by the transfer of a predecessor who “did not associate well with the community; 
there were a lot of problems”. He explained: “The previous officer was drinking a lot of 
the local beer and smoking. When he was drunk he was provoking, and he wanted to 
fight”.92 Another account shines some light on the routes that communities can take to 
have someone removed. The community living around a certain clinic had gone to the 
community radio station in the nearby town to complain about the new officer there; 
they wanted him removed. They had also gone to the district health office, but there 
they were told that they had not followed the right procedure. Instead, they were to 
resolve the issue through the neighbourhood health committee.93 In a different instance, 
this procedure was indeed followed. A nurse spoke of a clinic where a maternal death 
occurred. The responsible officer had been away at a workshop. When he returned, the 
community threatened to give him a beating. In the end, the community, through the 
Neighbourhood Health Committee, passed a vote of no confidence, and the district 
transferred the officer.94  
Transfers appear to be the easiest way of dealing with people who are misbehaving. 
An expatriate technical advisor interviewed argued that rather than deal with a difficult 
case, people prefer to just move the problem elsewhere.95 This was echoed by a human 
resource officer who cited a case that I had previously heard of from others. In a district 
in Western Province a doctor “suffered from drunkenness”. 96 He was often absent and 
would insult people who needed help. Then, following complaints by the community, 
he was transferred to the Chainama Psychiatric Hospital in Lusaka. His former boss 
explained that alcoholism is a disease and that at Chainama there would be people who 
could care for him.97 In the same province, I came across complaints of other doctors 
misbehaving. One respondent indicated that in one hospital some doctors are occasion-
ally absent and that others have to cover when they are off drinking to counter the 
boredom of living in a provincial town.98 Another respondent accused these doctors of 
boycotting the out-patient department. They refuse to hand in their work schedules. This 
respondent suspected that this might be connected to their receiving patients at home for 
a fee. It was also said that the hospital director responsible did not have the authority 
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and seniority to discipline his peers. 99 In the judgement of one of these respondents, this 
is because it is not in the nature of “us Zambians” to openly criticise and confront one 
another.100 Another explanation given was that this director had local roots and the local 
royal establishment had insisted on a local filling this important post, regardless of his 
professional experience. Thus, owing to his youth and relative inexperience, he did not 
have the clout to discipline older doctors, despite the fact that, according to others, he 
genuinely tried to manage the hospital as well as he could.101  
A number of managers or former managers I spoke to agreed that in the civil service 
it is extremely difficult to discipline workers. One former manager recounted that once a 
driver in her district repeatedly used the ambulance to transport maize. She sent him 
back, but it finally took two years to get him off the payroll. The case had to go from 
one level to another, following the ‘civil service route’. During the process, she en-
countered threats and intimidation as well as people at higher levels asking if she was 
sure she wanted to proceed with firing the driver, as it would be hard on the relatives.102 
According to some, this process has become even more cumbersome due to recent 
reforms and the dissolution of the health boards. An manager administration at the 
district level said, “Under the board we felt a sense of responsibility. We had the power 
to hire and fire. Now we can just advise. If people misbehave, we can't fire them”. He 
explained that a recommendation has to go from the district health office to the prov-
incial health office to the office of the provincial permanent secretary to the ministry 
headquarters to the public service management division of the Cabinet Office. He gave 
the example of “when a general worker steals drugs, you can recommend (firing him). 
Six months later he is still drawing a full salary. Before PSMD (the Public Service 
Management Division of Cabinet Office) decides, it can be three years later”. He 
indicated that this leaves him and his colleagues with little authority: “They even call us 
toothless; managers by name only”.103 Another human resource manager, this time at a 
large hospital, agreed that it had become more difficult to discipline staff since the 
health boards had been abolished. “Under the board, the board could institute a dis-
ciplinary case. The executive director would sign and that was the end of it. As a last 
resort, someone could approach the courts. Now it has to go through the system up to 
the Public Service Commission. That can take two years up to three years”. He did add, 
however, that “when someone deserts and does not show up for work, pay can be with-
held. That works well”. In fact, as I was interviewing him, a phone call came from the 
internal audit department. They asked about a dismissed worker who was still on the 
payroll. The respondent indicated that the case had come up at the last disciplinary 
meeting. He cross-checked with his colleagues at human resources and made sure that 
no payment would be made. He then called back to internal auditors to confirm when 
the person in question last had a working day.104 
From the preceding, it has become clear that there can be various factors that make it 
difficult to mete out discipline to erring health workers. The bureaucratic process is long 
and cumbersome. In such situations, it seems easier to simply move the problem by 
transferring someone than to tackle the root causes. Another element can be seen to 
                                                 
99  ML0607/15. 
100  ML0607/13. 
101  ML0804/02. 
102  ML0706/13. 
103  ML0810/07. 
104  ML0810/09. 
78 
 
emanate from the cultural values of those who are in charge of disciplining staff. 
Disciplining implies open confrontation and criticism, and people may feel that this may 
not be appropriate in a society that prides itself on evading conflict and striving for 
consensus. Moreover, the consequences of the ultimate penalty of disciplining human 
resources affect not only the worker himself but also the family and relatives dependent 
on him.105 One could thus argue that traditional solidarity conflicts with a need to mete 
out punishment. However, when I put this dilemma to a former Cabinet Office em-
ployee with whom I was chatting in a pub, he agreed that this solidarity impacts on the 
willingness to discipline staff, but he considered this wrong as people should be 
motivated to perform and deliver services.106 Another factor that can be argued to play a 
role in hampering the disciplining of staff can be found in the argument that has come to 
the fore throughout this section, namely the fact that qualified staff is scarce. The health 
sector has many vacancies to fill; and relative to the need, supply is low. This scarcity 
makes it difficult for the health system to lay off staff that are not performing or under-
performing. Instead, it is easier to simply reshuffle staff by transferring them.  
The consequence of the difficulty in disciplining staff discussed above is that it is 
thus difficult to manage performance in this setting. Is this an issue of neo-patrimo-
nialism in that rational-legal logic conflicts with traditional ‘patrimonial’ values? The 
argument of solidarity and affection, in which the social consequences of firing some-
one are given such value, would suggest so. The lobbying and the influencing that we 
have seen impact on the cumbersome rational-legal bureaucratic process of dismissing 
someone also points towards the impact of clientalism. At the same time, the consider-
ation on the part of a manager not to want to risk losing scarce staff and to take rather 
the more efficient route of transferring a wrongdoer – as opposed to going down the 
cumbersome route of laying him off – can be considered to be in line with the rational-
legal value of efficiency. In other words, while this dilemma is reflective of the neo-
patrimonial paradigm, the attempt to label considerations remains problematic.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter we have embarked on a journey in which we saw our health workers join 
the health sector and negotiate considerable spatial distances, being transferred from 
place to place. It was not, however, a story only of spatial mobility, but also of social 
mobility. The first section of this chapter suggested that there is an element of intrinsic 
motivation for becoming a health worker. Some did so to be able to care for others; they 
considered working in the health sector a vocation in the Weberian sense. However, it 
appeared that the motivation to get a job in a context in which jobs are scarce was at 
least as important. Getting to and through college in the pursuit of prized qualifications 
was an endeavour that could spell the difference between the life of most Zambians, 
surviving in informal employment or semi-subsistence agriculture, and the relative 
independence and security of paid employment for life (or more specifically, until 
retirement). A career in the health sector can thus be seen as a livelihood strategy for 
those involved that will to an extent emancipate them from the traditional peasant 
economy.  
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It appeared that this route through education into formal employment is a social 
effort. We saw how the pursuit of qualifications, passing through school and college, 
was partly made possible by the contributions of others. Not only parents, but also 
aunts, uncles, and siblings featured among those who have pushed our health workers 
through school. In Chapter 5 we will see the relativity of the emancipation and in-
dependence that comes from the process of qualifying for a job. In return for the social 
support they received, health workers face claims from their social environment for 
similar support. In this chapter above, however, we saw that the children of those in 
formal employment appeared more likely to qualify as professionals in the health sector 
that those from peasant backgrounds. It can thus be argued that this process of striving 
for qualifications and obtaining paid employment in the health sector is an avenue for 
upward mobility and, as such, an important contributor to the process of class formation 
in contemporary Zambia. 
The importance placed on qualifications resulting from formal education was more 
than evident in health workers’ accounts. The path from secondary school into college 
transformed them from an outsider into an insider within the state-run health system. In 
other words, from being a contender for scarce training opportunities, they became a 
qualified professional and thus a scarce asset themselves. As we saw, this scarcity gives 
health workers considerable agency vis-à-vis the management of the health sector, 
which depends on them for its existence and performance. As a consequence, in their 
negotiation with the system about issues such as posting and placement, they have 
opportunities to realise their private preferences. As such, some of our respondents or 
their colleagues were empowered enough to resist being posted to a location which they 
considered not to serve their interests. We also saw how people can influence the 
system to provide them a better alternative. Some respondents, however, were less as-
sertive or more accepting of their fate, remaining in more remote locations at the lower 
rungs of the system, a fact pointing to the variations in agency between individuals. The 
aggregate result of the influence individuals have on posting decisions can, however, 
conflict with the public interest. This is illustrated by the skewed distribution of health 
workers at the expense of more remote parts of the country. Health workers’ ability to 
influence posting decisions means that such decisions are not as neutral and impersonal 
as ideal-typical bureaucratic decisions.  
The pursuit of qualifications also poses a challenge to more extreme conceptions of 
neo-patrimonialism. The logic of qualifications as an indicator of merit being the pri-
mary criterion for eligibility to a professional position in the health sector appears un-
contested. This does not correspond with the patrimonial logic that appointment to an 
office depends on personal connections to a patron. In the situation in which qualified 
candidates are scare in relation to the available positions, personal connections are thus 
less relevant for getting a job. However, when this scarcity is reversed, as in the case of 
competition for scarce education opportunities – or as we will see in Chapter 4, training 
opportunities – there are more incentives for manipulating application procedures for 
private gain. This was illustrated by the frank accusations of nepotism and bribery en-
countered in this chapter. These convincing accounts can be seen to support the neo-
patrimonial paradigm. It also seems as if, in these accounts, complicity with such 
practices was less unavoidable or acceptable than some might suggest. Rather, this 
manipulation appeared to be more subtle than one might expect. As one respondent 
said, “Only very few people actually bring brown envelopes”. Such informal strategies 
merely manipulate rational-legal application processes rather than replace them. This 
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supports the argument that we should not negate the value of rational-legal logic in neo-
patrimonial settings – or in this case: Qualifications do matter. In short, there is no 
simple answer to the question whether it is either merit or personal connections that 
make someone successful when joining the health sector.  
In the last part of this chapter, we were confronted with situations in which people 
were transferred owing to problems or misconduct. It appeared from various accounts 
that transferring staff is a more convenient solution for errant staff than dismissing 
them. The arguments put forward to explain this varied. On the one hand, it appears to 
be a reaction to a cumbersome bureaucratic process. On the other hand, severe, im-
personal disciplining can be considered to be at odds with traditional values of solidarity 
and affection. While this dilemma is reminiscent of the notion of neo-patrimonialism, 
labelling such considerations as patrimonial is less straightforward. Nevertheless, it does 
appear that this dilemma makes the management of performance problematic and that 
personal considerations weigh heavily on a decision that in ideal-typical rational-legal 
logic should be a neutral, impersonal decision. As we will see later, managing loyalty 
appears to be more important than managing performance in a neo-patrimonial context. 
The importance of loyalty as a consideration in promotion decisions will come to the 
fore in the next chapter, in which we will examine health worker prospects for career 
advancement. Let us therefore now look ahead in the same way that health workers tend 






In the previous chapter we saw our health workers through school and college and saw 
them join the health sector. There it already became apparent that attaining qualifi-
cations plays an important role in realising the ambitions of upward mobility. In this 
chapter, we will continue following these career paths to examine how health workers 
attempt to forge ahead within the sector. We will again examine whether merit or 
personal connections are the key to professional advancement. In addition to looking at 
those who get extra qualifications by further specialising in their field, this chapter will 
look at health workers who depart from a specialised professional career path and 
retrain to be able to enter management positions. We will see that in doing so they are 
pursuing more power and influence, but there are also financial incentives. Again, from 
health workers’ accounts of their quest for further qualifications, we will see a strong 
sense of agency: People taking charge of their own destinies. We will examine what this 
means for them, but also what this means for the health system itself. Is the sector 
served by this upward mobility and the pursuit for further advancement? Also, does the 
system offer room for people to chart out their paths or does it rather challenge and 
block them? In other words, we will explore a possible tension between private interests 
for self-advancement and the official objectives of the health sector. 
In the next section, this chapter will discuss an important goal of this quest for 
further qualifications: Promotion. Promotions are an interesting subject from the neo-
patrimonial perspective. It is assumed that in a patrimonial context, people are not 
appointed on the basis of merit but on the basis of loyalty to or dependence on a 
superior, in a patron-client relationship. In this chapter we will examine what people 
themselves, as well as others, have to say about such promotions. Are promotions based 
on merit and sought-after qualifications, or do other, more personalised factors indeed 
play a role?  
Finally, this chapter will take a look at a particular cadre in the health sector: The 
doctors. In neo-patrimonial theory, much emphasis is placed on the vertical linkages 
between patrons and clients. It is suggested that horizontal linkages, such as class and 
professional distinctions, are less relevant for African power relations than vertical 
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ethnic- or identity-based linkages.1 The section titled ‘It’s a docs’ world’ will examine 
whether this assertion holds in the Zambian health sector. As such, we will gain insight 
into ‘who’s the boss’ in the Zambian health sector. 
Further education 
Picking up the stories health workers presented on their careers, let us address an 
important issue in health workers’ social mobility: Further education. When speaking to 
bright, young health workers – or in fact, nearly any young professional Zambian – they 
seem have a clear goal in mind. They aim to ‘upgrade themselves’ by getting further 
qualifications, in order to climb the professional ladder or improve their chances in the 
labour market. This can be pointedly illustrated by the example of John Mwewa, a 
miner’s son who became a nurse tutor. He had wanted to become a doctor but failed to 
get into medical school. Instead, he applied for registered nursing. At a mission hospital 
that also served as a nursing school, he had worked himself upwards to become a senior 
nurse and later a clinical instructor. But he wanted to go further. Having signed up for 
midwifery, he had also applied to a bachelor programme in nursing at the university. 
After studying midwifery for a year, he was accepted to the University of Zambia, 
where he completed his programme. With this he qualified to become a nurse tutor. 
John’s wife, whom he met at nursing school, is an enrolled nurse and was on leave 
studying pharmacy.2 This example suggests that the exact field of work – nursing, lec-
turing, midwifery, or pharmacy – is secondary to a primary goal: Getting ahead. This, 
we will see, is a recurrent theme in the following sections.3  
Supporting further education of public servants is an active policy of the Zambian 
public sector. This is unsurprising considering the fact that qualified Zambian health 
workers have been extremely scarce throughout the history of the Zambian health 
sector.4 This was even more striking in the early years of Zambian independence, as is 
illustrated by the account of a retired medical doctor and public health official. He was 
one of four black Zambians among thirteen medical students who graduated in the 
second batch of doctors trained at the school of medicine in Lusaka. After working at 
the UTH for two years, he was set to go abroad to help Mozambique, to where most 
Portuguese doctors had fled Zambia after independence. This support was an act of 
solidarity by Kaunda for his comrade Samora Machel, despite the fact that Zambia was 
only marginally better-endowed with doctors itself. The director for medical services 
and presidential physician at the time,5 however, asked him to go to the Kitwe City 
Council, as the expatriate medical officer there had left. The respondent said that he had 
argued that he was not qualified, not having studied public health. He was promised, 
however, that if he accepted he would be sent for a masters’ degree in public health. So 
after spending two months in Kitwe, he went to study in the UK for a year. Then, after 
                                                 
1  See for instance, Chabal & Daloz, Africa, 20. 
2  LB0809/06. 
3  A point also made when examining why health workers chose the health sector in the previous chap-
ter. 
4  In fact, human resource development, i.e. training, has long been a higher priority than human re-
source management, which focuses on staff performance. This can be deduced from descriptions of 
the early years of the Zambian health sector in Kalumba, ‘The practice’, and also more contemporary 
planning documents such as MoH 2001, National 10-year Human Resource Plan for the Public Health 
Sector. 
5  He was a Nigerian, which further illustrates the scarcity of Zambian doctors at the time.  
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another four years in Kitwe, he went to the US for a doctorate in Public Health, with a 
Swedish scholarship.6 
Many respondents have profited from government support in the pursuit of their 
qualifications. One laboratory technician reported that he had first qualified for a job in 
the health sector after following a certificate course.7 After five years of work, he went 
on study leave to pursue a diploma in bio-medical sciences. He claimed it was not dif-
ficult to arrange study leave, as it was pre-arranged when he did his certificate course. 
Furthermore, the three years he spent pursuing a diploma did not cost him anything, as 
government paid for it. This sponsorship, however, did come with the obligation spelled 
out by a ‘bonding letter’, meaning that he would have to spend at least two more years 
in his current post after qualifying.8  
The investment made by government in further education of its workers is a definite 
incentive for people to join government service. The question is, however, whether this 
will keep them working for the government that sponsored them.9 A pharmacist in his 
late twenties recounted that he had received a 75 per cent bursary from the government 
to support him at university. However, when his uncle who supported him died, this was 
scaled up to one hundred per cent. He said that he would like to continue working for 
the government because government had educated him. He was planning to go for a 
master’s degree soon to further his education. As he had spent almost three years in 
government service, he would be permitted to go. He also expected the Ministry of 
Health to sponsor this. He summarised his gratitude to government by saying, “The 
government sponsored me; they sent me to school. So I’ll work for government”. Later 
in the conversation, however, this resolve suddenly appeared less firm. “But maybe 
until a better offer comes around”. Apologetically, he added, “We cannot run away from 
the salaries”.10 This ambivalence about paying back the government for the investment 
made in one’s education was echoed in the words of another health worker. “The 
government pays the lowest salaries. In the private sector it is much better, but in the 
government the possibilities for education are much better. Job security is also higher in 
the government. I intend to remain working for the government, but if something comes 
along ...”.11 
Some health workers are less fortunate than others in accessing possibilities for 
further education. Because access is limited, it is contested, in much the same way as we 
saw when discussing chances of getting into college. One enrolled nurse mentioned that 
she had been trying for quite some time to be accepted into a college, to be ‘upgraded’ 
as a registered nurse. She explained her failure by stating that, especially in rural areas, 
one can apply several times without being picked. Part of the problem is that it is 
difficult to hear on which dates one can apply, and that the district only sponsors an 
applicant once. The rest of the time an applicant has to pay for transport costs herself. 
The district health office will then only support someone financially after he or she has 
                                                 
6  ML0811/02. 
7  Zambian colleges such as Chainama or Evelyn Hone offer certificates and diplomas to represent one’s 
qualifications, and together with bachelors’ and masters’ degrees these reflect an ascending order of 
qualifications. 
8  After that, he was considering moving from the government sector. “I’m not all that comfortable. This 
is a government set-up: NGOs are performing much better … We’re not making our ends meet. I’ve 
got friends working for NGOs who are earning five times more than I do”. PB0810/01. 
9  Despite the lofty words some may offer in response to an interviewer’s questions. 
10  PB0810/03. 
11  PB0810/17. 
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been accepted to college. The nurse found it very frustrating not to be accepted to a 
college. “How are we going to improve? If you have that plan, you should be able to go 
to school. Now we are growing old without upgrading”.12 Some health workers are 
resigned to the fact that it is too late for them to further their education. “As years went 
by, my interest was thinning and when the family grew it became more difficult as 
well”.13  
The complaint that it is more difficult for people in rural areas to get into colleges is 
often heard. During a focus group discussion in a rural provincial capital, participants 
mentioned that people ‘along the line of rail’ (those closer to colleges) have first-hand 
information about a selection procedure and thus it is easier to apply and get picked.14 It 
is very likely that this is indeed a complicating factor in seeking further education. 
Nevertheless, some respondents gave the impression that policies aimed at enhancing 
access to people in rural areas had some impact. One nurse, who had gone for mid-
wifery, said. “The government wanted to give a chance to rural areas, so I was lucky”.15 
In fact, chatting to a young nurse on the Copperbelt, I was told that he was even con-
sidering applying for a transfer to Mansa as people in rural provinces had more chance 
to go for further education.16 This argument was, however, contested by a participant in 
a focus group discussion who conceded, “The policies are there, but not put in practice”, 
claiming that if someone from a “higher office brings a person”, then that person would 
be more likely to be accepted than someone from a rural area.17  
As was the case with getting into colleges, allegations of unfair clientalism are rife in 
discussions of further education. “The time you go for interviews, someone else is al-
ready selected. The people who get selected might have relatives there; they might have 
some people backing them. Also, the people who are selecting, only select those who 
are a new entry; there is no gratitude for the years spent in service”.18 Another res-
pondent was more specific with an allegation of clientalism. He said that he had 
attempted to get into registered nursing twice. In addition to himself, there was one 
other from the same hospital who wanted to go. Eventually, the other one was picked by 
the nursing school. “The nursing officer (at his hospital) favoured someone from her 
own church, and she communicated about this with (the nursing school). The other one 
didn’t even have all the qualifications. He didn’t have the required maths ... It was not 
easy for me; I saw that I didn’t get the chance even though I was hard-working”.19 
Other respondents stress issues of prior qualifications as the source of their 
difficulties in getting accepted for further education. One young enrolled nurse told us 
she would definitely like to become a registered nurse. First, however, she would have 
to improve her high-school grades for science and biology; then it would be easier. She 
had wanted to get into registered nurse school for the last three years. She even tried to 
re-sit biology once before, but the attempt was not good enough. Then she got pregnant 
and had to wait. As her daughter was a year and seven months old when we spoke to 
                                                 
12  LB0809/18. 
13  PB0811/09. 
14  FG0811/02. 
15  PB0811/15. 
16  ML0810/11. 
17  FG0811/01. 
18  LB0809/19. 
19  PB0811/24. This account illustrates that clientalism is not merely an issue of favouring relatives or 
people from the same ethnic group; other contemporary social relations, such as membership of the 
same church, also play a role.  
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her, she could start working on her grades again. She mentioned that she was taking 
private lessons, though it was a difficult combination to work and study: “your mind is 
divided”. After qualifying, she said she could choose between a private and a public 
school, though private schools mean paying “big money”. In both cases, however, one 
can get study leave.20 Another nurse said that this strategy of re-sitting secondary school 
exams had been successful for her. She said she had tried to get into registered nursing 
many times, but had not been accepted. Then she was accepted for midwifery. As this 
was her second choice and she still preferred registered nursing, she decided to re-sit her 
mathematics. As she passed these exams, she now has “a better shot at getting into” 
registered nursing. Still, she wants to re-sit mathematics again to improve further. She 
explained: “Promotion depends on yourself; you have to advance. The young ones are 
becoming better off, so you have to study from time to time”.21 
The pattern shown by the previous respondent and also by Mr. Mwewa, the nurse 
tutor presented at the beginning of this section, appears to be common. Some people bet 
on various horses to increase their chances of ‘improving themselves’. One young en-
rolled nurse revealed his ambitions: “By God’s grace, I can continue my education. I 
already applied to Evelyn Hone, to study pharmacy. As a back-up I also applied to the 
Lusaka Institute of Nursing to become a registered nurse, but I would prefer pharmacy. 
In ten years I want to have a degree, either via nursing or pharmacy. My focus is just to 
have a degree, and I am pretty sure I can do it”.22 Not only does this account illustrate 
the strong sense of upward mobility that we have encountered a number of times 
already, it also shows a tendency towards what we can call ‘stacking qualifications’. 
One could even describe some Zambian professionals as ‘serial students’, who appear to 
have embarked on a seemingly indiscriminate quest of qualifications in order to enter 
more lucrative career paths.  
One registered nurse’s account of her career and the qualifications she tried to get is 
illustrative for this stacking of qualifications and changing career paths. After gradu-
ating, she started working in a rural health centre in a very remote part of the country. 
Although she was not trained as a midwife, she conducted many deliveries. Then the 
Central Board of Health began hiring people for the district health management team. 
At the time, the Netherlands was supporting a district health management course in 
Kabwe, to train people for the new management responsibilities that resulted from the 
health reform process. The top three managers in each district were appointed to follow 
this higher diploma course, including our respondent. After qualifying for her manage-
ment job, she returned to the district for a further four years. Then she applied for a 
nursing degree at UNZA. She claims that, based on her health management diploma, 
she was accepted. The district, however, wanted to support her only for management 
courses as she was part of the management, rather than for a further clinical speciali-
sation. Therefore, after six months her sponsorship was cut. She then decided to go back 
into nursing as there were rumours that the Central Board of Health would be abolished 
and she was afraid her management position would be given to someone else. After 
leaving UNZA, she had applied for a job in Lusaka, but the province she came from did 
not clear her for a transfer to Lusaka. She then went to work at the provincial hospital. 
In the meantime, she had secured sponsorship from the African Development Bank, 
with which she could go back to university to pursue a nursing degree. This, she said, 
                                                 
20  LB0809/23. 
21  PB0810/08. 
22  PB0810/17. 
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was due to her extensive rural experience. However, in her third year she got stuck. She 
failed a course in physiology, re-sat the exam and failed again, and was then excluded 
from the studies. If she wanted to retry she would have to start again from the first year. 
She then returned to the provincial hospital, where she continued working in the wards 
and the out-patient department. At a certain point she briefly worked as a lecturer at the 
nearby nursing school as she had nearly attained a degree in nursing, but the principle 
nursing officer transferred her back to the hospital because she did not have her papers. 
“I would prefer working as a lecturer”, she said. “My interest was to teach students. 
Also there is a financial incentive: The salary is the same, but the lecturers are getting 
250,000 every month for teaching and 250,000 for upkeep, so there is a 500,000 differ-
ence”.23 This nurse thus had a varied career, from working at a rural health centre, 
dealing with deliveries and primary health care, before she shifted to management. Then 
she went ‘back’ to hospital nursing and lecturing. This account does not shine light on 
the entire range of motives this health worker might have had for changing tack so 
many times.24 However, one is led to wonder whether it was indeed the personal interest 
and motivation for a specific job that were the decisive factors for going into nursing, 
management, or tutoring. Alternatively, the financial incentives that came with each job 
and a desire to secure her livelihood may have been decisive. One could also seriously 
doubt how efficient it is for public money to be spent training and re-training this in-
dividual. It does appear that management at a certain point tried to curb this nurse’s 
desire to stack qualifications, when she decided to pursue a university degree in nursing 
while being a manager. In the end, however, it appears that neither her own ambitions to 
be a tutor with a degree nor the management’s desire to retain her as a manager 
prevailed. Finally, a picture emerges from such accounts that health workers constantly 
pursue strategies to find new opportunities for both improving and securing their liveli-
hoods. These strategies appear to attempt to keep options open and seize opportunities 
that pass by, rather than focussing on a specific career trajectory. As we will see later, 
this relates to focus not only within one’s professional career but also beyond one’s 
formal job.  
Moving into management 
The move from clinical work into management is a common pattern in health workers’ 
accounts. In part, this is a result of the organisational changes the health sector has been 
undergoing over the last decades. During the implementation of the health reforms, 
considerable responsibilities were delegated to the district level. That created numerous 
management posts that needed to be filled, as we saw in the case of the registered nurse 
above. Environmental health technologists, nurses, and clinical officers were often 
given workshops, training courses, and the district health management course mention-
ed above to prepare them for their new tasks, in addition to learning on the job. At times 
this allowed capable and experienced health workers to climb up and share their 
practical experience as managers. Equally, at times it meant that health workers that 
were not really suited for management (as we saw in the case of Ashley and Anton’s 
manager administration) land in a position of power and influence. The suitability of 
                                                 
23  PB0810/15. ZMK 500,000 equalled € 90 at the time of interviewing. 
24  There may have been personal issues or conflict at the workplace, which may not have been deemed 
fit to mention in an interview. 
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this group of health workers for management positions, however, is contested, as we 
will see later.25  
In addition to this group who were raised into management en-masse owing to struc-
tural changes, there are also health workers who have re-educated themselves into man-
agement at their own initiative. Take for instance Mr. Mtonga, who had grown up in 
Lusaka, was trained as an environmental health technologist, and was initially posted in 
a very remote rural area. “That posting was a bad experience”, he remembered when 
narrating his story. In Lusaka he had been used to things like electricity, while at his 
centre “there was nothing”. After a year, the district noticed that he was depressed and 
they transferred him to what would shortly be the newly created district of Chiengi. At 
Mununga, his new location, he recalled that there was a Peace Corps project that was 
building a new health centre. At the time, during the run-up to the 1996 elections, the 
deputy minister of health, Katele Kalumba, was standing against a local politician for 
the parliamentary seat.26 In the course of the campaign struggle, those in power con-
sidered the sourcing of funds to build the health centre was in a sense campaigning for 
the opposition. Together with the Peace Corps volunteers, Mr. Mtonga was transferred 
elsewhere.  
After three more years working as an environmental health technologist at a different 
health centre, Mr. Mtonga decided to study human resource management. He claimed 
that the main reason for this change of career was that, as an environmental health tech-
nologist, he “experienced a lot of noise”. The work was antagonistic to the community; 
he was mainly inspecting premises or bars and threatening to close them down if health 
circumstances did not improve. “The communities were somewhat primitive; they 
didn’t want to see me. They would say ‘ah, the inspectors have come!’”. They even 
threatened him with witchcraft. In the beginning, he believed in it, but later he could not 
see how it would work. “Someone would say they had a charm, but it was just a wooden 
plank carved up”. It did not affect him. What did affect him though was the fact that the 
ministry did not approve of him studying human resource management. Mr. Mtonga 
was not clear on the reasons for this, but he recounted that he then decided to support 
himself. Three years later he had finished a diploma course in Lusaka. Since then he had 
worked as an manager administration at the district level. At the time we spoke to him, 
however, he still did not seem satisfied with his qualifications. He was studying devel-
opment studies, through a long-distance programme. Two more years of effort would 
get him his bachelor’s degree.27 But he had set his sights further than that. He hoped that 
in 2011 he would then be able to start a master’s programme.28 One can assume that Mr. 
Mtonga figured that a degree in development studies, together with his experience, 
would make him a good candidate for a job with an NGO.  
                                                 
25  This emerged particularly during the restructuring process that followed the abolition of the boards, 
when the aim was to hire people with degrees in management to fill management positions rather than 
health staff with management diplomas or certificates.  
26  According to the Zambian historian Musambachime, there was quite some disappointment with the 
Shila people of Mununga, who now found themselves split between Chiengi and Nchelenge, from 
which Chiengi had been split off. They would prefer a district to be established in the Kalunwishi 
area. Instead, the boma was created near Puta, seat of the Bwile royal establishment (Musambachime, 
personal communication). The episode described here fits well with this expert’s account of the local 
political context, as well as the section ‘Building Katele’s Kingdom’ in Chapter 8. 
27  He found combining study and a full-time job very busy. He claimed that when necessary, he got up at 
one in the morning to do his homework and then started working at eight a.m. 
28  LB0809/02. 
88 
 
During my fieldwork, I encountered at least two other health workers who decided to 
retrain themselves to become human resource managers. One, once he was in possess-
ion of the appropriate qualifications, made his way to a senior post at the ministry head-
quarters. He had started out as a clinical officer. After graduating from Chainama, he 
was posted to a remote part of North-Western Province. As we have seen before in other 
cases, he was very unhappy. Then, one day when he was back in Lusaka for training, he 
told the ministry that he refused to return to his post. He recounted that to hold on to 
him the ministry posted him to a major hospital on the Copperbelt. As time progressed 
and he continued working as a clinical officer, he decided to continue studying. He went 
on to finish a degree in public administration at UNZA. He then returned as a human 
resource officer to the hospital where he had been working. Later, the restructuring 
process put a strain on the human resources directorate in Lusaka, which was allegedly 
understaffed in both numerical as well as qualitative terms. He was asked to help out at 
Ndeke House from time to time: Looking at submissions, checking, counter-checking, 
and verifying. After a few months, he was appointed to a fixed position.29  
Another Chainama graduate was trained as a psychiatric clinical officer. He had 
wanted to be posted to a rural district. Once, he recounted, he had the possibility to 
become the AIDS expert at the district health office. However, his supervisor refused, 
saying that he was too valuable as a psychiatric clinical officer. The respondent claimed 
he had the feeling he lost out then, as the person who did get the job reportedly ended 
up working for a good NGO. Later, after having done a training course in the field of 
counselling, he was requested to open a counselling unit at the central hospital. Then, as 
the hospital board was established, there were vacancies in administration. The director 
then moved him, and the board appointed him as a hospital administrator. When he 
started as an administrator, he had hoped that the hospital would have a career devel-
opment plan for him, but it seemed otherwise. He applied and had been accepted to a 
diploma course in human resources three times. However, only on the fourth acceptance 
did the ministry decide to sponsor him. Then, because the boards were being dissolved, 
a vacancy opened up for him at his old hospital as acting human resource manager. The 
former human resource manager had been on a board contract but reverted to the old 
civil service conditions of service. His fuel allowance was stopped and electricity and 
water were no longer paid, so he had left to join the Roads Development Agency. The 
respondent claimed that he had no regrets that he had left his old profession. “When you 
are a clinical officer, your movement is limited. You can become senior or chief 
(clinical officer), unless you branch off”. He wanted to go further, however. He claimed 
it was not from a financial perspective but from a professional perspective. He argued 
that when he changed into administration, he only went up 4000 Kwacha in salary.30 
While I have no specific evidence to deny this claim, it might not be the entire truth. 
Those in management (including human resource management) positions are generally 
known to have more access to workshops, field trips, and other opportunities to receive 
additional allowances. It is thus likely that, at least more recently in his career, he has 
profited from the material benefits of management. Apparently, our respondent did not 
consider it virtuous to admit such financial motivations. Furthermore, the position of 
human resource manager creates power and influence, since one decides over the fate of 
others, whether they can access training, qualify for promotions or allowances, and so 
on. The neo-patrimonial paradigm would suggest that such a gatekeeper function could 
                                                 
29  ML0809/14. 
30  ML0810/09. ZMK 4,000 equalled about € 0.75 at the time of interviewing.  
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provide opportunities to abuse one’s influence for some personal gain, either in payment 
or favours. We can in no way claim that this respondent has indeed instrumentalised his 
position in such a way. If it were the case, however, this would of course be an issue 
best left unspoken for this respondent.  
It is interesting to note that in some of the stories above there was a disconnect 
between what a health worker considered appropriate further education and what was 
considered appropriate in view of the greater good of the state-run health system. As we 
have seen before, however, some health workers demonstrate considerable agency in 
pursuing their interests. That this can even lead to what can be safely called manipu-
lation can be seen in the following account of yet another clinical officer who turned 
human resource manager. We heard a quotation from him in the previous chapter, when 
he ran away from a rural posting to Lusaka so as not to be “forgotten about”. After four 
years of having worked at a very large hospital, he was sent to Australia on a scholar-
ship. He admitted that these scholarships were given only for courses that are not found 
locally. “I was supposed to go and study occupational therapy, and when I went there I 
took some orientation courses”. However, then he followed courses in the field of 
human resource management instead, for which he eventually got permission because 
there were people with diplomas in this field but no degrees. “When I came back, I had 
problems with my transfer from clinical officer to human resource manager. My 
colleagues didn’t want me to come to administration. No one had a degree in human re-
source management there; maybe they were scared for their positions. The person who 
had recommended me had already left when I returned from Australia in 1999. The 
managing director helped, and people who were making a lot of noise were transfer-
red”.31 This enterprising career hunter, in his frank account, shone light on the process 
of seizing opportunities and even bending rules in his quest to get valued qualifications. 
When the system tries to block such people, some might concede and accept their fate; 
others might look for alternative paths to further themselves; and the most brash might 
simply try to overbear the system and present people with foregone conclusions, as we 
saw in the case above. This account also shines light on transfers as an instrument for 
dealing with “people who make a lot of noise”. And while the social relations behind 
this account remain obscure, it also suggests a process of gaining allies to defend one’s 
interest. One can only speculate, however, whether such social allies would need to be 
repaid with favours or loyalty.  
Training your way out of the bush 
Having argued extensively the importance that Zambian health professionals place on 
the quest for qualifications, let us now look at the sometimes perverse effects that these 
laudable individual efforts32 can have on the formal objectives of the health system: The 
public interest. Earlier we have questioned whether it was an efficient use of resources 
for a nurse to change career paths several times in a seemingly haphazard manner. In yet 
another example, we will see a health worker over-qualifying himself for his current job 
and apparently spending more time training than actually working. A supervisor in the 
laboratory of a provincial hospital had made his entrance into the health sector with a 
certificate in laboratory technology. After a year and eight months working at a mission 
hospital, he was admitted to a college in Lusaka for a diploma course in bio-medical 
                                                 
31  PB0812/01. 
32  Or collective efforts focussed on a particular individual. 
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sciences. The mission hospital had given him transport money and helped him arrange 
paid study leave, before he had served the regulatory two full years. Perhaps this was 
influenced by the value that qualified laboratory technologists have, owing to their 
scarcity and the enormous extra workload the sector has experienced from the massive 
roll-out of anti-retroviral treatment for people living with AIDS and the diagnostic tests 
this involves.  
This respondent described his experience working in these conditions. The previous 
person in charge had left the laboratory he worked in somewhat dirty, so he had cleaned 
it up to standard. When he arrived there, three staff members had just left, while the 
laboratory catered for three districts. “I was working twenty-four hours. That place 
taught me about hard work. If you are alone, you are forced to process the work whether 
you like it or not. If patients come, you can't send them away”. He claims that this made 
him hard-working. As an after-thought, he said about his current workplace, “Here it is 
a bit different”. After another few years he went on study leave again, this time for a 
degree in bio-medical sciences. When he came back from his studies, however, he could 
not remain at the mission hospital. “It was tough when I told them I would leave. They 
realised a bit late that I would leave a gap. Still now I haven't been replaced there. But 
after completing my degree, my position does not exist there”, as he has been too highly 
qualified. “So the province transferred me here; otherwise, someone might have hooked 
me. I would have loved to stay; they even built me a house”.33 This is a clear example of 
someone training himself out of a job in a context in which an even moderately trained 
laboratory technician would be invaluable. Fortunately, in this case the respondent 
resisted the opportunity to go elsewhere where his qualifications would be welcome. 
Also, he was not completely re-retrained, as we have seen before. However, this case 
did show how, by constantly increasing their qualifications, health workers can be seen 
to train themselves out of the bush – and possibly out of the country. 
It is evident that certain high-tech skills may not be very useful in rural areas or even 
less-equipped hospitals. In the words of a surgeon in Lusaka, “When you’re trained in a 
particular field, you find you won’t be very useful. You don’t have the back-up; your 
training is a complete waste of time. I’ll give you an example. I went to Tokyo to study 
bypass surgery, and I can’t do that in a rural area. A surgery like that needs other sur-
geons, as well as trained nurses, etc. A training like this becomes completely useless in 
a rural area”.34 Similarly, a degree-holder in charge of a laboratory in a provincial 
hospital said that, before, one had to go outside the country for a university degree, but 
in 2002 the University of Zambia began a degree course. He had recently returned with 
a degree. The programme had given him new insights about the changes in the pro-
fession and in immunology. His professor had told him that he had to do research now, 
although his hospital is not running appropriate research programmes. “I am being 
under-utilised”, he complained. “I need a bigger hospital like Kitwe or UTH, but the 
government wants every lab in the country to be run by someone with a university de-
gree”. For the time being, he is not going anywhere, however. “I have a two-year 
bonding contract, and after that I have three years until retirement. Then I can start 
working for the private sector”.35 This account is echoed by a younger laboratory tech-
nician. He reported that since returning from his diploma course, he can use new tech-
nologies for examining, for instance, liver and kidney conditions. He can diagnose more 
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accurately now, but he is annoyed that he does not have certain equipment: “I have the 
knowledge, but I cannot do certain things. In five or ten years, my knowledge will be 
gone. Management is well aware of these problems, but there is nothing that can be 
done about it”. In the meanwhile, he wants to further his studies and get a bachelor’s 
degree. He is not sure if he will remain working for the government: “I’m not all that 
comfortable. This is a government set-up; NGOs are performing much better”. When 
asked, he mentioned that his main argument is that “what you get at the end of the 
month is what scares people: We’re not making our ends meet. I’ve got friends working 
for NGOs who are earning five times more than I do”.36  
Not all health workers seem so intent on ‘looking for greener pastures’ after getting 
qualified, however. One doctor who was trained in Russia and was working in Lusaka 
said, “The MoH should be flexible with staff. I would go to a rural area; I haven’t seen 
much of rural Zambia. It also leaves you a much better doctor. You are exposed to so 
many conditions. Here you become so focused, you forget other departments”. While in 
his profession the training opportunities are limited, he did not appear anxious to seek 
his fortune abroad. “I would like to leave the country for postgraduate research, but I 
would like to come back to Zambia afterwards. In UTH, only the postgraduate studies in 
surgery are recognised internationally. I want to be exposed to the latest developments 
in technology. But the need for doctors is so big here that I would feel guilty working 
somewhere else, making some huge salary”.37 The question is, however, whether he 
would indeed be so steadfast if, as was mentioned by others, ‘something comes  
along ...’.  
It is clear that in the Zambian sector there is a strong tide of health workers ebbing 
away from the rural areas where they are much needed.38 As we have seen from the 
preceding, this is to a large extent the result of individuals fulfilling their ambitions of 
upward mobility. As we have also seen, this is partly driven by financial incentives, but 
also by a pursuit of status as well as the desire for professional satisfaction: being able 
to do what you are trained for. Another factor we have encountered in numerous 
examples above is that the reality of life and work in rural areas is at odds with the 
expectations a professional has of living a middle-class life. The discourse of the human 
resource crisis in health sees this phenomenon as problematic, which is understandable 
viewed from the perspective of the public good. From the perspective of the health 
worker, it is not problematic per se and is morally justified. Another mitigating argu-
ment is that at higher levels in the system, appropriately qualified staff are also needed. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that the result of this accumulation of individual endeavour 
has negative consequences for an efficient and equitable distribution of human re-
sources. This clashes with the perspective of serving the public interest.  
However, as we can see from health workers’ accounts, the bureaucracy does try to 
deal with these efficiency and equity issues. We have already heard stories that men-
tioned that health workers were bonded. This is a useful quid pro quo: Government 
sponsors your training and a district or institution facilitates the training; in return, the 
health worker is obliged to stay at a particular clinic for a certain period. There is also, 
as we have seen earlier, a rule in practice (though we saw in that example that the rule 
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was not followed) that after having gone on study leave, one has to wait a period of two 
years before going on study leave again. And for doctors it is said that after an 
internship and before being allowed to go for post-basic education, they should go 
through a period of mandatory rural posting, though it is unclear to what degree this is 
implemented. As we have also seen, at times health workers are blocked in attempts to 
go for extra training. One former enrolled nurse, who had already been upgraded to 
registered nurse, said that he had wanted to go for midwifery, but that the district did not 
allow him. They argued that staffing levels did not allow for this. They also said that he 
had not put it in the action plan. At his next posting, however, the health centre was 
supportive and he went for his midwifery. At the time my research assistant interviewed 
him, he had recently applied for a degree course in post-basic nursing and was still 
waiting for the reply. He reflected that his recommendations are good, but that there is 
high competition.39 This account shines light on the way study leave and courses have 
to be planned and the bureaucratic process of recommendations and approval. While 
such bureaucratic processes are open to social influence and possible manipulation, they 
do show an attempt by the health system to get a grip on people’s training ambitions and 
efforts, to promote a more equitable distribution of health workers.  
The struggle and the negotiation involved in accessing the privilege of going on 
study leave is illustrated by the following example. A physiotherapist did his diploma 
course at Evelyn Hone, and after graduating he was posted to a hospital in a rural 
provincial capital. He had never been out of the Copperbelt and Lusaka before, so he 
was in some trepidation about it. He had the opportunity to go and see the working 
environment during a six-month probation period. After that period, he decided it was 
alright to stay there. What he claimed had helped him in this decision was the fact that 
the hospital promised to send him back to school later on. Then, after two and a half 
years the hospital sent him to UNZA, as promised, where he studied physiotherapy. 
During his training at UNZA, he was sponsored by the ministry and the hospital. He 
received a bonding contract for three more years at the hospital. After those three years 
he wants to go for his master’s degree. While his previous experiences were good, he 
did not seem confident about his future training, “It is quite difficult to get in. Only 
doctors get their masters. For doctors it’s easier; after two years of rural experience they 
automatically get back to school. It is discrimination; it is not fair. For physiotherapy the 
boss has to endorse before the Ministry of Health considers master’s”. But he is anxious 
whether this boss, the executive director, as a doctor will treat him fairly. “He has a 
certain orientation about doctors”.40 This is thus a struggle between health workers and 
the bureaucracy, in which we have to take into account that it is also the decision-
makers themselves who struggle for their own access to qualifications and upgrading.  
Let us end this section, however, with accounts that do not necessarily imply a diver-
gence of public and private interest: The stories from two young men whose strategies 
for forging ahead will leave their current work benefiting from their skills – for a short 
while still at least. But in their long-term planning, the sky is the limit. A young 
pharmacy technologist explained how he wanted to use the provincial town where he is 
currently posted ‘as a training ground’. He wanted to go back soon to school and 
upgrade himself with a diploma course. After that, he would like to go to campus. He 
said he expected to do this while using his current town of residence as a base; there-
fore, he reckoned that he would stay there for the next six or seven years. “I am looking 
                                                 
39  PB0811/33. 
40  LB0809/20. 
93 
 
at the vision that I have. Being a young man, and having a lot cut out for me, I don’t 
think I should miss that opportunity”. He thought it would not be difficult to get into a 
diploma course: “I have a basis, I don’t expect much restrictions, and they know us 
from the certificate course; they know my behaviour in school is good. Also, this time I 
will get help from the government for the expenses, because I’m in government service 
now”. In ten years, he saw himself going for a PhD, as he would very much like to do 
scientific research. He also expressed that he would like to go into business and have his 
own pharmaceutical company. For that, he would like to go out of the country as well, 
to see how people in other cultures are dealing with the challenges they face. “If you are 
somewhere for a long time, you don’t see the need for improvement; but if you see 
other cultures, this can help you. But the most important thing is that I arrive where I 
want to arrive”.41 
Another young man described the difficulties of living in a rural area: Witchcraft, 
rumours, and electricity “can just go off anyhow”. “And a big problem is relish. There’s 
just fish. Every day there’s fish”. And even when he buys something else, such as beef 
and keeps it in the fridge, the electricity goes off and it spoils. He looked at his friends 
who refused to go for rural postings and are working in clinics connected to the mines. 
“I’m just the black sheep for staying in a rural health centre”. He reflected, however, 
that after working there for a while he would have a better chance of getting further 
education. “Here we are few, so the chance of getting sent is bigger. And if I don’t get 
sponsorship, here I can save money for my schooling”. Even though he is not originally 
from the province where he is posted, he sees himself staying there for a while. Neither 
does he want to go abroad: “I want to build houses”.42  
Who’s the boss? 
In previous sections we have seen how health workers chase possibilities to get 
qualifications in their bid to forge ahead and improve themselves and possibly move 
into management. In this section, we will look at how people are promoted to more 
senior positions. Again, through talking to people, it is very difficult to get a true sense 
for all the factors that played a role in a specific promotion decision and to determine 
which factors were of overriding or significant importance. Nevertheless, we can iden-
tify certain patterns that are seen to play a role, by analysing the accounts of health 
workers of themselves and others.  
When asked why they were promoted, many respondents point out that they were 
qualified or that they have the capabilities. One official answered, “Because I am a 
performer”. He indicated that, in his judgement, 98 per cent of the reasons for getting 
opportunities “is based on your performance, and 2 per cent is who you know”. He 
added that it is “difficult for others; some of my classmates, even to this day, failed to 
get a promotion”.43 Another respondent, who made it up to principal nursing officer, 
said, “I’m not sure why they picked me. Maybe I just had what it took. But I haven’t let 
them down”.44 A former principal clinical officer thought the reason for his promotion 
was that he is a “very efficient worker”.45 And a stores officer, who started out as a 
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garden boy, said, “The management determined my upgrade. They have to see your 
performance, and then they write to you with a transfer. The performance should pave 
the way for an employee”.46 Of course, these accounts in part reflect a discourse of self-
justification: Representations of people wanting to shine a positive light on themselves. 
It is safe to say that they are not a precise and complete reflection of the considerations 
in the actual decision-making process.47 On the other hand, one could equally argue that 
they say something about a shared ideal in the public service: Someone gets promoted 
on the basis of performance, of merit.  
In various cases, promotion did not seem much of a contentious issue due to the 
scarcity of qualified staff. This was especially so in the earlier years of the Zambian 
health sector, as we saw in the case of the doctor who, when he was young and in-
experienced, went to work for the Kitwe City Council and who was, en passant, sent 
abroad to get the required qualifications.48 At the time, many positions in the sector 
were filled by expatriates, some of whom were anxious to leave. One former public 
health officer described how he took over from an expatriate who had left in such a 
hurry that there was no smooth handover. Coming from a posting in Eastern Province, 
where he had taken over from one expatriate, he had arrived in Lusaka for a placement 
at the ministry headquarters. As he arrived he was told not to unpack as the provincial 
health inspector on the Copperbelt had resigned and there was a vacancy that needed 
filling. At the time there was an active policy of Zambianisation, aimed at replacing 
expatriates with indigenous Zambians.49 According to our respondent, some expatriates 
were not anxious to leave as they had their families in Zambia and were oriented 
towards Africa.50 Others, however, were, no doubt influenced by the economic crisis 
that had set in in the 1970s and was gradually eroding Zambia’s capacity to pay civil 
servants internationally competitive salaries. At any rate, in this situation it is under-
standable that anyone who was qualified or even partially qualified could make very 
rapid career advances. In many cases, especially in more remote locations, this situation 
still holds. In part this is because of the new cadres and new positions that have been 
created in the course of time. One nurse described how, on arrival at a mission hospital, 
she was immediately put in charge of the children and maternity ward, as she was prop-
erly qualified, albeit in-experienced. “It was a challenge but it also brought confidence 
in my training that I was well prepared for it”.51 But even a senior doctor who was head 
of the department of medicine at a major hospital commented on his becoming head of 
the department: “There are very few people in the department; it was not very com-
petitive. The previous head of department was promoted; he is now the MD (managing 
director), and that’s how I became the head”.52 
One account shone some light on the process of selecting a candidate when a vac-
ancy emerged. It may be interesting to note that this case refers to a cadre that is 
relatively new in the sector, that of health information officer. This cadre has become 
increasingly essential to the health management system due to donors’ demands for 
health and service-delivery data. The respondent had trained as a public health officer. 
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Then, after having worked at a rural health centre for five years, he was transferred to 
the district health office. He claimed that it was not his own initiative to move from the 
rural centre. He did not have any problems with living in the bush, having grown up in a 
typical village. He had taken care of cattle and helped with farming when he was young. 
Rather, he had some problems managing his own small household; however, he held the 
principle: “If the community can do it, I can too”. He remembered that he was inter-
acting well with the community. It was just important to stick to agreements and to keep 
the trust of the community. He did remember some problems, however. A clinical 
officer, his boss at the centre, felt that as the person in charge he did not need to go on 
outreach programmes or organise neighbourhood health committee meetings. The 
respondent claimed the clinical officer felt that “he had grown up”. Fortunately, after 
nine months he retired. When the respondent himself left the clinic, he claimed the 
“programmes were running typical”. After five years he was shifted. As mentioned, it 
was not on his initiative. Rather, according to him the district health management team 
saw that he could contribute. He was made responsible for running the information 
department at the district level. He remembered that it was great to realise he was doing 
well and to get a more responsible position. In the next six years he was also sent to 
another district to hold the same job. Meanwhile, he was trained for the job he had 
initially held without the proper qualifications and got a certificate in integrated man-
agement of information systems. Then the person holding a similar position, but at the 
provincial level, went abroad for his studies. The provincial health director then re-
portedly asked the ministry headquarters to identify a replacement. On a tip from the 
predecessor, our respondent was appointed, though because of the abolition of the 
Central Board of Health and the restructuring he has still not been confirmed in his post 
for the last two years.  
Through our respondent’s account of what his work entails, we can also get a view of 
his erstwhile colleagues at other districts who thus indirectly were his competitors for 
his current job. He claimed that there are big variations in their competence: Some are 
computer literate while others just know the basics. In addition, in three districts the 
health information officers are on study leave to get their qualifications. He denied that 
these colleagues had negative work attitudes, though his further account did illustrate 
two such examples. To get reports from one district, he mentioned, he always had to 
phone, knock, or even threaten before a report came. The colleague really needed a talk-
ing to or some form of discipline, so our respondent influenced the provincial director to 
write a ‘charge letter’, an official notification that the colleague had violated applicable 
rules. The director did so and there was a marked improvement in the way reports were 
submitted. In another district, information was also not forthcoming. Again he influ-
enced the director to write a letter, this time to the district director. “When things get out 
of hand sometimes you need a strong approach”. From interacting with this respondent, 
I got the impression of a sharp and dedicated professional. When supervising staff at 
clinics, he took the time to teach and explain why demands for information from the 
centre are needed and how clinics themselves can benefit from collecting health inform-
ation. In the explanation of the project he had launched to tackle his main professional 
problems – timeliness and completeness of reports and data quality – he also gave an 
impression of professional competence. He instituted two-day periodic meetings with 
the district health information officers in the province to go through the reports together. 
By doing peer assessment, they could also tackle quality issues by identifying errors. To 
ensure completeness, they would identify gaps in information from districts and carry 
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out technical support to the districts and centres who need it. It is paradoxical that in the 
case of this apparently competent officer, it was not certain that he will remain in his 
position after the restructuring. His certificate did not formally qualify him for the 
position he is holding. If a recent graduate with a degree in information technology 
comes along, he might lose out and have to revert to his old job at the district. Alter-
natively, he might decide to take up the job offers from NGOs and international 
organisations which he had earlier rejected.53 Regardless of his apparent competence 
and despite the fact that he could be quite critical of issues further afield, he was careful 
not to address sensitive issues close to the office in which he worked.  
The previous example has described a situation in which a vacancy emerged, in this 
case when someone moved on to ‘greener pastures’. As in earlier anecdotes, there were 
few qualified candidates around to fill the gap. Apparently, a bright young man was 
picked and thrown into the proverbial deep end to learn on the job. Then, in the course 
of time, he was sent for a course to train him into the job he was holding. In this case it 
seemed that the sector could have gotten a far worse deal and some one far less 
competent for the job.  
Perhaps more interesting than situations in which there are few qualified candidates 
are situations in which there is more competition for a position. Personal accounts in 
which a respondent reveals that more factors were decisive than his performance, 
competence, or qualifications are understandably rare. Presenting anything other than 
the ideal formal factors might draw suspicions of less legitimate factors being of 
influence in one’s promotion. One enrolled nurse gave an account that does illustrate 
that having a good personal relation with one’s boss helps getting a more senior 
position, even if you are not sufficiently qualified. He mentioned how he became the 
person in charge of a certain department in the hospital, although he had not trained 
further than enrolled nurse. “There were many applicants”, he said, but because he had 
worked extensively with the executive director in the high-cost ward54 and the director 
had confidence in him, he was selected for the position.55  
We will return later to this issue of social relations in the context of appointments. 
But let us first examine how the matter of qualification plays out in determining who is 
in charge of a centre or a ward. In a specific hospital department, there was a clinical 
officer heading the department and an enrolled nurse in charge of the ward, as there was 
no registered nurse. An enrolled nurse recounted that he had been in charge of the ward 
from 2002 to 2006. “But then” he said, “the administration wanted us to swap, so that 
everyone could have the power for some period of time”. Since then the role of being in 
charge was passed first to a male enrolled nurse and later to a female colleague. “This 
caused some difficulties between the members of staff. Now (the female enrolled nurse) 
is in charge, but even then, the CO (clinical officer) thinks he is in charge of all of us. 
Sometimes there is disrespect between us”.56 The clinical officer himself pointed out 
that he had become head of the department because of his qualifications as clinical 
officer. He mentioned that the enrolled nurse who had become in charge of the ward 
after our first respondent had been upset after being replaced as the in-charge. He had 
even requested a transfer because of the matter.57 According to a colleague, he had to 
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fight really hard but succeeded and moved to Kabwe.58 The clinical officer reflected, 
“Someone is demoralised. Even though it doesn’t make a difference in income, it is nice 
to be in charge, and when it is taken away, this is demoralising. It would be better if we 
had a registered nurse to be in charge all the time”.59 This account shows how the 
hospital management in this situation apparently rotated the authority of being in charge 
in an attempt at fairness. Nevertheless, it can bring conflict and disgruntlement. It also 
shows, however, how qualifications can be used to resolve disputes as to ‘who’s the 
boss’.  
In other cases, however, using qualifications to decide who is in charge seems not to 
be uniformly applied, nor is it uncontested. Let us recall Anton, whom we encountered 
before. Despite his young age, this clinical officer had quite a track record of being in 
charge. He had been in charge of a rural health centre that was referred to as a zonal 
health centre. Although it had only three qualified and two unqualified staff, less than 
ideally recommended for a normal rural health centre, the clinic did have a rare am-
bulance. The previous clinical officer had requested a transfer after a conflict with the 
community. Then Anton had been posted in a different district. At that centre a midwife 
was in charge. Anton claimed that after he had been at the centre for two months, a 
letter arrived from the district health office putting Anton in charge. Anton claimed that 
the district said that there had been administrative errors.60 Ashley confirmed that this 
letter indicated the faults of the former person in charge.61 Then, after deciding to leave 
and return to the clinic where he was previously posted, Anton again became in charge. 
This meant that the environmental health technologist who had been in charge while 
Anton was away was again replaced. Anton admitted that there was some difficulty for 
the colleague to accept that he was not in charge anymore – especially considering that 
Anton had only been in service for 2 years, while the colleague had been in service for 
22 years. Anton claimed that he was just put in this situation as a leader. To deal with 
the situation, he said he just had to humble himself: Show humility and discuss things.62 
From the words of an old nurse, who was working on contract at the clinic, I got the 
impression that this was indeed what Anton did. “Once you explain, he can understand. 
He’s my boss”. When asked why, she simply responded: “He’s lucky”.63 The man who 
had been replaced as the person in charge was indeed disappointed and seemed to 
externalise the cause of the problem. “That is the system of the ministry. I don’t under-
stand. It’s somehow frustrating. I have a lot of experience, a lot of ideas”. According to 
him, the reason that Anton is the boss is because he is dealing with clinical work, while 
he often has to leave the clinic for outreach.64  
Anton’s friend Ashley put the fact that Anton was in charge simply down to the fact 
that he is a clinical officer. “According to the code of conduct, a CO is superior. But you 
should look at what is on the ground. There is theory but also practical knowledge and 
experience. It also may lower performance for some people. They may not show it, but 
being levelled lower than someone with less service years can become frustrating”.65 In 
one of our focus group discussions this frustration also came to the fore. The respond-
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ents were unanimous in their verdict that it is not fair when a registered nurse with 
limited experience is brought in and is automatically put in charge. They felt that “if you 
serve long, then you deserve a promotion. It’s better to automatically make a promotion 
after a number of years”. One participant remembered that in the past the Ministry of 
Health promoted people, before the boards came. “You were just promoted based on 
years of service”. These responses are very understandable in view of the fact that most 
participants in this group were more mature enrolled nurses.66 It does indicate, however, 
a social tension in this system. In the past and also in African tradition, age and seniority 
were important factors in someone’s social standing. As qualifications have now be-
come so desirable, obtainable, and real (though not always decisive) factors in some-
one’s placement and promotion, the relative value of age has declined. It is thus not 
uncommon to see what traditionally can be considered youths now in charge of their 
elders, and even (though this is less common) young women in charge of older men.  
A clash over who is the boss can even come to blows in physical terms. One clinical 
officer remembered such an incident. “Some friends, they always go for entertainment, 
and they drink beer and quarrel amongst themselves”. He recounted that, “about ten 
years ago, there were two officers, working together in a clinic, and when they went out 
they were both calling themselves the in-charge. It created confusion in the community 
and amongst the staff in the health centre”. The respondent explained that when a health 
centre was starting up, an environmental health technician would be the first to be 
posted; they were the forerunners. After some time, a nurse and a clinical officer would 
follow him. As we saw above, in general the clinical officer would be made in-charge. 
In this case the environmental health technician had also arrived first and considered 
himself in charge. On the basis of his profession, the clinical officer did the same. The 
respondent concluded, “I was told to go and (sort out the problem), together with a 
DHO (district health office) officer. We gave them a job description”. The respondent 
himself was promoted to senior clinical officer in 1996 and principal clinical officer in 
2000. “We were applying for promotions. The public service looked at who had served 
longer. We were several (people with similar years of service) but I was chosen. I don’t 
know why; we just handed in our papers, and they looked at it. I don’t know the cri-
teria”. He stated that he thinks promotions are important: “You feel demoralised if you 
don’t get up, you may even think of quitting”.67  
One respondent, who was no longer working as a government doctor, was a bit more 
revealing, even frank in his explanation of how promotions can work. He was once 
working as an acting district director of health in Southern Province, as the person 
holding the position was abroad pursuing a master’s degree in public health. One 
frustration was the politics involved in holding such a position. “Working in a district 
has a lot of politics. When bigwigs come, they expect you to be there”. He referred to 
politicians who request transport when they come to the district. Another frustration he 
recounted was that being in a more rural district gives little opportunity for promotion. 
“The way to get higher is through the province and it is mostly the junior guys in 
Livingstone (the provincial capital) who get those positions”. He explained these ‘junior 
guys’ would be physically and thus socially nearest to the provincial health director. He 
admitted that there is an element of politics there. “The PHD can appoint or suggest 
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people”.68 He said in conclusion: “One has to be obedient to get a position”.69 It is 
striking that in this account, rather than what one might expect when thinking along the 
lines of the neo-patrimonial paradigm, it is not ethnicity or family relations that are 
stressed, but simply obedience and physical proximity. On the other hand, the account 
neither excludes such familial nor ethnic relations. It certainly does point to the obvious: 
That informal relationships are an important factor in promotion decisions.  
The importance of informal relations as a factor in promotion decisions also becomes 
evident in the example of one Mr. Banda, which has been pieced together from various 
accounts. We have earlier quoted Mr. Banda saying that 98 per cent of the reasons for 
getting opportunities “is based on your performance, and 2 per cent is who you know”. 
From other accounts, it appeared that ‘who you know’ may have been a bigger factor in 
Mr. Banda’s career that he suggested. In a certain district, Mr. Banda had been ap-
pointed as acting director of health. Besides his two-year certificate course, he had 
followed various other training, even abroad. In an interview, he prided himself on these 
trainings.70 They did not lead, however, to further academic qualifications. He was 
made acting director while his predecessor was on sick leave and he has since retired. A 
former colleague did not agree with this posting. She indicated that Mr. Banda had only 
two years of training and a certificate. There were people who were more qualified. Her 
explanation was that “less qualified people get hand-picked by the person who is there, 
because maybe they are less difficult. Those who are less qualified will then accept 
everything and be pushed around. (They) will be insecure and become hostile to 
programme officers”.71 An account by someone else, a doctor with no conceivable 
interest in the position himself, corresponded with and elaborated on this account. He 
mentioned that Mr. Banda’s predecessor had been a nurse. When she received her 
retirement letter, another letter had already been prepared to appoint a doctor to take 
over as district director of health. Then, however, he claims that Mr. Banda went and 
had a talk with the provincial health director, saying that he would retire soon and 
asking if he could be appointed to act in the position in the meanwhile. This respondent 
argued that the provincial health director “just likes to surround himself with ‘yes 
people’”, people who are not too critical and who do not disagree with the director. He 
put this down to the fact that people who are district health directors and who are just 
nurses or environmental health technicians “just worship doctors” and, he added, “for 
the one who is worshiped, this is also nice”.72  
This image of a boss surrounding himself with cronies was also sketched in another 
context. Over a beer, a medical doctor complained about a director at the ministry head-
quarters. The criticism was that the director does not take criticism and just surrounds 
himself with loyalists. Our respondent remembered how this person was previously a 
district director of health at a time when he himself was working in a hospital in the 
same district. At that hospital there was a foreign doctor who had made a bad mistake in 
handling a patient. Our respondent had reported this to the medical superintendent of the 
hospital, who did not take action. Then he complained to the ministry headquarters, 
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following which action was taken and our respondent was even asked to review the 
case. Subsequently, the district director of health heard about it and concluded that our 
respondent could not remain at that hospital. He was then promoted to the position of 
medical superintendent in a remote district hospital. While our respondent admitted it 
was a promotion, he claimed he was in effect removed for being too critical.73 In yet 
another account, an official recounted how at a certain district, people were not forth-
coming in answering a request for information. When colleagues complained to their 
boss about the director of this district, he reportedly said: “There is no problem; he is 
working”. Our respondent argued that the district director is “from the same village” as 
the provincial director. “Some people are very good at talking. They might be favourites 
of the boss (who are) not doing well. But if they are his good boys or good girls, he 
won’t be tough on them”.74  
Having people who may not be competent in a position may be useful for a superior 
who wants to have control over his officers, by having their loyalty because they depend 
on him for their job security. This is likely to have a negative impact on those working 
under them. In our discussion of the case of Ashley and Anton, we already saw the 
behaviour of one such official. The manager administration was an enrolled nurse, who 
trained to become a midwife and then landed a job in management. However, when 
Ashley and Anton made suggestions about how their work could be improved, they 
were told, “We have been here for a long time. You have just been here for a few 
months. You can't tell us how to run the district”. And when Ashley had lobbied his 
own cause with the provincial health director, thus revealing the manager administra-
tion’s incompetence, this earned Ashley his enmity and earned him a reputation as a 
troublemaker in the district.75 
The above section has indicated that while qualifications matter – especially when 
qualified staff are scarce – in situations when there is more competition for a position, 
other factors can enter into play. Various accounts have suggested that bosses in certain 
cases prefer to surround themselves with uncritical loyalists who are insecure about 
their position. Having a boss who forgives them their incompetence, as long as they are 
‘his good boys and girls’, may mean that those occupying a position are not the most 
suitable. In turn, this insecurity would reinforce intolerance to criticism or good per-
formance below them as it would be perceived as a threat.  
Such allegations resonate with perspectives stressing patrimonial aspects of the Afri-
can state. They also resonate with Gerhard Anders’ study of Malawian civil servants. 
He sketched a parallel order of informal office mores that operated next to the official 
rules and regulations. Rather than harbouring a sense of loyalty to an abstract state, 
Anders’ civil servants feel loyalty to colleagues and superiors. The core of the moral 
principles underlying this parallel order is, in this perspective, the principle of “respect 
for the boss”. These informal rules are “a very vague set of generally accepted princip-
les open to negotiation and not known by uninitiated outsiders”.76 Moreover, as official 
rules may be unclear and contradictory, a gap exists between daily practice and official 
regulations. This, Anders argues, gives further legitimacy to the parallel system of 
office mores. The personal relationships in the Malawian civil service was based on two 
factors: The asymmetric patron-client relationship and mutual indebtedness. By offering 
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favours and overlooking transgressions such as illicit, corrupt acts, colleagues could 
maintain control over one another. While for some, such as young idealistic civil 
servants, the result of this social control – a culture of corruption and low motivation – 
may be vexing, few would openly oppose it as this would lead to social isolation, 
according to Anders. Those who would violate office principles would risk resistance or 
revenge, for instance by seeing promotion opportunities pass one by or by facing 
corruption allegations. A former donor official who had himself worked in the Zambian 
health sector had a similar impression of the Zambian health sector. He claimed it was a 
patronage system. He had the impression that people entering the system would be co-
opted to be part of a conspiracy of silence. He claimed that one would be offered 
favours and perks which would contravene regulations, and if someone spoke out on 
abuses of the system, they would be blackmailed with their own vices. This situation, he 
insisted, caused many inefficiencies, hampered performance, and impeded change.77  
This image of how things work and the allegations it is based on are very difficult to 
prove. Any description of the informal ‘office mores’, such as the one presented by 
Anders, is based on conflicting accounts, speculation, and innuendo. The same applies 
to the accounts of, for instance, Mr. Banda’s promotion and other allegations of bosses 
surrounding themselves with incompetent yet loyal cronies. Such accounts may be 
influenced to an extent by jealousy at others’ career successes and by attempts to 
cognitively find explanations for one’s own lack of successes. Nevertheless, these 
allegations form a part of reality as those involved perceive and narrate it. As such, it 
becomes part of people’s understanding of how things work, and it also influences how 
they themselves might act in a given situation. If personal relations based on loyalty or 
clientalism play a prominent part in how people explain how things work, it must 
indeed be a part of reality. At the same time, however, it has become evident how 
qualifications matter, how they are prized as a means of improving one’s chances at a 
better life and a more secure livelihood. We also saw the importance qualifications 
played in determining access to jobs and promotion. This demonstrates that this rational 
arrangement of determining merit by whether someone has passed a course and attained 
a diploma or degree indeed has value. This thus confirms that in the Zambian health 
sector both meritocracy and clientalism co-exist as parts of the same reality as logics 
determining placement and promotion. This conclusion supports the notion of neo-
patrimonialism as a hybrid of these two logics, in which rational-legal logic and patri-
monialism are interwoven. This makes the formal bureaucratic reality less of a façade 
but more of structure or scaffolding in which opportunities for patrimonial behaviour 
exist.  
It’s a docs’ world 
Having examined allegations of clientalism in the health sector and having concluded 
that that is merely one side of the neo-patrimonial coin in a situation in which qualifi-
cations matter, let us investigate a different allegation of a patronage system within the 
health sector. We will examine a situation in which qualifications, rather than simply 
familial, ethnic, or political relations, are instrumental in determining whether or not 
one has access to the ‘patronage’ system involved. This may seem paradoxical, yet fits 
with the conclusion above that in a neo-patrimonial context rational-legal arrangements 
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are not merely façade but a structure around which patrimonial behaviour takes place. 
For this, we will take a side-step away from health workers’ career paths by looking at a 
special cadre within the health sector: doctors. These cadres form an elite within the 
health system. Entry into this elite is determined by the merit derived from doctors 
having studied at least seven years to get the qualifications required.78 Rising within the 
system, however, is again determined by factors other than mere merit, as we have seen 
earlier.  
After an interview, Mr. Mulenga, the clinical officer in charge of an improved health 
post, showed me around his facility. The clinic, which is not equipped with a ward for 
in-patients, looked clean and orderly. Plastic drug jars were lined up on the shelves in 
the drug storeroom; exercise books, acting as patients’ registers, filled up two shelves in 
the screening room; a desk with a few stacked-up registers and log books, office equip-
ment, and jars of drugs appeared ready for business. The post had been opened only half 
a year earlier by the minister himself. Mr. Mulenga had taken that opportunity to tell the 
minister about his biggest concern. Although this health post had been designed for out-
patients as well as being a base for conducting outreach activities in the community, it 
had not been endowed with a motorcycle. There was also no borehole at their facility 
for drawing water yet. The minister promised that these issues would be addressed. 
When asked whether the minister is open and approachable, Mr. Mulenga replied, “He 
is approachable, but in the implementation he just favours doctors”. When asked what 
he meant, he indicated that conditions of service for doctors had been improving, but 
other cadres were overlooked.79  
While drinking a beer with another health worker, the same theme came to the fore. 
This former clinical officer, having since obtained a university degree and working as a 
human resource specialist, also complained that the benefits for doctors were incompar-
able with those of other health workers. “Patronage is very much there in the health 
sector,” he told me. The signs are clear. “The minister is a doctor, the deputy minister is 
a doctor, the PS (permanent secretary) is a doctor, and four out of six directors at Ndeke 
House”.80 
A survey of salaries and incomes of health workers in sub-Saharan Africa by McCoy 
et al. presents data for various countries. From this, one can learn that in Zambia, 
doctors earn more than four times as much as nurses. This difference is markedly higher 
than in Ghana (the only other country in this study for which comparable data are pre-
sented), where doctors earn three times as much as nurses. Studying the Zambia civil 
service salary scales for 2008 and adjusting them with the 15% increase that all civil 
servants received in May 2008,81 teaches us that the lowest-rank doctor, for instance an 
intern (a junior resident doctor at the UTH), earns a gross salary of 4.1 million Kwacha 
per month, compared with 1.5 million Kwacha for the lowest-grade nurse, for example 
an enrolled nurse in the male ward at Mansa General Hospital.82 In take-home salary, 
                                                 
78  Seven years is the length of time it takes for doctors to be trained at the Medical School of the 
University of Zambia. 
79  LB0809/19. 
80  ML0809/14. 
81  PSMD Circulars No. B.5 and B.8 of 2008. 
82  This disparity is to an extent lessened by the fact that the Zambian PAYE (pay-as-you-earn) income-
tax system is progressive, which means that the richest pay more. This progressive tax system is not 
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the intern at UTH thus earns 3.1 million Kwacha per month, while the nurse in Mansa 
gets 1.2 million Kwacha. Notwithstanding the equalising influence of Zambia’s tax-
regime, other factors inherent to the health sector have reduced equity in incomes 
among the health workforce, in favour of doctors. It is well known that a significant 
proportion of civil servants’ incomes in Africa is made up of allowances. Attending 
workshops and conducting field visits, people earn subsistence allowances and meal 
allowances. Housing allowance is also paid. Besides this and various other allowances – 
such as funeral grants, uniform upkeep allowance, tool allowance, and commuted night-
duty allowance,83 when relevant – there is an allowance that is given to doctors only: 
On-call allowance. This is a standard monthly payment to doctors to compensate them 
for the fact that they can be called to perform emergency interventions, regardless of 
how often they actually conduct rounds.  
This on-call allowance involves very significant sums of money. As of July 2008, the 
on-call allowance for medical doctors was increased from 2.6 million to 3 million 
Kwacha for the lower and medium grades of doctors, and from 3 million to 3.4 million 
Kwacha for the most senior doctors (senior registrars and consultants). This payment 
alone is at least two and a half times the base monthly salary of our nurse in Mansa, 
who earns 1.2 million Kwacha.84 
But it seems that many doctors in management and administration receive on-call 
allowances while they rarely or never make calls. One informant explained the work-
ings of on-call allowance. During one of my interviews, I asked a medical doctor 
working as a district health director whether he missed doing clinical work, as he was 
currently holding a managerial position. He indicated that he did occasionally do rounds 
or helped out in the district hospital when it was busy.85 Shortly afterwards, in an 
informal setting, I told the medical superintendent of the local district hospital that I had 
heard the district health director occasionally helped out. He looked surprised, told me 
he did not, and concluded that he probably had said that to be entitled to receive on-call 
allowance.86 In another district, a very frank planning manager, frustrated by doctors as 
managers, told me, “We need doctors in wards. When a doctor is needed, he may be in a 
meeting or a workshop. They get on-call allowance, but are not offering service”.87 He 
and other informants claimed that even doctors who are managers or administrators at 
Ndeke House receive on-call allowance. While this is not formally illegal, it is clear that 
this measure does not serve its nominal function, namely to compensate doctors for the 
inconvenience of being prepared to respond to emergencies.88 One could thus arguably 
call this misapplication of funds.  
Besides a difference in income, there is also a difference in status between doctors 
and other health workers. As in many countries, a doctor’s title is rarely forgotten when 
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addressing him.89 The social standing of doctors was also exemplified by one of my 
informants when he explained why he chose to be a doctor. Initially he had wanted to 
become an engineer. Then, however, he had a chat with an uncle. The uncle said that in 
his long life he had never seen a poor doctor, while he had seen many poor engineers. 
He had never seen a dirty doctor, while he had seen many dirty engineers.90 One can 
assume that, in the collective memory of Zambians, doctors historically took a special 
place when in the colonial period they stepped into the spiritual realm of sangomas and 
other traditional healers carrying powerful white-man’s or modern medicine. In fact, 
with only three indigenous Zambian doctors at the time of independence and consider-
ing that a African could for a long time not aspire to a higher position than medical 
assistant,91 it is no surprise that doctors still are considered special.  
Doctors’ status is demonstrated not just in terms of income or by occupying an 
honorific position. Organisationally, doctors also occupy a special place within the 
health sector. All doctors (and pharmacists), from the moment they appear on the 
government payroll as junior resident doctors or interns, occupy management scales.92 
For all other medical personnel, only the top three out of eleven scales, are management 
scales. Those in management scales, such as doctors, are not unionised. This was 
explained by one doctor as follows: “Doctors are officially part of management. They 
should come up with solutions for problems. So they should be the last to complain: 
The head should not protest; the head should offer guidance. Doctors do not have a legal 
platform for defending their interests. They should rely on the same union that they 
don’t belong to. The Resident Doctors Association (RDA) has no legal authority for 
collective bargaining. (Formally) they never engage with government: They advo-
cate”.93 For other health workers, the Civil Service Union or the Health Workers Union 
bargain with government over working conditions. Doctors, however, do meet with the 
minister in management meetings, but that is what my respondent euphemistically 
called consultation or advocacy rather than bargaining. 
Being in management scales also means that doctors tend to dominate management 
positions. At one mission hospital, which was still served by resident missionaries (ex-
patriates), I met a Zambian hospital director who by his own account is the only non-
doctor serving in such a position. He indicated that it does create some resistance from 
doctors.94 If not for the fact that he was working in a mission setting, which has some 
managerial autonomy, he would probably not be holding this position.95 Normally, in 
small hospitals, a doctor – even if there is only one – is automatically the director or 
medical superintendent, and thus involved in considerable administrative responsibili-
ties. In mission hospitals, hospital administrators can play an important role with 
commensurate status, by the grace of being attached to the church or the mission. At 
times, it is vexing for health workers posted by government to be, as they see it, bossed 
around by Catholic sisters whom they perceive as being less qualified, but who have the 
church behind them. However, in the formal structure as well as in common practice, 
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doctors are the boss. To illustrate this point, a medical superintendent in a provincial 
hospital holds the highest medial doctors’ scale (MDS01), whereas a senior hospital 
administrator is given a medium-rank general service scale (GSS06). This corresponds 
to a net base salary of 5.3 million Kwacha per month and 2.2 million Kwacha per 
month, respectively.96  
The process of restructuring has not only confirmed this exclusive position for 
doctors in management: It has even strengthened it. This is most apparent from the fact 
that the position of district health director has been abolished and replaced by a district 
medical officer, a situation which is as things were before the health reforms of the 
1990s. According to the report of a presentation by an official involved with the Health 
Reforms in 1994, the position of district medical officer was first introduced in 1982 but 
had since never been formally elaborated. De facto, the district medical officer was 
responsible for the management of a district hospital where he was posted. According to 
this account, the health reforms were yet to bring further clarity to the role of a district 
medical officer. In 1994 a new position was created, that of district director of health, 
who from 1995 onward would take over the financial and administrative responsibilities 
of the district medical officers.97 In practice, as is seen from the stories and career 
histories of various health workers interviewed, these were often environmental health 
technicians or clinical officers, and sometimes nurses or midwives. To prepare them for 
the roles they carried out, they were trained, through various workshops, but also by the 
district health management course at Kabwe. However, a number of young Zambian 
doctors were also recruited to fulfil such positions, though this was less common in the 
most remote rural areas.  
It might be instructive to view this policy change in the 1990s in light of the fact that 
at that time there were very few Zambian doctors available (or prepared) to serve in 
rural areas. In many cases, district medical officers were expatriates. In fact, a decade 
earlier none of them were Zambian.98 The shift towards moving management res-
ponsibilities, and thus power, from expatriate doctors to Zambian non-doctors can be 
seen as a logical extension of the rationale of Zambianisation, which had been a major 
theme in Zambian public service since independence. Or to put it in cruder terms, it 
secured access to the power and benefits of management for a considerable number of 
Zambians. A decade later, anything other than a Zambianised district health manage-
ment is inconceivable. Moreover, more doctors are available and willing to serve in 
districts, especially with the doctors’ rural retention scheme in place (as discussed in 
Chapter 10). In the process of restructuring following the dissolution of the Central 
Board of Health, it has been deemed that the management of the district health system, 
which as we know is central to this system, should in principle be in the hands of a 
qualified medical doctor.  
In interviews, I encountered various sides to this argument. One high-ranking doctor 
in a provincial hospital99 bemoaned the fact that in certain provinces hardly any district 
health directors are doctors. In his view, nurses or environmental health technicians are 
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not qualified enough for the complex public health role they have to fulfil. Doctors, on 
the other hand, have gone through seven years of training and, in addition, often hold 
masters’ degrees in public health. He mentioned that in a province such as Luapula, 
where until recently none of the district health directors were doctors, the maternal 
mortality figures were far higher than in Southern Province, where most district health 
directors are doctors.100 Another doctor holding a senior management position also 
made the argument of doctors being more qualified. He added that he had studied public 
health, which he considered to be “political medicine”. “I've gone beyond clinical 
medicine. I am in charge of AIDS and TB-programmes. You need a technical back-
ground for that”. He went on to compare it to generals, who are soldiers sitting in the 
office making battle plans.101 
On the other side of the argument, one can find those who have climbed up through 
the system and see a threat of losing career possibilities or even being posted back into 
clinical positions. Mr. Zulu, a planning manager serving under a doctor working as a 
district health director, said about the decision to make a district medical officer the 
head of a district health office: “Things are going back to how it used to be: A doctor on 
top because those are people with respect. Now they want to put all our doctors in 
management, leaving only Congolese doctors in the rural hospitals. In the whole 
province, it's just Congolese. Some don't even have work permits. Zambians are just in 
districts (district health offices). In most rural districts there is even not much work for 
them. You don't need to study seven years, just to be able to sign checks and go to 
meetings”. He added that maybe for larger districts or provincial towns it is fine to have 
a doctor as a district health director, but not in rural ones.102 
People like Mr. Zulu stress that academic qualifications alone are not enough to 
make someone competent, as these are no substitute for experience. Some qualifications 
even mean that doctors are perhaps not even properly qualified. In Mr. Zulu’s words, 
“Doctors are not trained at primary health care. No doctor has ever worked at a rural 
health centre. Some might have MPHs (masters’ degrees in public health), but public 
health is different from primary health care. Also being trained in something is different 
from actual working experience”. In explaining the importance of primary health, he 
invoked the vision of the health reforms, which were based on the concept of primary 
health care. This centred on how to fund the disease burden, based on equity. He added, 
“That means you have to understand programmes and partnership. These doctors don't 
understand that”.103 Moreover, various people in Mr. Zulu’s position are keen to list the 
workshops and training programmes they followed. One former nurse, who had made it 
up to human resource specialist, even complained, “they are throwing away our pa-
pers”.104 By this she meant that in the restructuring process, university degrees are 
valued over in-service training. 
As we saw, the argument has two sides. Both make sense from a rational perspective, 
but then again both points of view reflect the interests of those expressing them. A 
doctor will obviously argue that his seven years of training and the barriers that there 
are to get into medical school (that is, the fact that they need good secondary school 
grades) naturally make him a better candidate. On the other hand, someone who climb-
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ed up the rungs of the district health service will stress the importance of experience and 
in-service training. In other words, you stand where you sit. The discussion, however, 
does illustrate (yet again) the importance that is placed on qualifications, though this can 
be at odds with experience and need not reflect competence. It also shows how man-
agerial positions are coveted and contested and that doctors use their power to claim 
senior management positions.  
It is not automatically the case that doctors actually and necessarily prefer admi-
nistrative over clinical work. When arranging permission to interview people at a 
central hospital on the Copperbelt, I ran into a senior doctor who had to sign my 
permission letter. When I asked if perhaps I could interview him, he sighed in an 
exasperated way, “No, I don’t have much time. That’s what you get when you have to 
combine your clinical work with administration: You get torn apart”.105 It goes without 
saying, however, that the authority and status that come with managerial positions, with 
being closer to the top of the bureaucratic pyramid, is appealing to doctors. Beyond the 
salaries, which already are favourable to doctors, the access to workshops, meetings, 
and domestic and foreign trips also add a financial incentive. This is in addition to the 
more illicit ways of amassing wealth and power through clientalism and corruption, 
which the paradigm of neo-patrimonialism presumes to be opened up to office holders.  
So, how have doctors as a group attained the influence to shape the formal rules of 
the game to their advantage? The fact that doctors are not unionised is not to say that 
doctors never engage in industrial action. From the media analysis conducted for this 
research, one can determine an entire string of doctors’ strikes throughout the 1990s. 
This culminated in massive strikes (described in Chapter 9) at the end of the decade as a 
precursor to the anti-third term campaign. This episode of public unrest marked an 
absolute low-point in President Chiluba’s popularity. The government’s reaction was 
usually a threatening one. Ministers told doctors that they would be fired if they did not 
resume work. In 2000, hundreds were indeed laid off and at the same time deregistered 
as doctors by the Medial Council of Zambia. One respondent who was one of the 
leaders of the Resident Doctors’ Association at the time was indeed fired and de-
registered. He then started working in the private sector for the next two years, but only 
after he paid a fine of half a million Kwacha (roughly equal to € 190 at the time) to the 
Medical Council. In his words, “the instruments of government were used to mete out 
punishment”.106 Two other informants had also been active in strike action as organisers 
of the Resident Doctors’ Association at different times in the 1990s. They were both 
posted in far-flung rural areas as a consequence: One in Zambezi district in North-West 
Zambia on the border with Angola, the other at a mission hospital in Southern Province 
a good distance off the line-of-rail.107 One former senior official at the Ministry of 
Health admitted that indeed young doctors who displeased government with political 
actions and who were not in the position to opt to go abroad for work or study would be 
sent for rural postings. He also admitted that this gave the practice of mandatory rural 
posting, intended to familiarise young doctors with rural realities, a bad name.108  
While these doctors who asserted their rights were indeed punished for their dissent, 
in the long-run their careers were not irreparably damaged. One of the three informants 
ended up in a high position at an important NGO, one obtained a high and influential 
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position at ministry headquarters, and the third became the executive director of a 
second-level hospital. One can expect, however, that it has conditioned them to be wary 
of being too critical or openly venting dissent. As such, the reaction to striking doctors 
was part of the strategy of managing loyalty. On the other hand, the government has 
equally learned the power doctors have. The doctor who was active in the strike of 1999 
looked back in the following way: “Time revealed that we were right. We had the right 
to protest. It has raised awareness. In time they learnt never to take doctors ...” Then he 
corrected his slip, “never to take health workers for granted”. When I pointed out his 
slip, he admitted that it is true that attention has been more focussed on doctors and that 
this was the downside of the protests. In fact, the gap between doctors and others had 
widened. He added: “We were campaigning for better conditions of service and doctors 
did benefit. There is a fear of doctors. Conditions of service have never been the same. 
Then we couldn’t get loans; now we are creditworthy. Salaries have gone up since; on-
call allowance is up and continues to rise”.109  
These strikes have thus instilled a fear in politicians that doctors could walk away if 
disgruntled, not only through strike action but also by searching for greener pastures. 
Doctors are scarce and are trained at the public cost. Despite not being unionised, 
doctors are extremely well represented in management, and ministers hear doctors’ 
complaints and when possible address their concerns. The fact that, for much of the 
Mwanawasa era, the minister and his deputy were doctors must have been a factor add-
ing to doctors’ privileged positions. As the doctor cited above put it, “Having a doctor 
as a minister works better for MoH. Their understanding of issues is deeper. That is a 
big advantage”. He did admit, however, that the disadvantage is that they might be 
biased towards doctors’ welfare, to the expense of other cadres.110  
Doctors’ privileged position is not only manifest in the formal organisational 
structure and reward system of the health sector; it also appears that doctors form an 
informal network of acquaintances and are informally awarded priority over others. A 
former doctor, who has since moved to a development agency, mentioned that after her 
internships she was working at a large hospital on the Copperbelt. She felt, however, 
that she could learn more if she was working at a lower level in the system, closer to the 
community. The hospital refused to let her go, however, so she went to a doctor she 
knew who was working as a senior official in the ministry. It took a lot of informal 
influence and overcoming a number of bureaucratic barriers, but at the end of the day 
she was posted to a district and after two months she was on the payroll in her new 
capacity. She told to me that she was lucky to be a doctor as they are considered a 
priority.111 A similar story was also related by another doctor who, when I spoke with 
him, was working as a district health director. He was also working in a large Cop-
perbelt hospital. He felt the job was routine and was looking for a new challenge. Again, 
the hospital did not want to let him go. So he called someone who was his senior in 
medical school and held a management role in the Central Board of Health. He claims 
he was offered a choice of a number of positions and chose a far-flung location for the 
adventure. There he replaced an environmental health technician as district health 
director.112  
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When chatting informally with health workers, it struck me how, particularly among 
doctors, people have a good sense of who is who. This is not surprising as the number 
of doctors in the health sector was rather limited, with some 650 doctors working in the 
sector in 2005. If this was narrowed down to the Zambian doctors working in the 
government system, it would be even more meagre. This is likely to have something to 
do with the fact that there is only one medical school in Zambia, with an intake of some 
seventy students per year.113 Combined with the absolute scarcity of doctors, it is safe to 
say that doctors form an elite network that has the power and influence to advocate 
effectively for the interests of the group and allow members to serve effectively their 
private interests.  
Conclusions 
In the preceding pages, we have sketched the factors that play a role in moving up the 
hierarchical ladder in the Zambian health sector. It has been striking to see how 
qualifications have been prominent in the way in which people talked about getting 
ahead; it is clear that people value further education as a means for professional 
advancement. The extent to which government invests in further education, by offering 
paid study leave, by suffering existing vacancies while officers are on study leave, and 
by sponsoring some staff and subsidising government schools is enormous. This is 
understandable considering the historical scarcity of qualified health workers. Again, as 
we have seen in the previous chapter, as opportunities for further education are scarce, 
positions are contested. This leads to disgruntlement amongst those who fail to access 
further education. To an extent, people consider prior qualifications and school results 
to be the key to accessing education – hence people’s willingness to re-sit secondary 
school exams. On the other hand, those who miss out put this down to unfairness in the 
system, blaming advantages for those in urban areas or blaming clientalism and nepo-
tism. 
It remains evident that qualifications are prized. One can see this in the manner in 
which some respondents continue to stack qualifications. At times, this constitutes a 
logical career progression, but equally it can seem rather random or arbitrary: It depends 
on which opportunity for further education they can secure. The tendency to change 
one’s professional path raises questions again about the motivation driving people 
professionally: Is it primarily an extrinsic money-oriented motivator that drives people’s 
decisions? Moreover, it raises questions about whether individual ambitions to forge 
ahead, subsidised by government, are in fact in the public interest, in the interest of the 
public health sector. Of course, considering the scarcity of qualified health workers, 
public investment in training is logical. On the other hand, the health workers whose 
accounts we have examined are well aware of the fact that through further education 
their labour-market value increases. While in their accounts one hears some gratitude to 
government for the public investment that qualified them, they are also well aware of 
the fact that this increases their chances of employment in the private sector or possibly 
abroad. Moreover, as we have seen, going for further education provides a professional 
with skills and knowledge that are only of limited usefulness in most parts of the 
Zambian health sector. Some may in fact be training themselves out of the bush and 
even out of the country. The pursuit of upward mobility by individuals within the sector 
                                                 
113  MoH (2006), Human Resource for Health Strategic Plan 2006-2010. 
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can thus be seen to increase the skewed distribution of human resources within the 
sector.  
This is not to say, however, that the health system does not react to this potential 
divergence between private and public interests. People wanting to go for further 
education have to make sure their plans are taken along in the annual planning process, 
they are recommended by their bosses, and this is approved at higher bureaucratic 
strata, to try to rationalise in-service education. In addition, some health workers are 
coaxed to come and work in more remote or less popular posts with the prospect of 
being supported to go for further training after a certain period. Those who are educated 
at the public expense may also receive bonding letters requiring their service for a 
specific period of time. Failure to adhere to such bonding requirements risks losing 
pension benefits. In short, one can conclude that there is a struggle between health 
workers and the health system over whether one can access further training opportu-
nities. This struggle represents a tension between private interests for self-advancement 
and the official objectives of the health sector. 
Having discussed the quest for qualifications, let us now turn to the issue of pro-
fessional advancement. We have seen how some health workers on their own initiative 
retrained to qualify for management positions. We examined the accounts of three 
clinical officers who became human resource managers. While arguably it is valuable 
for the health sector to have human resource managers with the experience of working 
within the sector itself, one can debate whether it is worth losing scarce qualified 
curative staff such as clinical officers. From an individual perspective, however, it is 
understandable, as apparently there are benefits to being in management positions that 
are not experienced in the wards or in rural health centres. These can be benefits in 
terms of influence, power, and financial gains.  
When assessing the factors that played a role in people being appointed to more 
senior positions, we saw that in people’s own accounts qualifications and performance 
featured prominently, as can be expected. However, looking beyond such discursive 
justifications, we saw a difference between situations in which the scarcity of qualified 
staff meant little competition and other situations, especially those concerning positions 
of authority where there were more aspiring candidates. In situations in which positions 
were more contested, it appeared that, at least in people’s perceptions, issues of 
obedience and loyalty are an important explanatory factor for promotions. Being out-
spoken or critical, one can be considered as ‘a troublemaker’. These people may then be 
transferred elsewhere. As we have discussed, accounts of directors who surround them-
selves with ‘good boys and girls’ and who consider those who are critical as a threat 
point towards a strategy of managing loyalty. This resonates with images conjured 
within the neo-patrimonial paradigm and accusations of African bureaucracies being 
patronage systems. However, again we can conclude that it is not clear-cut whether 
personal factors or issues such as merit or performance are of primary importance in 
someone’s professional advancement. 
In the last section of this chapter we took what may have appeared as a side-step, by 
looking in some detail at the privileged and influential position occupied by doctors in 
managing and shaping the health sector. We saw how, in the views of other health 
workers, there was a feeling that there was an unfair bias towards doctors in the sector. 
One respondent even described it as patronage. It was pointed out that most of the 
senior management positions and at times the political leaders of the sector were doc-
tors. Indeed, in our analysis we saw that the advantage that doctors enjoy over others in 
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terms of salary levels is further increased by the use of on-call allowances, allowances 
paid in some cases that one could call dubious. This illustrates the privileged position 
doctors occupy in the sector. Moreover, doctors automatically occupy management 
scales and thus qualify for the most senior managerial positions in hospitals, districts, 
provinces, and the ministry headquarters. In the recent restructuring of the health sector, 
doctors’ hierarchical seniority was reinforced by transforming district health directors 
into district medical officers and demanding medical qualifications as a prerequisite.  
There are various sides to the argument justifying or contesting doctors’ dominance 
in the health sector. This was reflected in the accounts and opinions of the respondents, 
depending on which side of the fence they sat. On the one hand, doctors assert that due 
to the qualifications they possess they are simply the most competent to manage the 
sector. They better understand the technical aspects of public health needed to formulate 
a policy response and its implementation. Conversely, people question whether the 
highly technical and clinical training doctors receive prepares them for the management 
of people and resources in a bureaucratic and political environment. These respondents 
are more likely to argue that experience and on-the-job training are more valuable 
qualities. Finally, there is an efficiency argument to be made about doctors’ heavy 
involvement in management. Can a country in which medical professionals are so 
scarce afford to have them occupy so much of their scarce time on management and 
administration?  
Regardless of how one might judge doctors’ dominance in the sector, it is an im-
portant conclusion for this section that doctors as a professional group, and also as an 
informal network of acquaintances, have extraordinary power and influence within the 
health sector. Doctors’ are empowered by their scarcity and ability to withhold labour. 
Moreover, they occupy most positions of power, thus controlling many of the financial 
and human resources in the sector. This conclusion is remarkable as it challenges or at 
least nuances certain tenets of the neo-patrimonial paradigm. It is assumed that in neo-
patrimonial settings vertical patron-client relations are more dominant than horizontal 
cleavages such as class or professional distinctions. In the context of the Zambian health 
sector, it is evident that doctors’ qualifications are a real factor in determining the 
structure of power and authority. Entrance into this privileged group is essentially based 
on merit, as one is required to successfully complete medical school. While informal 
contacts arguably do play a role in getting into medical school and in further career 
advancement, the process of qualification is of primary importance.  
The accounts presented in this chapter and the patterns emerging from them pose 
serious challenges to the neo-patrimonial paradigm. Central to this chapter was a 
conflict between an individual’s interests in further advancement and the public need for 
an equitable and cost-effective distribution of human resources. This is a clash between 
public and private interests, reminiscent of the public–private confusion central to neo-
patrimonialism. However, can one call the pursuit of qualifications and professional 
advancement patrimonial? This pursuit is in no way reminiscent of the imagined 
traditional patterns of gaining advancement through loyalty and personal affection. 
However, if one projected a rationality on this quest for qualifications as a means of 
accessing prebendal positions of power and wealth, one could stretch the concept of 
patrimonialism to cover such behaviour. Many of the health workers featuring in the 
accounts above do not appear to be passive clients dependent on their patrons. Rather, 
empowered by their scarcity as qualified health workers, they display an agency and a 
mobility that allows many of them to seize and even manipulate opportunities. At the 
112 
 
same time, we also saw patterns in which office holders with decision-making power 
selected people who were under-qualified, to take up key positions below them. It can 
be assumed that this would indeed foster a certain measure of dependence and personal 
loyalty towards themselves in a patron-client relationship. Thus, while it is evident that 
the human resource structure in the Zambian health sector is primarily governed by the 
rational-legal principle of qualifications, this forms an arena in which agents can 
instrumentalise this reality and seize opportunities to further their private interests. This 
includes creating opportunities to forge patron-client relationships. However, the most 
striking feature of the Zambian health sector is that one of the most powerful social 
networks in the sector is an institutionalised patronage system that is firmly rooted in 
the rational-legal principle of qualifications: The dominance of doctors.      
In this chapter we have followed our health workers further into the sector to see the 
factors involved in getting a position of authority, which also means a better income. In 
this quest to forge ahead, we have seen indications of health workers’ behaviour and 
perspectives in pursuit of their private interests. Let us now continue following the 
accounts of our health workers, to further examine their private interests by looking at 
how their careers fit into their broader life-world. What financial imperatives motivate 





“We’re struggling financially”:  
Competing claims 
In the preceding chapters it was argued that securing a steady job with a steady income 
was an important motivator for people to join the health sector, as we saw in Chapter 3. 
We saw that completing college, qualifying, and subsequently landing on the govern-
ment payroll can be the difference between employment ‘for life’ and working in the 
informal sector or in small-scale agriculture. While health workers are fortunate when 
compared with the rest of the population, when speaking to health workers it is very 
common to hear them complain about the ‘peanuts’ they get paid. One enrolled nurse, 
Mr. Musonda, sympathetically formulated it thus: “I declared myself a volunteer in June 
1996 ... Because of the conditions of service, if you work in a (rural health centre) you 
can’t be motivated by the money, so you need to find another reason to attend to your 
patients”.1 Even doctors who, as we will see later, are much better off than other health 
workers feel they should be earning more: “Money is never enough, right? But I cannot 
complain, although with hours and risks it should be much higher. Doctors are least paid 
amongst professionals but exposed to more than bankers”.2  
In this chapter we will analyse health workers’ assertion that they do not earn 
enough. We will look at the competing claims that they encounter from society, which 
might explain why they present themselves as ‘struggling financially’. We will also 
look at health workers’ strategies for ‘working beyond the payslip’ and supplementing 
their income from other sources. We will then examine how this quest to make ends 
meet may impact on the system that employs them. Do the social and economic pres-
sures facing health workers explain patrimonial behaviours?3 
                                                 
1  PB0811/14. 
2  PB0812/04. 
3  Note: The aim here is to understand, not to judge or to justify. 
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Salary and allowances 
First let us get an impression of what health workers actually earn and what are the 
basic costs of living. Let us take, for instance, three people working in the health sector 
and see what they are earning in terms of salary. One is Mr. Musonda, the enrolled 
nurse working at a rural health centre, who calls himself a volunteer. Another is Brixton 
Mutale, a district stores’ officer, who worked himself up from garden boy, then worked 
as a registry clerk in the personnel department, and who is now following a distance-
learning course to qualify himself for his current position. The last is Dr. Chisa, a doctor 
still doing his internships at the UTH in Lusaka. As a net base salary, Mr. Musonda 
earns about 1.1 million Kwacha, and Dr. Chisa earns 3.6 million Kwacha. Brixton, if he 
was paid according to the position he is occupying would earn about 1 million Kwacha; 
however, even though he has been working as a stores’ officer, he has not been con-
firmed in this position, probably owing to the abolition of the boards and the ensuing 
restructuring, and also because he has not yet attained the appropriate qualifications. In 
the meantime, he is earning an estimated 720,000 Kwacha.4  
In Zambia, base salaries present only a modest part of the income a government 
employee gets from their day job. A further part of the income is furnished by a com-
plex of allowances which are difficult to fathom. Some of these allowances are monthly 
entitlements; others are incidental. An important monthly allowance is housing allow-
ance. Even though the Terms and Conditions of Service for the Public Service from 
20035 makes no mention of housing allowance, such an allowance is received by all 
those who are on the government payroll. According to a complex collection of cir-
culars from Cabinet Office, general workers, including Brixton, receive 110,0006 
Kwatcha per month; a nurse such as Mr. Musonda is entitled to 200,000;7 and junior 
doctors such as Dr. Chisa get 570,000.8 Previously, people who had received a housing 
loan from the government or had bought a house under Chiluba’s housing empower-
ment scheme received a considerably lower ‘owner-occupier’ allowance, but this has 
since been reversed. Now people who get accommodation provided by government 
have to pay the government a token rent of 7 to 12 per cent of their housing allowance, 
depending on the standing of the neighbourhood.9 Another allowance that is a fixed 
monthly amount is on-call allowance, which is specific to doctors only and is a con-
siderable contribution to their income. Earlier we have discussed this discrepancy 
between doctors and others in the health sector at length (Chapter 4). This means that 
Dr. Chisa gets another 2.6 million Kwacha added to his gross salary.10 Doctors and 
nurses can also get a monthly uniform upkeep allowance of 35,000 Kwacha and tool 
allowance of 20,000.11  
                                                 
4  Refer to Table 5.1 for a full comparison of incomes and their euro equivalent  
5  Which one senior official referred to as our Bible or Koran, while later admitting, “We are all sin-
ners”. 
6  PSMD Circular No. B.16 of 2008. 
7  PSMD Circular No. B.8 of 2008. 
8  PSMD Circular No. B.5 of 2008. 
9  In the more up-market ‘low-density’ neighbourhoods, this is 12 per cent, and in ‘medium- and high-
density’ neighbourhoods this is 10 per cent and 7 per cent respectively.  
10  PSMD Circular Minute No. 2. of 2008. 
11  PSMD Circular No. B.7. of 2003. While I was informed this was the applicable circular, these 
amounts may have been revised upwards, judging by a nurse’s account that she received ZMK 40,000 
in uniform allowance. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 4 and to be examined more closely in Chapter 9, there is a 
health workers’ retention scheme, which came about as a result of a donor initiative. To 
certain cadres – initially only doctors in rural districts, but later also nurse tutors and 
even some lower cadres in the most remote health centres in rural districts – a rural 
hardship allowance is provided, and depending on their rank they can receive other 
perks such as an education allowance for school-going children, house loans, vehicle 
loans, and so forth. Besides this donor-funded health workers’ retention scheme com-
prising a hardship allowance, there is also a government provision for rural hardship 
allowance, which also applied to cadres in other sectors. Recently this arrangement was 
adjusted so that it targets centres at a given distance from such amenities such as shops, 
banks, and petrol stations. Officers working at such rural locations are then entitled to 
an extra 20 per cent of their salary, while those at stations considered remote (even more 
inaccessible) receive 25 per cent extra.12 This change in this arrangement has meant that 
some who had previously profited from this allowance later missed out. Or to put it in 
the words of one nurse, working at a reasonably well-staffed health centre along a tar-
mac road at no more than thirty kilometres from the provincial capital: “They removed 
rural hardship allowance, which was boosting us”.13 Assuming that Mr. Musonda’s 
clinic is far enough away from basic amenities, he also receives rural hardship allow-
ance. At his salary, this means roughly an extra 290,000 Kwacha per month. 
In addition to monthly allowances there are incidental allowances connected to the 
activities that various cadres conduct during their work. Those health workers at hos-
pitals or larger clinics that have night duty can receive a commuted night-duty allow-
ance of 30,000 Kwacha. Staff at rural health centres are to conduct outreach activities, 
for instance for the immunisation of children. For these activities they are entitled to 
allowances. Moreover, for workshops and training, and for certain meetings, field visits, 
and other incidental activities, government employees are entitled to transport allow-
ance, subsistence allowances of between 140,000 Kwacha and 165,000 Kwacha, and/or 
meal allowances of 50,000 Kwacha per meal. Considering the fact that, especially if 
someone spends wisely, actual costs can be lower than the allowance given, this 
provides a potential extra something to bring home. For instance, a local meal14 at an 
eatery next to Cabinet Office in Lusaka cost me 17,500 Kwacha, whereas for the 
allowance of 50,000 one could eat at a much more up-market restaurant. The fact that 
people try to earn on allowances is also reflected by something a district director of 
health jokingly admonished the participants at a workshop: “Travel safely. You all have 
been given transport allowance to get home, so don’t let me catch you hitching rides on 
bikes or balancing on overloaded trucks”.15 
Of course, these allowances are not always paid promptly or equitably. One health 
worker mentioned that while in his current district allowances are paid on time, at the 
district where he was previously it “was terrible”: Allowances were rarely paid on time, 
if at all. “Because of that, people wouldn’t go on outreach any more, and the immu-
nisation numbers are very low. People are de-motivated. You would be spending time 
on outreach without knowing if you will get the allowances. I also stopped going when 
the allowances stopped. The allowances started piling; on paper I had a lot of money”.16 
                                                 
12  PSMD Circular No. B.2 of 2008. 
13  LB0809/18. 
14  Consisting of nshima (stiff maize porridge), village chicken, two vegetables, and a soft drink.  
15  ML0804/23. 
16  PB0811/33. 
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A colleague echoed this: “When I was in (another district), we used to get our allow-
ances only after six or seven months. This affected the work, because the (outreach) 
work is very involving, and when you don’t get paid for it you get frustrated. You 
develop an attitude towards the patient that is not good”.17 These examples not only 
reflect the fact that allowances can apparently be paid irregularly, but also that people 
strongly perceive them not only as incentives but as entitlements: If they are not paid, 
some will refuse to do their work.  
Some workers lack the possibility to carry out activities that earn allowances. 
Brixton, for instance, hid a complaint in the positive attitude that he presented: “I like 
working for the Ministry of Health, but I’m being denied of certain enjoyments. I don’t 
get the tasks with which I can get an allowance, such as night duty or missing lunch. 
But my vision is that I perform, and that I enjoy work”.18 Furthermore, the number of 
workshops one can follow is not equitably distributed. The following remarks, recorded 
from a nurse, hint at the lack of transparency and the sense of unfairness people per-
ceive in being picked to go for workshops. “Administration picks you; you can’t apply. 
It’s unfair who gets picked. Everybody wants to learn something. Administration should 
look into that more carefully. People pick themselves, leaving the ones who work in the 
wards with the patients”.19 This allocation, in part, depends on the different cadres. 
“There is a lot of extra knowledge in workshops. It depends on the profession how 
many chances one gets to attend a workshop: There are many for the lab and much 
fewer for nurses. In the lab, most of the colleagues have attended workshops”.20 A 
theatre nurse also felt her department was left out: “We are like forgotten. You can only 
go when you talk too much, so they remember you. For example, PMTCT21 training is 
important for us, but they forget that. They forget that we are very vulnerable for HIV in 
theatre. You keep going and talking to management, but most of the theatre staff have 
only been to one workshop”.22 From this account one can deduce, as we have seen 
earlier, that those who are assertive have a better chance of getting what they want.23 At 
rural clinics, however, the problem of understaffing can have a positive side, as one in-
charge mentioned. “When there is a workshop, I don’t have to decide who’s going, 
because I’m just alone”.24 
Again, as we have seen when discussing the access to college or promotions, access 
to workshops generating allowances is scarce and prized, and decisions about who can 
attend can thus be a source of power. As these opportunities are contested, this can 
equally feed suggestions of patronage. A dentist whom I met at a workshop in Lusaka 
told me that there is “a certain clique” at the provincial health office, which shares 
workshops, and that workshops are desirable because they “bring money”.25 It is widely 
acknowledged that management and administration positions give greater access to 
                                                 
17  PB0811/24. 
18  PB0810/02. 
19  PB0810/17. 
20  PB0811/01. 
21  Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (of HIV). 
22  PB0811/28. 
23  One might also question the need for a theatre nurse to have PMTCT. Possibly this was a slip with the 
respondent, meaning another course aimed at prevention of HIV transmission in the workplace; alter-
natively, it might signal the extrinsic financial motivation attached to any workshop regardless of the 
subject matter. 
24  PB0811/24. 
25  ML0706/06. 
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workshops and other allowance-generating activities.26 As one former manager reflected 
on her time in management: “It was a very good experience. I learned a lot about 
planning. I learned supervision, administration, et cetera, and got the chance to attend 
workshops”. A district health director admitted that he himself could be biased when he 
decides who goes for training. He mentioned that he could bypass those who are dis-
respectful or not loyal: Those who insult management.27 In other words, as these scarce 
opportunities for workshops and training are contested, such perks can be used as tools 
for managing loyalty. 
Later in this chapter we will again turn to the struggle for access to scarce oppor-
tunities for allowances and the impact the incentives involved have on health worker 
behaviour. The aim of this section, however, is to illustrate the importance of allow-
ances in the build-up of health workers’ income. This was well illustrated by the ac-
count of an accountant at a provincial health office. He was previously a board 
employee. He claimed that the restructuring following the dissolution of the Central 
Board of Health has caused a lot of confusion and has affected him personally. 
Although the board had been dissolved two years before I interviewed him, he had still 
not been put on the government payroll. He was told he had to wait until the restruc-
turing was over, which was expected to be six months later. In the meanwhile, he said 
that he was paid from the provincial health office’s operational funds and had seen his 
income fall by about sixty percent. Nevertheless, he said he was satisfied with his work. 
For his work, he travels a lot and he stays in places where he never imagined he would 
stay, such as the luxury hotel, InterContinental Lusaka. “There is a lot of capacity-
building. We learn a lot. Workshops are there”. The ambiguity as to the exact benefit of 
workshops – is it as a source of knowledge or as a source of income? – was heightened 
when the respondent said about such allowances: “That’s what supports me”.28 
 
 
Table 5.1  Health workers’ incomes 










Brixton 942,138 110,000  804,103 155 
Mr. Musonda 1,467,065 186,000 293,413 1,439,285 277 
Dr. Chisa 5,040,436 570,000 2,600,000 5,613,534 1,080 
 
 
With the complex of various incidental allowances, it is difficult to piece together 
what the average health worker earns in allowances, or even what a particular health 
worker receives. Notwithstanding the importance of these sources of additional income 
to our presentation of workers’ take-home pay, this presentation disregards such allow-
ances, as a matter of convenience. We have incorporated only substantive allowances, 
such as housing allowance and Dr. Chisa’s on-call allowance. We have also assumed 
that Mr. Musonda gets rural hardship allowance. While this table might provide an 
illustrative account of what health workers ‘get out of their work financially’, it is truly 
                                                 
26  Toyoshi-Hamada, ’Zambian’. 
27  ML0706/17. 
28  ML0809/12. 
29  After deducting PAYE income tax and pension payments. 
30  At € 1 = ZMK 5,200. 
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instructive only if we can also see this in relation to the cost of living. This we will 
examine below.  
The cost of living 
Estimating the cost of living for health workers is an arbitrary task, inherently subjective 
to an individual’s specific desires and context. Also, quoting Dr. Chisa, “Money is 
never enough, right?”31 In macro-economic comparisons, average incomes between 
countries are often corrected for purchasing-power parity, taking into account what a 
dollar can buy in a specific country. Perhaps more illustrative for our interest is a 
monthly exercise carried out by an NGO in Lusaka, which contributes to public debates 
on poverty in Zambia. This organisation, headed by an American Jesuit priest, carries 
the intriguing name Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection. Every month, they cal-
culate the cost of a basic needs’ basket for a family of six (Table 5.2). Average prices 
for basic commodities are collected at a number of retail outlets in Lusaka. In the 
calculation for September 2008, it was projected that a food-basket, composed of the 
essentials such as mealie-meal,32 relish,33 vegetables, and so on would cost a family of 
six a total of 656,600 Kwacha. Non-food items in the basket included rent, utilities, and 
cleaning products. They brought the basic needs’ basket to a total of 1,828,100 Kwacha, 
which at the time was equal to € 352.  
While the above is a fair representation of the costs a nurse in Lusaka, and also Dr. 
Chisa, will face, for Brixton or Mr. Musonda things may be different. In provincial or 
district towns, foodstuffs may be slightly less expensive, whereas manufactured goods 
might be somewhat more costly. Moreover, as we will discuss later, particularly in the 
most rural areas many professionals also do some farming on the side, particularly for 
their own consumption. A further and more substantial difference is the cost of housing. 
Most health workers at health centres are accommodated in staff houses provided by 
government. While they get a token amount deducted from their housing allowance, it 
does provide a significant adjustment to their basic needs’ basket. Nevertheless, depend-
ing on the cost of their housing, for nurses such as Mr. Musonda or his various fellow 
nurses, the basic needs’ package is either slightly above or slightly below the cost of 
their basic needs. For people-support staff such as Brixton, the basic needs’ package is 
slightly higher than what they bring home on their payslip. However, this does not even 
take into account the other costs they might have or chose to face. In the following 
sections we will see what expenditures health workers face beyond these basic needs.  
Educating your children 
On arrival at a rural health centre to conduct interviews, my research assistant Paulien 
and I found the in-charge occupied with screening patients. He asked us to wait half an 
hour before he could attend to us. We asked a lady who was attentively watching us 
wander around the clinic if she worked there. When she affirmed that she did, we asked 
her if we could interview her. She brought us to a desk in a nice-looking maternity wing 
built with NGO support, which was not being used at that moment. Then she went off 
and walked back with another lady, who looked old and emaciated and was dressed in a 
                                                 
31  PB0812/04. 
32  The maize meal which is made into the staple food, nshima. 
33  The main accompaniment to nshima, such as meat or kapenta (small dried fish). 
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chitenge34 wraparound and a simple shirt. She greeted us traditionally in Bemba and sat 
down next to her companion. When we learned that she was a colleague, we asked if 
she minded if we interviewed her separately. We then interviewed the first lady, who 
turned our to be a recently recruited community volunteer and had few stories that we 
could elicit from her. To our surprise, the other lady, whom we shall call Mrs. 
Mwaanga, had a much more interesting story, which she shared in articulate English. 
She had looked very much the typical local villager, but it appeared that she originally 
came from Southern Province and had worked at a number of clinics in Luapula as a 
cleaner since the 1970s. 
 
 




Mrs. Mwaanga had followed her mother, who had worked as a matron at a teaching 
college in Mansa, to Luapula. When she was looking for a job, she applied at the 
hospital, before being transferred to the clinic where we spoke to her. There she had met 
her husband, whom she had since divorced. Then, after 13 years she was transferred 
again, which she explained simply by saying that she had ‘overstayed’. At the end of the 
1990s she was ‘pruned’, retrenched together with many other casual employees. She 
then received a retrenchment package, which she put in the bank. In 2001 she was again 
employed at the clinic where she is now, this time on a contract with the district health 
office. “I wasn’t too old to stop working, so I re-applied”. The reason she chose to come 
                                                 
34  A traditional garment for women: A piece of batik cloth wrapped around the waist, chest, head or used 
as a sling for carrying infants.  
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back to this location where her ex-husband came from was that before she had been 
transferred, she had already bought a house there. She also did some farming, selling 
some cassava and ground nuts. About living as a Tonga among the Bemba, she said she 
sometimes had “difficulties, but when I explain our customs, it is ok, they understand”. 
Witchcraft was not a problem, she said, being a member of the United Church of 
Zambia: “I just pray”. A difficulty was that her relatives do not come to visit her in 
Luapula. “They say it is too far. They’re not happy with me staying here. They can’t 
visit me when I fall ill.” Indeed, Mrs. Mwaanga looked as if she had been struggling 
with serious illness. While it remained unspoken, it would not have surprised me if her 
emaciated appearance was a sign of her struggling with full-blown AIDS.  
The reason for telling Mrs. Mwaanga’s story here in this section is that there was one 
issue which she talked about with a particular passion and an occasional glint of pride. 
The money she had put in the bank after having been ‘pruned’ was used mainly to put 
all her six children through school. All children had in fact completed secondary school 
or were set to do so. The youngest was still at boarding school elsewhere in the prov-
ince, quite a distance away. The next one was a tailor in Ndola, who she said “is doing 
well”. The same pride, however, she could not show for her youngest daughter. She 
“refused to do anything”, Mrs. Mwaanga told us. Now the daughter was married to a 
driver in a nearby town where the Pedicle Road crosses into the Congo on its way to the 
Copperbelt. With clear disapproval, Mrs. Mwaanga added that the daughter was “just 
staying and doing nothing”. Another daughter had tried to study to become a teacher but 
she had failed twice. Now she was in Kitwe looking for another course to try. Mrs. 
Mwaanga’s second-born had apparently been more successful in getting further edu-
cation and was working as an electrician for the Ministry of Health in Itezhi-Tezhi in 
Southern Province. Finally, Mrs. Mwaanga’s first-born was the key to her retirement in 
a year’s time. He was in Mrs. Mwaanga’s home village in Choma district, farming and 
keeping cattle. He was also taking care of his mother’s two cows and two bulls, which 
Mrs. Mwaanga had already bought. She had also already bought a plough she found 
standing idle in her current place of residence. Bembas, she claimed, do not know how 
to use them. She sent it with one of her children to Southern Province. In a year she 
would sell her house and “live with mum”, who is getting old in Livingstone, before 
buying a house near her son in the village.35 
Mrs. Mwaanga’s story illustrates to what extent Zambians (perhaps particularly 
women) will go to ensure that their children have the chance to do well in life, by 
putting them through school. While from her account one can conclude that only one, 
possibly two, of her children had completed some tertiary education, by and large she 
gave the impression that most were “doing well”. For Mrs. Mwaanga’s meagre pay-
check, this must have been quite a strain. Estimating her pay-check, she picks up only 
480,000 Kwacha (€ 92) per month, as she probably does not receive extra allowances, 
being on contract and thus not on the government payroll. Apparently, the lump-sum 
pay-out she had received when government was ‘down-scaling’ the public service was 
of significant help. Ironically, Mrs. Mwaanga and her children appear to have been 
beneficiaries of structural adjustment. Getting back to our argument, however, nearly all 
our respondents were spending a significant amount of money and effort educating their 
children. This also came to the fore in another situation I came across. 
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At an office, somewhere in the Zambian health system, there was a quite elderly 
office orderly walking around. He would shuffle around with piles of paper, apparently 
looking around absent-mindedly. One of his colleagues told me that he was over sixty-
five and should have retired already. She indicated that because of the confusion 
surrounding the restructuring, he was still around. His retirement had not been auto-
matically processed by Lusaka, and although he was old and had trouble seeing and 
hearing, he was still at the office every morning at six to prepare the office for a day’s 
work.36 Later, another colleague explained that this gentleman had two wives and six 
children with each. Soon he would retire, as his last child would finish school. Accord-
ing to his colleague, he had continued working past the normal retirement age of 55 to 
‘finish’ educating his children.37  
Owing to economic circumstances, some fail to give all their children equal oppor-
tunities to access education. One health worker reported having had ten children with 
his wife, of whom three had since passed away. He and his wife had managed to school 
their children, with two girls becoming teachers, one son a miner, and another son a 
driver. Nevertheless, some of these children did not go as far as they might have. In 
1998, however, the family had a lucky break of sorts. Our respondent’s wife had been 
working as a classified employee at a clinic but was retrenched, in much the same way 
as Mrs. Mwaanga. With this lump sum, our respondent and his wife were able to 
sponsor one of their younger sons through university. Now he is a public relations 
officer at the refinery in Ndola.38  
As mentioned in an earlier section, primary public education in Zambia is nominally 
free. Government also issues bursaries and subsidises many institutions of higher learn-
ing. Nevertheless, educating children remains costly. In the basic needs’ basket exer-
cise, under the heading ‘some additional costs’, schooling costs for secondary schools in 
Lusaka are listed. Fees and PTA-contributions for Grades 8 and 9 are quoted at 252,000 
to 380,000 Kwacha per year, and for Grades 10 to 12 at 465,000 to 600,000 Kwacha per 
year, with school uniforms quoted at between 75,000 and 180,000 Kwacha per year. Of 
course, there are variations between public and private schools, and some of our 
respondents admitted to sending their children to “expensive private schools” no doubt 
because that would improve the chances of their children being successful. 
In Zambia, families are traditionally large, with women on average having 6.2 child-
ren in their life.39 This thus poses considerable costs. One clinical officer mentioned that 
he had seven children, out of which five were in boarding school. “Our vision is to get 
our children into college ... We need our children to be independent”. In addition to his 
work, this clinical officer has various projects to raise money for school fees40 (a topic 
we will elaborate on later). While on average families can be large, in practice families 
are very varied in structure. In the Christian Nation Zambia,41 where the picture of a 
nuclear family is at times idealised, it might be tempting to look at families through the 
nuclear lens of one man, one woman, and their children. In practice, however, this ideal 
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41  Zambia is perhaps the only country in the world that is constitutionally defined as a Christian Nation. 
The declaration of Zambia as a Christian Nation has been cause for vehement debate. See for instance 
Hinfelaar, M., ‘Debates on the secular in Zambia: The Catholic church response to scientific socialism 
and Christian nation (1976-2006)’. In: Englund, H., ed., Christianity and public culture (forthcoming). 
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rarely holds. One wise retiree whom I interviewed re-impressed this point on me. When 
I asked, “How many children do you have?”, he told me that that was the wrong 
question to ask in Zambia. Instead I was supposed to ask, “How many children do you 
have with your wife?”, because God knows how many children a man has elsewhere.42  
Traditionally, describing the family structures of Zambians and other ‘research ob-
jects’ has been a favoured pastime for anthropologists. Using their concepts and typo-
logies in contemporary Zambia may not create clarity but rather illustrates the com-
plexity of family arrangements. Nevertheless, it can be said simplistically that in the 
past many Zambians lived together with people from their lineage. Among many ethnic 
groups in Zambia, including most in Luapula, these were matrilineal lineages, meaning 
that heritage was determined through the line of the mother, as opposed to patrilineal, 
which was the norm among for instance the Lozi and the Ngoni. Some ethnic groups 
described by anthropologists were further labelled ‘matrilocal’, which means that hus-
bands move in with their in-laws, as opposed to wives moving in with theirs, which may 
be common elsewhere. As anthropologists began describing real and imagined pro-
cesses of modernisation, in some parts of Zambia such as Luapula an interesting topic 
of discussion was whether, under the influence of Christianity, colonialism, and capi-
talism, matrilineal extended family relations were giving way to more nuclear family 
structures that were more patriarchal and patrilineal.43 In this research, we did not 
primarily delve into family structures, nor do we attempt to classify them. We did en-
counter many family arrangements of health workers. Some were widowed, some were 
divorced, and some were unmarried women with children. We also met men with 
multiple wives,44 with children living in different households, divorced men with new 
families, or widowers whose new wives cared for their husband’s children as well as 
their own. Some individuals had split their households because of their jobs. One senior 
nurse had two of his children with him in Luapula, while his wife was living with the 
two youngest on the Copperbelt, where she had a managerial job in a bank.45 Others 
serving in rural stations had a house in town where their children were staying to go to 
school; one of the older children or another relative would take care of the others.46  
When listening to people’s accounts, the distances over which family members can 
be spread are striking. In the quest for quality education, many children find themselves 
going to school at some distance from their parents, at boarding school, or with rela-
tives. This is very consistent with a clear pattern in Zambian history, namely the strong 
tradition of labour migration and the spatially complex social relations this has resulted 
in. Schooling children away from home, however, does not necessarily absolve parents 
of costs involved in schooling; it can even make it more costly. One nurse worked 
together with her husband at a clinic. Together they had five children. The first-born 
was working on the Copperbelt; the rest were in boarding school. She claimed they 
managed to school their children, although that may mean they fail to achieve other 
things. “The money is not enough, but we save for the children. We send them to school 
even if we suffer”.47  
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In the next section, we will look at the great importance of relatives and dependants 
in the lives of contemporary Zambians, and the financial costs this implies for those 
with jobs. While it is wrong to deny the importance of the extended family, neither is it 
right to minimise the significance of the idea of the nuclear family in the accounts of 
some health workers. When I was giving a lift to a health worker who had just come 
from a different district from his own, and where he was acting as a peer-assessor in that 
district’s performance assessment, we were talking about his career history and family 
situation. He told me that his father had been an office orderly for the council in Kitwe. 
Then his father passed away and his mother took the family back to their village in 
Eastern Province. They had not been farming in town, but now his mother said they 
would have to work together as a family. Of his five siblings, two had since passed 
away; the others were getting by. One is a mechanic; another works for a factory in 
Kabwe. He himself went to Chainama college to study public health and he is working 
at a district health office. He mentioned that his wife was a high-school teacher. 
Together they farm; he has a heart for farming as he comes from a farming family. Last 
year they cultivated two hectares of maize and two lima48 of groundnuts. They 
harvested two-hundred and fifty kilo-bags of maize but the groundnuts did not do well. 
This year he and his wife decided to cultivate less; they decided to better share their 
labour. They both worked during the day; then they would go to work the land together. 
After they came back, she would go prepare food while he would sit and relax. He did 
not know why he would do that, but he appeared to consider acting differently, adding, 
“It is important to be a good husband”. He said that he and his wife had three children, 
two girls and boy between the ages of twelve and one. “But that is enough”. He and his 
wife decided not to have more children. When I asked why, he explained, “We made an 
analysis”. Both of them come from large families and there was not enough money “to 
bring us far”. With three children it should be easier to send them to university. “That is 
our goal.” From this account it becomes clear that this particular respondent sees his 
marriage to a fellow professional as a partnership. While, by his admission, typical 
patterns of a division of labour do slip into the relationship, he appeared resolved to 
share labour better. He also professed the intention not to have more than three children 
so as to be able to give them a better life.49 In short, with his account our respondent 
sketched the ideal of a small nuclear family, indicating there is an element of personal 
choice in determining one’s household structure and the burden this implies. Although 
one cannot assume this respondent’s account to be the norm in Zambia, it does suggest 
that for some50 professionals the ideal a nuclear family correlates with middle-class life.  
Despite the professed ideal of a nuclear family representing the concept of ‘mod-
ernity’, in practice most health workers also face the burden of educating children born 
to their relatives. A nurse tutor we spoke to had one child with his wife, who is a nurse 
studying to become a pharmacist. He claimed that he would like to have one more child, 
but no more. This is because he already also had to take care of three nieces from his 
side of the family. Their parents had died and he took responsibility for caring for these 
three girls. His other siblings have also taken in orphaned relatives, but being the eldest 
he has taken in most.51  
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49  ML0811/07. 
50  It needs to be explicitly emphasised that it is unclear to which extent this is common. 
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Having to care for other children competes with the schooling one can give one’s 
own children. Another public health official, living in a provincial town, gave an ac-
count reflecting this. He said that he had three children, as well as caring for two 
children of his late brother. Educating the children was “a struggle; it hasn’t been easy”. 
He is sending the children to a private school and recently the rates for next year have 
been increased. For his own children, he will be paying 600,000 Kwacha per term per 
year; for his two other children, 300,000 and 350,000 Kwacha. Although we did not 
discuss this further, apparently he discriminated between his own children and depend-
ants from the extended family, placing more importance on the education of his own 
children than that of his dependent relatives.52  
One respondent even explicitly said that educating his own children had priority over 
caring for dependants. He recounted that he had five children, three with his first wife, a 
nurse who had since passed away. The eldest, a daughter, had become a nurse; the 
second-born was in university; and his twin sister was at home hoping to be accepted to 
college. The two youngest children, whom he had with his second wife, also a nurse, 
were still in school. He mentioned that currently he had no dependants living with him. 
“Relatives don’t have our vision, which is to get your children educated. Therefore, 
relatives can pose problems”. He made this statement more concrete by describing the 
case of a girl he sponsored from his wife’s side of the family, who went to boarding 
school. There she “didn’t take her education seriously and got engaged in extra-curri-
cular activities”. He explained that she got pregnant and dropped out. “It was one thing 
to have one dependant, but I didn’t like getting another one from her. She ran off to her 
family and she avoided us from that time”. Now, our respondent stated, he and his wife 
are only prepared to support dependants who live with them from an early age, so they 
can teach them their own values. He concluded, “My own relatives have to accept what 
I put in. Education is the only inheritance that I can give my children”.53  
In this section we examined both the costs of educating children and the drive of 
health workers to willingly bear these costs. We have also seen that while actual family 
sizes, structures, and compositions vary, in part reflective of how this might have been 
traditionally, some might tend to strive for more compact nuclear families in line with 
the costs of raising a family as a professional in contemporary Zambia. From these 
accounts it becomes clear that the theme that has permeated this chapter on the human 
factor, the drive to forge ahead to improve yourself by striving for qualifications, is also 
transposed onto the next generation. Implicitly or explicitly, most of the health workers 
we spoke to shared this ‘vision’ of educating their children.  
Relatives and dependents  
Nearly all health workers that we spoke to had to care for at least some family members. 
Often this involved orphans: Siblings, cousins, or nephews and nieces whose parents 
had died. Although this was not necessarily the case in all instances encountered, there 
is no doubt that the AIDS pandemic placed an enormous extra burden on many of our 
health workers. Let us take the case of Brixton, for example. As we remember, he began 
working as a garden boy for a health office. He got this job after having completed 
Grade 12. In the course of the years, he had worked his way up to district stores officer, 
although he had not been confirmed in this position. We saw that he was still earning 
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the salary of a registry clerk, bringing home 800,000 Kwacha (€ 155). This was less 
than would cover the basic needs of a family of six in Lusaka. Brixton who was 35 
years old. He said he and his wife had four children. His latest had just been born as he 
was interviewed, so he indeed had a family of six. Fortunately, Brixton was not living in 
Lusaka but in a provincial town, which might have made the cost of living a bit lower. 
However, a family of six was not all that he had to care for. In the interview Brixton 
revealed that besides his own family he was supporting 13 family members. His twenty-
eight-year old niece and her two children, his wife’s brother, his mother-in-law, and a 
divorced sister and her three children were among the people living at his house. Four of 
these are in school, plus two of his own children. “People come and go,” he explained, 
“but I never have less than ten family members living with me. They follow me because 
there is too much poverty. I cannot chase them away”. In 1996 his parents died and 
Brixton’s two older brothers also passed away. Because of this, he explained, “Those 
who were still there, they came to see me since they had no one to look after them”. He 
is also the only one around with a reliable job. “In my family, there is only one who has 
attended school. I cannot chase them away because they have nothing. I cannot run from 
that responsibility, even if it is a drawback”. Brixton’s wife was not working. She only 
made it up to Grade 9. Brixton claimed he took her back to school so that in the future 
she could supplement the family’s income. She had finished now, but still had to re-sit 
some subjects. “We still have a long way to go”.  
No matter how depressing this account may sound, Brixton has his eyes set firmly on 
the future. He was following a long-distance course in supply-chain management with a 
UK-based organisation. After passing the next module, he would qualify for the position 
he was holding, thus increasing his salary to 1.1 million Kwacha. Each module of this 
programme was costing Brixton an estimated 337,000 Kwacha.54 “I starve my family 
and myself to pay. But when I make it, I can work and serve my people and serve the 
nation ... I’m so eager, but I don’t have sponsors. The family has come to understand 
that the only way to proceed is through study”.55 This account yet again exemplifies the 
sense of upward mobility, as well as the sacrifices made to secure further qualifications, 
that we have seen in previous chapters. This young man has seen a lot but still is very 
determined to better himself and his family. Besides ambition and sacrifices, this 
account also shows the burden that poor relatives can pose for someone lucky enough to 
have a job, especially if he is one of the few in their family.  
Having dependent relatives seems unavoidable for most of our respondents. Brixton 
indicated that he could not run from his responsibility of caring for those family mem-
bers who have nothing. Another respondent, an official working in Luapula, had most of 
his relatives in Eastern Province, though a brother-in-law and a junior sister were living 
with him. He considered the responsibility of attending to visiting relatives unavoidable. 
When asked if he could not send relatives away, he seemed a little taken aback. “That is 
unethical,” he replied. “You can’t leave your people who are suffering”.56 In another 
case, a doctor in a senior management position, who had stated he had struggled out of 
poverty to be able to “become better and help improve my family”, passionately made 
an argument for the moral virtue of the extended family. “There is something good 
about us:” he said, “the extended family. We recognise that a child belongs to all of us. 
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It is very helpful to cushion gaps. It is strength. We should not nuclearise”.57 A clinical 
officer, who described himself as not being “from a wealthy family”, whose father is a 
village headmen and most of whose family are subsistence farmers, does not consider 
being a medical professional in such a family much of a problem. “When our family 
members come by, we just take them to the farm; we have enough food there for every-
one. In Africa, we help each other”.58 
This is not to say, however, that claims from relatives do not pose problems. One 
retired public health official said, “There are very many claims from relatives. Tradi-
tionally, we say that a child belongs to his parents during and after life. It is often 
misunderstood,” he said, adding that it is not necessarily malicious, but that it can lead 
to property-grabbing, a practice of which he does not approve. “In our society, when 
someone leaves a will, people will grab it, tear it up and burn it and then discuss the 
division (of the inheritance)”. In the wake of President Mwanawasa’s death, he drew a 
parallel with current events. “Mwanawasa knew that as a lawyer and that is why he left 
a video will”.59 A nurse interviewed gave an account of just such a situation. Her hus-
band had been a miner on the Copperbelt. When their two daughters were just starting 
school, her husband died in a mining accident. Shortly after, her husband’s relatives 
took the house the family was living in and even some money and the package that was 
offered after the husband’s death. Fortunately the family was able to survive on her 
salary and were even offered a council house because of the ordeal. She looked back on 
it relatively mildly, saying, “His relatives seem to come to their senses now; they send 
me the rent of that house when they feel like it”.60 For another health worker, this meant 
a spilt with his relatives. He had grown up on the Copperbelt. When his father was alive 
they had contact with people from their home village in Eastern Province. Even the 
chief visited them. When his father passed away, the relatives came. Because of the 
conflict that ensued, he said he never went back to his home village.61  
Others also considered claims from relatives to be a nuisance. A laboratory tech-
nician mentioned that his relatives live nearby, near the town where he is posted. 
“Somehow it is not good to live too close to your relatives. They trouble you a lot, 
unless they are also independent”. He indicated that the relatives have financial con-
cerns: Sometimes they ask for money, sometimes they need clothes and other basics. 
This is worse for him because he is the only one with a good job in the area. He 
mentioned he had three sisters who are married nearby. “Their husbands don't have 
good jobs. They bring trouble. Even my wife is troubled”.62 One accountant claimed he 
does not let himself be distracted too much by his relatives as he has a (nuclear) family 
to support. Having grown up on the Copperbelt, his own relatives were in Eastern 
Province. His wife, however, was local to the town where they were staying. Of them he 
said, “You try to avoid them. They can distract you by needing support, they want 
money, invite you into family activities, visit without knocking, ask for money for 
someone in hospital, for transport”. He claimed that he manages to keep them at bay by 
indicating that he is not their relative. He alluded to the fact that for his wife this might 
be more difficult though. “There are those who are closer and those who are not so 
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close”. But in the end, he said, his wife depends on him and has to follow what he 
decides.63 This respondent gave the impression that he is very much in control of the 
situation. Others also gave that impression. One said that although he lived close to his 
relatives, being in the same province, “they are all independent”. He thus does not need 
to support them much, “unless I feel like giving”.64 Yet others did acknowledge a bur-
den from relatives but, like Brixton, felt they could not avoid it. One health worker 
mentioned that he and his younger brother, who was a teacher, were the only ones in the 
family with formal employment. “Most of the burden is for us. My budget is disturbed; 
things plunge in”. But he conceded, “It is difficult to isolate yourself. I have been 
brought up by an uncle and this is a reason for me to look after others as well”.65 
Despite there being a social sense of moral obligation to respond to relatives’ re-
quests for assistance, this is not as unavoidable as it may be portrayed. There seems to 
be considerable agency for people in deciding the extent to which they support relatives. 
Some actively choose to do their duty, while other relatives are shirk their respon-
sibilities. A nurse said, “Right now I only have one dependent, a boy who is my late 
brother’s son, and then I’m also supporting one who is in Grade 12. But I have brought 
up a lot of dependants, many. I am the only one caring for dependants, maybe because I 
am the only woman in the family. Men don’t really care for relatives; my older brothers 
are just caring for their own children. But I do it out of love for people; you cannot just 
leave them”.66 Other respondents weigh what they can be involved in and what not. One 
nurse implied that she and her husband carefully consider requests for assistance. “With 
dependents, it depends on how you as a couple handle them. We look at the most 
important things, and we help them out with those important things”.67 A senior official 
posted in his home province replied that working close to your relatives is a “mixed 
grill”. On the one hand, being away from home means fewer disturbances by family 
members. On the other hand, with aging parents there is much more one can do if one is 
closer. However, he stated, “It is a question of managing family issues. Through dial-
ogue you make them understand the position you are in and that you cannot get in-
volved in certain family matters”.68 Yet another respondent illustrated that dealing with 
claims from relatives is a subtle practice. He admitted that relatives can be difficult. 
They can trouble you with complaints and at times want assistance. The respondent 
added that sometimes he needs to get involved in settling disputed between relatives. 
Moreover, besides his own children, he is schooling two dependants. But he admitted 
that sometime he ‘technically ignores’ requests, not by bluntly refusing them but by not 
following through. “I know the way to do that”, he added. He suggested, however, that 
doing this incorrectly poses risks: “When you are closer to your relatives and if you 
don’t use the right approach, they can make your name bad”.69      
The philosophical doctor we quoted above, who was very clear about the moral 
virtue of the extended family, also indicated that “there should be limits; otherwise, the 
poverty of your brother can transform you into a poor man”. This in his view was not 
something to avoid but to deal with. “Still, you should help and not complain”. One 
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does not have to offend when setting these limits. He explained how one should offer 
support. “If he is a minor, support him and educate him. If he is an adult, support him to 
find employment”. If he does not find employment, find other ways of gradually mak-
ing the dependant independent. “Sit down with your brother to discuss him moving out. 
Tell him ‘I will pay rent for let’s say six months and then you will start paying’. Or you 
help him go to a driving school and get a driving licence, so that he can drive a taxi. 
Offer a starting point to become independent”. He admits that sometimes this is not so 
easy. There is sometimes abuse, and according to our respondent, often it is the one 
doing well who ends up being abused. “The recipient might end up spending money on 
beer or on a ka-phone. Such recipients can be abusive”. He concluded his argument with 
an apt metaphor revealing his medical training. “There is a difference between a sym-
biotic relationship and a parasitic relationship. A parasitic relationship ends up killing 
both”.70 
This opinion on supporting dependants with the aim of making them independent, so 
eloquently aired by the previous respondent, was repeated by others. One health worker, 
who had moved to the other side of the country for his job, said that most of his siblings 
were peasant farmers. They had been happy when they saw him leave to work else-
where as he sent money to his family to support them. But he showed that he would 
prefer them to become more independent. “I have been pushing them to finish their 
education, but they think they are too old now”.71 A different health worker said, “I got 
my brother a piece of land outside Mansa for cultivating, so he can start supporting his 
own family”.72 Yet another said that he paid for his three cousins to go to school. “I 
keep on encouraging them to educate themselves. Education gives a basis for life”.73 
And education leads to independence, as yet another health worker implied. He revealed 
that in addition to the two nephews his family and he are supporting, they used to sup-
port a niece of his. “But she is a teacher now and doesn’t need support anymore”.74 That 
this takes the pressure off was indicated by a nurse: “Most of my relatives are inde-
pendent. They have all learned to work. My hometown is near, and I have relatives 
there, but they don’t come by unless they really need to. So when they come, I know 
they are in real need of assistance, and if I have the means, I help them”.75 
One respondent gave an account of how he dealt with a dependency that had grown 
parasitic. He mentioned he had one dependant staying with him, a younger brother. His 
wife, who was living elsewhere for her job, had five. This respondent explained that he 
was brought up in an extended family himself and has fond memories of that. He missed 
the drama of staying as a family: Recalling things from earlier times and really knowing 
each other. Now, as he was living at quite a distance from most of his relatives, he 
admitted he was not contributing much to the family. “Those that are near have a bigger 
burden and responsibility”. While for him the expenses are less, he does feel his rela-
tives are being deprived of the benefit. “You just send something once in a while”. He 
went on to explain, however, that with his younger brother things have not worked. “Let 
him be. Let me not bother him; he doesn’t like to work. He just wants to play. He just 
can’t take care of himself. I could think of maybe buying a car, which he can use as a 
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taxi, but that wouldn’t work. I have a shop, and I tried that with him several times, but 
then I would find empty shelves and books that weren’t correct. He decided not to take 
care of himself. If he was extended family, I wouldn’t keep him”.76 
A recurring theme in people’s accounts of relations with relatives is that of distance. 
In his study of civil servants in Malawi, Gerhard Anders described how his informants 
“experienced a tension between their dream of material wealth for their own nuclear 
family and the numerous demands on their resources by kinfolk”. As we have seen 
above, while there is a tension and an ambivalence, Anders argues that there need not be 
a contradiction between individual aspirations and kinship obligations.77 Instead, people 
try to deal with both. One strategy that Anders described was that after retirement, civil 
servants move to “neutral ground” at a “safe distance” from their relatives. As such, 
they translate a social distance into a spatial distance. In the accounts, we saw similar 
strategies. While we will come back to our respondents’ preparations for retirement 
later, below are a number of illustrations of how health workers take the issue of dis-
tance from relatives into account in their decisions on where to be placed.  
In an earlier section on placements and transfers, a number of accounts were pre-
sented on health workers who chose to be posted close to specific family members. 
Often people wanted to be close to their parents to help them in illness or old age. 
Having said that, numerous respondents attested to a more or less pronounced incli-
nation to put a safe distance between themselves and their relatives. During a trip to 
Western Province, I spoke with a man who previously was posted in North-Western 
Province. He said he had been doing well running a mobile eye-clinic, for which he was 
specially trained in Malawi as one of the first Zambians. At a certain point in time, the 
ministry wanted to transfer him back to his home province of Western Province. He had 
refused. He suggested that he did not want to be close to his relatives. After the ministry 
told him for the third time that they wanted to transfer him, because he had overstayed 
in Solwezi, he finally conceded. He went back to Western Province. When I asked if it 
indeed was so bad, he sighed: “Yes, I’m running a boarding school”. He told me that his 
relatives come from a nearby district, asking for assistance. Sometimes they come with 
genuine cases and he struggles to manage. “It is difficult for village people to under-
stand,” he concluded.78 A colleague of his proudly wore a broad ivory bangle. He 
explained that this indicated that he was a headman in his home village in Southern 
Province. When I asked if he would not prefer to be closer to home, he said no. At home 
there would be relatives nearby; at the place where he was, at least he could work with 
few disturbances.79 This was echoed by a number of other respondents: “You do better 
if you’re working in another place” than the one where your relatives live. 
The ambivalence remains: Creating or maintaining distance between a professional 
and his or her family members does not imply severing the ties with these family mem-
bers. Let us go back, for instance, to that nurse who came from Solwezi and was 
transferred to Mbereshi to reduce the travelling time to his family in North-Western 
Province. As he was interviewed 12 years after his initial posting, he did not consider 
going back to Solwezi an option for him yet. He explained that would mean that he 
would then be closer to his relatives and he would get a lot of pressure from them. “I 
might not advance if I go back, because of that. Maybe I will go back in two or three 
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years, but not yet because I haven’t yet bought a lot of things for the home. I need to lay 
a very good foundation and get some capital”. Obviously, being close to his family 
would be such a financial drain that he could not spend money on other things. He 
mentioned buying things for the house, but there were also other projects he had run-
ning. Currently, he was farming on one or two hectares; in the previous year he had 
made four and a half million Kwacha selling maize. He said that he did not have any 
other business at the moment, though he admitted having some money in the bank. For 
this, he had some plans; maybe he would use it for poultry-farming. Having relatives 
close would obviously compete with these plans and prevent him from advancing. That 
is not to say, however, that he does nothing for his relatives. Later he mentioned that his 
parents had passed away, which left him to support some family members. Staying with 
him were his brother, with his wife and two children, and his sister, with her husband 
and three children. “You have to be experienced financially. A big family against (the 
budget of) one person is really hard”.80 
On one hand, it is evident that spatial distance can buffer people from claims from 
the extended family. As one respondent put it, if he moves, relatives need to pay for 
transport, whereas now they can just walk to his place. On the other hand, despite dis-
tances, one may find it difficult to isolate one’s self. One respondent, who was working 
in a remote rural district, mentioned that his relatives are all in Lusaka. According to 
him, he is the only brother in a family of five surviving children. Two of his sisters are 
working; two are unemployed. The latter two, according to the respondent, are in 
trouble financially. When asked if he is not safe from disturbances being so far away 
from his relatives, he held up his mobile phone with a look of resignation. He claimed 
that still they could find him to ask support; he received a lot of text messages: “We 
have debts. Send us so much”. When he has money, he said, he sends some.81  
In this section we examined the burden and the claims of the extended family on 
people holding jobs. As we saw, there is a lot of ambivalence in people’s assessment of 
this burden. On the one hand, there is a sense of pride in the virtuousness of valuing the 
extended family. There is a sense that this solidarity is at the core of an ‘African iden-
tity’. As one respondent said, “in Africa, we help each other”. On the other hand, some 
respondents complain of the burden this imposes and actively try to deal with claims. 
Some refuse or ignore claims, others use the special mobility inherent in the Zambian 
public service to their advantage by creating a distance from their relatives to decrease 
the claims they face. Whereas very few of the people we have encountered found it 
either possible or desirable to wholly withdraw from kinship obligations, it was seen as 
competing with other aspirations that our respondents may have held – not least, the 
dream of a ‘modern middle-class life’, with all the material comforts that this implies. 
As was also suggested by the tentative conclusion on smaller nuclear families, it appears 
as if our health workers are in the process of reforming and renegotiating culture. In this 
process, conceptions of what is traditional are an important resource, but they are by no 
means the sole determinant of this process. Someone’s sense of their current and as-
pired-to economic situation is also of influence – just as are, perhaps, concepts of 
modernity and the desires associated with a middle-class life. In the next section, we 
will further explore such aspirations to modernity. 
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The material trappings of middle-class life 
Having looked at the basic costs of living as well as having gained an impression of 
extra claims being placed on health workers by family and dependants, let us go on to 
examine the things health workers aspire to spend their money on. In his study of 
mineworkers on the Copperbelt, James Ferguson, distinguishes two cultural styles: The 
cosmopolitan and the localist styles. Part of his argument is that the people he studied 
had different consumption or investment options, which are perhaps not mutually 
exclusive but certainly depend on how an individual chooses to prioritise his expen-
diture. Either one can invest in smart clothes, electronic gadgets, and bottled beer to 
reinforce one's cosmopolitan style or one can prioritise investing in social capital, by 
remitting to relatives and caring for dependants. This last fitted with what Ferguson 
called a localist style, which allowed some of his mineworkers to have a relatively safe 
retirement. In this section, we will examine some patterns of consumption related to 
what Ferguson terms this cosmopolitan cultural style, having already looked at depend-
ants’ claims.  
When talking to a medical doctor in his early thirties, who had been posted in a 
remote rural district as district director of health, my respondent sketched why it was 
difficult to get doctors such as himself to work in rural areas. He explained that there 
were few opportunities to take his wife for a pizza or his children for ice-cream. He also 
openly wondered whether the salary he received was empowering him enough, as he 
had to pay “big taxes” to government and educate his children well. He also admitted he 
wanted to be able to buy “small things” such as a nice pen, a nice shirt, and a nice 
perfume. Judging from his attire and the nice-looking pen he was handling, he did not 
deny himself these small luxuries.82 This frank admission shows how this respondent 
was stuck between very different worlds. On the one hand, when comparing him with 
the average Zambian, these “small things” might be extreme luxuries. On the other 
hand, when comparing himself with siblings studying abroad, study mates who had left 
for ‘greener pastures’ or even the PhD researcher interviewing him, these luxuries again 
become “small things” that should indeed be obtainable for a qualified professional. 
Moreover, with his statement, our respondent shone light on some important symbols of 
success, the visible material possessions that display to the world that one has made it.  
Perhaps one of the most potent status symbols is the possession of a ‘vehicle’, as 
motorcars or light-trucks are often referred to in contemporary Zambia. In fact, as I 
myself drove a battered pickup-truck, its merits – who owned it and what I would do 
with it when I came to leave Zambia – were subjects commonly raised in casual 
conversation with health workers and others.83 Undoubtedly, this vehicle was used to 
socially categorise me in the conceptions they had of me. On the one hand, vehicles 
have an important functional aspect. As we have seen, the spatial distances that Zam-
bians traverse are enormous. It is not uncommon for relatives to have to travel over a 
thousand kilometres to meet. Furthermore, the major commercial centres and the 
bureaucratic centres, such as the ministry headquarters in Lusaka, lie at hundreds of 
kilometres from most parts of the more remote provinces such as Luapula, Western, 
North-Western and Eastern Provinces. To arrange things and conduct ‘business’, Zam-
bian health workers need to be mobile. Possession of a motor vehicle of course sig-
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nificantly reduces the difficulty of traversing these distances, albeit at a tremendous 
cost. On the other hand, the desirability of a vehicle goes beyond its functional value, 
and it can be a measure of economic and professional success. One respondent men-
tioned that he was contemplating moving to ‘greener pastures’, with the argument, “You 
see other people driving, and sending their children to good schools ...”.84 A laboratory 
technician also argued that it was in his view unfair that nurse tutors benefit from the 
health workers’ retention scheme while he did not, illustrating it with the argument that 
“they drive, but I can’t afford to”.85 Finally, when conducting a focus-group discussion 
and discussing the issue of becoming successful in the health sector. one participant 
compared himself with “people driving big cars”, to show that he does not consider 
himself successful.86 Being able to afford to drive a vehicle could be seen as a dividing 
line across the emerging middle-class. Four-wheel drive vehicles are among the most 
desired cars for Zambians. On the streets of Lusaka, luxury saloons look dull in the 
shadow of the many luxury SUVs that overtake them. In part, these vehicles are func-
tional, considering the conditions of the unpaved roads in much of Zambia. Another 
functionality could be the need to occasionally visit the farm. This functionality, how-
ever, does not fully explain all the spotless four-by-fours plying the roads in Lusaka and 




 Figure 5.1 Vehicles at Ndeke House 
 
 
That is not to say that all those with vehicles have actually already earned the money 
to buy vehicles. One of the conditions of service for senior civil servants is that they can 
access car loans. In part, this is an arrangement of the health workers’ retention scheme 
referred to earlier, but there is also a car-loan scheme provided to civil servants across 
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the public service. Various respondents, however, complain about the accessibility of 
this scheme. One nurse in a provincial town complained that in Lusaka people could get 
car loans “but here you can’t”.87 Another health worker complained about the tough 
conditions for car loans and house loans, implying that only those in Lusaka could 
attend the meetings where the criteria were explained. He even went so far as sug-
gesting that once one would get the information, the scheme would be revised.88 While 
it goes too far here to assess these claims of unfairness, it is sufficient to state that 
owning a car is a desired good that some health workers can just afford, while for others 
it is out of reach. Indeed, when going round ministries in Lusaka, one can see civil 
servants getting into various vehicles with private registrations. Some are donated by 
donor agencies, others are ‘personal-to-holder’ vehicles which come with a position, 
while many are second-hand cars imported from Japan, either paid for by a car loan or 
through other means. 
Other material possessions can also be seen as ‘must haves’ for someone who has 
arrived in the middle-class. Let us also recall the respondent who indicated that he was 
not ready to go back to Solwezi. He argued that he had not “yet bought a lot of things 
for the home”.89 The account of another health worker gives us an insight into what 
things he might have meant. This public health officer had been posted to a rural health 
centre after graduation in 1997. At this time, due to ongoing reforms there were 
problems putting him on the payroll. According to our respondent, during the first two 
years of his posting he was receiving no salary whatsoever; instead, he was depending 
on the allowances that he received for outreach activities to survive. Then when he 
finally was put on the payroll, he received two years of back-pay. To my question con-
cerning what he spent this on, he replied that he bought household appliances, beds, 
mattresses, and a sofa, and he sent some money to his relatives.90 Ashley had also re-
ceived several months of back pay, after finally having been put on the payroll. He also 
said he had spent this money on furnishings, and indeed when I was invited into his 
house, it looked well-furnished, his living room lined with large and comfortable sofas 
and armchairs. It still, however, lacked a television set, which Anton had and which 
took up a place of prominence in other health workers’ living rooms I visited, some-
times accompanied by DVD-players, video recorders, or satellite receivers. Of course, 
these modern conveniences require electricity; hence the frequent complaints from 
health workers about the lack of electricity at rural stations. One health worker during 
an interview proudly talked about his solar panels and his generator.91 At Ashley’s 
clinic, electricity was lacking, as the health post had not yet been linked up to the 
national grid. The clinic also did not have solar panels, while the former in-charge, who 
was away on study leave, did have a solar panel connected to his staff house.  
Logically, being able to afford these modern conveniences competes with other 
expenditures. This was aptly illustrated with the dilemma one young man shared with 
Paulien, my research assistant, whom he had invited to dinner. In the house which this 
bachelor shared with a friend, he had a television with a DStv-receiver. DStv is a satel-
lite television service provided by a South-African company, which broadcasts mainly 
international and South-African content. Some of the content, however, specifically 
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targets the Anglophone part of the continent, particularly with Nigerian drama. Another 
type of content that in my observation is particularly popular in Zambia is sports, with 
especially the UK’s Premier League matches drawing considerable enthusiasm. It is not 
surprising that a DStv subscription is particularly desirable for someone with a cosmo-
politan orientation, such as our informant. His dilemma, however, was the cost of the 
monthly subscription. He said he paid 350,000 Kwacha per month for this, which he 
admitted was as much as his monthly rent.92  
Satellite television is one more technology within reach for the emerging Zambian 
middle-class that serves to make the world become smaller. With its images of a 
consumer lifestyle in South Africa, Europe, and America, it presents images of what life 
could be if you forge ahead. This is reinforced by another relatively new phenomenon in 
Zambia, the spread of the South-African supermarket chain, Shoprite, over the country, 
with at least one branch in every province. This has brought food and non-food consu-
mables physically closer to many. For the poorest in Zambia, many of the products are 
still unobtainable. For others, such as our health workers, it significantly broadens the 
range of consumer options. Walking through a Shoprite branch in a provincial town one 
can see this contrast. Workmen with a single bottle of water and old ladies in chitenge 
with a single loaf of bread queue up with professionals doing the weekly shopping, 
emptying out their trolleys onto the conveyer belt.  
Another relatively recent commodity in Zambia is what is now the seemingly ubi-
quitous mobile phone. As we have seen, the spatial distances involved in a Zambian 
health worker’s life world are substantial. Mobile phones cut these distances consider-
ably. Nowadays relatives, friends, business partners, and colleagues are considerably 
closer in a virtual sense. This means that official tasks and business deals can more 
easily be arranged. It also means, as we have seen above, that social claims can be more 
easily expressed over a distance. Of course, as with vehicles, besides the functional side 
of mobile phones there is also the aspect of status. In price, phones vary from the most 
basic phones costing around 200,000 Kwacha to the more desirable luxury phones with 
catchy ring-tones, photo-imaging options, and many other extras. In my own observ-
ation, it appeared that most middle-ranking and senior officials carried more flashy 
phones than the almost embarrassingly modest phone I carried during my fieldwork. 
In the preceding section, we have had a glimpse of the consumptive expenditures that 
go beyond the basic needs’ package that was presented earlier. Depending both on 
someone’s socio-economic standing (partly corresponding with one’s professional 
standing) and also on one’s personal preferences, there are huge variations in how much 
someone wants or can afford to spend on such luxuries. At the lower rungs of the health 
sector, including some qualified staff at rural health centres but mainly classified em-
ployees and other support staff, one would be likely to see people corresponding more 
with the image of Ferguson’s localist style. However, the higher up the professional 
ranks and the closer to the urban centres one looks, the more likely it is for one to see 
the trappings of the cosmopolitan style such as smart suits, flashy phones, and luxury 
four-wheel drive vehicles.  
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Working beyond the payslip 
Adding up the basic needs’ package required for simple survival and the costs of other 
desired expenditures creates a huge financial burden for our health workers. They bear 
the costs of putting their children through school, of supporting elderly relatives and 
worse-off siblings, of schooling their relatives’ children and orphans, as well as the 
costs of a comfortable modern life. Considering this burden and offsetting it against the 
salaries earned by health workers, one can understand that doctor who said, “money is 
never enough, right?” From this perspective, it is thus not surprising that so many of our 
respondents had secondary sources of income from, as one respondent put it, “working 
beyond the payslip”.93 
During an interview, Mrs. Tembo – who had started off as a nurse, gone on to mid-
wifery, and later gone to work at a district health office – stated that she was only 
earning 1.6 million Kwacha (€ 308). “We’re struggling financially”, she exclaimed. 
However, when we were piecing together what we learned from the interview and what 
my research assistant learned when visiting her farm, a different picture emerged 
entirely. Our respondent, who was originally from Western Province, was married to a 
man from Eastern Province. They had been working throughout Luapula Province. He 
had made a career in the education service, while she ‘followed him’ from one job in 
the health sector to another. They had a farm just outside of town that covered one 
hundred hectares. In the previous year, Mrs. Tembo claimed she had only cultivated one 
hectare of maize. From her harvest, she sold over a hundred fifty-kilogram bags to the 
Food Reserve Authority.94 This raised five million Kwatcha, while her costs were two 
million. For the next year, Mrs. Tembo said she was planning to cultivate two or three 
hectares of maize, while her husband would only cultivate one. He would rather be con-
centrating on a guest-house he was building in town. According to our respondent, her 
husband reckoned that tourism in Luapula would grow in the near future, so they should 
focus on that first. At the time of the interview, the guest-house was said to be under-
way, at concrete-foundations’ level, and the complex was expected to have 15 chalets.  
Mrs. Tembo also mentioned that they grew some vegetables, which they usually sold 
directly to local schools. They had some banana plants that had not been doing well and 
were also trying to grow pineapples. In terms of livestock, they owned 10 head of cattle, 
including a pair of trained plough oxen as well as 50 mature goats and 14 kids. More-
over, they had begun rearing pigs. At the moment, they had one pigsty with 21 pigs, but 
according to Mrs. Tembo, they were thinking of building another pigsty. Our respon-
dent was already calculating that with Christmas coming, these pigs should sell for 
about 450,000 Kwacha (€ 87) each. In addition, the farm had 20 modern beehives 
collecting honey. The family had 3 local ‘boys’ working on the farm. Two of them had 
done two years of agricultural college. When asked why they did not have relatives 
working on the farm, Mrs. Tembo indicated that they might feel that “you throw them in 
the bush while you are enjoying yourself in town. You can then find that they do not do 
a good job”. Of course, the family also worked on the land. They had two nieces living 
with them from his side of the family and one from hers. She mentioned that even 
though one is Lozi and the other an Easterner, they get along very well. The girls had 
both completed school. One, who was an orphan, stayed with the family while the other 
went back after having helped sow the new crop. The family also had four sons. Their 
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eldest had just completed school and was planning to go to medical school. When asked 
whether it would be difficult to get into medical school, he answered that he did not 
expect so. As a further indicator of how well the household was managing, they appar-
ently owned two houses. One was bought when the family was still living in another 
district town and Chiluba’s government was selling off houses to the sitting tenants. 
That house was now being rented out. The spacious house, in what must have been a 
low- or medium-density suburb where we interviewed this enterprising health worker, 
was bought when the house was still being built. Mrs. Tembo and her husband had since 
completed it and furnished it with various modern conveniences. On the property, one 
could see two cars and a motorcycle belonging to the family.95 Mrs. Tembo thus had 
quite a commercial venture going, which she had built up together with her husband and 
family next to her long career in the health sector. This did not necessarily evoke an 
image of someone who was in her own words ‘struggling financially’. However, 
considering the plans she and her husband had yet to realise, such as building a guest-
house, a new pigsty, possibly buying a tractor, and seeing their firstborn through med-
ical school, admittedly one can concede that they face a financial balancing act. As that 
doctor said, “money is never enough”.  
When speaking to people about their economic activities, it is difficult to get a 
complete account of what they are involved in or of the viability and profitability of 
their ventures. Some may want to minimise their secondary economic activities as this 
could be seen to conflict with their day-job. Others might exaggerate their activities to 
make them appear successful. Also, as in the case of Mrs. Tembo and her husband, it 
may be unclear how far a respondent’s ownership of a venture goes and to what extent it 
is shared with her husband or other household members. In the previous account, we 
were able to verify certain parts of the account with direct observation, but at times a 
respondent’s word is all we have. Nevertheless, such accounts do provide an insight into 
the fact that health workers’ economic activities are not limited to their role as a pro-
fessional, but can go well beyond that. The example that was presented above is not 
necessarily typical, not least in the scale of the activities and the apparent success of 
these entrepreneurs-cum-professionals. Nevertheless, it does shine light on part of a 
public official’s life that is often left untouched. Let us go on to examine other accounts 
of health workers activities ‘beyond the payslip’.  
As appeared from accounts presented above and used to argue other issues, many 
Zambians are farmers. Whereas a few respondents replied that they were not engaged in 
farming and only survived on their Ministry of Health income, these were a definite 
minority. Others consider it only natural that they should farm. As one nurse put it, “you 
can’t let the wet season pass by just like that”.96 Some indicated that they do some 
farming but only for their own consumption. Some may sell surplus maize, cassava, or 
other crops either locally or to the FRA. One respondent admitted that his farming 
“doesn’t give a lot of profit but it helps to sustain the family”.97 Often this farming is 
not a very large affair. For example, one clinical officer claimed to have collected about 
eighty bags of fifty kilograms of maize.98 If he had sold these to the FRA in the 2008 
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season, they would have fetched about 3.6 million,99 not taking into account his input 
costs including the effort he and his family put into it. Considering the three million 
Kwacha profit Mrs. Tembo claimed to have earned from her hundred bags, one can 
assume that for a health worker taking home a bit over a million per month, this is a 
nice extra, either in cash or in saving on a family’s own consumption. According to the 
basic food basket, a family of six spend around 150,000 Kwacha on seventy five kilos 
of maize meal. Thus, these eighty bags could last a family of six for 53 months. Ex-
cluding the cost of milling, this would hypothetically save them about eight million 
Kwacha.  
One might expect that farming is an economic activity that is limited to those in 
villages. Anecdotal evidence from our accounts, however, suggests that this is not 
necessarily the case. Various respondents indicated that they had farmed or were farm-
ing from provincial or district towns, such as Mrs. Tembo. Another respondent, a nurse 
in-charge of an urban clinic in a provincial town, mentioned that she had a farm 54 
kilometres out of town, from which she had collected 82 bags of maize in the previous 
year, and hoped to have more next year. She claimed that at the weekends she went to 
the farm, right after leaving work. She would then supervise the workers and return 
home on Sunday. She indicated that the workers were people from the area near the 
farm, but that during the week her nephew also supervised.100 Two other accounts fur-
ther illustrate not only that urbanites can be involved in farming, but also that farming 
by people working in the health sector can be larger-scale affairs. One driver for the 
ministry headquarters told me that outside Lusaka he had a 13-hectare farm. On this he 
had two diesel pumps to irrigate his vegetable production. He mentioned that he would 
sell tomatoes and other vegetables in the city. Considering the proceeds of irrigated 
vegetable production per hectare, this might yet be a reasonably lucrative addition to his 
drivers’ income.101 
Another Lusaka-based professional working in the health sector gave a similar ac-
count. She was a nurse tutor, whose husband was working at the Ministry of Finance. 
They both came from Western Province. Somewhere in their home province, they had 
twenty hectares of land in a ‘resettlement scheme’. She said that this scheme provided 
land to civil servants who could not farm in their home village. Last year, the res-
pondent said she had grown a thousand bags of maize. She did not sell these to the 
FRA, but to two different private buyers that had offered better prices. At an assumed 
price of 50,000 Kwacha, that would mean proceeds of fifty million Kwacha (€ 9,600), 
of course not taking into account the considerable costs she must have borne. She said 
that she travelled to the farm at weekends, but was planning to take vacation leave 
during the rainy season to plant a new crop. She had already had a hundred bags of 
fertiliser, bought from a private trader, delivered. She suggested that she was looking 
into further investing in the venture, as the tractor they had was ‘a non-runner’. A new 
tractor and a plough would help her much. Soon she and her husband would retire and 
then, she indicated, they would settle on the farm.102 Another health worker, an environ-
mental health technician, had mentioned that he had two farms of 10 and 12 hectares 
respectively. He claimed he had already planted some 200 oil palms, both a traditional 
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crop for home consumption and a potentially lucrative cash crop with the emergence of 
bio-fuels. He mentioned that he was even speaking to the chief, a friend of his, about the 
purchase of 200 hectares of land for planting oil palm.103 In short, professionals can not 
only be entrepreneurs in traditional sectors but can also be early adopters of non-
traditional crops and technologies.  
In addition to growing crops, rearing poultry is a niche that various respondents 
claimed that they or their partners had found. This is not unsurprising, considering the 
economic growth in previous years with a corresponding growth of the consumption of 
meat, a relative luxury item. One health official mentioned that his wife is now a 
housewife, but she also used to work in the health sector. She was trained as a maternal 
health assistant, but in 2001, when the new government had reportedly decreased the 
number of staff on the government wage bill, she was made redundant. Our respondent 
said that with the package she received, she started a small business raising chickens. 
He claims she had from one to two hundred chickens, which he still referred to as “a 
very small business”.104 Another public health official was rearing chickens in Western 
Province, where she was posted. She was planning to retire in Kabwe, where she would 
expand the business.105 Another health worker used to rear broiler chickens at the place 
where he was previously posted. However, in the few months since having been trans-
ferred, he claimed not to have been able to start something new. He claimed that he was 
still “looking for a good idea: A niche”. If he had one, he might open some kind of a 
store.106  
As we saw in this previous account, the high mobility inherent to the health sector, 
where one can be placed where one’s ‘services are needed’ can possibly disrupt peo-
ple’s private projects. One health official recounted how he had been caught up in a 
reshuffle in which various senior district health managers had been shifted from one 
part of the province to another. From a professional perspective, he was not happy about 
it. In his view, it has destroyed teamwork to put people who were all strangers together. 
The first six months things did not go well in the district, he stated; a few months later 
they still were learning. Privately, he was also not happy with the move. At his current 
post, accommodation was a problem for him. At his previous post, he claims he had 
started settling down. He had begun projects that were “only quarter way” when he was 
moved. This included building a house and developing a farm; he made investments, he 
claimed. Whereas previously he used to grow his own food, now he was forced to buy 
food in shops. At his current location, he claimed there was little possibility for farming. 
Farms were on the plateau, far from the boma, because in the valley land was not fertile. 
Soon, however, he admitted that he would take leave to cultivate his farm; then he could 
also work on finishing the house.107 Another health official had bought land at his 
previous posting to build a private nursing school. When he was moved to a new town, 
he had to put these plans on hold. He claimed that he “he hasn’t trusted anyone yet” to 
build the school for him, though he suggested that he had talked to the pastor of his 
church, who might be able to supervise the project.108 For others, changing one’s work 
location may actually partly depend on their business success. One health worker stated 
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that he would like to continue working in the town where he was posted, because he 
claimed to see business opportunities there – not only in his own profession, but also in 
the mining and in other fields. Still, he had not yet decided whether to build a house. 
First he wanted to see if his business plans would work out. “It is tricky, tricky, tricky. 
What makes a person leave a place is when you don’t generate money,” he argued.109  
Of course, not all business ventures are in fact a success. One health worker had also 
been transferred to a different district. There he still had a farm, but he claimed that after 
he left, it had been mismanaged by the hired workers. He had also planted sweet 
bananas there, but again these had not been performing well. This he also attributed to 
the lack of care from the workers. Now, he suggested, he would focus on his current 
location. He already had plots of land, a hectare for farming and a plot to build a 
house.110 Another respondent mentioned he had a business raising ‘layers’ (chickens 
producing eggs), which had failed to do well. He put this down to the fact that the 
person he had hired to manage the business did not do a good job. He claimed that he 
was intending to restart the business on the plot he had bought to build a house. The plot 
had been bought from a colleague who our respondent claimed had gotten into financial 
problems. Possibly, our respondent considered, he could even put up three houses as the 
plot was big enough. Unfortunately, putting up structures on the plot had been delayed 
because of other expenditures, such as school fees, rent, and support for his mother.111 
Another health worker was currently building a second house and doing some farming, 
while his wife was running a tailoring shop, which he claimed was doing fine. He added 
that he and his wife also used to own a cleaning company, which had two employees. 
They have since abandoned it, however, which our respondent attributed to the fact that 
the town where he is based was not big enough to sustain the business.112 These ac-
counts are illustrative of a trial-and-error approach to business on the part these part-
time entrepreneurs. They place a number of arrows on their bow and try to see which 
ones hit the target, hoping that one will hit the bull’s-eye. One respondent suggested a 
conscious strategy of honing one’s business skills. He mentioned that he had a small 
shop at the market. He would like to expand his business, but he admitted capital was a 
constraint. Nevertheless, he felt it important to practise at doing business before retire-
ment. “You have to develop the skills”. He said he had seen people go into business 
after retirement and failing because they did not have the experience.113 
In addition to farming, livestock rearing, and owning a store, various health workers 
or their spouses were involved in petty trade. Some would buy chitenge materials from 
Congolese traders, selling them in commercial centres along the ‘line-of-rail’.114 Others 
would buy second-hand clothes or other goods in, for instance, Lusaka and the Copper-
belt, selling them to villages, sometimes on credit.115 One health worker along Lake 
Mweru said that from time to time he transported and sold dried fish on the Copper-
belt,116 the trade described by Gordon in his study of the Luapula-Mweru fishery.117  
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Beyond these more traditional economical activities, however, some health profes-
sionals would venture into more contemporary market niches. As I was interviewing an 
official at the Ministry of Health, he received a phone call. From the ensuing con-
versation and the respondent’s explanation, I learned that a truck carrying goods for him 
had some problems crossing the border into Zambia. He later explained that he and his 
wife had a business. In school he had learned woodcraft and metalworking and with 
these skills they had started building furniture. He said he had designed and produced 
metal beds that could be taken apart and easily carried, which he delivered to the armed 
forces as equipment for Zambian contributions to peace missions. He also said that he 
was working on a hire-lease scheme of furniture for students at police colleges, for 
which he imported furniture into Zambia.118 In short, from his account it seemed that his 
business had over the course of time expanded following opportunities he encountered. 
In another case, an accountant explained he had a business centre in town, run by his 
wife. They offered copying, typing, and word processing services, in addition to selling 
supplies. Two employees were working at the business centre, including his niece. They 
had stopped offering Internet because of problems with viruses. Informally, this res-
pondent admitted that he could use his regular visits to Lusaka for his work to arrange 
things for his business.  
Some health workers used the skills and experience gained during their training and 
in their day-job as a basis for their business. A doctor mentioned that he had a small 
company, which he and some colleagues run to provide training and consultancy. As an 
example of the services offered, he explained that they would, for instance, offer talks 
about AIDS at functions organised by, for example, a commercial bank or a news-
paper.119 Another professional also considered using the knowledge from his profession 
for his private business. A radiographer at a provincial hospital mentioned considering 
opening up a private practice. He claimed that for five to six thousand US dollars he 
could buy a second-hand ultrasound machine on-line. With this, he argued, he could 
determine the sex of unborn children for a fee. This service he claimed was not offered 
in the government public health set-up and he calculated how profitable it could be. The 
money needed to buy a machine, he claimed, was not a problem for him.120  
In these examples, private business interests may continue where one’s formal work 
stops. From these accounts we cannot, however, see how this boundary is maintained. 
Sometimes health workers benefit from opportunities presented by their day-job, such 
as the accountant using business trips to also pursue his private affairs. Potentially, this 
can give rise to conflicts of interests: A neo-patrimonial blurring of the public and the 
private. Such conflicts of interest between private and official business will be discussed 
later in this chapter, but let us now look at other jobs ‘on the side’. In his dissertation, 
Anders referred to this as moonlighting. Whereas moonlighting by civil servants may 
have a negative connotation, in Zambia it is legal and acceptable to have multiple jobs 
as a civil servant,121 as long as there is no conflict of interest between official and priv-
ate activities.122 
In addition to engaging in farming or business, some health workers work extra jobs. 
When visiting two private clinics in a provincial town, on both occasions the owners 
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admitted that their staff were nurses and clinical officers working at local government 
clinics or in the hospital. One even advertised his business by telling me that the part-
time nurses at his clinic were charming and had a better attitude there than at their day-
jobs.123 In hospitals also, some health workers related how they worked part-time, 
referring to working extra shifts in other wards. One nurse said that she does part-time 
work in other wards occasionally. She claimed that this practice had been set up due to 
the shortages of manpower. She explained that you had to book extra time in advance 
through the nursing officer; then you could work extra shifts for extra money. The nurse 
admitted that she did do this sometimes, “but not very often because I also need to 
rest”.124 Even a doctor in Lusaka, who had moved back from living in Scotland, men-
tioned that previously he was working part-time at the hospital, though he had stopped 
five years earlier. He claimed that his children had wanted to continue the same type of 
life as they had in Scotland, “so I had to work hard and add some part-time work to my 
income. Now they have grown and I don’t need to work part-time anymore”.125 
Yet others had jobs with international organisations or NGOs. One psychiatric nurse 
said he was a part-time radio presenter, at times doing programmes sponsored by 
NGOs. He claimed he did not get a regular salary for this, though: “If they feel like 
paying me, they do. I do get a bonus based on the money I bring in for the station by 
working for sponsored programmes. It is not a salary as such, more like a motivation 
fee”. In addition, he had been trained as a psycho-social counsellor by a UN-agency. He 
mentioned he occasionally worked for NGOs such as KARA Counselling in Lusaka or 
UN-agencies. He mentioned that he was sometimes hired as a counsellor and sometimes 
as a trainer for courses of up to 12 days. In those cases, he claimed, he would have to 
arrange with his colleagues that he could be away from work.126  
From many of the previous examples of health workers working beyond the payslip, 
we can deduce that such business can be a social affair. For many, their spouses or 
others in their household are involved. Disentangling the social network behind com-
mercial ventures in contemporary Zambia can at times be quite complex, as Ferguson 
learned in his description of a retired mine worker, who had become involved in his 
family business by the time Ferguson visited him.127 The accounts collected in this 
research do not delve deeply into the social arrangements behind these businesses. It is 
clear, however, that a household’s livelihood portfolio is filled with various income-
generating and investment opportunities. A day-job in the health sector is but one of 
these livelihood ventures. At the same time, such a job provided a steady, dependable 
source of income, which can be invested in other livelihood ventures. On the other 
hand, having regular salaries from their day-jobs offers capital to invest into business 
ventures. In fact, there are various companies that offer credit products specifically 
aimed at civil servants, in which their employment serves as security (see Figure 5.2). 
One of the aims of the livelihoods’ strategies presented by our health workers is to 
accumulate wealth in order to prepare for the future. Considering that Zambian civil 
servants normally retire at fifty-five years, this is a future that comes soon. 
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Preparing for the future 
In this section we will follow health workers until the end of their career in health: 
Retirement. But as we will see, this is by no means the end of their working lives. 
Before discussing pensions – how government provides for their retirement – and before 
discussing the ventures they might engage in after retirement, let us first examine a 
private strategy for amassing wealth for later years: Investing in real estate. This is a 
venture which we will see not only cuts a household expenditures by saving on rent, but 
is also a striking part of health workers’ preparations for the future. This strategy for 
accumulating wealth has also been stimulated by government, particularly under Chilu-
ba in the run-up to the 1996 elections, as we saw earlier in the case of Mrs. Tembo.  
 
 



















Housing and accommodation feature prominently in the accounts of health workers. 
We have seen in the example of Ashley and Anton how lack of accommodation can be a 
cause of disaffection among health workers. For many health workers there is insti-
tutional housing for which they, as we have seen, need to pay only a modest fee. Other 
health workers indicated in interviews that they were renting. At times the rent was 
higher than what they received as housing allowance. One nurse in a provincial town, 
for instance, mentioned that she received 200,000 Kwacha in housing allowance while 
she was paying 250,000 in rent.128 Another was living in a house in a medium-density129 
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neighbourhood. With the same 200,000 housing allowance, she claimed that she and her 
husband paid a million Kwacha in rent.130 From this, it is easily understood that some 
would prefer to build a house to cut their rent expenditures, unless for instance they are 
not sure they would like to remain posted at their current location. This was the case for 
another nurse, though that is not to say she was not keen to own houses. She was not 
interested in building a house at her present location. She and her husband are renting a 
four-bedroom house for 700,000 Kwacha. She did add, however, that they had two 
houses elsewhere. They had one in Lusaka, where her children were living. With her 
husband she had one son going to college there and she had two stepdaughters, who 
were both married. The other house was in Kabwe, where they had previously been 
working. That one, she said, was being rented out to cover the rent they were currently 
paying. “If I had a way,” she added, “I would buy each child a house”.131 
As we have seen before in passing accounts, various respondents were living in 
institutional houses, while they had other houses in which their children lived in town. 
One nurse, who was working with her husband at a rural health centre, stated that they 
were building a house in town. They already had a plot. To argue the rationale of 
building a house, she said, “There’s death,” explaining that when they die they could 
leave the house to the children. Also if they were transferred, they could rent it out, or 
when retired they could come back to the house.132 For some, however, building houses 
appeared more of a commercial venture. One clinical officer staying at a rural health 
post said he was building a house in town, which was almost complete. He claimed it 
was a bigger house than the two-bedroom staff house he was living is. To finish it, he 
said, he just needed to wait until he had saved the money to finish the floor and to put in 
the electrical wiring. The prospective landlord added that he wanted to furnish the house 
nicely, so that “ma-bosses, or people like you, can rent it for big cash”.133 As an illus-
tration of real estate investment on a slightly larger scale, we can take another account. 
As I was waiting at a certain health office, I spoke with someone else who was waiting 
around. He mentioned that he was working for the Ministry of Works and Supplies. In 
his free time, however, he explained that he carried out private jobs with colleagues. 
This was the reason, he claimed, he was spending part of his free Monday morning 
waiting for a certain doctor. The doctor, while my conversation partner and others 
waited, was busily engaged. It appeared that he was building apartment flats in town. 
The man from the Ministry of Works and Supplies was constructing the tarred driveway 
on the property and needed to consult the doctor about that.134  
While it is impossible from our accounts to get a picture of the full extent to which 
health workers construct houses, it seems evident that this building activity is signifi-
cant. Depending on their phase in life, many respondents had one or more houses in 
their possession. The empowerment scheme that the government implemented in the 
mid-1990s, selling government houses to the sitting occupants, judging from some res-
pondents’ accounts definitely contributed to this endeavour. In any case, it is clear that 
building and owning real estate is a lucrative objective for Zambians who can afford it. 
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Not only are they saving on paying rent, generating extra income, and thinking of their 
children’s inheritance, they are also accumulating wealth which can later be used for 
financing business ventures or other expenditures. These health workers are following a 
common pattern in a country where the construction business has been growing stead-
ily. Between 1999 and 2005, for instance, construction in Zambia grew at an average 
rate of 15 per cent per year.135 Moreover, by accumulating wealth through real estate, 
they are laying a stable basis for retirement.  
Here this section moves on to examine what retirement from government service 
means for our health workers. In Zambia, the retirement age is fifty-five. However, 
rather than being the end of someone’s working life, it seems that retirement for many is 
merely the continuation of one’s economic life based on a portfolio of different liveli-
hood ventures. When retiring, civil servants can choose to get about half of their 
pension as a lump-sum, leaving a small additional monthly pension. Historically, these 
pension payouts have not been worth that much while the Zambian economy was going 
through the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. As people were waiting years to 
receive their packages, inflation steadily eroded the real value of these payouts.136 What 
was left of the residual pension was often less that the postage costs required to mail the 
pensions to the recipients, as the pensions were not adjusted to inflation.137 In the mid-
1990s, a national pension scheme was set up, following an act of Parliament reforming 
the various pension schemes and establishing the National Pension Scheme Authority 
(NAPSA). This meant that all those in formal employment were entitled to a pension. A 
fellow researcher told me an anecdote from one of his respondents, who had worked in 
the health sector for 34 years until his retirement in 2003 or 2004. Under the previous 
pension scheme, he had paid his pension contribution for 27 years, and he then paid 7 
years to NAPSA. When he was awarded his pension, the former Civil Servants Pension 
Fund allegedly paid him 6 million Kwacha, whereas NAPSA paid him 11 million.138 
This anecdote suggests what one might assume: In the favourable macro-economic 
climate that Zambia has seen in most of the first decade of the millennium, lower 
inflation has protected the value of pensions in recent years. It may also indicate that 
since the reforms initiated in the Chiluba era, pensions are in fact better managed. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that historically Zambian professionals had been used to heavily 
eroded pension packages. Moreover, the current generation of retirees will still have 
built up much of their pensions before the establishment of NAPSA. It is thus under-
standable that Zambians have learned to adopt strategies preparing them for a retirement 
in which they would have to remain economically active.  
When he was being interviewed, one health worker said he was nearing the date of 
his retirement. He had been due to retire earlier, but this was delayed due to bureau-
cratic issues. Now he was waiting for the letter and presumably the package that went 
with it. He said that he had already finished two houses, and he was set to complete a 
third. Perhaps he would even build one or two more houses, he went on, “for the child-
ren, when we say goodbye”. After retirement, he said, he would try to improve pro-
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duction on his farm, as currently it was producing below capacity. He was also planning 
to start a hardware business. He had already applied for a loan, having filled in the 
paperwork, and now he was just waiting for the finances.139 A nurse admitted that she 
still had seven or eight years to go before retirement. Nevertheless, she was already 
thinking about it. “I have been encouraged by my husband to do something after retire-
ment. He says, ‘You are a nurse and I am a lab tech, so let’s open a surgery together’. 
But I don’t have an interest in that: I like farming. But my husband says, ‘One day 
you’ll be old and then you cannot farm anymore, so it is better to improve your car-
eer’”.140  
Others did in fact choose to do something after retirement that was close to their old 
profession. One elderly man, the owner of a private clinic who had presented himself as 
a doctor, was in fact a retired clinical officer.141 Another respondent, a pharmacy 
technologist, said he had been considering opening a drugstore after retirement. He 
claimed he had specially chosen to be transferred from a hospital pharmacy to a district 
pharmacy as that extra experience could help him with a drugstore. He admitted that he 
had even wanted to groom his son to be a pharmacist. Then that he could register the 
pharmacy in his son’s name and run it himself. He could not do that on his own as he is 
merely a pharmacy technologist rather than a proper pharmacist. The son, however, had 
chosen to pursue a different field of studies and the father decided not to force him to do 
his will. As an alternative to opening a drugstore, our respondent indicated that he could 
stay on as a pharmacy technologist working for a district, as there are shortages for 
trained people in such posts.142 
Staying on after retirement is a phenomenon that was encountered frequently in 
interviews. Various respondents who were still working had already retired from 
government service. However, to cover the manpower shortages, they were continuing 
to work on a contract. One psychiatric clinical officer said that he had retired in 2000. “I 
didn’t want to come back after retirement,” he recounted, “but the executive director 
came to see me. He told me I was the only one who was qualified and that the patients 
were suffering without a clinical officer. I thought I could do it because of my care for 
the patients”.143 Besides the lofty motivation presented by this respondent, of course 
there are also basic financial motives to continue working. One clinical officer had 
graduated and started work in 1966. Then in 1991 he retired at the age of fifty-five. He 
said that he used his retirement package to buy a house. Nine years later he applied for a 
contract on the Copperbelt. He said that his children had started going to college. “Life 
was getting harder and harder for me and my children, both because of the schools and 
because of the financial crisis”. While his wife was still living in Luapula, he went to 
the Copperbelt, to have a “change in environment”. The cost of keeping two homes, 
however, made him move back to Luapula after a year. “I got very little; I had to divide 
500,000 between the homes and I was remaining with nothing”. Then, however, he 
started working in the place where his wife lived until 2004. Then he stayed at home for 
a further two years until he again got a new contract because his children were still in 
college.144 This practice of taking people who have retired to work on contract can be 
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seen as a pragmatic way of coping with the tremendous shortages of staff which the 
health sector is facing. Some of these health workers are indeed still active and have a 
wealth of valuable experience to contribute. However, interviewing some elderly health 
workers on contract also provided a different view. One retired nurse I interviewed 
appeared dull, old, and tired. She could not manage to give a clear account of her career, 
mixing up decades and giving vague and minimal answers. After the interview, she 
resumed sitting in front of the clinic on a bench, waiting and eating a mango.145 Her 
boss, the clinical officer in-charge, also did not appear too impressed with her perform-
ance, indicating she was not very active, but old and tired.146 However, in a sector 
where human resources are scarce, perhaps ‘beggars can’t be choosers’ and the sector 
should be happy with what they can get.  
Now let us now examine where health workers plan on settling after retirement, after 
having spent a mobile career and being moved from place to place. A respondent said 
that he wanted to return to the province he came from, as he was a headman. He said 
that his relatives had followed him to where he was. His social responsibilities would 
thus draw him back to the village.147 Sometimes this decision is not as easy for married 
couples. From the separate interviews of a man and his wife working in the health 
sector, we learned that they had different views on this issue. The man, who still had 
three to four years to go before he retired, announced that he would start a business 
trading general merchandise after retirement. He reflected that one day he might move 
back to Eastern Province, where he came from originally. He argued that his relatives 
missed him, wishing he was back home.148 His wife mentioned that she still had seven 
years before retirement. She indicated, however, that when her husband retired, “we can 
just go” from the rural health centre they were managing together. She did not, how-
ever, share his dream of one day going back to Eastern Province. The province where 
they currently lived was familiar to the children, she argued. Moreover, the family was 
building a house in town. She claimed that it would bring problems if they went home. 
“Relatives will think we have a lot of money and they will depend on us. If we visit, we 
bring them things and they can come and visit us and we give them what they need. But 
when you have money, that can bring conflicts. In Africa we are superstitious; there can 
be witchcraft”.149 
Other health workers claimed that they and their partners had clear plans on where to 
settle. One district health official, whom I met at a workshop, told me that although he 
was working in a rural part of the Copperbelt, he was originally from Western Province, 
while his wife was from Eastern Province. He said he was planning to retire halfway 
between his relatives and his wife’s relatives in Central Province. He explicitly said he 
did not want to retire in Eastern Province, as being too close to your wife’s relatives 
brought nothing but trouble.150 A nurse gave a similar account. She was from Eastern 
Province, having grown up in Kabwe, and her husband was a teacher from Serenje 
district in Central Province. After her retirement, she said, she would like to go back to 
Kabwe, explaining that “for our retirement we want to choose a neutral place, without 
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relatives”.151 In other words, while other health workers may have had other plans, these 
health workers were intent on maintaining a distance. Their careers had allowed them to 
accumulate capital. Moreover, they may have failed to continue investing in social 
capital, ‘back in the village’. Deciding to go back to the village could confront them 
with rural jealousy and witchcraft, risking all that they had worked so hard to accu-
mulate. As such, distance could help them to guarantee the emancipation that their jobs 
had brought.  
This brings us to the end of our journey following the career paths of health workers 
that has stretched over the preceding chapters. In the preceding sections, we have 
witnessed health workers as rational economic actors. If they have the social and eco-
nomic assets, and of course the appropriate competencies, they have the possibility to 
balance a broad array of necessary, desired, and demanded expenditures against a 
salary, allowances, and a number of extra sources of income, all this with an eye on 
their own future in retirement, and also the futures of their children. It is evident that 
along this journey, one can see much struggle: Up the rungs of the education ladder, out 
of poverty, against a system that might want to post a health worker where he would not 
like to be posted, a struggle to make ends meet and to care for others without forgetting 
your own future. In spite of these struggles, the preceding does not reflect the sense of 
doom evoked in Ferguson’s study of retiring mine workers in the early 1990s. In part, 
this is because Ferguson ended his analysis at the mineworkers themselves, without 
taking into account their children, some of whose accounts were presented above. For 
the mineworkers themselves, their expectations of modernity might have suffered a hard 
blow; it is not evident that the same necessarily applies to their children. On the other 
hand, more relevant is the fact that the economic climate in the decade that separates his 
account from this one has markedly improved, impacting particularly on the group of 
people followed in this dissertation. While it is very likely that these economic condi-
tions influence behaviour, some patterns of behaviour may be enduring, not least be-
cause of the risk of economic conditions again deteriorating, for instance as a result of 
the global economic crisis following the credit crunch of 2007–8. In the last part of this 
chapter, we will make an attempt to analyse health workers’ behaviour as a result of the 
economic and social pressures they face. 
Stealing government’s time, and ...?  
In the previous sections, we have been looking at various competing claims on health 
workers’ limited, but varying sources of income. Many respondents had different ideas 
and saw various opportunities to make extra money. At times, they claimed that they did 
not have enough capital for further investment. In this section, we will see what these 
economic pressures may drive them to besides the more straightforward economic 
activities presented above.  
It is not only money that limits health workers’ possibilities to do better. Another 
important factor is the scarcity of time health workers have in which to earn extra 
income. Above we saw accounts of people who did not have time to supervise their 
businesses, causing them to fail. Time is especially scarce since health workers are 
already holding down what are officially full-time jobs. Some respondents have stressed 
how they do farming at the weekends and attend to their studies or other business before 
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and after work. Of course, civil servants are formally required to be ‘present on duty 
during the whole period of the normal working hours’, or so the Terms and Conditions 
for the Public Service reads.152 Failure to comply with this constitutes misconduct. This 
was also reflected in the words of a doctor who, when asked about his business activi-
ties, said that “existing laws allow for private enterprise on the part of public servants. 
But your private enterprise must not interfere with your work”. He stressed that there 
must be a clear and transparent delineation between official and private work.153 It 
would be naïve, however, to simply take such statements at face value and assume that 
these rules are representative of general practice. If people work on their own projects 
during the boss’s time, one cannot expect them to bluntly admit it and thus incriminate 
themselves. On the other hand, it would also be too cynical to casually dismiss state-
ments by respondents that they separate public from private business. Suffice it to say 
that there is both a real and a potential tension in keeping a balance between a day-job 
and secondary activities. This was illustrated when we asked the participants to a focus-
group discussion on how one can become successful in the health sector. One partici-
pant stated, “by stealing government’s time”, causing hilarity among the other partici-
pants. A colleague chipped in, “he has a point there”, adding that people steal govern-
ment time (as opposed to money) by taking time off to attend to other business. “Maybe 
you come at nine, knock off at eleven and then go back at fifteen. It's very difficult to 
run a business next to work”.154 
This assertion by our focus group participant, as well as the way in which his col-
leagues perhaps embarrassedly supported it, suggests that this may indeed be common 
practice. The assumption on the part of the provincial officials intervening on Ashley’s 
behalf (in Chapter 2), that the manager administration was just rushing after his own 
business, also suggests the same. This research did not set out to determine to what 
extent people actually steal government’s time, though as a researcher I did remain 
attentive to picking up accounts or behaviour suggesting such. While interviewing 
people or waiting for them, I have observed some receiving calls that may have been 
related to business rather than work; I found them out of the office or coming in later; I 
waited and chatted with people waiting for health workers for other than official 
business; and I have seen them surfing the Internet for possibilities for further education 
or second-hand Japanese cars155. In such situations, it might have been easy to speculate 
or assume; it was more difficult to contextualise these fragments, make full sense of 
them, or verify suspicions. In part, this was influenced by a desire not to appear too 
snooping or nosey, potentially offending people or jeopardising good relations needed 
for further research. Nevertheless, having seen how normal it is to work beyond the 
payslip, having got a sense of the claims on health workers’ limited money and time, 
and having heard accounts suggesting the prevalence of such behaviour, it is safe to 
assume that there are incentives driving people to consider stealing government’s time, 
despite the fact that this is against regulations.  
The same may be said about stealing more than government time: Stealing govern-
ment resources. In a Transparency International country study of Zambia, poor condi-
tions of service were first among a list of factors presented as causing corruption. It is 
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argued that these poor conditions of service ‘fuel corruption as the public service 
workers strive to survive in a harsh economic environment’.156 This argument that low 
salaries are instrumental in people benefiting from government beyond what is legally 
accepted also features prominently in casual conversation. Having examined the ac-
counts and the situations of contemporary health workers, it is clear that it is a struggle 
to balance all of one’s desires, ambitions, and the claims and demands one is facing. 
However, having also compared the figures of the basic needs’ basket with salaries and 
allowances, it appears that this struggle is not that of basic survival. Nevertheless, for a 
long time it had been the case that the real value of civil service salaries had plummeted 
from what in the early years of Independence was a good salary allowing for a modern 
middle-class life. Amidst the permanent economic crisis Zambia underwent, those on 
the government payroll must have developed strategies for ‘striving to survive in a 
harsh economic environment’. Possibly such survival strategies have endured to sate the 
needs, ambitions, and desires of some of those health workers whom we saw ‘struggling 
financially’.157  
The argument of linking corruption to poor conditions of service was used above to 
explain the stealing of government resources. Such arguments, however, can also be 
used as an excuse to justify their behaviour by those involved in such theft. Basic 
survival might justify issues that may otherwise be considered morally deviant. Let us 
examine, however, indications of the theft of government resources in the Zambian 
health sector from health workers’ accounts. Let us start by presenting an account that 
empathically does not subscribe to the justification of theft with the survival argument. 
This will allow us to argue that while theft is prevalent, it is not as ubiquitous or un-
contested as exaggerated views of neo-patrimonialism may assume. A senior officer at a 
hospital said that once he had gone to a workshop. He explained that the organiser, 
presumably a foreigner, had access to the participants’ payslips. The organiser had 
asked, “How do you survive? You are starving or you are all thieves”. Our respondent 
still looked a bit taken aback by the argument, saying, “But we just survive by the grace 
of God. If everybody would pinch, there would be nothing left. Health workers are put-
ting in everything”.158  
In spite of this striking account, pilfering of government resources does occur in the 
Zambian health sector. However, it is nearly impossible to determine to what extent it 
occurs. Newspaper stories occasionally report on health workers caught stealing. One 
such article reported that two senior health workers at the district hospital in Mazabuka 
were suspended while they were being investigated for theft and misappropriation. They 
were alleged to have been connected to the disappearance of fifty bed-sheets and for 
failing to account for excessive fuel tanked at a petrol station. They were also suspected 
to have stolen medical fees, which had been collected but not yet lodged in the bank. 
The article quoted the manager administration of the district health office, who reported 
that these anomalies had been discovered by an ad hoc committee established to look 
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into the disappearance of the bed-sheets. In an article half a year later, it appeared the 
duo were due to face court.159  
From health workers’ accounts also, there are indications that pilfering occurs and 
attempts are made to deal with this. A human resource officer who had previously been 
working at a large hospital reported that he had been involved in dismissing someone 
working in catering for having stolen two chickens, suggesting this was not the person’s 
first offence.160 A provincial pharmacy expert explained how she would audit district 
and hospital pharmacies to prevent stealing of drugs. She explained that there is one 
trick which people may attempt: To put good drugs between expired drugs due to be 
destroyed, the good drugs then being removed before destruction to be sold.161 Finally, a 
provincial human resource officer spoke of how someone at a district health office was 
supposed to pay electricity bills. Instead, the human resource officer claimed, he had 
“chewed the money”. Subsequently, he was suspended without pay for three months. 
Also, someone at a nursing school was reported to have “chewed twenty million” 
Kwacha.162 When I wanted to further delve into these two cases for more detail, this 
was politely refused.  
The issue of pilfering also came up during a performance assessment visit to a rural 
health clinic, which I witnessed. The team, consisting of officials from the provincial 
and the district health office, had noticed that there were stock-outs in the storages of 
drugs. A district official said that people from the clinic passed the district pharmacy 
weekly to pick up consignments of drugs, yet there were still stock-outs. The team 
leader then advised the man from the district to carry out an audit to see if pilfering took 
place or whether it was an issue of bad stores’ management. He then told the in-charge 
of the clinic to be careful and monitor how the clinic managed drugs. Drugs, he said, are 
the most expensive resource in health centres, and the DRC (Congo) is very close by. 
He also cautioned that the health centre is dealing with volunteers and classified 
employees and that one must be suspicious of everyone. The team leader then spoke of 
a health centre in another district where they found drugs missing. There it appeared 
that a classified employee was married to a businessman. Moreover, he recounted a 
story of when he himself had been working in a mission hospital in Eastern Province. 
At that time, there were frequent stock-outs of chloroquine.163 One day he decided to 
take care of issuing chloroquine himself, and it appeared there were enough drugs for 
the caseloads they encountered. It then appeared, or so the official recounted, that a 
classified employee had been giving chloroquine tablets to relatives who passed by, as if 
they were groundnuts.  
As the performance assessment team was driving away, this issue was being dis-
cussed. I got the impression that the in-charge was being suspected. A district official 
said that the in-charge’s wife was living elsewhere, where she was working as a teacher. 
Every Thursday or Friday, before going to his wife for the weekend, the in-charge 
would pass by to collect drugs at the district health office. It seemed that he was retired 
and continued to work on contract.164 When I visited the clinic several months later, the 
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in-charge was still working there. He told me that he was continuing to work beyond 
retirement to help educate his children. When I raised the issue of drugs, he said that he 
occasionally received technical support for dealing with stock management. I did not 
get a picture of the extent to which this issue was followed up, not having prodded him 
further on the issue.165 Instead, speaking to a young nurse who had joined the in-charge 
at the clinic since I my last visit, some complaints about drug management at the district 
surfaced. The young nurse, who seemed to have taken charge of administrative issues 
such as drug management, complained that “when we order drugs, we go there with our 
book showing what we need. Then there is no vehicle. It can then take a week and when 
they do come they don't have all the things you need. They just pick some things and 
give it without looking what you really need. It can be that there are shortages, but 
basically it is more a transport issue”.166 
These accounts presented above are extremely anecdotal and fragmentary. The 
behaviour of both those complicit and those in positions of responsibility make it 
difficult to get a full perspective on how widespread such cases are. It is clear that theft 
is a crime, and the fact that people are in certain cases prosecuted indicates that it is 
punishable crime. Thus, if people are involved in theft, there is no reason for them to 
incriminate themselves; on the contrary, they evidently have incentives to conceal such 
behaviour. For officials dealing with such cases, too much openness, and possible pub-
licity, would cause embarrassment. They would thus prefer not to give public attention 
to such cases. On the one hand, this is logical behaviour for bureaucracies anywhere. On 
the other hand, the lack of openness encountered while investigating such issues, 
combined with rumours among those outside the sector, may equally fuel conjecture 
about whether stealing of government resources is rampant and an inherent part of the 
system. Those who are part of the system would then share complicity by keeping quiet 
on specific cases of theft. If one followed this line of reasoning further, as Anders did in 
his study on Malawi, one could assert that those who are caught are lower in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy or those who violate the ‘office mores’. Such office mores 
require people to keep quiet about this conspiracy of ‘democratised appropriation’.167 
On the basis of the information gathered in this research, it is impossible to either verify 
or falsify such theories. What we do know is that there is great economic pressure on 
health workers and sating their needs, ambitions, and desires is an enormous struggle. 
Especially when people have been adversely struck by unexpected loss or have accu-
mulated debts to settle the claims they face, they might be tempted to look for a ‘lucky 
break’. We have also seen the ambitious manner in which many try to forge ahead. It is 
thus quite possible that some might use their assertiveness to create an opportunity to 
make extra profit from the system that is sustaining them.  
Having examined possible economic motivators for stealing government resources, 
the questions arise as to how wide or narrow the margins are within which one can steal 
and what the chance is of doing it with impunity. This depends in large part on the 
systems in place to prevent this and to deal with it. It also depends on the extent to 
which the formal organisational culture is able to influence people to follow civil 
servants’ codes. We saw above that systems are in place to sanction devious behaviour. 
We saw that at times these are indeed applied by suspending or transferring staff. At the 
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same time, we saw in Chapter 4 that there is an ambiguity in the way in which such 
sanctions are applied. Moreover, there is a large measure of impunity enjoyed when it 
comes to dealing with grand corruption, as we shall see in the next part of this dis-
sertation, in which some such cases will be examined. This may then feed a certain 
resignation at lower levels of the system when enforcing public service ethics.  
Conclusions 
This chapter examined the claims by health workers that they were “struggling finan-
cially”, as “money is never enough, right?” The claims that are made on health workers, 
by themselves and by their social environment, are very considerable. The fact that 
many of them have struggled out of poverty and others have kept absolute poverty at 
bay does little to lighten this load. In fact, especially in environments in which the 
health worker is one of the few with a good job, they are seen as a potential source of 
support by their relatives. Responding to these claims is usually presented as virtuous 
and normal, though it may be considered a burden. It is illuminating, however, to see 
that these claims are neither unavoidable nor uncontested. The spatial mobility that 
characterises most health workers’ careers is used by some to maintain or create a social 
distance between them and their relatives, with the aim or consequence of lessening the 
social burden. Some also choose for retirement a safe distance from relatives, to enjoy 
the legacy of their working life. People also negotiate with relatives directly and through 
their deeds. While trying not to strain or sever relations, they attempt to minimise the 
burden. Some health workers declare their desires and their aims to be to try to help 
dependants become independent, not least by stimulating them and supporting them to 
attain qualifications. The relations between health workers and their less fortunate 
family and relatives can, in large part, be seen as solidarity, as repaying the previous 
generation for what one has received, or as repaying this hereditary debt to one’s child-
ren. They can also be seen as a strategy of hedging oneself against future insecurities by 
investing in social capital. However, one can also see in the behaviour of some profes-
sionals a tendency towards personal emancipation. This could be the emancipation that 
is part of Zambia’s process of class formation, emancipation through joining Zambia’s 
emerging middle-class – or, if one prefers, the continuation of Zambia’s tradition of the 
boma-class.  
Emancipation from one’s former social environment is certainly not a clear rupture, 
nor is it necessarily based on conscious rational decisions. Rather, it can be a process in 
which people drift away from their kin, in part as a consequence of the investment 
decisions they might make. As was argued in this chapter, investing in social capital 
may coincide with buying a house, schooling one’s children, or buying a TV, a car, a 
nice pen, a nice shirt, or a nice perfume. At the same time, such expenditures also com-
pete with family requirements, as health workers’ means of meeting both sets of claims 
are scarce. Some people may fall short of relatives’ expectations of what is necessary to 
maintain the relationship. Others may gradually feel the social distance becoming too 
great for the relation to be considered significant. Nevertheless, regardless of the precise 
dynamics of emancipation or the extent to which such vertical ties continue to be 
maintained, it is clear that many health workers have made investments that benefit not 
only themselves but also others in their social context. The most significant of these in-
vestments is perhaps the investment in human capital: Investing in the education of the 
next generation to allow them a similar opportunity to forge ahead.  
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In addition, in this chapter we have seen how health workers are also entrepreneurs. 
Beyond their jobs, they invest their labour and resources in other productive ventures, 
including producing food and cash-crops, delivering various private medical and other 
services, and investing in construction and trade. It is of course impossible from this 
qualitative research to estimate the economic impact of these productive activities be-
yond the payslip. However, from a workforce of several tens of thousands, this does 
appear to be a welcome contribution to Zambia’s national income. Perhaps one could 
even with some validity argue that public health sector employment, together with simi-
lar contributions on the part of those employed in the various other sectors of the public 
service, has made a significant contribution towards achieving the goal of the Zambian 
Fifth National Development Plan, namely broad-based employment and wealth crea-
tion.  
Of course these livelihood ventures beyond the payslip are secondary to the official 
objectives of the health sector. The public interests health workers are intended to serve 
deal with providing access to affordable preventative and curative health services. At 
the end of this chapter we have examined how the ambition and opportunism health 
workers displayed in pursuit of their private (and familial) livelihood strategies may not 
only distract them from but also undermine the public interest. As health workers 
themselves put it, one way of successfully pursuing such livelihood strategies is by 
‘stealing government’s time’. It thus appeared to be a practice for some to violate the 
rational-legal ethics of the public service, which distinguish the private from the public 
realm. As we saw, this appropriation of government resources was at times even ex-
tended to other resources beyond time. In other words, there is indeed a link between 
the social and economic pressures facing health workers and patrimonial behaviours. 
However, this explanation is emphatically not a justification. As we saw in previous 
chapters, behaviour that can be labelled patrimonial, such as theft, may in health work-
ers’ accounts have been resignedly accepted as being prevalent, but it was not univer-
sally condoned. Moreover, there were systems and arrangements in place to prevent and 
punish such behaviour. However, such systems appear to have a questionable impact. 
Moreover, there is arguably a sense of democratisation of corruption, as grand corrupt-
ion appears to go unpunished (as we shall see in later chapters).  
Our health workers are thus caught between different forces. On the one hand, as is 
evident from their discourse, the ethics and morality in which they have been socialised 
denounce opportunistic behaviour at the public expense. Others may take offence at 
selfish profiting as it may affect opportunities for them. There is also a latent threat that 
deviant behaviour may be punished. On the other hand, there are strong pressures and 
ambitions facing health workers to accumulate, invest, and consume, which are likely to 
outstrip their income. Moreover, there may be an office culture of impunity starting at 
the top, which may give people a sense that they can get away with stealing govern-
ment’s time and resources; at the very least, there is a sense of resignation that others 
get away with it. In the preceding chapters, we have highlighted health workers’ relative 
agency. We have also shown that there is wide variation in the choices health workers 
make and the preferences they hold. Within the context sketched above, there is also a 
choice for health workers: To what extent they want to conform to rational-legal rules 
and expectations or to manipulate them, bend them, or violate them. There is no way to 
generalise about what an average health worker will do. However, as one young res-






















In the previous chapters we have seen the agency demonstrated by health workers in the 
struggle to improve their livelihoods. Now we will see what this agency can lead to 
when it is played out in a national political and institutional arena. This section will 
trace a narrative of the health reforms, a political and bureaucratic process that aimed to 
change the status quo of the health sector. We will explore to what extent it succeeded. 
As we shall see, this process as well as other aspects of the health sector would be 
instrumentalised by Zambians at various levels. Was such instrumentalisation purely for 
private gain – self-advancement – or did it serve a political rationale, such as securing 
regime survival? Linked to this question, we will examine how the collective interests 
of health workers shaped the process of health reforms as well as the structure of power 
and allocation of resources in the sector. 
In this section of the dissertation, we will explore the health reforms we were 
introduced to briefly in our first glimpse at the Zambian health sector in Chapter 1, and 
which we came across in health workers’ accounts. In the next five chapters, we will 
trace the history of these reforms from their origin in Zambia’s political transition of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s (and also further back in the mists of Zambia’s colonial 
past), through their partial implementation up to their partial reversal in the early years 
of this century. We will analyse whether this experience with health reforms reflects van 
de Walle’s ‘syndrome of partial reform’. In doing so, attention will not only be paid to 
the policy plans and ambitions that underlay the reforms, but also to the political context 
that influenced these reforms. Moreover, the political arena in which the health reforms 
were negotiated was influenced not only by local politics but also by the donor commu-
nity in Zambia, in addition to global economic and discursive realities. Therefore, the 
changing role of the policies and practices of international donors will also be given 
attention.  
The narratives presented below will be based on this researcher’s understanding of 
these developments, gained from informal interviews, formal interviews, policy docu-
ments, Zambian media articles on health, and archival material from the Netherlands 
Embassy in Lusaka, as well as secondary literature. 
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Genesis of the health reforms 
In this chapter we will be introduced to the conceptual origins of the health reforms.1 
We will explore the question where the ideas behind the health reforms originated. Was 
this a Zambian process or driven by international aid agencies? In order to explore these 
questions, the focus will shift to one particular actor, Katele Kalumba, who was the 
midwife and progenitor of the ideas of health reform, reminiscent of the Gramscian 
concept of an organic intellectual. Kalumba was an academic, who in his doctoral 
research traced the history of the Zambian health sector from the colonial era to his 
contemporary times. This academic work created the inspiration for him to challenge 
the structure of the health sector and at the same time served as a denunciation of the 
eclipse of idealism: The perceived failures of Kaunda’s UNIP regime.  
Kalumba’s dissertation, which will be dealt with in this chapter, was written at a time 
in which, on the one hand, technocrats within the Ministry of Health were working on 
ideas for reforming the health sector, while on the other hand, popular opposition to 
Kaunda’s UNIP government was gaining momentum. Kalumba, with experience in the 
global North and within development agencies, was able to be a competent broker of 
ideas. He could mould discourse and seize opportunities to spur on a process that 
resulted in the health reforms that would later be heralded as an example to other 
developing countries. In the process, however, Kalumba also encountered opportunities 
to increase his own role of influence and launch his political career. As such, he would 
go on to play a role in the narrative he had written. However, as a result he would also 
become caught in the pitfalls of failed planning and reform he had accused his pre-
decessors of. As an actor within an arena determined by various conflicting interests and 
realities, he failed to entirely change the structure of the health sector he had discredited, 
as we shall see in subsequent chapters. At the same time, he created dynamics of change 
that would provide opportunities for various actors to benefit from.  
Introducing the health reforms 
In the middle of the 1990s, Zambia’s health reforms were heralded as a flagship exam-
ple in the international health policy community. The state-of-the-art thinking about 
equitable primary health care for the population had been translated into ambitious 
policy plans and programmes. Moreover, under ostensibly committed leadership, con-
crete steps had been taken to implement these ambitions. What is more, donors were 
excited and eager to jump on board to back – and try to push forward – these showcase 
reforms.2 
The health reforms, as with all human conceptual and discursive constructions, are 
extremely nebulous; in the process of conception, formulation, negotiation, and im-
plementation, the reforms took a wide array of guises. In this process, ideas were fre-
quently posed, elaborated, reformulated, rejected, or lay idle, as implementation of these 
ideas took a different turn in the political arena of different interests and influences 
which shape the health sector in everyday practice. By 1996, the health reforms would 
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reach their conceptual maturity, building on insights conceived a decade earlier. By that 
time, a start was made in the implementation of many of the elements characteristic of 
these reforms. In Annex I a document that clearly captures these ideas is presented and 
analysed, which also shows strong links to the historical process of conceiving and 
developing these concepts, described below. Here we will limit ourselves to a summary 
of the key elements of the reforms. 
The essence of the health reforms was to change the structure of the health sector, 
which had since its foundation been developed into a centralised set-up with a bias 
towards treating people in urban centres at the expense of rural areas and preventative 
health care. The health reforms would mean a devolution of decision-making and re-
sources to the district level and the creation of participatory structures to better involve 
the community in decision-making. As the conception of the health reforms progressed 
and the first attempts at implementation had commenced, a secondary element of the 
reforms was developed. Gradually, the idea was conceived to move policy imple-
mentation tasks away form the Ministry of Health and to create a technical body which 
would be dubbed the Central Board of Health. In its ideal form, this would separate the 
technocratic realm from the political and move health workers from the civil service to 
contract employment. Though this element of the health reforms had not been part of 
the original plans, it would grow to symbolise the reforms and become the object of far-
reaching power struggles.  
Although the health reforms were the product of Zambian political and technocratic 
arenas, external transnational influences played a significant role. Donors played a large 
part in shaping the reforms and influencing the sometimes contradictory discourses on 
which the reforms were based. At the same time, the reforms also shaped donors’ way 
of working. A key innovation on the part of donors was to fund the health reforms 
through a district basket fund, which meant that donor agencies would pool their funds 
and then channel them through Zambian allocation systems, rather than support distinct 
projects with reporting systems specific to each donor. However, to justify this leap of 
faith and in order to mitigate the risk of theft or corruption,3 donors worked with 
technocrats in the health sector to develop systems. Such systems included a financial 
management and administration system (FAMS), operational planning and reporting 
systems, and a health management information system (HMIS).  
The changes brought by these reforms would have a lasting impact on the further 
development of the health sector, despite the fact that major elements associated with 
the reforms would eventually be reversed. Most importantly, however, the reforms 
would be an object of struggle between various stakeholders. In this struggle various 
interests – private, group, regime, and institutional – would be defended and pursued. In 
the process, however, the health sector would be re-created and re-negotiated.  
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Kaka Wesu the developer4 
Looking for the human factor in a political process also means giving a face to the key 
actors in the process. This means that due attention is given to the backgrounds and 
personalities of the politicians who played a role in the reforms. One personality has 
above all put a mark on the health reforms, as was indicated in the introduction to this 
chapter. This was Katele Kalumba – academic, technocrat, and politician who played 
the role of midwife and progenitor of the reforms. The narrative of the health reforms, 
its conception, implementation, stagnation, and partial reversal remarkably traces 
Kalumba’s own professional and political breakthrough and prominence and, subse-
quently, his notoriety and ultimately his fall from grace. 
 When introducing Kalumba, let us start with his own presentation of his back-
ground. In an interview, Kalumba presented a self-glorifying image of himself. He 
claimed to be from a family of ‘royal rebels’. His mother was from the Bwile Royal 
Establishment5 in what is now Chienge District, and his father stemmed from the 
Mushima lineage of the Kaonde in Central Zambia. According to his account, an 
ancestor had fought the Lozi and refused to be subjected by the Litunga, the King of the 
Lozi, and joined Livingstone on his trek to Northern Zambia. There the ancestor stayed 
and married into the Katele clan of the Tabwa, a people who had fought colonial rule 
and had resisted Arab slave traders. Kalumba claimed that his father’s participation in 
the colonial struggle, which led to his detention, was influenced by this background. 
Similarly, he suggested that his own political reformist zeal was explained by his 
heritage.6  
A random encounter with a beer drinker in a Copperbelt bar gave an equally 
mythologized perspective on young Katele’s early years. This man claimed that his 
father had gone to school with Kalumba. One year in secondary school, Kalumba had 
fallen ill and missed a large part of the year. The teacher had told him that he would 
probably have to repeat the year, but Kalumba studied hard and ended top of the class. 
While it is difficult to verify this account, it does illustrate the image Kalumba has as a 
driven and studious person, which is consistent with his further academic and political 
career.  
After obtaining a bachelor’s and master’s degree in psychotherapy,7 Kalumba 
proceeded to pursue a doctorate in Canada. In the meantime, he also carried out 
consultancies for donor organisations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), 
UNICEF, and an American aid agency.8 A more obscure part of Kalumba’s curriculum 
vitae was the fact that he had been an operative of the Zambian intelligence services 
                                                 
4  This label was used for Katele Kalumba by his supporters in his constituency in various election 
campaigns in the 2000s, (see Figure 8.1). It combines the affectionate ‘our’ Katele Kalumba with the 
influence he had in bringing development to the constituency. This does not represent who Kalumba 
was at the start of the reforms but rather who he became in local politics. The constant factor, how-
ever, was the role of being a broker who could straddle different realities to perform. Figure 6.1 shows 
a painting of Katele Kaluma, which adorns a bar annex guest-house he owns in Kashikishi, Nchelenge 
district. 
5  The customary leadership of the Bwile people. 
6  ML0812/01. 
7  Zambian National Assembly website: 
 http://www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=349&Itemid=100&pr
ovince=3&constid=65 (accessed 7 May 2009).  
8  Lake et al., Analyzing, 38-39. 
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since the 1970s.9 According to a former colleague, this gave him contacts which were 
useful for politically selling the health reforms.10 This also provides an impression of 
Kalumba’s relative competence in melding different images and identities. Publicly and 
to me as a Western researcher, Kalumba was keen to present himself as a technocrat 
rather than a politician.11 Indeed, as we shall see, as deputy minister and later minister 
of health, he played an important role in pushing the health reforms. At the same time, 
as we will equally see, in pursuit of a political career he did not shun getting involved in 
political ploys and power plays at odds with this technocratic image he cultivated. 
Finally, as will become clear from his greatest public controversy, his academic, tech-
nocratic image had as a counterpoint an orientation towards traditional medicine12 and 
the practice of traditional ‘magic’. 
 
 




Conceiving the health reforms 
Most documents produced by the Zambian government that mention the health reforms 
place the origin of the reforms in the political transition which brought the MMD to 
power. Indeed, as we shall see, the ideas presented above, which carried the reforms, 
were indeed formulated as the MMD was preparing its programme for the elections that 
brought it to power. In addition, as has been observed by others, the transition gave the 
                                                 
9  Times of Zambia, ‘Mbula Unaware Katele Was Under OP’, 8 March 2003.  
10  ML0811/02. 
11  Post, ‘Chiluba Picks Katele As His Successor’, 12 December 2000. 
12  ML0810/01. 
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political impetus to and enabled this process, which challenged the status quo.13 On the 
other hand, it is also important to recognise that these reforms built upon and reacted to 
earlier processes and interventions that shaped the Zambian health sector.  
As the MMD was forming to call for and contest the first multiparty elections since 
the abolition of the one-party state, informal policy-advisory groups had been formed, 
comprising academics and professionals, to prepare a policy programme for the 
‘government in waiting’. As such, there was an MMD health committee that included 
three future ministers of health. Dr. Boniface Kawimbe, who would be the first MMD 
minister of health, chaired the group; another member was micro-biology professor 
Nkandu Luo, who would become deputy minister in 1996 and minister in 1998. Perhaps 
the most influential member of this group in conceptual terms was Dr. Katele Kalumba. 
He was charged with writing a health policy framework that lay the conceptual basis for 
the health reforms.14  
This resulted in a policy document, ‘Managing for quality: A healthy people policy’, 
which was authored by Kalumba in September 1991 and was intended for discussions 
of the MMD President’s advisory group. This document first launched the vision, which 
to this day represents the mission statement of the Zambian state-run health sector, of 
providing ‘citizens with cost-effective quality health care ... as close to the family as 
possible’. Kalumba also formulated the principles of leadership, partnership, and ac-
countability, which were required to guide this process. In order to justify the health 
reforms, Kalumba in this documents briefly sketched health problems and problems of 
service delivery that he linked to the ‘general crisis of the Zambian state’. He explained 
that four trends underlay these problems. One was the demographic trend of a fast-
growing population, and another was the increasing disease burden caused by the 
emergence of AIDS and drug-resistant malaria. The trends that Kalumba emphasised 
most, however, were more of a political-economic nature. The first trend he addressed 
was the economic process of structural adjustment. Rather than presenting a critique of 
the structural adjustment paradigm, Kalumba apparently recognised the political eco-
nomic reality that health services had to be delivered in ‘the context of a limited re-
source base’.15 In other words, health and social policy had to be ‘structural-reform 
sensitive’, something he claimed had not been possible under ‘medical-bureaucratic 
incompetence fuelled by UNIP political patronage’.16  
The final trend Kalumba described as negatively impacting health and social devel-
opment in Zambia was the ‘increased political bureaucratisation and centralisation of 
health care’ which caused this ‘medical-bureaucratic incompetence’. He claimed this 
was the definitive problem that health reform needed to tackle. He explained that the 
‘pyramidal organisation’ of the public health sector was based on the logic of state 
administration, which affected the distribution of resources in the sector. This meant 
that a geo-spatial hierarchy had been created which classified rural areas as ‘less com-
plex’ whereas urban areas were considered ‘more complex’. This inequity has resulted 
in people in rural areas ‘bypassing or ignoring under-serviced rural health centres, and 
resisting the burdens of preventive health care strategies’ as a means of enforcing their 
claim on public health budgets. The answer, Kalumba argued, was an ‘equalisation 
process’ that was based on a common operational level of district health governance. 
                                                 
13  See Lake & Musumali, ‘Zambia’; Lake et al., Analyzing. 
14  Various interview data (ML0811/02, ML0706/03, ML0706/04); Lake et al., Analyzing. 
15  Kalumba, K., Managing for quality: A healthy people policy (Lusaka, 1991), 4. 
16  Ibid. 2. 
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Following from this, the document also articulated the essence of the health reforms that 
would follow: A health sector that considered the district to be the primary focus of 
health management, in reaction to the equity problems the sector (and the country as a 
whole) had faced. 
After having presented his diagnosis of the health sector and the vision and principles 
that should guide the MMD’s new health policy, Kalumba proceeded to propose a 
number of initiatives to arrive at ‘a healthy people package’ of policies. These initiatives 
included enhancing the roles of consumers, integrating the private sector into health 
care provision, and improving quality assurance. He also advocated better teamwork 
and conditions of service for health workers. The main focus of the proposals put for-
ward by Kalumba, however, was on management systems. Rather than the Central 
Board of Health that we referred to above, Kalumba’s proposal called for establishing a 
national health council to examine, prepare, and propose policies for the health sector. 
He also called for the establishment of district health councils to which decision-making 
authority would be decentralised and which would ensure community input into 
decision-making. Analysing this document, it becomes clear that though this document 
is more theoretical and political than the National Health Strategic Plan,17 both in terms 
of the ideological justification and in terms of actual policy proposals, the contours of 
the health reforms as they would be presented a few years later were already clearly 
visible. It also shines light on the instrumental role of Katele Kalumba in the design of 
these reforms.  
A number of people interviewed shone some light on the dynamism of these early 
days in which the health reforms were conceived. One former colleague of Kalumba at 
the Department of Community Medicine of the University of Zambia, where Kalumba 
worked as a lecturer, remembered how Kalumba would sit in his office at the end of the 
working day and work on MMD policy documents together with friends such as the 
prominent political analyst, Neo Simutanyi.18 Another respondent, a medical doctor 
who as a student attended some of Kalumba’s lectures, remembered that while Kalumba 
was working on the MMD health policy, he would bounce ideas on health reforms off 
the students. These anecdotes gave the impression that the respondents felt that they 
were witnesses to a significant historical process.19 
Piecing together a narrative of the genesis of a significant policy process on the basis 
of eye-witness accounts from people, who have seen part of the process themselves and 
heard of other parts from others, one may risk contributing to the creation of a mytho-
logy. Errors can easily slip into one’s understanding of events. One such misunder-
standing evoked by some respondents was that Kalumba had formulated the ideas on 
health reforms as part of the ‘MMD manifesto’.20 In fact, the manifesto that the MMD 
circulated during the election campaign contained a small paragraph on health, which 
presented ten points and which made no reference to reforms or to the core elements of 
reform such as decentralising decision-making to the district level. While it did mention 
promoting primary health care,21 encouraging the private health sector, and restructuring 
                                                 
17  Annex I. 
18  ML0706/10. 
19  ML0706/13. 
20  This misunderstanding influenced a publication on health reforms in an earlier phase of this research: 
Leenstra, M., Beyond the façade (Leipzig, 2007), and also H. Mahler et al., Independent review of the 
Zambian health reforms (Geneva, 1997). 
21  As well as psychiatric health care and maternal-child health. 
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the administration of the ministry, the manifesto did not reflect the language or the 
focus of Kalumba’s document. In fact, it reflected more mainstream language on health, 
with arguably a curative and a hospital bias. Perhaps this paragraph was written by 
Boniface Kawimbe, the chairman of the MMD health committee, a surgeon more 
oriented towards hospitals, rather than by Kalumba.  
It would be a misunderstanding to isolate the political process advocating for health 
reform from initiatives and ideas that had earlier been formed within the Ministry of 
Health. As reported by Lake et al., around the same time as Kalumba was formulating 
his ideas, there was a group of professionals, senior officials at the ministry as well as 
some representatives of the donor community, who ‘were tired of the mediocrity’ within 
the sector. They had started a process of restructuring that formulated ideas on decen-
tralisation and built on the idea of autonomous management boards within hospitals, a 
possibility that had been created by a medical services’ act passed by Parliament in 
1985 but never fully implemented. This act had not only paved the way for the creation 
of hospital boards but also for the introduction of cost-sharing.22 According to one of 
the senior officials involved, Kalumba had interacted with them, sharing ideas which he 
politically sold to the MMD.23 Indeed, Kalumba, at the time when he was a lecturer and 
after having completed his doctorate in Canada, served on an advisory body of the 
ministry, the national primary health care committee. It would thus be appropriate to 
assume that the political process leading to health reforms came from a concerted effort 
in which various individuals’ ideas came together. Thus, despite the role others attribute 
to Kalumba24 as well as the impression he gave himself in the interviews he gave to me, 
it would be a mistake to see the health reforms as merely a one-man show. Neverthe-
less, as Kalumba was such a prolific writer, it is easier to discern his fingerprints on the 
historical process than others’. As we say in Dutch: Wie schrijft, die blijft – “he who 
writes, stays”.  
It is evident that reform was a reaction to the structure of the health sector in the 
Kaunda-era, a structure that was considered to be problematic. In his political docu-
ment, Kalumba had alluded to structural, political-bureaucratic deficiencies of the health 
system in the UNIP era. It is understandable that a member of a political movement in 
his discourse distanced himself from the system he was opposing. Later we will see 
whether in his actions he would distance himself from what went before, but first let us 
look back to further examine the structural deficiencies that the health reforms sought to 
address. Again, to do so, we have to turn to Katele Kalumba’s writing in order to gain 
such insight, as his unpublished doctoral dissertation is the only comprehensive work on 
the development of the Zambian health sector from the colonial period up to the eve of 
Zambia’s Third Republic. 
‘Symbolic power and urban bias: Limits to health reform in Zambia’ 
Kalumba’s dissertation, in which he sketches the development of both the policies and 
the structure of the Zambian health sector, at the same time provides the justification 
and the rationale for health reforms. His assertion in the MMD policy framework that 
the health system had undergone a trend of political bureaucratisation and centralisation 
                                                 
22  Lungu, G.F., ‘Decontrolling or entrenching ministerial oversight in the Zambian health services 
system: The case of the Medical Services Act of 1985’. Zambian Law Journal, 18 (1986), 93-107. 
23  ML0804/07. 
24  As reported by Lake et al. from their interviews, as well as by various of my own respondents. 
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was directly drawn from his doctoral dissertation.25 In this dissertation he argued that 
the nationalist government had, at Independence, inherited a health system that was 
based on a structural inequity, in which divisions ran along geographic and racial lines. 
He contrasted an urban health system oriented towards complex health care with a rural 
system oriented towards less complex care for the African population. This he attributed 
to the phenomenon of ‘rural down-classing’, the result of organisational and discursive 
strategies that portrayed rural areas as unproductive and unable to contribute to health 
care and, therefore, justifiably receiving a smaller part of scarce resource allocations. He 
further argued that under the one-party state, health policy makers had not been able to 
fundamentally challenge these inequities. While the first decades of Independence 
showed a significant expansion of the health infrastructure, it also solidified the 
colonially inherited, pyramidal organisation of the health sector, which was biased 
towards tertiary curative care in urban centres and against the majority of the popu-
lation.  
 
Kalumba on the colonial roots of health reform 
Let us now follow the data and the analysis provided by Katele Kalumba’s dissertation, 
to examine his argument of the inequitable set-up of the health sector. This will allow us 
to go back to the roots of Zambia’s health system and to trace its development from 
there.26 Modern medicine27 first entered what is now Zambia with Dr. Livingstone. 
However, as Livingstone was just a passing visitor,28 one could not claim that this lay 
the basis for a health care system as such. Arguably, the same applies to the period in 
which the British South Africa Company administered the area. While this period saw 
the first establishment of health care, it was little institutionalised. Kalumba reported 
that around 1913, the company employed a medical staff of 15, with a matron and 5 
nurses. Company doctors were allowed to privately offer their services to European 
settlers in the territory. While Kalumba asserts that any services that were rendered to 
Africans by these doctors were entirely incidental,29 these doctors did medically 
examine African labour recruits. The aim of these examinations was to see if these 
labourers were fit for employment in the mines.  
The decades between the takeover of the administration of the territory by the 
Colonial Office in London and the end of the Second World War saw the establishment 
of a rudimentary, formal health bureaucracy. This period also saw a gradual expansion 
of the capacity to deliver health services. In 1930 a public health ordinance was passed 
which defined health authorities in the territory. According to Kalumba, however, while 
                                                 
25  In fact, parts of this political document have been literally copied from his dissertation. For example, 
part of the wording of the fifth paragraph of the third page of the MMD policy framework is literally 
copied from the second paragraph of page 372 of his dissertation.  
26  Much of the remainder of this chapter provides an analytical summary of Kalumba’s thesis. The 
justification of presenting this here is that it provides insight into the rich data on which Kalumba 
based his argument. At the same time, it provides a historical context for our narrative on the health 
reforms. This is not to suggest, however, that this section presents a proper historiography, as it 
merely bases itself on one source. At the same time, presenting this information here also serves to 
highlight the value and uniqueness of Kalumba’s dissertation as both a primary and a secondary 
source on the history of the Zambian health sector.  
27  It would be a misnomer to refer to this as ‘Western’ medicine as this would disregard the medical 
profession’s historical debt to various renowned Arab physicians. 
28  Although his heart was buried in Zambia. 
29  Kalumba, ‘The practice’, 66. 
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it had been designed as a major public health intervention, it remained irrelevant to the 
majority of Africans as it failed to extend medical services to Africans beyond mining 
camps and administrative centres. It was accepted as a practical problem by colonial 
administrators that it would be too costly to expand medical services meeting European 
standards to meet the needs of the African population. The country was seen as too large 
and available resources as too limited. In 1936 there were reportedly 12 government 
stations with medical officers, of which 10 primarily served European interests. In 
addition, there were 23 rural dispensaries serving the rural African population ‘staffed 
by very imperfectly trained native assistants’.30 By 1946, however, the number of 
government-run rural dispensaries had been expanded to 59. Furthermore, by that time 
there were 13 ‘African hospitals’ in towns, 6 of which were along the line of rail. In 
1946 over 120,000 out-patient cases were treated in these hospitals, as well as over 
23,000 patients being admitted. There were also welfare clinics in urban areas acces-
sible to Africans. Initially, the funding for these clinics was raised from ‘canteen funds’ 
(profits from beer halls), but from the 1940s, central government contributed from its 
revenues.31  
The provision of health services was not only a government responsibility in colonial 
Zambia. Authorities held mining companies responsible for the healthcare of their own 
staff. In the compounds of mining townships, labourers who were found ill were taken 
to hospital to ensure a quick return to work. Gradually, as the mining sector grew as 
well as the hospital facilities mining companies provided, mining companies’ medical 
services were expanded to also offer fee-paying services to patients other than mining 
staff. Mining hospitals thus formed an important contribution to healthcare provision in 
the towns of the Copperbelt and in Broken Hill (now Kabwe).  
Healthcare in rural areas was to a large extent left to the initiative of missions. In 
fact, Kalumba quoted Haslam, who reported that he was told on arrival in Northern 
Rhodesia in 1936 that he was to leave ‘African work’ to the missions, who possessed 
the missionary spirit that government did not have. In 1935 there were 27 mission 
medical institutions, of which 6 were run by qualified practitioners, and by 1946 this 
had grown to 75 mission health posts. Kalumba reported that these mission health 
services were partially funded by the colonial government, and the government 
consulted with the North Rhodesian Christian Council about mission medical services. 
He also reported criticisms that missions would provide services primarily to their own 
congregations and that medical work was at times considered subservient to gospel 
work. It would not be unusual for missionary medical or nursing staff not to be replaced 
for over a year or for staff to be absent for weeks conducting evangelical tours. The 
government health department also reportedly criticised some missions for their atti-
tudes towards venereal diseases.32 Some would not treat these diseases, considering 
them sinful, while others would charge fees for this treatment when other services were 
free.33 
After the Federation with South Rhodesia and Nyasaland had been created, responsi-
bility for healthcare policy and provision was shared between the federal and territorial 
governments. An issue for Zambian nationalist politicians had been the equity of 
spending between the parts of the federation, as there was a fear of revenues from the 
                                                 
30  Ibid. 84, quoting Haslam. 
31  Ibid. 86. 
32  In modern jargon, sexually transmitted infections (STIs). 
33  Ibid. 86-89. 
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north flowing to public service provision in the south. Kalumba also wrote of inequity 
in healthcare spending and investment. Of course, Southern Rhodesia had a different 
socio-political and economic position, having undergone a more significant influx and 
settlement of Europeans. While there were significant internal disparities in Southern 
Rhodesian healthcare, there were more high-standard hospitals, and more financial and 
human resources than in the north. Even in rural areas, there was a healthcare system 
based on wide access to hospital care with 61 rural hospitals and 11 rural health centres 
compared with 28 hospitals and 133 rural health centres in the north34. In the Zambian 
part of the federation, the health sector expanded, despite the fact that investment was 
biased towards the south, but internal inequalities continued in the territory. Kalumba 
wrote that health services were primarily designed for the white settler population. 
Whereas there were 6.5 beds per 1,000 Europeans, there were 2.5 beds per 1,000 Afri-
cans in government and mission hospitals.  
It will be no surprise that human resources, or manpower as it was called at the time, 
were lacking. We saw above that in the British South Africa Company era, available 
personnel were modest in numbers, and that in mission institutions qualified staff could 
be lacking and ‘native medial assistants’ were ‘imperfectly trained’. Nevertheless, 
numbers of staff working in healthcare had expanded. By 1951, 300 Europeans were 
working in public health, both in medical professions and as administrative personnel. 
At the same, there were 786 Africans working in the sector, mostly as medical assistants 
and clerks.35 In Chapter 1 it was noted that very limited education opportunities existed 
for Africans in the colonial period. Kalumba quoted Mwanakatwe that at Independence 
there were only 100 university graduates and 1200 Zambians with full secondary-school 
certificates.36 It can be assumed37 that many of the medical assistants before their 
training had only a few years of formal education. As regards more advanced training, it 
was not until 1959 that the first three Zambian men were sent to South Africa on a 
government bursary to study to become medical doctors.38 Thus, at Independence, the 
human resource base of the health system, as with the entire public sector, was still 
predominantly based on European professional labour.  
Having described the evolution of the public health sector that the nationalist govern-
ment of Kaunda inherited in 1964, Kalumba concluded that the allocation of healthcare 
resources between Europeans and Africans, between urban and rural areas, remained 
fundamentally unequal. This was in spite of the colonial health plans that had been 
made by his historical ‘predecessor’, Haslam, as well as subsequent administrative 
reforms by the colonial and federal health services. In interviews,39 also, Kalumba 
asserted that the colonial health sector was mainly designed to serve the white settler 
population and to keep Africans healthy as a labour population. Other healthcare claims 
were ‘down-classed’ by the policy discourse of administrators. ‘The politico-administra-
tive structure made it unthinkable for health policy planners to question the allocative 
logic of the health care benefit structure across racial or regional lines’. Kalumba further 
claimed that the advances that were indeed made in expanding health services to 
                                                 
34  Both governmental and mission. 
35  Ibid. 102. 
36  Ibid. 116. 
37  This was also confirmed by an elderly respondent who trained as a medical assistant. LB0809/05. 
38  Ibid. 124. 
39  This was echoed in an interview with another architect of the health reforms, a former senior official 
of the Ministry of Health. ML0706/03. 
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Africans were part of a strategy of ‘normalisation’ rather than the alternative strategy 
employed by colonial authorities: Repression. He argued that a ‘scheme of perception’ 
was created that there were welfare benefits to being a colonial subject.40  
The perspective chosen by Kalumba in framing his narrative thus highlights the 
moral problem of inequity. This is, however, but one of the aspects that characterises 
the evolution of the health sector that Zambians had inherited from the colonial period. 
This moral perspective, however, phrased in social science discourse, eclipses an 
empirical observation that can also be made from the data Kalumba presented in his 
dissertation. This observation is that a system for service provision (however imperfect) 
had been created and had seen a significant expansion in an area where those services 
had been unknown before. It is easy for me to sympathise with this focus on inequity, 
coming from a field of work and studies that aims at pro-poor development. However, 
regardless of normative considerations, there is a rational explanation for the emphasis 
on equity, as it fits in well with the political discourse of the independence struggle. 
Given that the aim was to gain power though the support of the populace, this discourse 
naturally did not focus on the benefits created by colonial rule. Rather, the focus was on 
the injustice of the down-classing of the indigenous/autochthonous majority of the 
population: The fact that whites had access and blacks, as second-class citizens, did not. 
That the ideology of the independence struggle inspired Kalumba in the writing of his 
dissertation and his subsequent political endeavours is evident from the acknowledge-
ments he presents in his thesis. He dedicates his research to his father Katele Mushima 
and a comrade who for him symbolised the ‘silent UNIP nationalist majority’, who were 
detained during the Cha Cha Cha nationalist struggle for independence and who to-
gether with Kalumba watched ‘with awe the fading of a social democratic vision’.41 We 
will now continue our exploration of the history of the Zambian health sector through 
Kalumba’s dissertation by looking at the post-colonial period up to the mid-1980s. This 
will shine light on this perceived ‘fading of a social democratic vision’, or what Ka-
lumba calls ‘the eclipse of idealism’.42 
 
Kalumba on Health ‘reform’ in the Kaunda era 
As Kaunda’s post-Independence UNIP-government came to power in 1964, it presented 
a political programme aimed at development based on the principles of equal op-
portunities. This reflected a nationalist ideology, which was initially labelled African 
democratic socialism but was later given the label humanism. In the health sector, UNIP 
undertook to provide free healthcare to its citizens and to ensure that every Zambian 
would be at walking distance from a health centre and at a reasonable distance from a 
fully equipped hospital.43 Kalumba, however, claimed that soon after Independence 
these political objectives were transmuted into administrative ones and that rather than 
basing health sector allocation on a logic of equitable access in response to popular 
demands, allocations were based on a logic of scarcity, reflected in bureaucratic regu-
lation.44 In the first major national policy framework, the first national development 
                                                 
40  Kalumba, ‘The practice’, 102. 
41  Ibid. Acknowledgements, page unnumbered.  
42  The title of an academic article co-authored by Freund, P.J., K. Kalumba & P.J. Freund, ‘The eclipse 
of idealism’. Journal of Health Policy and Planning (1989). 
43  On this, Kalumba quoted Kaunda: Ibid. 128 and 180.  
44  Ibid. 130. 
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plan,45 healthcare had to compete with policy priorities such as economic diversifi-
cation, infrastructure development, and education and was only allocated 2.1 per cent of 
public investment, though actual expenditures were 50 per cent more than planned. 
As healthcare had been partially a federal responsibility before Independence, the 
relatively small territorial headquarters in Lusaka, tasked with implementing the 
policies of the federal ministry in Salisbury, had to be transformed into a Ministry of 
Health. Meanwhile, considering the shortage of educated Zambians and the emigration 
of personnel following Zambia’s independence, the ministry had to depend on a few 
colonial officers willing to stay behind. Because of the lack of staff, these officers not 
only bore the burden of carrying out routine tasks but also retained continued control 
over the sector. Formally, the head of the ministry was the minister, who was assisted 
by a parliamentary secretary. The top-ranking civil servant, meanwhile, was the perma-
nent secretary, who was also director of Medical Services. While the minister and the 
parliamentary secretary were responsible for publicly articulating issues of public 
health, as well as controlling the public health bureaucracy to ensure that it was in-line 
with government policy, Kalumba doubted they provided effective executive leadership. 
He attributed this to the fact that bureaucrats saw these politicians as uneducated and 
unable to grasp the issues involved in public health.46  
This tension between black politicians and white civil servants illustrates for the 
health sector what the entire Zambian public sector faced. How could an administrative 
bureaucracy, not only inherited from colonial rule but also staffed by officers who 
arguably retained a colonial administrative dispensation, be used as an instrument to 
attained nationalist political objectives. As we saw in Chapter 1, there was thus an 
evident political motive for tightening political control over the bureaucracy, originating 
in a political mistrust of bureaucracy. In the health sector this political control was 
ostensibly increased by replacing the parliamentary secretary with a minister of state 
who, like the minister of health, was also a member of the National Assembly and 
appointed by the president. The permanent secretary was also appointed by the presid-
ent, though the secretary had to be a qualified medical doctor. At the end of the 1970s 
this was a Nigerian, who was also director of medical services and the president’s per-
sonal physician.47  
Kalumba provided an illustration of a concrete issue in which the struggle between 
Zambian politicians and expatriate technocrats came to the fore. In the years after 1964 
a parliamentary bill had been drafted to create a Medical Council. This council would 
be charged with regulating and registering the medical and allied professions such as 
dentists, pharmacists, and paramedical staff. During consultations, however, the Med-
ical Association, which represented doctors and consisted primarily of Europeans, had 
objected to two provisions of the draft bill. They felt that the minister could only 
designate qualifications for professionals after the council had approved and that mem-
bers of the council should not be appointed by the minister, but rather by the profes-
sions. The Cabinet, however, rejected the modifications proposed by the Medical 
Association. Then in 1966, despite an appeal by the association to its members not to 
accept an invitation to the council, the council was established. This, according to 
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Kalumba, showed that the government was politically determined not to be dictated to 
by expatriate professional interests.48  
In the first years after Independence, the ministry headquarters was expanded from 
an establishment of 63, including the minister, to 101 in 1965, to 165 by 1967. In 
practice, however, the actual staffing in these years was only 48, 66 and 94, respec-
tively. The main shortfalls were at clerical and lower levels. The ministry was in 
practice divided into three divisions: Medical services, preventive services, and admini-
strative services, which were headed by the permanent secretary’s deputies. Also as of 
1968, in-line with the government’s idea of ‘decentralisation within centralisation’, 
some administrative responsibilities were delegated to the provincial level as well as the 
largest hospitals. At provincial level, there was a provincial medical officer assisted by a 
provincial medical assistant and a provincial health inspector. Administrative, person-
nel, and financial issues at this level were put under senior executive officers.49  
Service-delivery level saw a truly enormous expansion in the first few years after 
Independence. According to figures collected by Kalumba from Ministry of Health 
reports, the number of hospitals in the country grew from 48 in 1964 to 76 in 1971.50 
The government constructed 17 of these new hospitals, the missions 9, and the mines 2. 
This meant that the total number of beds and cots in hospitals grew by 55 per cent from 
7,710 to 11,919. At health centre level the expansion was also enormous. In rural areas 
over the same time period, the number of government and mission health centres grew 
from 250 to 418.51 The number of urban and industrial clinics meanwhile grew from 56 
to 138.52 Whereas the absolute expansion of health centres was far greater in rural areas, 
with 168 new rural centres constructed, the relative expansion was higher in urban 
areas, as the number of urban clinics grew by 146 per cent, compared to a 67 per cent 
growth of rural clinics. Although the growth in the number of health centres (82 per 
cent) was relatively greater than the growth of the number of hospitals (58 per cent), the 
number of beds and cots in health centres grew only by 29 per cent to a little over 
4,000.53 Thus, the number of facilities grew at a faster rate in rural areas than in urban 
areas, while the bed capacity did not.  
At the same time, this expansion of physical healthcare infrastructure was taking 
place in a context of a structural shortage of human resources. Kalumba reported that at 
the time of Independence there were only 151 doctors in the country, of which 77 were 
employed by the government, 47 were working for the mines, and 27 were in mis-
sionary service.54 As reported above, only 3 of these doctors were in fact Zambian. It 
comes then as no surprise that training of medical staff was a considerable priority for 
the health sector. In 1968, pre-clinical teaching of medical students had begun at the 
University of Zambia. Two years later a school of medicine was established, linked to 
what has since become known as the UTH in Lusaka. The first batch of graduates 
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attained their full medical qualifications in 1973.55 A consultants’ report commissioned 
by the World Health Organization in 1966 had recommended an initial intake of be-
tween 40 and 56 students.56 According to one of the second batch of students, however, 
in his output there were 13 qualified doctors, 4of whom were black Zambians.57 In 
establishing the medical school, the aim had been to produce doctors in accordance with 
international standards and competence, though with special experience in preventative 
and social medicine relevant for a developing country and specifically for rural areas. At 
the same time, a programme of training nurses in accordance with international pro-
fessional standards was established at the teaching hospital. State-registered nurses were 
trained in a four-year programme. The syllabus followed was the state-of-the-art in 
nursing, modelled after recent training reforms for nurses in Britain. The ministry 
disregarded the criticism of this system, that it imposed a too-heavy burden on limited 
resources.58  
Since before Independence, a system of training nursing auxiliaries and female 
medical assistants had existed. This system was reformed to train Zambian enrolled 
nurses, preparing them specially for practical nursing duties. The regular nursing syl-
labus was condensed, leaving out more theoretical training, and the course was short-
ened to three years, despite protests from doctors and nurses who felt this threatened 
professional care. The programme for male medical assistants,59 however, was expand-
ed to four years. This cadre was specially trained as medical auxiliaries in smaller 
hospitals and for independent practice at rural health centres. The training programme, 
however, was structured to allow for a career perspective. As Kalumba rightly remark-
ed, this not only meant upward career mobility but also spatial mobility: From rural to 
urban areas. Finally, health inspectors were trained at Evelyn Hone College, though this 
was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Local Government, not Health. Mean-
while, for all professional categories, examinations were conducted along the standards 
of the Royal Society of Health in London.60  
Although the decision-making processes involved have not been studied in detail, it 
is striking to note two logics that played a role in these reforms. One logic valued 
international professional standards, which may have biased urban areas as it may have 
imparted skills less appropriate for rural healthcare: Higher standards correspond with 
more complex technology, which needs infrastructure and resources more commonly 
found in urban centres. At the same time, there was a separate categorisation made by 
training medical assistants to be specially suited for work in rural areas. This thus fits in 
with Kalumba’s argument on down-classing. Another logic involved the gender roles in 
healthcare, which reaffirmed professional categories for men and women, by which men 
were categorised higher than women, as we saw in the distinction made between male 
and female medical assistants. Kalumba recognised the gender categorisation here, but 
he could have also termed this gender down-classing. Without further study, it is im-
possible to analyse the interests and perspectives of different stakeholders in the process 
that led to these policy decisions. As it would be nearly impossible to retrospectively 
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reconstruct this for the period discussed, it is more feasible to look at health workers’ 
perspectives in the present, as we did in the earlier part of this dissertation.  
Getting back to the late 1960s, the policy aim of the focus on training in the early 
post-Independence years was not only to respond to shortages, but also to Zambianise 
the staff establishment of the health sector. As we saw in the description of the political 
and bureaucratic top of the ministry and in the illustration of the creation of the Medical 
Council, the fault-line of African politicians and European technocrats had its tensions. 
In part, this was based upon the mistrust of the politicians as to whether expatriate 
technocrats would or could further the nationalist political aims of government. Ka-
lumba noted that official plans framed this discourse on Zambianisation in terms of 
‘national security’, and that ‘patriotic’ support was expected from policy analysts.61 It 
can also be assumed that providing jobs for ‘the people’ UNIP was representing, in-
cluding ordinary Zambians, party members, and relatives was an important motivation 
for this policy62. The policy of Zambianisation can thus be argued to have been an 
instrument in the struggle for control over the sector, including the benefits this meant 
such as access to jobs.63  
The other side of this argument, however, was provided by the logic of valuing 
professional standards and qualifications, or what can be referred to as the merit 
principle. This limited the possibilities for Africans to claim job opportunities to the 
capacity to train staff. The possibilities to overcome shortages by training were limited. 
At the same time. the need for manpower was growing together with the physical 
expansion of health facilities. Thus, recruitment of expatriate medical staff remained 
necessary for much of the immediate future. By 1969 the number of doctors in Zambia 
had grown from 151 to 527, of whom only 19 were Zambian nationals. The government 
employed 333 doctors, including 19 at the university. The missions had 37 doctors 
working for them and the mines and industry employed 94.64  
In the years running up to the establishment of the one-party state, Zambian planners 
undertook to create a second national development plan. This process included the 
drafting of sectoral development plans, including a ten-year national health plan for 
1972 to 1981.65 This plan was prepared by a committee under the chairmanship of the 
permanent secretary and made up of three other senior Ministry of Health officials, a 
member of the National Assembly, a representative of the World Health Organization, 
one representative of the medical services of the mines and one for the missions, two 
academics, and a representative from the Ministry of Planning. The committee was 
supported by a consultant in health planning from the World Health Organization. Only 
two of the members of the committee were not medical doctors, thus suggesting, 
according to Kalumba, a significant technical rather than political bias.66  
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The main thrust of the plan was the comprehensive development of ‘basic health 
services’, which were seen as primary needs that should be accessible to all Zambians 
throughout the country. ‘In keeping with the socialist policies of the government’,67 
both hospital and ambulatory (out-patient) care was to be available free of charge to 
each citizen. The plan would also place greater emphasis on the prevention of disease 
and on health education, which coincided with a conceptual shift from medical to 
health.68 Kalumba argued in his analysis of this process that the ‘basic needs’ focus of 
this national health plan was consistent with the contemporary discourse of the World 
Health Organization and other agencies such as the International Labour Organization. 
This influence is not surprising, considering the composition of the planning committee 
and the fact that the plan had been realised with the technical and financial support of 
the World Health Organization. Moreover, Kalumba stressed that in contrast to a 
country like Tanzania, there was no publicly articulated challenge to the policy planning 
of the committee. He thus concluded that the plan was the product of an internal bureau-
cratic process of public resource management, influenced by the discourses of donor 
agencies.69 Meanwhile, Kalumba failed to signal that this donor discourse of ‘basic 
needs’ was used alongside the political discourse of free healthcare, thus suggesting 
alignment of discourses rather than a conflict. 
The ten-year plan analysed by Kalumba presented a reorganisation and expansion of 
the ministry headquarters, with a fourth department added under an extra deputy direc-
tor, who would be primarily occupied with planning. While Kalumba argued that this 
expansion was motivated by the fact that in the years since Independence the establish-
ment of the ministry had nearly trebled, he did conclude that this had led to the estab-
lishment of a huge medical bureaucracy that did not suggest the primacy of rural health 
care, but rather the ‘increased concentration of central bureaucratic control’.70 Later 
policy proposals recommended further expansion of the ministry headquarters, includ-
ing the upgrading of assistant directors to directors, but Kalumba admitted having 
difficulty piecing together these policy developments and their impact owing to limited 
data.71  
At the same time, the plan suggested reinforcing the provincial medical officers’ 
offices with an extra assistant, a trained finance officer, and a statistical clerk. It was 
also decided to fully delegate authority over the administration of health services in a 
province to the provincial medical officer. On the district level, the plan proposed the 
establishment of 42 health districts in the areas not served by the 8 city or municipal 
councils. These health districts would be administered by a district medical officer, who 
was responsible for supervising health activities in the district and developing an 
integrated health service. The offices of these health districts would be located at district 
hospitals, where these existed, and be the link between the central administration and 
peripheral basic health service delivery. This means that in the early 1970s the organisa-
tional level was instituted that would receive so much attention in the later reforms, 
after Kalumba had shifted from policy analyst to policy maker.  
The ten-year plan put forward a structure for the peripheral organisation of basic 
health service delivery. As was the case in the strategic plan that we analysed in Annex 
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I, in the extreme periphery of the system, health posts were proposed. These would be 
located in existing buildings, such as schools or church buildings, where staff from 
health centres would visit on a weekly basis. Health centres would see a division into 
sub-centres and centres, previously referred to as stage I and stage II health centres, 
respectively. Sub-centres would be staffed with one or two medical assistants, an en-
rolled nurse with midwifery training or an enrolled midwife, a health assistant, and 
unskilled support staff. A total of 164 of such sub-centres were proposed, at a planned 
rate of 20 per year over the years 1972-1976 and 22 per year in the years leading up to 
1981. Health centres (stage II), of which in 1972 there were only 3, with 6 under 
construction, would be larger facilities and also have a supervisory role over sub-
centres. These were to be staffed by two or three medical assistants, an enrolled midwife 
(or an enrolled nurse with midwifery training), a health assistant, a laboratory assistant, 
a dispenser, and a driver (and a vehicle), in addition to support staff. Forty-four of these 
centres were foreseen by the end of the planned period, 20 to be built in the period up to 
1977 and 24 thereafter.  
A special focus was given to the district health headquarters, which would combine a 
district hospital, or health centre where there was no hospital yet, with the office of the 
district medical officer. From here, not only curative care and supervision was to be 
provided but also programmes of preventative health and disease control. These 
facilities would have one or two medical doctors in addition to supportive professional 
and non-professional staff, and one or two vehicles. In Kabwe Rural, in central Zambia 
at an hour’s drive from Lusaka, a demonstration project was planned with support from 
the World Health Organization and the United Nations Development Programme. This 
project would develop both curative and preventative activities in an integrated basic 
health programme. In the meantime, larger hospitals, such as the UTH in Lusaka, were 
to be re-built and expanded with extra bed-capacity, and 12 new hospitals were to be 
built, notably at district health headquarters.72  
Despite these intentions, the rate of expansion of health facilities in the years covered 
by this plan did not mirror the impressive rate of expansion of the earlier years. In fact, 
in the period from 1972 to 1982, only 5 government hospitals were indeed constructed, 
an increase of 6.5 per cent. In comparison, the years from 1964 to 1972 had seen an 
increase of more than 58 per cent, from 48 to 76 hospitals. The expansion in the number 
of government clinics during the period of the plan, at a rate of 36 per cent, is also 
significantly lower than the rate of expansion between independence and 1972, when 
the number of facilities grew by 74 percent. Nevertheless, and it is striking that this does 
not appear in Kalumba’s analysis but only in the data he presented, the number of rural 
health centres did in fact increase by 152 in the period of the plan.73 Compared to a 
planned construction of 164 sub-centres and 44 centres, this does fall somewhat short, 
though not dramatically so.  
It should be kept in mind that this period coincided with a negative change in 
Zambia’s economic fortunes. Copper prices as well as copper production decreased and 
oil prices rose, and the global oil crises of the 1970s further deteriorated the country’s 
terms of trade. This had its impact on the availability of resources. At the same time, the 
health sector’s proportion of total government expenditure fluctuated around an average 
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of 5.5 per cent.74 This meant that the health sector would have to ration allocations. At 
the same time, however, Kalumba cited a report by the ministry and various donors that 
there was much under-utilisation of resources in rural areas. In fact, in 1981 he reports 
that only 21 per cent of the allocations to rural health centres were actually spent. While 
owing to bureaucratic financial constraints, millions of Kwatcha were returned to the 
Ministry of Finance, health centres were lacking such essentials as paper and bicycles. 
Kalumba attributed this institutional inefficiency to the slow re-imbursement process 
from headquarters and provincial authorities,75 rather than to lack of individual initia-
tive.76 This problem also applied to capital development, where only the health minis-
try’s budget was spent in 1981. This might be a factor in explaining the discrepancy 
between planned facilities and the number actually built.  
This lack of absorptive capacity at local level, caused in part by bureaucratic con-
straints, might be one factor explaining the unequal distribution of financial resources at 
the time. In 1981, ministry headquarters, training, and research took some 23 per cent of 
expenditures in the health sector, the Copperbelt received 18 per cent, Lusaka including 
the university training hospital took 19 per cent, and all other provinces combined 40 
per cent. Comparing total per capita spending, provinces along the line-of-rail were 
even better off, receiving on average 75 per cent more than rural provinces. The health 
spending of the mining medical service augmented this discrepancy. Reflecting on the 
Zambian state policy discourse that had problematised this rural/urban divide by 
defining it as unacceptable and needing change, Kalumba concluded that state planning 
had failed. It had not been able to significantly restructure the investment and allocation 
pattern in favour of rural areas. The existing patterns, Kalumba concluded, were less 
than optimal, not in terms of efficiency but in terms of the political question of social 
entitlements.77      
Not only were financial resources lacking and unequally divided in the Zambian 
health sector of the Second Republic, but this also applied to human resources. It 
became clear above that the health sector had faced a situation of manpower shortage. 
The ten-year health plan continued the policies of increased training and Zambiani-
sation. The plan set a target that by the end of the period covered, eighty per cent of the 
professional and technical grades of the public health service should have been 
Zambianised. From 1971 to 1981, the number of health workers had more than doubled 
from some 37,000 to some 85,000. Data from 1982 suggests that this included 220 
doctors in government employment. In total there were 821 doctors and other medical 
specialists, of whom 300 were Zambian. These doctors were, moreover, unequally dis-
tributed over the country. Forty government doctors out of 220 were working in a single 
hospital, the UTH in Lusaka. Of all doctors, 82 per cent were working in line-of-rail 
provinces, while only 13 per cent of government doctors were working in district hos-
pitals. None of these doctors were Zambian. Thus, the modest increase in training 
Zambian doctors hardly filtered down to rural areas. Moreover, there was a significant 
shortage of precisely the cadres that the ten-year plan had focussed on with its emphasis 
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on basic health, such as midwives and health assistants were lacking at health centres. 
Also among cadres such as medical assistants78 and nurses, there was a bias in dis-
tribution towards line-of-rail provinces and away from rural areas.79  
Kalumba provided little insight into the extent to which staff at the ministry 
headquarters had been Zambianised. From interview data, we know that in the 1970s 
there had been a Nigerian permanent secretary, who later moved to the World Health 
Organization.80 Kalumba did indicate that there were frequent reshuffles of senior 
officials at the ministry. For example, after a long-serving permanent secretary, who 
was also serving as director of Medical Services, left Zambia in 1984, four different 
permanent secretaries had served up to 1986.81 One can assume, however, that due to 
the trend to tighten the political grip over the ministry, many senior positions had been 
the first to be Zambianised as soon as qualified Zambians became available. In the 
periphery, meanwhile, most senior qualified staff remained expatriates, as among 53 
district medical officers there were no Zambians and only 2 of the 9 provincial medical 
officers were not expatriates. It can thus be deduced from these data that there was a 
tendency for the scarcest Zambian human resources to be distributed in the socio-
geographic centre of the country. The question that this raises, however, is whether this 
was a result of the bureaucratic structure and allocation mechanisms, or an aggregate 
result of the agency of the numerous individuals involved.  
Assessing Kalumba’s thesis 
Katele Kalumba was successful in describing inequalities that have dogged the Zambian 
health system since its emergence in colonial times and throughout its evolution. None 
of the governments, neither the colonial and federal administration nor the governments 
of the first and Second Republic, have been able to change the unequal distribution of 
resources. The theoretical arguments he used to explain this, however, are predominant-
ly reduced to structuralist arguments blind to the human factor that shaped this ine-
quality. His argument was that owing to the statist logic driving the health sector, the 
pyramidal structure of the sector based upon a referral system had never been chal-
lenged by bureaucrats and policy makers. Moreover, he placed particular emphasis on 
the discursive strategies that were employed in what he saw as rural down-classing. He 
argued that policy discourses used categorisations – distinguishing the complex needs of 
the urban population from the less complex needs of the rural population – which 
followed formulaic criteria. As an example, he takes primary health care, which he sees 
as reducing the complexity of rural health needs and thus contributing to the status 
quo.82 Furthermore, by apparently replacing curative by preventative needs, primary 
health care could be seen as ‘political gimmicks, which are designed to repress the 
needs of rural people’.83 One contradictory element in this argument is that he equally 
accuses policy discourse of aiming but failing to reduce rural-urban disparities. Are 
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these policies then hollow and ineffective, or are they effective instruments of down-
classing? 
Moreover, these arguments are in my view one-sided and reductionist and do not do 
justice to the rich data Kalumba presented in his detailed study of policy documents. 
The predominant impression one gets from focussing on the gap between rural and 
urban areas is one of continuity: Historically there was inequality and this has persisted 
into contemporary times. While there are merits and logic to this argument, which we 
will revisit below, it passes over the fact that in absolute terms the health sector had 
undergone an impressive expansion and investment even in rural areas. By 1982 there 
were more than 500 government-run rural health centres, whereas at Independence there 
had been less than 200, and 50 years before that there had been none.  
In his theoretical arguments Kalumba also seems to diminish the importance of the 
issue of scarcity of resources. He refers to scarcity as a policy discourse that justifies the 
logic of down-classing, rather than a reality that places limits on bureaucratic practice.84 
Considering the economic fate of Zambia throughout the 1970s and 1980s and the im-
pact this had on public finances, scarcity must have been an objective reality rather than 
merely a policy discourse. In his analysis Kalumba shines little light on the arena in 
which the allocation of these scarce resources was contested. He merely states that rural 
demands were down-classed in favour of urban demands. Here it would be interesting to 
see what influence stakeholders’ agency has in this allocative process, as such a process 
should be seen as the result of a negotiation process based on claims and counter-
claims. Are rural populations in a position to articulate their demands as well as 
urbanites? Are professional interests – the desire to access high-status technologies 
rather than work in backward rural areas – of overriding importance? We could specu-
late on this, but it is clear that such human aspects were left out of Kalumba’s analysis.  
Certainly when it comes down to the scarcity of one factor – human resources – in 
the production of health services, human agency must have an important part to play. 
From Kalumba’s data we can deduce that throughout its existence, the Zambian health 
sector has had to operate under conditions of striking shortages of human resources, 
particularly of qualified health workers of Zambian African origin. The actions and 
strategies of these scarce individuals must have had an influence on the distribution of 
resources within the sector, not least on their own spatial distribution. It seems that 
Zambian health workers, like so many others, seem to gravitate away from the peri-
phery towards the centre of a society, where opportunities for accumulation of scarce 
resources exist. Policies may have articulated a challenge to this social law of gravity, 
but have not been able to reverse it. Perhaps in a context in which there was less of a 
shortage of resources more could have been contributed to peripheral areas. But in the 
context of the economic decline, this apparently was not the case. 
Another shortcoming in Kalumba’s analysis is his lack of focus on the inefficiencies 
within the system. There was no focus on spillages or leakages of resources. He demon-
strated that a large part of allocations to the sector were not in fact spent and concluded 
that this was due to bureaucratic bottlenecks. Kalumba did not go further, however, in 
analysing to what extent these bottlenecks had been increased or decreased in the period 
after decolonisation. In the political document presented above, for instance, Kalumba 
made a bold statement about ‘UNIP political patronage’. In his empirical analysis, 
however, he did not touch upon these allegations other than stating that with the 
                                                 
84  Ibid. 130 and 366. 
178 
 
ideology of ‘unity of political and administrative agents’ the distinction between public 
and private spheres was increasingly diffused.85 He failed, however, to detail what em-
pirically observed actions or behaviours underlined this point. Thus, while he criticised 
the policy rhetoric of the political-bureaucratic system, he did not base his conclusions 
on an analysis of socio-political practice behind the façade of these policy documents.  
Notwithstanding some analytical shortcomings in Kalumba’s dissertation, it provided 
considerable insight into the background of the health reform process that Kalumba 
together with others would spearhead a few years later. This contribution fits into two 
areas: First, the insight provided into the historical background of the sector; and 
second, the insight into the intellectual justification for the health reforms. The disser-
tation described the establishment and the evolution of a health sector that was inherited 
by the Zambian nationalist government on Independence. Within a context of human 
resource shortage and a policy of Zambianisation, the sector was further expanded from 
the centre in Lusaka into the rural periphery. We saw how in the late-1960s some 
functions were delegated to provincial authorities and that health districts were later 
created in the early 1970s. This is thus at odds with the image of the health sector at the 
time as statically centralised; in fact, some steps had been taken from centralisation to 
decentralisation, albeit at a very slow pace. Nevertheless, this demonstrates that the 
decentralisation that took place as part of the health reforms was grafted onto the longer 
process of forming the sector.  
As regards the justification for health reforms, we have examined Kalumba’s argu-
ment that the UNIP government, rather than fundamentally challenging the pyramidal 
structure of the health sector, had reinforced a system that perpetuated inequality in 
access to healthcare. It is evident that this argument contrasts with the expectations that 
people like Kalumba and his father, the ‘freedom fighter’, had had of independence. It is 
thus clear how this conviction grounded in empirical analysis calls for a second 
liberation, as would be offered by the movement that led to the overthrow of the one-
party state. More specifically for the health sector, it is apparent that this argument 
emphasised the need for a fundamental rethinking of the structure of the health sector, 
to ensure that the ‘real social discrepancies in health care between regions and within 
regions’ were indeed rectified. In the following sections, we will see to what extent 
Kalumba appeared successful in this pursuit, or whether he succumbed to the ‘pitfalls’ 
of past reform efforts, or indeed whether he lived to see his own ‘eclipse of idealism’.  
In the meanwhile, however, we will trace the steps he and others with him took to 
implement the concepts of the health reforms in a political-bureaucratic arena. First we 
must pause at the moment in which Kalumba graduated from being an academic and 
policy strategist to taking up a decision-making role. In an apparent attempt to foster the 
image of a technocrat, which he was keen to portray and to downplay any political 
opportunism he might have had, Kalumba said he did not expect to become a deputy 
minister after helping out in the election campaign. In fact, he claimed, he had been 
packing his bags to go to back to Canada, where he said he had a wife. He had received 
various job offers from international organisations which he was considering. Then, to 
his surprise, he had heard Chiluba announce his appointment as deputy minister of 
health86 and nominated Member of Parliament. And, apparently, one cannot refuse the 
call to public service.  
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This chapter set the stage for our narrative on the health reforms and how they were 
driven and used and even manipulated by political actors. We have explored the origin 
of the health reforms and how they originated from their political and historical context. 
Thus, while external influences certainly played a role, the health reforms were firmly 
rooted within Zambian reality. The analysis in this chapter has highlighted that the 
health reforms (like any policy process) were not just a technocratic process in 
bureaucratic isolation. Rather, they are a historically and politically rooted set of ideas, 
which would have an impact on how the health sector would be organised. Moreover, 
since political processes of policy formulation and implementation are human proces-
ses, an attempt was made to highlight the human factor at play. One way of doing so is 
to pay attention to the personalities who played a role in shaping these processes. As 
such, we examined Katele Kalumba, a broker of ideas who played a key role in this 
process, and some of his writings. In later chapters other key actors will also be intro-
duced. This will allow us to examine how the ideas presented in this chapter were used 
as opportunities for actors to serve both their personal interests and the political interests 
of the regime to which they related.  
While examining Katele Kalumba’s dissertation in order to understand his inspira-
tion for assembling a discourse of Zambian health reform, we equally gained insight 
into the institutional history of the Zambian health sector, as a proxy of the Zambian 
state itself. Beyond an array of successive ideologies and discourses (varying colonial 
and nationalist ideologies and critiques), we saw how a sector of the state was 
established and how it increased its geographical presence. A noteworthy phase in this 
process was independence: The transfer of legal ownership of the sector from foreign to 
indigenous control. Independence, however, exacerbated the pre-existing characteristic 
of the sector: The availability of resources – and particularly human resources – was far 
outweighed by what was needed. From Kalumba’s dissertation – though his analysis 
paid little attention to the human factor itself – we can deduce that Zambian politicians 
with little experience in managing a health sector, together with four Zambian doctors, 
inherited a system largely managed by foreigners. In the subsequent decades they would 
expand and Zambianise the sector. As we saw in the earlier Human Factor section, the 
relative scarcity of Zambian human resources in the health sector empowered health 
workers claims on the system to provide for them, while at the same time weakening the 
power of the system to discipline them for issues other than disloyalty. Thus, the strate-
gies of instrumentalising state resources and systems, strategies central to this disserta-






The first years of implementation  
Having described how the health reforms had been conceived in the latter days of the 
UNIP era, let us now look at the early years of implementing the health reforms. In this 
section, we will take a chronological approach to examining the events, policies, and 
issues involved in realising the health reforms, as well as focussing on the main political 
protagonists who influenced this process.  
The implementation of the health reforms involved a process of translating the 
academic and political ideas and discourse of the reforms into a political-bureaucratic 
reality. In this process of translation, Kalumba’s concepts were further elaborated, but 
also confronted with vested interests both within and outside the sector. One case in 
point can be illustrated by Boniface Kawimbe, the new Minister of Health, to whom 
Kalumba had been appointed as deputy. Kawimbe, a surgeon by profession, was seen as 
a champion of the cause of tertiary hospitals, while the reforms were aimed at priori-
tising basic healthcare in rural areas. The National Health Strategies which are pre-
sented early in this chapter illustrate how the need to appease the interests of tertiary 
healthcare influenced the early ideas on health reforms. The analysis of this document 
also highlights the influence donors had on the shaping of the health reforms. Finally, it 
is made apparent how the reforms were claimed as part of the democratisation discourse 
of the newly elected, ruling MMD.  
As is suggested by the factors influencing the process of policy formulation, this 
process did not take place in bureaucratic isolation. Rather, it took place against the 
backdrop of severe challenges for the health sector. As the MMD was settling in, the 
public health system was facing strains which led to significant cholera outbreaks. At 
the same time, health workers had started agitating for better conditions of service, 
which proved to the political management of the sector that they were a force to be 
reckoned with. Kawimbe also became involved in a power struggle in which he tried to 
gain control over the management over the UTH by appointing people to the board. As 
such, he would identify his own potential benefit from the health sector and its reforms.  
Another illustration of the arena in which the health reforms were shaped is offered 
by the presentation of a episode of conflict in which the interests of two donors clash 
along with the interests of Zambian and expatriate actors within the health sector. This 
episode shows how donor influence is not matter-of-fact, but rather is contested by 
Zambian actors. This conflict also heralded a long-term process in which donors grad-




This chapter ends with a description of Kawimbe’s fall from grace, which was 
grounded in a conflict between donors and Chiluba’s regime at the highest level. During 
a row in which donors were urging Chiluba to fire ministers accused of drug-smuggling, 
Kawimbe and two colleagues addressed the media without clearance from their boss. 
The colleagues who had a stronger power base were spared, but Kawimbe was sacrifi-
ced for his disloyalty. This illustration contributes to an argument in this dissertation 
that African regimes are more interested in managing loyalty than managing perform-
ance. Kawimbe’s demise as Minister of Health set the stage for an even more contro-
versial and influential minister, who would play an even bigger part in shaping and 
instrumentalising the health reforms, Michael Sata. 
Key actors in the reforms 
When the new government came to power, the chairman of the MMD health committee, 
Boniface Kawimbe, became the first Minister of Health under the Chiluba government. 
According to a fellow doctor, who worked under Kawimbe at the ministry and had been 
his senior at medical school, Kawimbe was a ‘cerebral political tactician’, who had 
already been politically active in the 1970s. He had been part of Simon Kapwepwe’s 
UPP opposition party and was forced to interrupt his studies because of that. After 
completing medical school, however, Kawimbe trained as a surgeon in the United States 
and later went to work as an endocrinologist at the University Teaching Hospital in 
Lusaka. As the MMD was formed in opposition to the one-party state, he joined the 
movement. This former colleague described Kawimbe as being eager and in a hurry to 
push through the MMD’s social reform agenda.1  
At the same time, he was widely seen as championing the cause of hospitals,2 which 
was at odds with the focus in the reforms on the district level. A donor representative 
reported to headquarters in the first months of Kawimbe’s tenure that he seemed well-
intentioned but that as a surgeon he had no experience with primary health care. Rather, 
he was seen as eager to improve curative and institutional care. This attitude was a 
cause of concern for donors who were eager to see a policy oriented towards primary 
health care be approved and implemented.3 A less positive image was painted by a 
former colleague who saw Kawimbe as reckless, lacking leadership and accountability, 
throwing professional ethos away and flying around the country with the flying doctors, 
handing out money the way he saw fit.4 Another claimed that he also had private 
business interests, which was the motivation for one of his first projects being the 
renovation of mortuaries.5 Nevertheless, as the Cabinet minister responsible for health, 
he played an important role in realising the achievements of the first years of the re-
forms, contrary to donors’ fears. 
Kawimbe’s deputy was Katele Kalumba, whom we encountered earlier. As we shall 
see, as deputy minister and later Minister of Health, he not only played a role in pushing 
                                                 
1  ML0811/02. 
2  Lake et al., Analyzing, based on their interview data. This accords with impressions from my own 
interview data. 
3  Note on the Zambian health sector by the Dutch health expert in Lusaka – undated, but probably end-
1991, early-1992. (EKN files, ISN 1701). 
4  ML0810/06. 
5  ML0812/01. 
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the health reforms but also his own political career, becoming one of the most in-
fluential and controversial politicians in Zambia at the time of writing.  
When the new government came into power, top civil servants were also changed. 
This is not surprising, considering the ambiguity that had existed between the ruling 
party and the state. From the perspective of political patronage it would also seem 
logical to appoint someone new, whose loyalties would lie with the one appointing him 
rather than with the former power-holder. Even before his successor had arrived follow-
ing the holiday season of 1991-92, the incumbent permanent secretary had secured a job 
with the World Health Organization in Brazzaville and was packing his bags.6 
According to Kalumba, the new permanent secretary, a medical doctor who had spent 
most of his career working on public health at the municipal level, had been his pre-
ferred candidate as he did not have a curative bias. Rather, he had experience in 
preventative public health.7 For this appointment an overt logic of regional or familial 
patronage does not seem apparent as the new permanent secretary was an easterner and 
not someone from Northern Zambia like the minister, or from Luapula like the deputy 
minister or the president. There is also no reason to suggest he was an active member of 
the political movement that had just assumed power.8  
For the newly appointed deputy permanent secretary, Kashiwa Bulaya, however, a 
strong case for political patronage could be made. This character would, as we shall see 
later, earn considerable notoriety. He had been working at UNIP headquarters as a 
research director and as such was part of the intelligence system.9 He had attained a 
PhD in Bulgaria in a field related to economic planning. According to partially cor-
roborated rumours, he had earned his position by siphoning information from UNIP to 
the MMD.10 Another rumour put forward by a former donor representative, which has 
not been substantiated, was that he was related to President Chiluba.11 However, even 
before the new permanent secretary and his deputy had been appointed, the first sig-
nificant health policy paper of the MMD government had been issued. 
National health policies and strategies 
In December 1991, within the first few months of the new government’s rule, a policy 
document was issued: The National Health Policies and Strategies. According to a 
donor representative, this document had already been prepared by the planning unit of 
the ministry, following broad consultation within the sector and with technical support 
from the World Health Organization. Then, after the MMD had assumed power, the 
document had been revised and elaborated in line with the new ruling party’s health 
policy ambitions. 
This document was introduced by both the minister, Kawimbe, and deputy minister, 
Kalumba.12 Kawimbe’s foreword gave a concise overview of the goals and formal 
process leading to the development of the health reforms. It stated that in January of that 
year, before the MMD had come to power, a national conference had been convened 
                                                 
6  ML0811/02. 
7  ML0706/04, although the new PS himself had mentioned that Kawimbe had appointed him.  
8  ML0811/02. 
9  ML0811/02. 
10  ML0810/06. This was confirmed by Mr. Anamela, a member of the current UNIP leadership, who 
admitted that Bulaya had played a role in undermining UNIP. ML0706/01. 
11  ML0811/01. 
12  Both forewords are presented in full in Annex II. 
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and ‘reviewed the current performance of the Ministry of Health and attempted to 
realign resources and commitments towards objectives which would improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Health Care System’. Kawimbe’s foreword went on 
to state that the MMD had developed a radical reforming policy for health services: 
‘The ruling party manifesto amounts to a fundamental change towards improvements in 
Primary Health Care and Hospital Services’. The key to the reforms, according to this 
foreword, was to delegate authority to autonomous district health boards and hospital 
management boards. At the same time, the ministry would be reduced in size and its 
role would be revised. Kawimbe argued that this would be done to ‘avoid adopting an 
autocratic approach’, and this would mean greater popular involvement in health service 
provision. After describing the steps ahead of implementation and reviewing progress, 
which would take years, the foreword concluded in a lofty, sweeping manner: ‘For the 
first time in our history we have a comprehensive set of policies in which the aspirations 
of the Zambian people for improvements in Health Care are expressed’. 
Kawimbe’s foreword was an apt introduction to the reform process, combining as it 
did the political ideals of a change from autocracy to more participative democracy with 
the ideals of an efficient and effective public service which appropriately aligned 
resources to chosen objectives. Moreover, by emphasising the role of the consultative 
meeting, the national conference leading up to the formulation of this document, the 
suggestion that this document indeed reflected the ‘aspirations of the Zambian people’ 
was strengthened. This presentation of the process lent more legitimacy to the policy 
document than a conclusion that the reforms were the product of an elite process, 
namely the collaboration of reformers within the ministry and professionals with poli-
tical aspirations. The language that is used to describe the national conference,13 how-
ever, suggests that technocrats later attributed meaning14 to a forum at which various 
views and issues were aired by stakeholders, the sum of which views and issues lacked 
coherence or convergence. Finally, by highlighting the role of the MMD in authoring 
these reforms, Kawimbe asserted the new ruling party’s ownership of the process. This 
would ensure that any results of the health reforms could later be claimed by the party.  
Deputy minister Kalumba’s foreword, again put forward two well-known mottos of 
the health reforms: The LAP-principles of leadership, accountability, and partnership, 
and the vision ‘to provide cost-effective quality health care as close to the family as 
possible’. The main thrust of his foreword, however, was the fact that a gap ‘existed 
between the increasingly severe health problems faced by the population and the limited 
resources available to the public health system to respond to them’. In order to over-
come human resource constraints, he stressed the need for ‘capacity building’ and 
reforming the ‘weak support systems that reduce the productivity of existing human 
resources’. In response to financial constraints, Kalumba proposed a comprehensive 
health financing system based on locally sustainable modes of financing, while admit-
ting that ‘external assistance will continue to fill many gaps’. The foreword then went 
on to stress the importance of popular participation in health care delivery and of 
                                                 
13  ‘A National Conference was convened to review the National Health Policies and Strategies. The 
Conference took stock of the current situation in the Health Sector, it reviewed the current perform-
ance of the Ministry of Health and attempted to realign resources and commitments towards ob-
jectives which would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Health Care System’. MoH, 
National Health Policies and Strategies (Lusaka, 1991). 
14  This language is so general that it is in fact difficult to deduce any specific meaning. The language, 
however, leads one to wonder whether this text was entirely authored by Kawimbe or rather was a 
collaboration of his with people from the ministry’s planning unit. 
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fostering direct contact between health management and the people. In this vein, 
Kalumba stressed that decentralisation of health management to the district was not only 
a political imperative, but a practical necessity. Thus, in addition to the district, which 
was the lowest point of health service management, area health boards were suggested 
as a ‘board of directors of community health services’. Other aspects stressed in Ka-
lumba’s foreword were the importance of quality assurance schemes and the need for 
integrating health services, particularly at higher service-delivery levels. He wrapped up 
his foreword by distinguishing the MMD’s approach to policy formulation and planning 
from previous practices. The approach to health care management he envisioned was 
‘an antithesis to dogmatic and mechanical thinking about how a healthy nation could be 
built’. Kalumba concluded: ‘I am hopeful that individuals, their families, communities, 
institutions both public and private and our core-partners in the international community 
will join together in sharing this challenge that our new emerging democracy has set 
itself to meet’. 
Kalumba’s foreword shows a consistency with his earlier documents in its democ-
ratic vision of bringing health care closer to the people. It also takes up the discursive 
instruments of the ‘LAP-principles’ and ‘the vision’ as a means of explaining and 
justifying the reforms which he presented earlier, which he had first introduced in the 
MMD health framework. It is striking, however, that on certain levels he departs from 
his earlier academic thesis. Whereas in his dissertation he had stressed the inequity in 
allocation of resources in geo-spatial terms and within the organisational pyramid of 
health care, this critique of the status quo does not feature explicitly in the foreword we 
have examined here. On the other hand, this critique is implied by the proposed focus 
on the district level of health management and the empowerment of popular influence 
through area health boards, and it also permeates the actual content of the document. A 
plausible explanation for the lack of explicit emphasis on this equity argument is that in 
the process of translating his political and theoretical ideas into an actual policy 
document, Kalumba could no longer dwell in intellectual isolation. Rather, he had to 
engage with stakeholders during the formulation of the national health policies and 
strategies at workshops and in the health-reform steering committee which he chaired. 
In these forums, various representatives of the medical establishment were represented. 
A too-explicit challenge to tertiary curative health care would have been unacceptable to 
these stakeholders. Moreover, Kalumba was formally subservient to Kawimbe, who 
himself had a tertiary curative background and would have been very likely to represent 
these interests. This meant that arguments on rural down-classing had no value in this 
context. Furthermore, whereas in his dissertation he had disregarded arguments putting 
forward the scarcity of resources as a policy discourse justifying bureaucratic regulation 
of the control of these resources, in this foreword Kalumba actively stresses arguments 
of scarcity. One explanation is that as a policy maker he himself had become con-
strained by scarce resources; he could thus no longer negate the objective reality of 
shortages and scarcities. But the argument of financial constraints must also have 
proved useful as an instrument to justify the far-reaching changes proposed by the 
health reforms. The target audience included those stakeholders within the sector who 
would be affected by the reforms, but also the donor community which had been pro-
moting structural adjustment and reform as an answer to the macro-economic crisis of 
the Zambian state. Thus, despite the consistency one may see in this foreword when 
compared with Kalumba’s previous writings, it is also evident that he had to assume a 
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change in language in line with his own change of roles, from an engaged observer to an 
active participant in policy making.  
The National Health Policy and Strategies document was structured into four 
chapters. The first dealt with the existing situation in the health sector, and the second 
put forward the content of the new health policies. A third chapter dwelt exclusively on 
primary health care, a central tenet of the international community’s discourse on health 
care for developing countries at the time, while the final chapter dealt with another 
donor preoccupation: Monitoring and evaluation.  
In the first chapter, on the context of economic decline, demographic pressures and 
the associated health burden were sketched. It was concluded that by the standards of 
the developing world the country had a reasonably established infrastructure and a 
reasonable cadre of health workers, although it was made evident that with the econo-
mic crisis the expansion of health facilities had stagnated, as financial resources for 
health had declined. In Chapter 6 we saw that by the 1970s the expansion of the 
physical infrastructure had declined from the impressive rate of the early independence 
years. The figures presented in this document show that in the 1980s not even one new 
hospital was built by the government (and only one mission institution). On the other 
hand, the number of government health centres did grow from 589 to 796 during the 
1980s. Nevertheless, the Health Policies and Strategies document did conclude that 
there was a structural bias in the health sector towards urban areas at the expense of 
rural areas and towards curative care as opposed to preventive services. With respect to 
conditions of facilities, transport, and equipment, the document presents a image of 
deterioration and disrepair which it associates with poor working conditions and low 
staff morale. The human resource situation reflected shortages and a skewed distribution 
favouring urban areas. From the text it can be deduced that out of 508 doctors employed 
by the government in 1991, 168 were working at the University Teaching Hospital, of 
which 90 were Zambian.15 Nevertheless, considering the fact that the hospital had a 
formal establishment of 296 doctors, the document concluded there was an acute short-
age of doctors. Another notable issue presented by this report was the ‘notable exodus 
of nurses to other countries in search of better opportunities’.  
The policies and strategies presented in the second chapter are again preceded by ‘the 
vision’ of the health reforms. It is notable that the chapter states that in order for this 
vision to be realised, a primary health care strategy has been chosen as the vehicle. The 
National Health Strategies and Policies of 1991 sets out a package of health goals that 
reflect an integrated vision of health with a strong emphasis on preventative services 
and socio-economic issues in health. A notable difference from the later National Health 
Strategic Plan, analysed in Annex I, is that the concept of an essential health package 
was not yet put forward; instead, mention was made of an ‘integrated supermarket type 
of services to vulnerable groups’. However, similar to later documents, organisational 
issues and issues of health financing took up a major part of the document.  
The core of the strategies was explicitly determined to be the district health manage-
ment system, in which district health boards would play an important part. Whereas the 
MMD policy framework did not yet mention district health boards,16 the policies and 
strategies launched this concept for the first time. The policy document set out that the 
                                                 
15  At the level of junior resident doctors, there were proportionally more Zambians: 21/28 (= 75 per 
cent). At a senior registrar or consultant level, 18/54 (= 33 per cent) of doctors were Zambian. MOH, 
NHPS, 14.  
16  It talked instead about district health councils. 
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minister would, in 1992, establish district health boards to autonomously manage and 
provide health services. Into these boards, existing district health management teams 
would be integrated, to be led by a newly created position of district directors of health, 
who would be responsible for the actual running of health services in the district. The 
boards were to be made up of elected members from the districts in which they were 
situated. Their role would be to plan and manage health services in view of local 
priorities and in accordance with the allocated budget. Other tasks would be to consult 
with local government and to evaluate and audit district performance and take corrective 
action when appropriate. Finally, these boards were to set up area health boards which 
were to capture the views of users of health services and also to foster community self-
help initiatives. 
At the national level, the proposed organisational structure differed considerably 
from the later strategic plan. Rather than a Central Board of Health functioning under 
the aegis of the ministry, a National Health Council was proposed, as in the MMD 
health policy framework. This would be a multi-sectoral council to be headed and 
appointed by the vice-president. The National Health Council would examine policy 
options and establish goals and priorities. It would also promote inter-sectoral consensus 
for change and advise and assist in the establishment of a health innovation fund to 
support innovative pilot projects and national health surveys. Finally, it would advise on 
the establishment of the district and area health boards and establish a review commis-
sion which would streamline and update existing public health acts and other relevant 
legislation. At the same time, the Ministry of Health would serve as an executive and 
guiding body for this council. The ministry itself would be restructured with the aim of 
transferring authorities of management and decision-making over health resources to 
district health boards, while together with provincial-level structures it would facilitate 
and support activities at the district level by providing technical advice. The ministry 
would be divided into four departments: clinical services, basic health programmes, 
logistics and technical support, and administration. Two separate units were also pro-
posed, to fall directly under the permanent secretary: One dealing with planning and 
management, and the other with manpower. At the provincial level there would be a 
regional health advisor as a local representative of the ministry, who would advise, 
audit, and support districts – without command authority, however. The document did 
not mention, however, how many of these regional advisor positions would be created 
or what structure they would have at their disposal. Finally, the roles and responsi-
bilities for ‘parastatals’ such as Medical Stores,17 the Medical Council, the General 
Nursing Council, and the Churches Medical Association were spelt out. 
With respect to manpower, the focus was predominantly on training. In order to meet 
the staffing requirements to enable facilities such as health centres and district hospitals 
to provide primary health care,18 more expanded training capacity was needed. It was 
therefore announced that a new school for training clinical officers would be opened in 
Kabwe, in addition to a school for post-basic training of clinical officers in Ndola. Also, 
the number of doctors trained was to be doubled, and it was emphasised that their 
training would be appropriate to local needs. Furthermore, expatriate personnel were 
required to undergo orientation training in primary health care. Counter to this focus on 
primary health care was the plan to upgrade nursing schools in provincial towns, from 
                                                 
17  The company responsible for procuring and distributing drugs and other medical equipment. 
18  It is striking that a table was presented that focussed solely on the staffing requirements for primary 
health care, disregarding larger provincial and central hospitals. 
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training facilities for enrolled nurses to ones for registered nurses. According to the 
staffing requirements presented in the same document, registered nurses were not to be 
posted to rural health centres, which is where enrolled nurses were deployed. This plan 
did not yet propose the introduction of polyvalent public health practitioners, as was 
later seen in the strategic plan for 1995-99;19 the focus instead was on the existing 
cadres. However, there was a change in nomenclature: Health inspectors and health 
assistants were changed to environmental health technologists and technicians, respec-
tively. Another issue that was dealt with under the heading of manpower was that of 
staff retention. In bold font it was stated that, ‘The Government shall put in place 
attractive conditions of service to retain professionals such as doctors, pharmacists, etc. 
to ensure that these professionals remain in the country and also develop a package to 
attract professionals working abroad to come back and work in their country’.20 
Furthermore, it was stated that bonding of graduates would be enforced by law. Another 
manpower policy presented was that staff would be permitted to do part-time work 
during their spare time, which was previously prohibited. This decision had been 
reported in the media mere weeks after Kawimbe had assumed office, with the glaring 
headline, ‘You’re free docs told’.21 At the UTH in Lusaka, Kawimbe had told staff that 
they could do part-time work to supplement their income. The hope was that this would 
dissuade medical personnel from leaving the country owing to poor conditions of 
service.  
The third chapter of the Policies and Strategies document dwelt on primary health 
care. Following an international conference on primary health care at Alma Ata in 1978, 
where the concept was launched as the primary strategy for health care especially in 
developing countries, the Zambian government had adopted it as ‘the most appropriate 
approach for meeting the urgent needs of the people of Zambia’.22 According to the 
document, throughout the 1980s structures for putting primary heath care had been put 
in place, such as the building of health centres and the training of community health 
workers, but it was more a matter of putting in place selective interventions rather than a 
comprehensive primary health care strategy. The concept, as put forward in this 
document, entailed an approach that went beyond mere accessibility of health services; 
rather, it implied people’s participation in improving their quality of life and their health 
status. A special emphasis was also to be placed on rural and peri-urban areas and 
especially on vulnerable groups such as women and children. The operational principles 
put forward thus included all of the following: Self-reliance and participation of in-
dividuals, families, and communities; equity; intersectoral collaboration; decentralisa-
tion; appropriate technology; and an emphasis on promotive and preventive health 
services. The chapter then proceeded to describe how the health reform proposals 
meshed into the provision of primary health care.  
It is striking how well the policy proposals for health reform conceptually link up 
with the concept of primary health care. Both focus on participation, preventative 
services, and moving the focus of decision makers closer to service-delivery level. Even 
though Kalumba in his dissertation presented the primary health care paradigm as an 
instrument of down-classing rural demands for health care, it is clear that the concept 
strongly influenced the health reform process he helped create. Numerous primary 
                                                 
19  MoH, National Health Strategic Plan 1995-1999 (Lusaka, 1996). 
20  MoH, NHPS, 69. 
21  Times of Zambia, ‘You’re free docs told’, 18 November 1991. 
22  MoH, NHPS, 71. 
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health care activities had been undertaken in donor-managed projects throughout the 
country. A notable example was a Dutch primary health care programme covering 
Western Province, which will feature later in this narrative on the health reforms. One 
analysis of the health reforms drew attention to a tension between, on the one hand, the 
primary health care paradigm, which was given an impetus by the Alma Ata Con-
ference, and on the other hand, the thinking espoused by the World Bank, based on 
structural adjustment and new public management, as would be codified in the World 
Development Report 1993. This analysis claimed that initially the reforms were based 
on the first paradigm, but gradually they were modified to relate more closely to the 
latter.23 While this tension is indeed reflected in various documents, the conclusion that 
one paradigm replaced the other is not accurate, as Kalumba had already stressed the 
need to be ‘structural-reform sensitive’. Instead, both competing donor paradigms were 
accommodated. However, as we will see later, the active courting of the World Bank by 
the Ministry of Health would place increasing emphasis on the new public management 
paradigm.  
It is difficult to determine to what extent the strong focus on primary health care, and 
also the emphasis on cost recovery and downsizing the ministry headquarters, in this 
document was an opportunistic strategy on the part of the architects of reform, since 
linking up with donor discourses would enthuse donors and as such make extra or 
continued funding available. Alternatively, it could also be argued that appropriation of 
the concept of primary health care as well as the realisation that free-health care was no 
longer tenable were logical steps in the face of the constraining realities the Zambian 
health sector was facing. Nevertheless, it is clear that the concept of primary health care 
was stimulated by donors, as was even explicitly stated in this policy document. In the 
section in which the design for a restructured ministry headquarters was discussed, it 
was stated that ‘the Donor Community wishes to retain a viable structure to sustain 
progress in Primary Care Services’. Equally, there was a competing Zambian interest in 
the ‘concerns of senior clinical staff at the University Teaching Hospital who wish to 
see more attention given to policies for acute care and the rehabilitation of (the) fabric 
and equipment in hospitals’. In conclusion, it becomes evident that the National Health 
Policies and Strategies of 1991 demonstrates a convergence of competing donor dis-
courses on primary health care and structural adjustment with a Zambian policy 
discourse of reforming and democratising the health system to bring it closer to the 
people. At the same time, the interests of certain Zambian health professionals that 
conflicted with a shift of focus and resources away from tertiary hospitals towards the 
periphery also had to be accommodated in the health reform plans.  
Health workers’ interests (political turbulence?) 
As Kawimbe and Kalumba took over the helm at the ministry, they were soon beset by 
labour unrest. In February 1992, only three months after the installation of the new 
government, doctors in Ndola threatened to hold strikes, demanding extra local sup-
plementation allowances.24 Then in April junior doctors in Kitwe actually held a strike. 
They claimed the protest was over poor security and demanded the withdrawal of three 
senior officials at the hospital in addition to certain expatriate doctors. Seventeen junior 
doctors were then fired and forced to leave their living quarters under the watchful eye 
                                                 
23  Blas & Limbambala, ‘User payment’, 21. 
24  Times of Zambia, ‘Tough medical bill in offing’, 4 February 1992. 
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of armed paramilitary police. In the meanwhile, according to the government paper the 
Times of Zambia, nine patients had died as a result of the strike, and clinical officers and 
newly arrived Bangladeshi doctors had been called in to take over the striking doctors’ 
duties. Shortly afterwards, the strike spread to hospitals in Ndola and the University 
Teaching Hospital. Medical students in Lusaka also boycotted class out of solidarity 
with their colleagues. Then, following the intervention of the permanent secretary, the 
minister, and the deputy, in consultation with the Zambian Medical Association and 
after even the vice-president got involved, most of the striking doctors were reinstated.25 
In the editorial of the independent Weekly Post newspaper of the following week, the 
government was accused of being too hasty in firing the doctors without notice while it 
was ‘pretending to negotiate with them’. The opinion put forward was that this was at 
odds with the adherence to human rights that the administration of the Third Republic 
prided itself on.26 In a statement by the Ministry of Health placed as an advert in the 
same paper, the ministry stated that the government was in the process of resolving the 
issue and addressing the doctors’ grievances with the Medical Association and the Civil 
Servants Union. Although this statement indicated that the doctors’ initial grievances 
had concerned two break-ins at the doctors’ residence, the ministry stated that it would 
‘leave no stone unturned to improve the conditions of service for health workers’.27  
Within a month a new strike had been called, this time by nurses and clinical 
officers. In Ndola and Luanshya, health workers had halted their work until government 
increased their salaries. Union representatives were quoted by the Times, accusing 
government of not taking negotiations on salary increments seriously. Meanwhile, 
nurses and other health workers in Mazabuka in Southern Province also threatened to 
hold a sit-in over the same issue.28 The strike lasted three days, during which hundreds 
of patients were prematurely discharged. After government promised to pay an extra 
10,000 Kwacha across the board to all health workers,29 the health workers were 
reported to have resumed their work.30 Two weeks later the Times again reported on an 
ongoing strike of nurses and other health workers, this time at the main hospital and 
clinics in Lusaka. Doctors who were overstretched, filling in for striking staff, also 
threatened to strike if the issue was not resolved soon and they called on Kawimbe to 
resign. The ministry and the UTH reacted by issuing an ultimatum that those who did 
not get back to work would lose their jobs, institutional accommodation, terminal 
benefits, and practising licences.31 Then the following day – the third day of this strike – 
health workers defied the ultimatum to get back to work, while the strike had spread to 
other parts of the country such as Solwezi, Kabwe, and Livingstone. Nurses were de-
manding professional status in order to get the same incentives as doctors. Nevertheless, 
in the same article Kawimbe was quoted as saying that nurses did have a professional 
status and that striking nurses would not be fired as they had gone back to work.32 
                                                 
25  Times of Zambia, ‘9 patients die as doctors pack up’, 6 April 1992; and ‘Strikers stay put’, 7 April 
1992.  
26  Weekly Post, ‘Doctors’ sackings were improper’, 10-16 April 1992. 
27  MoH, (7 April 1992), ‘A case of continued withdrawal of services by junior doctors at Kitwe Central 
Hospital’. In: Weekly Post, 10-16 April 1992. 
28  Times of Zambia, ‘Striking nurses stay put’, 1 May 1992. 
29  At the time this equalled approximately € 63 (calculated via ZMK, USD, NLG exchange rates in 
January 1992 and the fixed NLG EUR rate). 
30  Times of Zambia, ‘Ndola nurses back to work’, 4 May 1992. 
31  Times of Zambia, ‘Nurses strike spreads’, 21 May 1992. 
32  Times of Zambia, ‘Nurses won’t be fired’, 22 May 1992.  
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The government’s reaction to this labour unrest appeared to be a messy combination 
of appeasement and repression. In Kitwe, paramilitary police had been called in. 
Strikers were fired, reinstated, threatened, and threats were withdrawn. The government 
was also seeking additional legal powers for the Medical Council to be able to 
deregister ‘unruly doctors’.33 At the same time, the ministry was looking for ways and 
means to respond to health workers’ demands. This was clear from the ministry’s 
statement in the Weekly Post to ‘leave no stone unturned’ to improve conditions of 
service. It also became clear when Kawimbe announced in May, in the wake of the 
strikes, that the government would soon issue a white paper presenting the health re-
forms. In this announcement in the media, he did not fail to stress that this white paper 
would ‘emphasise manpower development’. 34 
In an interview, a senior ministry official said that Kawimbe had around that time 
requested his officials to put together a blueprint proposal that aimed to motivate the 
workforce, in reaction to the dissatisfaction that was being aired. The proposal that was 
put together comprised higher salaries and allowances, car loans, housing, post-graduate 
training, pension schemes, and medical schemes. Kawimbe then took this proposal to 
Cabinet to defend it. After a one and a half day discussion, Cabinet rejected the pro-
posal. A week later an official letter arrived explaining the Cabinet decision. It said that 
health workers were part of the civil service and could therefore not have different 
conditions of service from the rest of the public sector. Subsequent discussions with the 
minister led to the conclusion that this was the key: Different conditions could only be 
implemented if health was outside of the civil service – for instance, as a parastatal. 
This, the respondent argued, turned out to be the key for later policy proposals that 
would call for a Central Board of Health, the staff of which would be unlinked from the 
civil service.35  
First steps towards implementation of the reforms 
The Central Board would not be in the books for a few years to come, however. In 
1992, the Cabinet approved the National Health Policies and Strategies, which still 
proposed a National Health Council and an executive ministry that was part of the civil 
service. Most importantly, the document approved by Cabinet contained the proposal to 
create district health boards, which with their health management teams would assume 
significant responsibilities in the planning and managing of resources. As can be 
expected, this plan ran into opposition from others in the public service, notably the 
Ministry of Finance. It was argued that there was no capacity at district level to perform 
proper bookkeeping and account for the money. There was a fear that money would be 
misused and stolen. Defending this core element of the reforms, however, Boniface 
Kawimbe echoed the views of the reformers in the ministry: ‘If we are a nation of 
thieves, let us decentralise stealing’.  
In the first year, progress on the reforms was slow. In addition to being preoccupied 
by labour unrest, the ministry was occupied with a number of health emergencies such 
as outbreaks of cholera and dysentery. This is reflected in newspaper headlines 
screaming, ‘Diarrhoea breaks out’, ‘Diarrhoea ravages tourist capital’, ‘Death toll now 
                                                 
33  Times of Zambia, ‘Unruly docs warned’, 23 May 1992; and ‘Tough medical bill in offing’, 4 February 
1992 
34  Times of Zambia, ‘Hospitals granted autonomy’, 23 May 1992. 
35  ML0811/02. 
191 
 
55’, and ‘Deaths blamed on UNIP mess’.36 In an article he wrote on the reform process, 
Kalumba remembered that the response to these emergencies was code-named ‘Opera-
tion Quench Fire’. He claimed that these emergencies were the first test for the new 
government’s capacity to deal with problems of public health security and also served 
as a confidence-building phase.37 In an interview, Kalumba indicated that he and 
Kawimbe had a difference of opinion on how to deal with this problem. Kawimbe as a 
clinician had the inclination to see cholera as merely a medical problem requiring 
treatment, while Kalumba, with more of a public health background, saw the solution in 
prevention and a strategy of improving water sources. Eventually, he claimed that 
Kawimbe saw reason and that they worked together on a preventive health strategy 
resulting in, among other things, a Japanese-Zambian water tower in the compound of 
Matero in Lusaka.38 Kalumba admitted that too much time was spent on this operation. 
Meanwhile, the reforms were receiving limited attention. The reason for this was that 
perhaps policy makers were reluctant to take the difficult decisions needed to translate 
their policy commitments into action. Kalumba continued that this was impressed on 
him by a World Bank mission in July-August 1992. During this mission, the ministry 
was given the message that, on the basis of an assessment of available resources and 
health needs, a total strategy to deliver a minimum package of care and to raise the 
needed resources would have to be developed. To do so, a metaphor of a Cadillac in a 
state of disrepair was used to symbolise the health sector as is was. Now this would 
have to be redesigned into a car that Zambia could afford.39 Following this mission by 
the bank, the Times reported that the reforms won praise from the World Bank but that 
more work was to be done on health financing.40  
One of the first steps undertaken after Cabinet had approved the health policies and 
strategies document was the creation of a Health Reform Implementation Team (HRIT). 
Sources differ on when the team was established; some say 1992, while others put it at 
1993.41 Perhaps part of this confusion was that establishing the team was not straight-
forward. Kalumba remembered in an interview how it had taken nine months just to get 
staff seconded to the team. For instance, he had wanted to pick someone who was 
working in Lundazi to join the team, but the “big bwanas at Cabinet Office” had 
objected, saying that there was already someone else from Eastern Province in the team. 
                                                 
36  Times of Zambia, 3 December 1991, 18 January 1992, 1 June 1992, and 21 January 1992. 
37  Kalumba, K, Towards, 19. 
38  ML0812/01. This account needs to be taken with caution as it evidently was told with the goal of 
enhancing Kalumba’s role in events. Nevertheless, it is consistent with the image of Kawimbe having 
had a curative bias, while being pragmatic enough to eventually defend reforms with a strong prevent-
ive and primary health care character. This anecdote is also consistent with a media report of Ka-
lumba’s briefing to donors over government action against cholera, which stressed control and 
prevention and collaboration with other ministries (Times of Zambia, ‘Anti-cholera measures stress-
ed’, 27 August 1992.) Finally, the anecdote shines some light on what Kalumba considered the con-
fidence-building phase.  
39  This metaphor subsequently featured in various discursive representations of the health reforms, such 
as Kalumba, Towards, 19; See also Annex I. 
40  Times of Zambia, ‘Health Reforms win World Bank praise’, 24 August 1992. 
41  A World Bank staff appraisal places this event in 1992, while secondary sources such as Bossert et al., 
Decentralization; Bennett, S., ‘Health sector reforms in Zambia: Putting them in perspective’. In: 
Center for health and gender equity, The population council; Report of the meeting on the implica-
tions of health sector reform on reproductive health and rights (Washington, 1998); and C. Chansa, 
‘A critical evaluation of the sector wide approach (SWAp) in the health sector in Zambia’, (unpub-
lished Master’s thesis, University of Cape Town, 2006) – rather place it in 1993.  
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They said that would amount to tribalism. Kalumba was angered at this, because he 
claimed he was selecting people on their merits. He then wrote a letter to the unions and 
to President Chiluba to intervene.42 The HRIT had been set up as a temporary structure, 
drew its staff from the ministry, and worked closely with the ministry’s planning unit. It 
also worked together with the ministries of finance and justice so as to develop the 
financial and legal preconditions and modalities for the health reforms to be imple-
mented.43 The team was headed by the ministry’s former deputy director for decentrali-
sation. Initially, the team’s structure was rather small with three sections, dealing with 
capacity building, quality assurance, and administration. The team, which was housed 
apart from the ministry, was dependent on Danish support for its operating costs. It also 
formed the base for two Danish technical advisors and made up the project implementa-
tion unit for the Danish Health Sector Support Programme.44 Kalumba in retrospect 
argued that the rationale behind the HRIT was that it stood apart from the civil service 
and as such was able to be an effective instrument for change. Reform could not be left 
to the civil service, which was controlled by Cabinet Office, “the mother of non-re-
form”.45  
The primary challenge in the first two years of the health reforms was to devolve 
ministry functions to the district health boards. In 1993, statutory instruments were 
passed providing a legal basis for the creation of the district health boards, before 
legislation supporting the reforms could be drafted and passed by Parliament. The actual 
appointment of the boards, however, was a more drawn-out and erratic affair with only 
about half the boards in place at the time of an independent review of the health reforms 
in 1996. Meanwhile, district health management teams were in place and operating 
under district directors of health, who had been appointed by that time. Initially, the 
HRIT had intended to start working in three districts, although the decision was soon 
taken to expand this to 21 districts.46 Early in 1993, however, it was decided to use 
Danish funding to provide block grants to all districts, rather than take a piecemeal 
approach. This funding could be provided to district management teams only if they 
complied with three conditions: They needed to have received training in planning and 
budgeting; they needed a team member appointed as an accounting officer; and they 
needed a bank account.47 Not all district management teams had the requisite capacity 
and resources to adhere to these requirements. As an illustration, according to a report 
by a representative from the Netherlands Embassy describing a donor coordination 
meeting, by the end of June 1993, 22 districts out of 58 did not have an appropriately 
trained accountant. Therefore, members of the health management teams of these 
districts were hastily brought up to standard. Facilitators from the HRIT also fanned out 
from Lusaka to all provinces to help all districts to adhere to the Danish requirements 
for funding, most notably the requirement for drafting of fundable plans.48  
To train district management in planning and budgeting, a methodology was used 
that was adapted from a combination of a planning system developed in Western Prov-
ince under the Dutch Primary Health Care Project that had been operating since 1988, 
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43  World Bank, Staff appraisal report health sector support programme (Washington, 1994) (EKN files, 
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44  Lake et al., Analyzing, 54. 
45  ML0706/04. 
46  World Bank, Staff appraisal, 11. 
47  Lake et al., Analyzing, 63-64. 
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and a methodology used by the World Health Organization in Ghana.49 However, in the 
first round of action-planning carried out in 1993, the quality assurance aspect of the 
Dutch planning system was not applied, though this would be integrated in later years.50 
In the capacity-building round, central facilitators were first trained, who in turn trained 
provincial teams and planned a cycle of three district workshops for the year. First, 
district managers were introduced to the planning concepts used, and district plans were 
initiated on the basis of the Danish grants. During the next two months, the districts 
would further develop their plans, which were subsequently reviewed by the facilitation 
teams joined by specialists from vertical programmes focusing on the technical content 
of the plans. Finally, a third workshop would take place several months after the grant 
had been disbursed, to monitor implementation and plan for the subsequent year.51  
This phase in the health reforms was characterised as learning-by-doing. The archi-
tects of the reforms later told a review mission that it was a learning process, in which it 
was important to embrace error.52 Indeed, the process of building district capacity was 
indeed a tumultuous and even conflictual process that was perhaps illustrative of the 
entire reform process. Reports in the archives of the Netherlands Embassy tell of an 
episode in which the central and the district level, Zambians and expatriate experts and 
two donor approaches came to blows during one of these planning workshops. As indi-
cated previously, the Netherlands had been funding a Primary Health Care Programme 
in Western Province. This programme operated through the office of the provincial 
medical officers, district hospitals, and district health management teams. There were 29 
Dutch doctors in Zambia at the time,53 many of whom were working as district medical 
officers throughout Western Province. The programme ran community-based health, 
water and sanitation, and nutrition projects, but it also supported basic health service 
delivery by strengthening the district health management system. Not only vehicles and 
equipment were provided but also part of the recurrent costs of the district health 
management teams. In the meantime, a system of annual budgeting and planning had 
been developed in line with a focus on quality assurance. In Northern Province, there 
was a smaller Primary Health Care Programme, which provided district medical offi-
cers, a senior medical officer attached to the provincial medical officer, and direct 
district support. Here a low-key gradual approach had been chosen so as ensure the 
sustainability of the programme. As such – from the perspective of Dutch policy makers 
– these Dutch interventions were completely in line with the health reform programme. 
It was also reported that the Zambian authorities had designated the programme in 
Western Province as a pilot for the reforms.54 
From 27 to 29 May 1993 a workshop was held in Mongu, the capital of Western 
Province, as a follow-up training workshop to prepare districts for Danish support and 
the implementation of the health reforms. This was the second workshop in the cycle, 
following an initial training in March. The aim of the workshop was to ‘polish up’ the 
district-proposed plans. The training team consisted of 24 members from the HRIT and 
                                                 
49  Lake et al., Analyzing, 64.  
50  This can be deduced from the description of the training process early 1993 in communication be-
tween RNE and DGIS (EKN files, ISN 3204). Accounts of district staff and other observers, however, 
suggest that this HIPPOPOC system was indeed used by HRIT later (e.g. ML0811/17).  
51  Lake & Musumali, ‘Zambia’, 64. 
52  Mahler et al., Independent, 10. 
53  This referred to doctors financed by the HPI/DGIS of the Netherlands government. Koot, J. & J. 
Oosterhoff, Supplementation Programme Dutch Medical Doctors in Zambia 1978-2003 (2003). 
54  Communication between DGIS and RNE, 11 June 1993 (EKN files, ISN 3204).  
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representatives from all departments of the ministry headquarters. From the side of the 
districts, members of the health management teams were there, including a number of 
Dutch district medical officers. Representatives from the Provincial Medical Office 
were also present, having supported the districts to prepare for the training. They had 
helped prepare action plans to qualify for Danish support for the period July-December 
1993 as well as rough action plans for 1994. The atmosphere at the workshop was quite 
tense. The Dutch programme coordinator who reported on the workshop attributed this 
to the experiences of the training team at a similar workshop in Northern Province. 
There the national team had become irritated by a perceived self-absorbed and inward-
looking attitude of Dutch medical officers present. These had given the impression that 
the Dutch had their own primary health care planning approach and that they were not 
prepared to change it for the sake of another donor. One member of the facilitation team 
was quoted as saying, “After the experiences in Northern Province, we have decided to 
come and make an end to the Dutch programme in Western Province. We have to bring 
the health services under Zambian control again”.55 
The problems that emerged at this workshop were partly due to communication, 
partly interpersonal and intercultural, and partly due to a fundamental mismatch in 
approaches between the pre-existing Dutch programme and a national programme 
driven by Danish funds and Danish conditions. The miscommunication flowed from the 
fact that neither the province nor the district knew what to expect from the workshop. 
Districts’ proposed plans were checked against criteria that were unknown to the 
districts. The Dutch project leader reported that the districts felt they were sitting an 
exam, not knowing what they would be judged against. To his dismay, the facilitation 
team leader reacted that this had been intentional as this was a learning process. In 
addition, owing to the large number of trainers and different levels of competence, 
confusing and conflicting information was given to the districts. Furthermore, while the 
aim of the workshop was ostensibly to polish up the districts’ proposals, the focus was 
merely on how to formulate problem statements, describe interventions, and list planned 
actions. Not a single action proposal was adjusted. Finally, the facilitation team left no 
room for discussions on implementation constraints, discussions on policy were cut 
short, and objections from the side of district medical officers about the shortage of hu-
man resources were disregarded. The response was, “You have to do it; the politicians 
are on our side ... Just go and implement and we will get your reports in November”.  
The flaring up of tempers and tensions clearly signified an interpersonal and 
intercultural clash between the Dutch doctors and Zambian officials. The Dutch pro-
gramme coordinator admitted it was mainly the Dutch who argued with the national 
team. While he reported that the provincial medical officer, a Zambian, agreed with the 
Dutch district medical officers, he had a more pragmatic approach: “Do not get nervous; 
after three days these people from headquarters will be gone, and then we continue 
business as usual”. Other Zambian colleagues from the district health management 
teams were reported as saying, “The top-down approach has been there in the past, and 
will be there in the future. Headquarters will always overrule us. Such is life”.56  
A Dutch regional health expert based in Harare, who had previously worked in the 
Ministry of Health in Lusaka, later commented that on the one hand the Dutch doctors 
had displayed an admirable drive and commitment with the local context when they 
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were confronted with a too-directive and insufficiently elaborated national programme. 
He further argued that besides its action-oriented approach, which was both welcome 
and necessary, the implementation of the health reforms egged on by Danish support 
also demonstrated a ‘bulldozer effect’. This meant that any criticism, however well and 
constructively meant, was just pushed out of the way. On the other hand, he also 
concluded with regret that the Dutch doctors demonstrated a typically Dutch cultural 
over-sensitivity towards authoritarian government action which had driven them to ‘dig 
trenches in the Kalahari sand’57. This, for Zambian cultural standards, unusual position-
ing had angered and offended the national team, which in effect further polarised the 
situation. He concluded that it was not the Dutch doctors who articulated or represented 
the formal Dutch position, but rather the embassy in Lusaka, and that the primary 
loyalty of the Dutch doctors should lie with their local employer. As regards the mem-
bers of the HRIT, he concluded that they should not be seen as the only representatives 
of the ministry. In his view, they lacked the calibre and the competence of the architects 
of the health reforms such as Dr. Kalumba and the chief planner at the ministry. In part, 
the Dutch health specialist attributed the attitudes of many in the HRIT to his as-
sessment that they were still very much rooted in the centralistic Kaunda era. Many had 
seen their jobs in Lusaka threatened by an increased focus on the periphery. On the 
other hand, he also empathised with the fact that the team was under considerable 
pressure to achieve results within a short timeframe, while usually dealing with districts 
demonstrating considerable apathy and incompetence towards health planning.58  
The report of this meeting also highlighted both a fundamental and a technical clash 
between the Dutch and the Danish approaches. On the technical side, the Danish pro-
gramme introduced different accounting procedures from the one that staff in Western 
Province had been used to. And as we have seen above, the re-training of provincial and 
district staff would take place just before the programme would get underway. Time-
frames and deadlines also differed for the two planning processes. This would mean 
parallel systems which would overburden already stretched staff. A more fundamental 
disconnect was that the Danish programme and the health reforms, in the opinion of the 
Dutch, mainly had the aim of streamlining existing health services, while the Dutch 
programme in Western Province also tried to experiment and innovate with intersectoral 
cooperation and community development. From the perspective of the programme 
coordinator, still more had to be done to get health services into the communities. This 
perceived difference in focus59 not only had theoretical implications but potentially also 
practical ones. There was a call for the Dutch funds for Western Province to be inte-
grated with the grants that came from Danish and eventually Zambian government 
funding, specifically from a Swedish technical expert seconded to the HRIT. From a 
Dutch perspective this was undesirable, as not all Dutch funding could be considered 
recurrent funds, since community activities and other innovative projects were also 
financed from the funds. Pooling Dutch funding would thus mean that districts in West-
ern Province would lose out.60  
                                                 
57  He wrote: De voeten in het Kalahari-zand schrap te zetten. 
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The incident in Mongu which laid bare this disconnect between Danish and Dutch 
approaches led a representative of The Hague to speculate whether this indicated 
divergent visions and thus division within the Ministry of Health, or whether it was an 
attempt – be it conscious or unconscious – to set two donors up against each other. If the 
latter was the case, it would mean that the Dutch would be the underdog, considering 
the prospect of substantial multi-annual support from Denmark, which was budgeted at 
forty million US dollars over a seven-year period.61 This would then have led the team 
from Lusaka to impose Danish and Zambian government standards, thus overruling the 
approach of the Dutch primary health care programme. While the Dutch headquarters’ 
representative considered this understandable, he/she found it inconsistent with his own 
perception of the contribution of the Dutch programme to the health reform process.62 
Assessing this argument in context, it seems that this speculation of a coherent and 
considered strategy on the part of Zambian actors was wide of the mark, as it was clear 
that on the Zambian side there were various actors with different perspectives, interests, 
and characteristics. It is equally evident that a new and competing Danish approach 
challenged the paradigm and the realities in which the Dutch had been able to operate in 
Western Province in relative isolation.  
This incident was followed by intensive communication between the programme 
coordinator in Mongu, the embassies in Lusaka and Harare, and headquarters in The 
Hague. An embassy representative also had meetings with representatives from the 
ministry and the chairman of the HRIT. According to the report of these meetings, the 
participants concluded that considering the time-pressure generated by the momentum 
of the health reforms, it was not always possible for the preparatory team to operate 
tactfully. Moreover, the reforms not only meant a different way of working for the 
districts but even more so for representatives of the central level, and this realisation had 
not yet dawned on everyone at that level. The ministry and the HRIT representatives 
agreed to adopt a less rigid and directive approach and to realise the diversity in 
management capacity among districts, notably the districts in Northern and Western 
Provinces. On the other hand, it was also important for the districts to consider that 
increased autonomy did not mean complete independence and that the central level 
retained a role to ensure that each district offer a basic package of care. The ministry 
representative also agreed to keep the Dutch primary health care budget out of the 
Danish and government district grants. The chairman of the implementation team 
conceded to leave Dutch non-recurrent expenditure, for the time being, out of its block 
grants to the districts in Western Province. However, he emphasised the need to inte-
grate all primary health care activities into the district planning and to integrate the 
Dutch programme into the Zambian government system, a point with which the em-
bassy representative agreed.63 This incident thus provided an additional impetus to 
further integrating the Dutch programme in Western Province into Zambian policies and 
systems until the subsequent end of the programme in 1998.  
While the capacity-building tours of the HRIT aimed at preparing districts for the 
significant Danish funding that had been promised, the process risked being derailed 
owing to bureaucratic hiccups in Copenhagen. In May of that year, it appeared that 
Danish funds would not be approved by headquarters in time to send grants to the 
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districts before July, as had been intended, as the proposal could only be discussed by 
the Danish Parliament around the middle of August. This led deputy minister Kalumba 
to lobby donors for bridging funds to cover the financial gap. The World Bank proved 
prepared to bridge this financial gap by issuing a short-term loan. The government, 
however, preferred to bridge the gap with grants rather than a loan; thus, the European 
Commission, the Swedish, the Dutch, the British, and the United Nations Children’s 
Fund were approached. According to a Dutch representative, donors were generally 
sympathetic in their consideration of the request, as the districts had already partially 
been put through the crash-training and capacity-building programme. A delay of funds 
at this stage would lead to considerable disappointment at the district level and would 
thus jeopardise the momentum of the reforms. On the other hand, donors shared con-
cerns about the accountability of the funds, and some – such as the Dutch – expressed 
criticism of the approach taken by the Danish Health Sector Support Programme.64 
After discussions and consultations with agency headquarters, four donor agencies 
stepped in and joined the Danish. These were the Swedish and British development 
agencies and the European Commission and United Nations Children’s Fund.65 The 
Netherlands proved unable or unwilling to respond favourably to the request, in part 
influenced by the clash between the Danish-funded HRIT and the Dutch Primary Health 
Care Programmes in Western and Northern Provinces described above, but also because 
of accountability risks. The Hague did, however, consider increasing their allocations to 
district support within these programmes, with a view to further streamlining their 
support for the national health reform process.66  
The support by this consortium of donors created a considerable momentum. Lake et 
al. report that for stakeholders at the district level, this created the confidence that the 
decentralisation process was more than policy rhetoric and that government was actu-
ally committed to the health reforms. The ministry in turn was also buoyed by seeing 
donor money successfully reaching the districts, leading it to bring forward its own 
plans to directly fund districts’ recurrent costs. Kawimbe then took a decision to base 
the grants on districts’ population size, and from January 1994 the government joined 
donors in providing direct block grants to the districts. This co-funding became known 
as district basket funding.67 A World Bank staff appraisal from early 1994 considered it 
significant that for the first time donors had agreed to provide direct support in response 
to district priorities, without earmarking their assistance to specific partial program-
mes.68 This was thus a historically important moment in the development of aid 
modalities. 
A change of power 
Kawimbe’s first year in office seemed to have been relatively successful. He had dealt 
with the immediate crises of cholera and dysentery in the beginning of 1992, weathered 
a number of strikes which challenged his authority, and played an instrumental role in 
                                                 
64  Report RNE representative (EKN files, ISN 3204). 
65  Chansa, ‘A critical’, 30. 
66  Communication DGIS(DAF/ZF) to RNE (EKN files ISN 3204). 
67  Lake et al., Analyzing, 64-69; Mahler et al., Independent; Chansa, ‘A critical’, 30. 
68  World Bank, Staff Assessment, 11; Incidentally, this report glosses over the fact that donors other than 
itself contributed to the district grants before the World Bank and other donors had discussed with 
government about its contribution. In fact, the World Bank itself has never been prepared to contribute 
to the basket, as it is primarily a lending agency. 
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defending the health reforms in Cabinet.69 At the turn of the year, however, he attracted 
controversy in the media. With the advent of the rainy season, cholera had surfaced 
again and hit Lusaka, with the death toll in the city rising to 119 by the end of the 
1992.70 Kawimbe portrayed himself in the media as taking charge, accusing people in 
government services of stealing money allocated to fighting cholera and invoking the 
public health act to gain legal powers to deal with the epidemic.71 Shortly thereafter, the 
media reported on dire situations at the University Teaching Hospital, with articles 
headlined, ‘Close UTH, urge docs’ and ‘UTH horror!’, which described the hospital as a 
‘death-trap’. The first article decried a lack of resources and equipment, which had led 
to near tragedies. This had prompted senior doctors to call for the hospital’s closure, as 
they could not continue to work under such circumstances. A spokesman for the 
hospital board claimed that the equipment shortages were due to lack of funds, which 
had forced the board to raise its user fees. Kawimbe reacted that funding could not be 
the issue as the hospital board was autonomous and was free to undertake ventures to 
raise funds. Instead, he accused the hospital board of negligence. The next day, as the 
Times reported several deaths owing to a power outage, including 15 premature babies 
in incubators, Kawimbe made an announcement. He dissolved the hospital board and 
removed seven of the top management from their posts, highlighting further examples 
of the malaise at the hospital. Kawimbe accused the management of not tackling the 
existing shortages of drugs and equipment while the institution had money in the bank. 
He immediately appointed a new executive director and announced that the ministry 
would temporarily take over financial control of the hospital while Medical Stores 
would take care of supplying the hospital. In a reaction, however, some senior hospital 
officials were unhappy with these ‘public sackings’ and likened the actions to ‘the 
Kaunda era’.72  
Kawimbe’s take-charge approach, however, led to continued controversy over the 
issue. A few days later, the dismissed board chairman, flanked by the former executive 
director and his deputy spoke out at a press briefing. They denied that the hospital had 
money in the bank that they could have accessed to purchase supplies. Rather, they 
accused Kawimbe of scheming to remove them by running to the press to frame them. 
They asserted that this plan had been cooked up as early as February a year earlier to 
fulfil job promises he had allegedly made to people. Furthermore, they claimed that the 
drug shortages witnessed were not out of the ordinary and that involving Medical Stores 
in solving the shortages was contradictory as they had been part of the initial problem. 
Finally, they asserted that the hospital board had never really enjoyed autonomy and 
that reasserting government control would be retrogressive. In Kawimbe’s absence, his 
deputy Kalumba faced the media to stress that the problem at the hospital was not one 
of funds but one of poor management. He also disclosed that the issue had previously 
                                                 
69  Of course, it is difficult on the basis of the limited data available to determine to what extent he was 
responsible for these achievements and what was the doing of his deputy or other colleagues.  
70  Times of Zambia, ‘Cholera toll tops 29’, 15 December 1992; and ‘State acts on Cholera’, 29 Decem-
ber 1992. 
71  Ibid. and ‘Kitwe cholera cost state K 68 m’, 19 December 1992.  
72  Times of Zambia, ‘Close UTH, urge docs’, 9 January 1993; ‘UTH horror!’, 10 January 1993; ‘Gory 
tail of UTH’, 10 January 1993; and ‘UTH bosses fired’, 11 January 1993.  
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been discussed with the former executive director, who had conceded to changes and 
had offered to leave his post to pursue other opportunities.73      
A few days later, union representatives also spoke out publicly. They made a state-
ment denouncing the appointments made by Kawimbe. They charged that independent 
people should have been appointed when the board was dissolved and that now the 
functions of the personnel department had been negated, which would lead to anarchy 
and victimisation of workers. Moreover, ‘the practice of hand-picking people to high 
offices breeds regionalism and favouritism’, the union’s statement declared.74  
A month later the issue had still not gone away. The Zambia Medical Association 
denounced Kawimbe’s decision to fire hospital management. They charged that al-
though the minister had the right to dissolve the board, he had no powers to fire and hire 
senior management. The association even called on the vice-president, Levy Mwana-
wasa, to intervene in the issue. Kawimbe, however, refused to back down, saying, ‘To 
reverse the decision would mean I did not think through the matter and what use would 
be reversing the situation, which is improving’.75 The controversy, however, lingered on 
with the private media running a story on the extravagant conditions of service enjoyed 
by the new executive director of the UTH. The story claimed that up to 40 million 
Kwacha had been spent on the hospital boss, with 14.5 million having been advanced 
for his housing and 16.5 million for his executive land cruiser. Meanwhile, the hospital 
still owed its drug and equipment suppliers 150 million and could not spare 10 million 
for improving other workers’ housing. The Weekly Post also published an article re-
emphasising that the minister had no powers to appoint hospital directors – only to 
appoint boards. While the media’s attention to this issue gradually faded away, the 
courts later ruled that Kawimbe’s dismissal of the management of the University 
Teaching Hospital had been erroneous.76 A year later, the hospital’s old board had been 
cleared and reinstated by Kawimbe’s successor, Michael Sata.77  
It was not the controversy over the management of the UTH and associated allega-
tions of cronyism in appointing replacements that proved to be Kawimbe’s downfall. 
However, the affair may have damaged his reputation, particularly among doctors and 
other staff at the hospital where he had his support base. In the beginning of 1994, after 
a little over two years in office, Kawimbe was dropped by Chiluba from Cabinet over 
the mandrax affair, which had led to a tense stand-off between donors and Chiluba’s 
government. It appeared Kawimbe had become too ambitious, was disloyal to the 
president, and had become a pawn in a power struggle at the highest level. 
Kawimbe had been part of the Zambian delegation that had travelled to Paris to 
attend the Consultative Group meeting of donors and the Zambian government to dis-
cuss further aid contributions to the country. On their return to Lusaka, the minister of 
finance Penza, Kawimbe, and deputy minister of planning and development cooperation 
Mung’omba told the press at the airport what had been discussed in Paris. They said that 
donors had raised concerns about high-level drug trafficking and that the Cabinet would 
discuss measures to combat the scourge. They claimed that the disbursement of the 
                                                 
73  Times of Zambia, ‘Kawimbe lied’, 15 January 1993. In an interview, Kalumba said that the executive 
director of UTH had been offered a job with the HRIT, dealing with quality assurance, having asked 
for a opportunity to ‘contribute to the vision’. ML0812/01. 
74  Times of Zambia, ‘Kawimbe postings attacked’, 15 January 1993. 
75  Times of Zambia, ‘Kawimbe won’t back-down’, 11 February 1993. 
76  Lake et al., Analyzing, 53. 
77  Times of Zambia, ‘Medical stores gets board’, 20 May 1994. 
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funds pledged by donors would not be affected by this issue, as the delegation had 
declared the government’s commitment to address the issue.78 The next day, Penza and 
Mung’omba became more specific on the matter, disclosing that Cabinet ministers were 
involved, though they claimed to be unaware of their names.79 Obviously vexed by 
ministers issuing press statements on this sensitive issue, Chiluba ordered ministers to 
stop discussing it in public.80 Penza subsequently called a press conference to apologise 
for commenting on the matter without the president’s permission. Shortly afterwards, 
the ministers implicated in mandrax trafficking resigned. These were Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Mwaanga, and the Minister for Community Development, Nakatindi 
Wina, as well as her husband, Sikota Wina, the deputy speaker of Parliament.81 Shortly 
thereafter, Chiluba called a press conference at which he announced a Cabinet reshuffle, 
dropping both Mung’omba and Kawimbe. Observers agreed that this was over the fact 
that they had spoken out and washed the proverbial dirty linen in public.82 One former 
senior health official close to Kawimbe at the time said that Kawimbe was dropped 
because, in contrast to Penza, he failed to repent.83 
Other factors must have contributed to Kawimbe’s sacking, as his overt role in the 
mandrax affair appeared to be a minor one. At the press conference, he merely made 
remarks that it was, from a health perspective, in Zambian interests to combat the 
scourge of drugs. When Mwaanga and the Winas resigned, they railed against Penza, 
Mung’omba, and the deputy minister in the office of the president, Derrick Chitala, 
whom they saw as forming the ‘Mbala mafia’ and who had called on Chiluba to dismiss 
them.84 They did not mention Kawimbe. Kalumba, however, remembered that Kawimbe 
was dropped because he, just like Mung’omba, was indeed part of Penza’s camp, the so-
called ‘Mbala mafia’ and that Penza was becoming strong and a challenge to Chiluba. 
As Chiluba could not drop Penza, who as Minister of Finance was well regarded by 
donors and essential for keeping the economic restructuring programme on course, he 
attacked the ‘weaker guys’ from Penza’s camp in order to weaken him. According to 
Kalumba, Kawimbe had also challenged Chiluba over financial policy and was be-
coming politically ambitious.85 These last arguments were also put forward by the 
Dutch ambassador at the time, who reported to The Hague that Kawimbe was reported 
to have said to friends that he was bored with the Ministry of Health and aspired to a 
different portfolio. This was considered to be an arrogant attitude. Moreover, the 
ambassador reported that Kawimbe had publicly differed with the president about the 
president’s policies,86 thus showing lack of respect and loyalty to the man who could 
appoint and disappoint.      
As a replacement for Kawimbe, Chiluba appointed perhaps the most controversial 
politician Zambia has known: Three-time presidential contender, Michael Sata, popu-
                                                 
78  Times of Zambia, ‘We’ll deal with drug barons’, 15 December 1993. 
79  Times of Zambia, ‘Drugs saga rages’, 16 December 1993. 
80  Times of Zambia, ‘Stop this drugs talk – Chiluba’, 18 December 1993. 
81  Weekly Post, ‘You haven’t heard the last of me!’, 7 January 1994; Weekly Post, ‘Nakatindi blames the 
“Mbala Maffia” for her resignation’, 11 January 1994. 
82  Weekly Post, ‘Chiluba sacked ministers over drugs scandal’, 11 January 1994. 
83  ML0811/02. 
84  Weekly Post, ‘You haven’t heard the last of me!’, 7 January 1994; Weekly Post, ‘Nakatindi blames the 
“Mbala Maffia” for her resignation’, 11 January 1994; Times of Zambia, ‘Winas quit’, 10 January 
1994. 
85  ML0706/04, ML0812/01. 
86  Report to HQ, 11 January 1994 (EKN files, 279/07/0339). 
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larly known as ‘King Cobra’. For the health reforms, this proved to be a period of 
turbulence and political interference, though during his tenure the reforms did not get 
derailed – yet.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter we saw how the pre-existing ideas of the health reforms were confronted 
with and transformed by the political-bureaucratic reality of the health sector and the 
process of implementation. An important influence on the transformation of the dis-
course and concepts of the health reforms is the issue of personalities. We saw above 
how Katele Kalumba, as deputy minister, had to adapt earlier ideas to the new minister 
Kawimbe and his interests. This does not necessarily mean only Kawimbe’s direct 
personal economic interests – though we saw how Kawimbe instrumentalised the 
opportunities created by his power over the board of the UTH – it also concerns biases 
based on a person’s previous life experiences and a desire to serve the interests of those 
one used to work with. In this case, this led to a bias towards tertiary hospital care, 
which was translated into a slight refocus of the health reforms. 
In the analysis of the documents which came to guide the implementation of the 
health reforms, we also saw how other interests and realities transformed the concepts 
of the health reform. This included integrating concepts of importance to donors into the 
reform strategy. The process even managed to accommodate the competing donor 
paradigms of primary health care and new public management. It also meant accepting 
the reality of resource constraints, both in terms of human and financial resources. 
Documents therefore reflected a gradual convergence of discourses to reflect and satisfy 
divergent interests and realities. 
Another reality central to this dissertation is that of health workers’ demands for 
entitlements. These demands were clearly articulated in the strikes described in this 
chapter. During these strikes, health workers asserted their power by withholding lab-
our. The government’s reaction combined repression and appeasement. This provided 
an arena for negotiating the price of health workers’ loyalty to the state, represented by 
the minister. It is striking that in these episodes of labour unrest, health workers did not 
present themselves as passive clients, but rather reconfirmed the image presented earlier 
in this dissertation of active agents, intent on securing their livelihoods. Arguably, 
however, this and subsequent episodes of strikes contributed to a relation between 
health workers and the state in which loyalty is managed as a priority at the expense of 
managing performance. 
 A further arena for negotiating power and interests described in this chapter con-
cerned a struggle between donors and recipients, and among donors themselves. On the 
one hand, this struggle appears to contribute to shaping the systems and relations in the 
health sector. At the same time, it is also a struggle for control in which Zambian actors 
appear to resent the power of outsiders in shaping their health system. It appears that 
these Zambian interests were partially victorious. Such struggles arguably contributed to 
a shift on the part of donors (in this case the Netherlands) away from managing their 
own projects and deploying their own nationals to mange these projects. Instead, they 
would move towards a more upstream involvement in the health sector.  
A final conclusion to be drawn from this chapter relates to the argument that this 
dissertation makes concerning loyalty versus performance. From the episode describing 
Minister Kawimbe’s fall from grace, it becomes clear that it was not a failure to deliver 
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results or controversy about clientalistic behaviour that cost Kawimbe his career. 
Instead, his cardinal sin was a lack of loyalty to the patron who had appointed him, 
President Chiluba. This episode would lead to a change in the leadership of the sector, 






Political distractions  
for the health reforms 
We now move on to describe the period in which the health reform process reached its 
conceptual and operational zenith. Paradoxically, however, the instrumentalisation of 
the reforms for personal and political gain also seems most prevalent in this phase. This 
period is very much coloured by Michael Sata’s tenure at the ministry; he was a mover 
and shaker in Zambian politics, whose earlier reputation of political dealing and fixing 
followed him into the health sector as soon as he was appointed. Kalumba, who 
remained deputy minister of health, played a supportive and complementary role to 
Sata, studying his strategies and later defeating Sata in the quest for control of the health 
sector.  
This chapter zooms in on several workshops as arenas in which donors and govern-
ment representatives jointly negotiated policies and exchanged discourse. In one of 
these workshops, Katele Kalumba demonstrated his performative competence in dealing 
with donors. He used a discourse which was very appealing to donors to convince them 
to buy into the health reform process. He apparently also persuaded donors to channel 
their funds directly through Zambian government systems rather than through their own 
projects. This workshop also revealed that conflicts between donors about their com-
peting approaches were played out at the national level, which further strengthened the 
argument for donors to follow Zambian plans and systems. At the same time, donors 
claimed a role in creating systems to operationalise the health reforms. In technical 
workshops, they contributed to shaping rational-legal arrangements, such as a financial 
and administrative management system that would mitigate the fiduciary risks of 
putting their funds into a Zambian basket rather than through their own projects.  
This chapter also describes Sata’s role in shaping the formal institutional set-up of 
the health sector and its power structure. He was confronted with a draft legislative 
framework to formalise and underpin the health reforms. This draft law would lead to 
an erosion of the power of the minister as it would create a semi-autonomous body 
responsible for health policy implementation, the Central Board of Health. Moreover, it 
would devolve authority and control of resources to the district level. In a bid to 
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minimise this loss of power, Sata used his position as minister to alter the proposed 
legislation by insisting that the minister himself appointed all the district health boards 
and the leadership of the Central Board of Health. In doing so, Sata constructed a 
political base, which would be used not only to mobilise support for the MMD’s re-
election but also to generate loyalty to himself. Thus, Sata was able to generate political 
gain for the party in the short-term and a boost to his own political reputation in the 
longer term, albeit at the expense of the institutionalised power of the position of the 
Ministry of Health. This further illustrates the argument promoted in this dissertation 
that in a neo-patrimonial set-up, the instrumentalisation of order is at least as relevant as 
the instrumentalisation of disorder.1  
But it was not only Sata who exploited the opportunities provided by a political 
position overseeing the health reforms. Kalumba especially, as the midwife of the health 
reforms who had mobilised significant donor support for the health sector, benefited 
from the boost to his political reputation. This allowed him to join Sata in mobilising 
public support for the MMD’s re-election. In doing so, however, he also created a 
personal power base. Kalumba’s rising political fortune is best illustrated by the fact 
that he had used his political capital to lobby for the creation of a new district in his 
home area, where he would be elected as a Member of Parliament in 1996; this act of 
creating a new district, with the associated job creation and infrastructure development, 
is perhaps one of the most striking examples of contemporary African political patron-
age.  
This chapter ends by taking stock of the results of the health reforms hitherto. In the 
later days of the tenure of Kalumba as Minister of Health – he went on to replace, or 
perhaps displace, Sata – a mid-term review mission was fielded by the donor com-
munity, under the leadership of Professor Mahler of the World Health Organization. 
This review showed the benefits and shortcomings of the health reform process, but was 
much less explicit about the instrumentalisation that the process had undergone. The 
mission found that the health reforms had achieved progress in developing account-
ability systems for the health sector. The area where the reforms had made the most 
significant progress, however, was in the decentralisation of authority to district level, 
together with the direct allocation of funds to district level through the district basket 
fund. The health reforms had thus succeeded in significantly altering the way power and 
control was structured in the health sector, despite the instrumentalisation by Sata and 
others. At the same time, the review also hinted at instrumentalisation of the reforms at 
lower levels. This can be deduced from the conclusion that the reforms had led to the 
creation of new elites at local level by creating and staffing structures with resources 
and authority at district level. Finally, the report provided an argument to Kalumba’s 
successor, who opposed the health reforms, that perhaps too much attention had gone 
into developing systems at the expense of improving health care. This chapter thus 
demonstrates that the long-term transformation of the power structure in the health 
sector generated short-term political benefits for the regime as well as consolidating the 
political power and reputation of Kalumba and Sata. 
                                                 





Many Zambians, health workers, taxi-drivers, barmen, and other normal Zambians 
remember Michael Sata as the best Minister of Health Zambia has ever had. During the 
2008 election campaign, I was sitting at a hotel chatting to the barman. I asked him 
about his views on the elections. Being in Northern Province near Mpika district, Sata’s 
traditional home area, I was not surprised to learn that the young man would vote for 
Sata. When I asked why, he told a tale about Sata as Minister of Health. It was told in 
such detail one might almost think he had been there; it was a fine contemporary exam-
ple of the African oral tradition, a tale that had obviously been told and retold many 
times. He related how Sata had once travelled to a hospital clinic in Eastern Province at 
night. He had disguised himself with a coat and a hat and joined other patients in the 
waiting room. There he noticed how the nurses lazed and were rude to patients. When 
he got up to approach the nurses, they shouted at him, telling him to get in line and wait 
his turn. Sata then took off his disguise and told off the staff, firing them there and 
then.2 
Some individuals within the health sector also retained positive memories of Sata’s 
time at the ministry. For instance, a former senior ministry official, who had since 
moved to a faith-based organisation, said that Sata had been an experienced hand in 
government ‘and he gave us a glimpse of how things worked. At times he was un-
predictable, but he introduced some good things. He really cleaned up the place. He 
introduced incentives3 for cadres, who really benefited. Doctors were picked up for 
work, nurses got good new uniforms. He didn't rock the boat. He wasn't bureaucratic but 
a man of action, a practical man, who worked well with professionals who took the 
decisions’.4 This is also an image that Sata himself attempts to cultivate. According to 
his party’s website, he was an action man who brought ‘sanity to the health sector’ and 
who worked well with technocrats.5  
Others, though, paint a different picture. One former donor representative remember-
ed him as a “mad man”.6 A former senior official at the ministry said, “They call him a 
man of action, but sometimes the actions were very destructive. He was an unguided 
missile. If it was launched from your side, it could be safe; but if you were unlucky, it 
could damage you”.7 We will later evaluate what he did for the health sector. At the 
moment, it suffices to state he was a controversial figure, who brought controversies 
with him the moment he came to the Ministry of Health. 
On 12 January 1994, the same day that the newspapers announced Michael Sata’s 
appointment as Minister of Health,8 they reported on further developments in one of the 
corruption cases haunting him. The article indicated that the Anti-Corruption Commis-
sion had recommended that the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) bring Sata to 
court on charges that in the position Minister of Local Government, which he held 
before moving to Health, he had deposited more than a billion Kwacha into a bank in 
                                                 
2  Unfortunately, this informal interview went undocumented. This representation is therefore lacking in 
the colourful detail and expressively acted-out dialogues with which the tale was told. 
3  In common usage in the Zambian health sector, incentives refer to financial remuneration, underlining 
the argument about extrinsic motivation made before.  
4  ML0810/06. 
5  Patriotic Front website: http://www.pf-zambia.com/michael_sata.html (accessed in June 2007). 
6  ML0810/13. 
7  ML0811/02. 
8  Times of Zambia, ‘Cabinet shuffled’, 12 January 1994.  
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which he had shares. Contrary to legal requirements, he had not disclosed this interest, 
and in doing so, government lost out on higher interest that could have been earned 
elsewhere. Sata was never prosecuted, however, as the attorney dropped the charges 
because this would be against ‘public policy’, an argument that was not elaborated 
upon.9 It appeared that the case was dropped because the penalty Sata would face for 
this abuse of office would be only fifty Kwacha, for which it was not considered worth 
prosecuting him.10 The report of the Anti-Corruption Commission detailed this case and 
others against ministers in the first few years of the MMD government.11 It is notable 
that Sata featured twice in the report. Another issue he was involved in was ordering the 
water company to make a special delivery of water to his residence, thereby upsetting 
its normal schedule, though this was not considered grave enough to pursue.12  
Barely a few months into Sata’s tenure with responsibility for the health portfolio, at 
the end of February, the Weekly Post published a profile article on Sata, as he was again 
probed for corruption. The profile had the ominous title, ‘A snake in the grass roots’. 
Sata was described as having been a police constable, who in the 1960s quit his job to 
become a trade unionist. The article suggested that this demonstrated his early political 
aspirations, as the labour movement was seen as a gateway for African nationalists to 
enter into politics. Later he had teamed up with a foreign businessman to build houses in 
what was to become Lusaka’s Avondale residential area. After the business partner was 
deported under obscure circumstances, Sata was left with an investment ‘that would 
help him transform from a failed policeman into a minor tycoon’. Later Sata served as 
Governor of Lusaka. The Post’s profile article suggested that at this time he served as 
Kaunda’s right-hand man and ‘the UNIP vigilante par excellence, bullying frightened 
citizens into a reluctant worship of the president’. As governor, he would force market 
women to close their shops every time Kaunda was travelling so that they could dance 
for him at the airport. As the Kaunda era drew to a close, Sata was one of the later UNIP 
politicians who crossed over to the new MMD, preferring to sit on the fence until 
Kaunda fired him for treachery in January 1991. Then, under the MMD government, 
Sata proved himself as a good organiser and a mover and shaker. The article recalled 
that two years earlier, Chiluba had confirmed that the Anti-Corruption Commission was 
investigating Sata for criminal dealings, but at the same time admitting that he could 
never drop Sata, who was a ‘good grass roots’ organiser’. To complete this characteri-
sation of Sata, the article claimed that ‘Sata certainly is a riotous character. His coarse 
blustering ways and rude domineering style cost him dearly in his social life’. Perhaps 
more to his credit, the article stated, ‘He also is a generous man – after a fashion. 
Usually he is only too glad to oblige. He will readily use his political muscle to help one 
get, say, a council flat – even if it is against regulations’.13      
                                                 
9  Times of Zambia, ‘Attorney saved Cobra’, 12 January 1994. 
10  Matenga, G.R., Corruption: Is it endemic in Zambia? (Lusaka, 1998). This handling was also con-
demned in Levy Mwanawasa’s resignation statement in Times of Zambia, 3 July 1994. 
11  Action was taken only against one minister, the Minister of Works and Supplies, Ephraim Chibwe, 
who was accused of irregular purchases for State House. He was dropped from the Cabinet and the 
MMD electoral list. The new MMD candidate for his Chienge constituency was Katele Kalumba.  
12  Anti-Corruption Commission (undated), Reports on Suspected Corrupt Practices involving Ministers, 
Submitted to the President by the ACC since November 1991. EKN files ISN 2292.  
13  The Weekly Post, ‘A snake in the grassroots’, 22 February 1994. 
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A few days earlier, the Post14 had reported that once again the Anti-Corruption 
Commission had begun investigating Sata. Although he had been at the ministry for less 
than only two months, he was alleged to have ordered the parastatal drug procurement 
and supplying company, Medical Stores, to pay rent for his private office at Farmers’ 
House, in downtown Lusaka. He was also said to have named a friend as the sole 
buying agent for medical supplies on behalf of Medical Stores. Sata, in turn, accused the 
Anti-Corruption Committee of organising a vendetta against him, having planted agents 
in his surroundings.15 Then, a few weeks later, the Post published accusations that the 
director at Medical Stores had hired a number of MMD cadres in return for the 
facilitation of an appointment to meet Chiluba at State House. These party cadres, who 
had no more than secondary-school qualifications, were employed in the security 
department and as a receptionist. The paper also reported that the director at Medical 
Stores had since then been replaced, having previously resisted previous attempts by 
Sata to appoint two senior officers there.16 The Post’s editorial in this edition of the 
paper was outraged by this scandalous example of political patronage. This behaviour 
reflected that Chiluba had failed to de-link the ruling party from the government and 
was reminiscent of the old UNIP-era slogan: ‘It pays to belong to UNIP’. 
Sata’s alleged corruption did not go unchallenged. Several months later, as the 
investigations into the allegations of corruption at Medical Stores had drawn to a close, 
the DPP ordered the Anti-Corruption Commission to arrest Sata.17 Sata promptly 
reacted in a characteristically brazen manner, taunting the Anti-Corruption Commission 
to go ahead and arrest him if they had any evidence. He then charged that there was a 
conspiracy on the part of the Minister of Justice Sondashi and Vice-President Mwana-
wasa to frame him. Sondashi, he claimed, had pressured the DPP to order his arrest. 
After he was arrested, Sata continued, Mwanawasa and Sondashi, both being lawyers, 
should lead the prosecution against him, so that he could produce documents showing 
their complicity in framing him. He alleged that he had proof that the former director of 
Medical Stores, an unnamed permanent secretary, Mwanawasa, and Sondashi had met 
at Mwanawasa’s office to plot Sata’s victimisation. In the same article, however, the 
DPP called on the Anti-Corruption Commission to close the case against Sata, as the 
key witness testifying against Sata had since been charged with a very serious offence, 
thus rendering the evidence against Sata inadmissible due to the witness’s lack of 
credibility. Consequently, there was not enough evidence to successfully prosecute Sata.  
This prompted both Mwanawasa and Sondashi to resign from government two days 
later. Following his resignation, Mwanawasa issued a detailed statement subsequently 
published in the media. In this statement he claimed that part of the reason he had 
resigned was that there was inconsistency between his role as vice-president and the 
tools at his disposal, explaining that he had spoken out on issues of good governance, 
reprimanding colleagues and party members, only to be contradicted and challenged by 
his colleague ministers. He then went on to describe his role in facilitating the case 
against Sata over his abuse of office. He confirmed that he had been approached by the 
director of Medical Stores, who made the allegation that Sata had ordered him to pay 
the rent of his private offices from the Medical Stores’ account. He also told Mwana-
                                                 
14  Which still called itself The Weekly Post although its frequency of publication had been increased to 
several editions per week.  
15  The Weekly Post, ‘Sata is probed for corruption again’, 18 February 1994. 
16  The Weekly Post, ‘MMD jobs shock at Medical Stores’, 4 March 1994. 
17  Times of Zambia, ‘Arrest Sata – DPP’, 29 June 1994. 
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wasa that Sata had directed him to employ one of Sata’s relatives as a technician at 
Medical Stores, as well as another man as general manager. Mwanawasa then explained 
that in his role of vice-president, and at the time even as acting president, he referred the 
case to the Anti-Corruption Commission. After it appeared that no action was taken, he 
consulted the Minister of Legal Affairs, Sondashi, with whom he heard the former 
director of Medical Stores in the presence of the permanent secretary of Health, who 
had witnessed Sata issuing the order to pay for his rent from the funds of Medical 
Stores. Later, as we have seen, the DPP ordered Sata’s arrest and subsequently retracted 
this order, which Mwanawasa claimed left him aghast. After suggesting that the DPP 
had acted impartially, he concluded by suggesting that Chiluba had considered firing 
Sondashi rather than Sata for washing dirty linen in public.18 Echoing the analysis put 
forward in the Post’s profile of Sata, Mwanawasa thus suggested that though corrupt, 
Sata had been retained by Chiluba as he was considered untouchable and indispen-
sable.19 Days later the Post published accusations of Sata influencing the Lusaka town 
clerk20 to arrange a high-cost house for the DPP to induce him to drop charges against 
Sata.21 The lack of follow-up applied to these substantial suspicions of corrupt behav-
iour supports the argument of impunity for political leaders, put forward at the end of 
Chapter 5.  
Health reforms continue 
In the meanwhile, as Sata was settling into his new job as Minister of Health, the health 
reform process was continuing, with Kalumba chairing a five-day appraisal workshop 
for donors to discuss the Strategic Health Investment Plan 1994-1999, which would 
later evolve into the National Health Strategic Plan 1995-1999 (referred to at the 
beginning of this Health Section of the dissertation).22 Shortly after the meeting, the 
Times ran a special focus article reporting on the meeting and introducing the health 
reforms to the public. It reported that representatives of the ministry, including the 
minister, deputy minister, and permanent secretary, met with four bilateral donors and 
five international organisations for a five-day workshop at Siavonga, a resort town on 
Lake Kariba. Donors were reported to have presented a joint statement that stressed 
their firm commitment to supporting the reforms, ‘based on the very positive results in 
the field in a very short time’. These results were reflected in donors’ observation that 
health staff at district level had been ‘empowered and are taking charge of service 
delivery in their districts, resulting in improved morale and commitment to better 
health’. The media report drew the conclusion that this commitment was demonstrated 
by donors’ pledges of over 150 million US dollars for a period of four years to support 
the activities in the strategic plan. The article then proceeded by introducing various 
elements of the reforms and of the strategic plan, as well as ‘the vision’ of the reforms. 
Finally, it quoted Katele Kalumba presenting an argument he was wont to articulate.23 
He admitted that there was still far to go before this vision would be attained and that 
people felt that there was too much planning already. ‘In my own empirical assessment 
                                                 
18  If you will, for violating the vow of silence about corruption.  
19  Mwanawasa, ‘Resignation statement’. Times of Zambia, 3 July 1994. 
20  Whom he had hired as Governor of Lusaka and who later became the treasurer of the patriotic front. 
21  Post, ‘Sata accused of helping DPP in acquiring a house’, 8 July 1994. 
22  See Annex I. 
23  See Annex I. 
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of Zambia’s health reform history, planning outputs have far exceeded services reaching 
the people. This strategic plan should not be allowed to fail’.24  
A report by a Dutch delegate, however, indicated that donors had more reservations 
than this article in the state media would suggest. The delegate reported that the plan 
presented was still far from complete and that from the Zambian side more energy 
would have to be invested before one could consider this a plan that was acceptable to 
all donors. The report indicated that the original aim of this workshop had been to give 
the World Bank an impression of the progress made with the health reform process, as 
the World Bank was at that time preparing a 30 million US dollar loan for the health 
sector. However, the inclusion of other donors in the workshop reportedly led to very 
lively discussions. A striking issue of discussion regarded the packages of care (what 
would later be known as the ‘essential care package’). After World Bank missions had 
recommended that the ministry look closer at ‘designing an affordable Zambian car’,25 
the HRIT had spent much energy on a so-called ‘packaging exercise’. They had 
meticulously tried to quantify the packages of services to be delivered at various levels. 
After calculating the costs of these packages, it would be determined if they were 
affordable; if not, the package would be reformulated. However, after months of cal-
culations and consultations, the process had not yet resulted in presentable packages. 
Other donors had suggested that the HRIT should not follow such a detailed approach, 
quantifying and costing individual actions on the level of health workers. Instead, the 
joint donor statement suggested that the HRIT should focus on describing packages for 
key health problems for which districts would get technical support for implementing. 
Other donors’ critiques placed the World Bank in a difficult position, as it would lose 
face if it now advised the ministry to drop a time-consuming methodology that it had 
instigated.26  
Another issue that came to the fore was the heavy burden placed on district health 
management teams to comply with the conditions set by the HRIT and the Danish 
project on planning, budgeting, and reporting. It was suggested that districts be offered 
breathing space so that they could focus more on service delivery rather than merely on 
paperwork. This was an issue that was compounded by the fact that in Western Province 
districts, in addition to having to adhere to the government’s own and Danish require-
ments, they also had to adhere to the requirements set in the Dutch Primary Health Care 
Programme. Besides these considerations of administrative burdens, the political leader-
ship found equity considerations important in determining the allocations to districts. A 
problem for them was the fact that some districts received significantly higher allo-
cations as they received donor support in addition to government support, notably the 
districts in Western Province receiving Dutch support. There was thus an impetus to 
come to a unified disbursement system with a unified financial reporting system, in 
addition to the necessity for a further refinement of the allocation mechanism to ensure 
equity. This resulted in the special attention that in subsequent years would be placed on 
developing a financial management and administration system. A step in this process 
that was reported at Siavonga was to send a mission to Zambia in June 1994, com-
prising headquarters’ representatives of the seven donor agencies involved.27  
                                                 
24  Times of Zambia, ‘Health plan, from vision to reality’, 19 May 1994. 
25  See Annex I for more on the metaphor of the Cadillac.  
26  Communication RNE to DGIS on the Strategic Health Investment Plan 1994-1999 (EKN files, ISN 
3204) 
27  Ibid. 
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An appraisal report from the World Bank staff, which presented the proposal for the 
World Bank’s loan referred to above, also shone light on this workshop in Siavonga and 
how it contributed to creating a new way of working between donors and the govern-
ment. This report emphasised the role Zambian leadership played in shaping these 
relations by, for example, using excerpts from speeches.28 A special place was given to 
Kalumba’s speech at the Siavonga workshop, presented in Box 8.1, which served to 
convince donors to buy into the joint endeavour of health reform, an endeavour which 
may have seemed like a path with an uncertain future.29 This speech was also presented 
by Kalumba himself, in an article which he wrote to present the reforms to an 
international audience.30  
 
 
 Box 8.1 Health reform: A Zulu healer’s tragedy 
 Source: Hon. Deputy Minister, Dr. Katele Kalumba. Speech at MoH Appraisal Workshop, April 1994. 
 
 
If we analyse the content of this speech we get the impression not only of an elo-
quent presentation, but also a well-crafted piece of oratory aimed at convincing donors 
to open their purses and invest in Kalumba’s political project of health reforms. This 
excerpt contains many elements that would appeal to donor agency representatives. The 
metaphor, taken from Africa’s traditional past, adds a certain couleur locale to an 
international discourse of public health. In the mouth of the speaker, an African in-
                                                 
28  Though it is unfair to deny this role, at times it seems as if the report manipulated reality by 
downplaying the role of donors such as the World Bank and highlighting their ideas when they are 
reflected in the words of Zambian politicians. This is most extreme in their attribution of the Cadillac 
metaphor to a speech by Sata (referred to earlier), when Kalumba (who is not too modest to take credit 
for any achievement) puts its provenance in a World Bank mission one and a half years earlier.  
29  World Bank (1994), Staff appraisal report. 
30  Kalumba, K. (1997), Towards; World Bank (1994). 
 
“An anthropologist documented the Zulu healer’s method of proving success with cases of epilepsy: 
to have the patient dive into a river known to be infested with crocodiles and lethal snakes completely 
nude, early on a morning during the coldest part of the year, and hold his breath as long as possible. If 
he came up alive, he would b cured of epilepsy. There are no records to show how many survived the 
ritual to tell the story! 
We in Zambia are trying to avoid a Zulu healer’s tragedy of the past. We all need a real success 
story in Health Reform, consistent with a vision of health that moves away from orthodoxy … or 
more of the same thing. Work with us to provide environments that are conducive to health; help out 
people learn the art of being well; and provide a basic package of health care for all. We want to be 
able to spend less on drugs, less on expensive technology; less on super-specialists with long cre-
dentials whose value is only acknowledged by editors of professional journals. We want cost-
effective, quality-assured health, centred around the needs and resource possibilities of the family. 
This vision we have defined. This vision we share with you. This vision, we learn, is now being 
shared by many the world over. Somewhere it must succeed. That place is here … 
You cannot walk away from Zambia’s reform effort saying, ‘We helped Zambia dive into the 
river of comprehensive Health Reforms … and those chaps were courageous, but Zambia’s infant 
mortality rate has become worse; its infrastructure remains unfixed; its drug supplies still inadequate; 
its epidemics uncontrolled, etc’. There is no taxpayer in Europe, Japan America or member country 
of multilateral agencies who wants to hear that kind of ‘success’ story. Our fate is your fate too; we 
are in this boat together. We have gone too far together not to share in the common cause for real 
success – and not one measured by the volume of documents we collectively produce.” 
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tellectual, it would lend weight to the idea that these reforms were indigenous Zambian 
reforms, rather than ones imposed by international agencies or Northern donors. Equal-
ly, it would also appeal to international public health experts, as it portrays traditional 
medicine as irrational – and possibly dangerous to the patient – thereby confirming their 
convictions that reinforcing modern medicine in Africa was indeed a worthwhile pur-
suit. The speech also aptly summarises the vision of the reforms in a manner that fits 
with representations of a health care system as held in the international discourse of 
public health care, an emphasis on health education, appropriate technology, and 
affordability, rather than the high-tech, high-cost, and high-status pursuits of ‘super-
specialists’ and other orthodox medical professionals – such as Boniface Kawimbe and 
the senior medical professionals he represented. Finally, Kalumba in his speech cleverly 
combines the idea of taking risk, which is something donor bureaucrats are loath to do, 
with the need of reaching tangible results and success stories, which is something 
donor-bureaucrats are under pressure from their headquarters to pursue. He does this by 
invoking the idea of Northern taxpayers’ expectations, in a way donor representatives 
are likely to do, therefore suggesting to donor representatives that he knows and appre-
ciates donors’ preoccupations and that it is in their interests to take a risk and launch 
into the river of health reforms in the same boat as the Zambian reformers are taking. 
Considering that this eloquent and colourful piece of discourse was presented in the 
World Bank staff assessment, this piece of discourse may have served the bank staff’s 
own interest of getting approval for a loan from their executive board.  
In addition to illustrating how a Zambian political actor attempted to seduce donors 
into giving support, the report also presented the advances made in donor coordination, 
which in later development jargon was to be known as ‘alignment with government 
systems. The report suggests this trend was also significantly influenced by the political 
leadership of the Ministry of Health, notably in the person of Kalumba. A notable 
development in coordination between donors and the government was, or so the report 
suggested, the intention of using the strategic plan discussed in Siavonga as the frame-
work for all donor contributions to the health sector. Having the opportunity to discuss 
and give input to the plan, donors would then have to ensure their support fitted into the 
agreed strategic plan, which would be complemented with an annually updated five-
year investment plan. Further, the development of the district basket was notable in that 
it contributed directly to the recurrent costs of the government’s service delivery sys-
tem. For this, donors would use common planning, budgeting, disbursement, and ac-
counting systems. The report states that this way of working departed significantly from 
donors’ traditional way of working, in that it not only contributed to recurrent costs but 
that districts would be unaware (and would thus not have to account for) which Kwacha 
came from which donor.31  
The World Bank report, as has been suggested above, put significant emphasis on the 
Zambian ownership of the reforms, as well as the changes in donor government 
relations. Two other citations were taken from Kalumba’s speech as textbox illustrations 
for the report, which demonstrate this point. One quote, which was further emphasised 
with the heading, ‘It’s Zambia’s Plan’, indeed highlights Zambian conceptual owner-
ship, though implicitly acknowledging convergence in Zambian and donor discourse. 
Kalumba said, ‘The approach to this exercise of strategic planning reflects the working 
philosophy of some of your organisations, but the logic of what the Plan contains 
                                                 
31  World Bank, Staff appraisal, 18. 
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reflects the originality of Zambian reform. Both the concepts of the Strategic Plan and 
of a basic package of health services were defined in the MMD’s Policy Framework 
paper!’ Of course, there is a clear logic both in Kalumba’s assertion of his intellectual 
ownership of at least part of the reforms and in the World Bank’s presentation of these 
arguments. Kalumba was working on getting credit for his achievements, and the bank’s 
staff was eager not to be seen as a prescriptive bully (a reputation that structural ad-
justment had understandably given them). In particular, Kalumba’s claim on the 
intellectual ownership of the concept of care packages illustrates the instrumentalism of 
the World Bank in presenting this quote. As the Dutch report of the workshop recorded, 
there was a discussion among donors about the feasibility of the package approach that 
was pushed by the World Bank. Presenting it as a Zambian idea, the World Bank ap-
pears to try to minimise its role in forcing the controversial decision. A cynic might 
assert that Kalumba merely bounced back the discourse that donors would be eager to 
hear. On the other hand, seeing the development in Kalumba’s thinking on health 
reform over time, as we have done, it certainly reflects an influence of, and adaptation 
to, donor discourses, but it also suggests a certain originality and consistency. Rather 
than assuming the cynical view, it would be more correct to conclude a convergence of 
discourse and mutual adaptation between policy makers and donors.  
The argument that there was mutual adaptation and a two-way flow of influence is 
supported by a quotation presented in which Kalumba urges donors to align with and 
contribute to the strategic plan. This illustrates his assertiveness and his efforts to set 
conditions on donors rather than simply accepting theirs. “We want to encourage you as 
our cooperating partners to buy into our National Strategic Plan”, he said. “We want 
your input into the design but then we will discourage parallel vertical programmes 
which operate outside the national programme that is being designed. We invite you to 
transcend the temptation that you take only that which you can individually label: 
‘Made in the Republic of Luampungu’. Donor community funding should be seen in the 
context of complementing the Zambian effort not the other way around”. Again, Ka-
lumba went beyond the expected courtesies of a speech addressing donors and showed 
his insight into the factors influencing donor behaviour. He even criticised aspects of 
such behaviour, namely flag-planting and the quest for visibility. Considering the fact 
that one is still likely to see labels such as ‘From the American People’ or various other 
donor acronyms on equipment in the health sector, such criticism is still valid today. 
However, considering the way some donors received the criticism Kalumba articulated 
here and acted on it in subsequent decisions regarding their health sector activities 
demonstrates that this was not mere rhetoric. For example, we saw both in the report of 
the Dutch delegate to this Siavonga workshop and in the incident between the HRIT and 
doctors in Mongu that there was a consistent pressure on the Dutch to fit their 
programme into the government framework.      
Following the functional decentralisation of planning and budgeting functions to dis-
tricts, and their ‘empowerment’ through training and direct grants in the period leading 
up to the workshop in Siavonga, the process of supporting this new district level re-
quired further steps to be taken. As we saw, initially the HRIT had undertaken capacity-
building and technical support. However, already in 1993 the intention had been to 
gradually shift this responsibility to the provincial level, while the HRIT would focus on 
supporting the process and the reorganisation of the ministry at the central level.32 To 
                                                 
32  Report RNE to DGIS, 1 July 1993 on donor coordination health (EKN files, ISN 3204). 
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prepare the provinces for this supportive role, considerable work was yet to be done. 
According to a proposal document for provincial capacity-building intended to solicit 
donor funding, historically there had been considerable lack of clarity about the func-
tions of the offices of the provincial medical officer. The last document on these offices 
dated from 1968, more than a quarter of a century earlier. Officially, provincial offices 
were the representatives of the central ministry, but there were various perceptions of 
what this meant. Programme officers within the office were answerable to the managers 
of vertical programmes at the central level, and the provincial medical officer had little 
authority over them. This unclear situation was described as leaving staff uncertain, 
demotivated, and with inappropriate attitudes. At the same time, there was little team-
work and lack of competency for supporting and supervising districts.  
In August 1994 a workshop had been held with members from provincial health 
management teams and a working group on provincial capacity-building, consisting of 
three representatives of the ministry, two provincial medical officers, one member of the 
HRIT, and four technical advisors. Two of these advisors were the Dutch primary health 
care advisors from Western and Northern provinces, one a Dane with the HRIT, and one 
a Dutch-funded Tanzanian who advised on primary health care within the ministry. The 
document that resulted from this workshop summarised the functions of the provincial 
health management team as ‘discharging supportive technical supervision, effective 
training based on identified priorities, health administration/logistic support and promo-
tion of interventions and exchange of experiences’. The document went on to define a 
range of detailed roles, an ideal organisational structure, and action plans for building 
capacity at this level.  
One important action in the proposal was to restructure provincial medical offices 
into regional offices. If we recall, the policies and strategies from 1991 had called for 
regional health advisors, and the later version of the national strategic plan from 1996 
had talked about four regional health offices. This document, however, remained vague 
about what this change to a regional health office entailed, besides offering descriptions 
of their roles and structure.33 One working-group participant remembered that there had 
been extensive discussions. Katele Kalumba had wanted to get rid of the provincial 
level completely, as it would be likely to interfere with the development of districts, 
being loath to transfer their authority over financial management and human resource 
management. Others had been worried that supervising and coordinating 58 districts 
from the centre would be unmanageable. In his role as deputy minister, Kalumba had 
not been able to win this argument. This working group thus developed proposals for 
nine smaller provincial offices aimed at supporting the districts.34 Shortly after Kalumba 
became a full minister in May 1996, the decision was taken to indeed go from nine 
provincial offices to four regional ones.35 Another concrete action that was proposed in 
this plan was to improve the financial and management skills and develop financial and 
administrative management systems (FAMS) at the provincial level, together with a 
separate FAMS-working group and the HRIT.  
These FAMS were also an area that would get considerable attention in the years of 
Sata’s tenure at the ministry. In June 1994 the mission of donor headquarters’ staff 
referred to above was indeed held. This joint mission of financial controllers at donor 
                                                 
33  MoH, ‘Report of a workshop on the functions of provincial health management teams’ (Lusaka, 
1994).  
34  ML0905/01. 
35  MoH, NHSP, 95-99, draft 3.  
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agency headquarters attended a seminar with, and at the invitation of, the ministry and 
the HRIT. The purpose of this seminar was, according to a document reporting on a 
later FAMS workshop, ‘to provide technical support in the process of developing a 
unified system for disbursement, accounting and reporting of external and GRZ 
(Zambian government) funds to the Ministry of Health’. Following the recommend-
ations of this joint mission and discussions within the ministry, the HRIT contracted an 
American consultancy company, which issued a detailed report with recommendations 
of improvements to financial and administrative routines, procedures, and forms used at 
various levels in the Zambian health system. This led to a workshop held in Livingstone 
in February 1995. The participants at this workshop included ministry staff at various 
institutional levels and a special FAMS’ working group. This group included some of 
the representatives of the HRIT, the ministry, and technical advisors who were also 
involved in processes such as the district and provincial capacity-building described 
earlier. The content of this workshop was extremely technical and it led to numerous 
concrete outputs. Participants discussed accounting, record-keeping, financial reporting, 
stores, and medical record-keeping procedures and contributed to the formulation of 
formats and forms for these various areas.36 This contributed to revising and developing 
the various systems that the heath sector uses today. A subsequent step was the imple-
mentation of these systems. Stationary kits and guideline manuals were prepared for 
distribution to the districts. It had been decided that the system would be piloted in 
Western Province. This and the fact that two Dutch technical advisors had been in-
volved in designing the system would assure Dutch commitment to Zambian financial 
management systems. Furthermore, using Western Province as a testing ground gave 
relevance to the Dutch Primary Health Care Programme as a field laboratory for the 
health reforms, a role which would also be played in designing a Health Management 
Information System (HMIS). The Dutch had also commissioned a report by an account-
ing firm on the FAMS as a basis for deciding whether it too would directly contribute to 
the district basket.37  
Beyond such technical issues aimed at strengthening rational-legal systems, one 
major political struggle was significant in Sata’s years at health. This struggle involved 
fundamental issues of power involved in the process of drafting and deciding on the 
legislative framework for these reforms. These discussions would eventually, after a 
heavily contested process, result in the National Health Services Act of 1995. A number 
of the architects of the reforms and participants in its implementation argued that Sata 
played a crucial role in the process to arrive at the final act.38 His main preoccupation, 
however, appeared to be to resist any change that would limit his own powers as 
minister. Instead, he succeeded in consolidating his power of appointment and control, 
thus creating a loyal power base which could be used for his political objectives. Such a 
strategy is wholly consistent with the idea of patrimonial instrumentalisation of a 
rational-legal process.  
As we recall, originally the health reform documents, the MMD policy framework 
paper and the policies and strategies from 1991, had called for a National Health 
Council. This would be an advisory body chaired by the vice-president. This body 
would have a guiding role towards the ministry, which would retain executive authority. 
According to a former ministry official and co-architect of the reforms, Sata had op-
                                                 
36  HRIT, FAMS report from a planning workshop held in Livingstone, February 1995 (Lusaka, 1995). 
37  Report on donor coordination from RNE to DGIS, 20 June 1995 (EKN files, ISN 3204). 
38  ML0812/01, ML0706/03, ML0811/02, ML0810/01. 
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posed this idea of a National Health Council to advise the minister. “He wanted no one 
above him”.39 An argument against the council would be that there would be no legal-
institutional precedent for such a council. Kalumba was then said to have gone to the 
Public Health Ordinance of 1930, which he had studied during his doctoral research. It 
seemed that this colonial-era document had instituted a central health board. Although it 
had apparently never fully functioned, and in fact in Kalumba’s dissertation no mention 
is made of it,40 legally it still existed.41 A central board, moreover, provided a solution 
to another problem reformers had run into. As mentioned before, early attempts at 
drawing up a blueprint to improve the conditions of service of health staff had been 
rejected by the Cabinet as this would not be possible within the public service. Creating 
a central board of health apart from the public service could overcome this problem if 
staff were employed by this autonomous agency rather than the civil service.42  
The exact conceptual origins of the Central Board have caused some debate among 
observers. A consultants’ report from 2004 states, ‘The CBoH has been modelled along 
the functions of the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, and the functions in 
the Health Services Act 1995 coincide largely with the Swedish Board’.43 This is 
interpreted by some as meaning the board was an idea proposed by Swedish technical 
advisors and consultants.44 One observer working outside the government health sector 
asserted this was the case, as he had overheard a discussion between Swedish consult-
ants and ministry staff on this issue in a hotel lobby in Lusaka. The architects of the 
reform, however, vehemently deny that the idea was originally Swedish, while they 
admit that for the implementation of the idea the architects closely studied the Swedish 
model and that Swedes were brought in to advise. Considering eye-witnesses’ narrative 
of Sata’s objection to a council, the institution of a board in colonial times, the desire to 
de-link staff to provide for better conditions, and the admission that Swedes were indeed 
involved in designing and implementing the idea, this later version of events seems 
more plausible than the blanket contestation by less-informed observers that the board 
was a completely Swedish idea.      
Thus, a working group supported by a number of technical advisers, including the 
two Dutch primary health care advisors, and taking into account Swedish technical 
advice, developed draft legislation with a view to creating a Central Board of Health. 
This again ran into Sata’s objections. The draft had stipulated that the board’s director-
general would be appointed by Parliament. One former senior official argued that this 
was to make the board more autonomous, as it would give more security of tenure to the 
director-general.45 In this way it was implied that the director and his board would not 
be subject to the minister’s schemes, as we have seen in Kawimbe’s attempts to appoint 
senior management at the country’s biggest hospital and in Sata’s recent changes of 
management at the Medical Stores. Further, another official claimed that Sata was 
opposed to the de-linkage as this meant he would lose control over large numbers of 
                                                 
39  The idea that the council would be chaired by the vice-president must have been even more vexing to 
Sata, considering the troubles he was having with vice-president Mwanawasa in the first half of 1994. 
40  Kalumba merely mentions that this Public Health Ordinance had defined health authorities in the 
territory. Kalumba, ‘The practice’, 76.  
41  ML0706/03. 
42  ML0811/02. 
43  Koot, J. & A. Inambao, Institutional and organisational appraisal, Ministry of Health (Lusaka, 2004) 
– unpublished. 
44  In an interview with Kalumba, this was a major point of his critique of the report in question. 
45  ML0811/02. 
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health workers and other staff.46 Kalumba said that Sata had also objected to linking 
district boards to the district councils of local government. Subsequently, the draft act 
was amended many times, with the result that, in Kalumba’s words, Sata ‘created a 
eunuch’.47  
From other sources also we can learn that Sata had blocked earlier drafts of the 1995 
Act at various times to resist losing patronage power. In February 1995 the Dutch 
ambassador reported to his Minister for Development Cooperation that Sata was in-
creasingly asserting his influence over the reforms. This influence the ambassador ‘un-
fortunately could not always judge positively’. Sata had again postponed the adoption of 
the draft health act, this time by telling Parliament that a commission would review the 
health reforms. While the ambassador was not in principle opposed to critically 
reflecting on what had been achieved, he doubted Sata’s good intentions based on the 
recent scandals Sata had been involved in. The first case referred to continued rows over 
Medical Stores, where Sata had placed a protégé after removing her predecessor for 
refusing to cooperate in allocating money to Sata’s personal expenses. At the time, there 
were serious concerns over the purchase of inappropriate medicines by the central 
Medical Stores to supply hospitals. The other example cited concerned labour unrest at 
Ndola Central Hospital. A number of junior doctors had gone on strike to call for the 
removal of senior staff. This had forced Sata to suspend the director – a relative of his – 
and replace him with a confidant of his from Lusaka. Moreover, the junior doctors had 
made allegations over the procurement of curtains, in which a brother of Sata was 
involved. The third reason the ambassador had for distrusting Sata’s intentions was his 
insistent refusal to send the draft act to Parliament. The ambassador put this down to the 
fact that the bill would significantly weaken the central ministry and its political leader-
ship in favour of the districts. Since Sata was seen as wanting to control many issues 
himself, even to the smallest detail, this would be a considerable erosion of his power 
base. This had led to considerable concern among the group of donors. The ambassador 
reported that a mission from the World Bank had put considerable pressure on Sata to 
place the draft act before parliament. This had prompted Sata to go forward, while 
altering the draft so that he, the minister, would have the power to appoint the director-
general of the board. Nevertheless, the future of the bill still remained uncertain.48  
This conflict between donors and Sata over the health act did not go unnoticed by the 
public. A month after the Dutch report to headquarters, the media reported on the dis-
cussions over the act. The Times of Zambia reported that the draft bill would cut the 
minister’s power, as the director of the Central Board was to be appointed by the 
president from three candidates, subject to ratification by Parliament. The article also 
reported on the ‘disappointment’ of donors at the fact that the bill had not been 
presented to parliament. Denmark had suspended 31 million US dollars earmarked for 
supporting the health reforms, while Sweden was reluctant to offer its proposed 
contribution of 25 million US dollars. The Netherlands and the United States were also 
reportedly concerned about the delays. Sata coldly ignored the protests in the media, 
however, saying he had not received any official correspondence on the matter.49  
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By the end of May of that year, the Cabinet agreed to send the bill to parliament. 
They did, however, object about the lack of linkage between local government and the 
district health boards. As a concession, Sata, who had to defend the bill in Cabinet, 
agreed that district councils would have to approve district health boards’ annual plans 
and would be informed of progress on a quarterly basis.50 In September, the National 
Health Services Act of 1995 was finally passed, although it was not gazetted until six 
months later.51 The final bill had undergone significant changes in Sata’s favour, 
although it still made the de-linkage that he was opposed to possible. In the final version 
of the act, the minister appointed the director-general of the Central Board after con-
sultation with the representatives on the board. Of the 16 members of the board, the 
minister could appoint 7. The other 9 included the dean of the Medical School, re-
presentatives of the Medical Association and the Traditional Healers Association, and 
representatives of the Attorney-General and the Ministry of Local Government.52 
However, considering that the minister had an influence in the appointment of some of 
these 9, such as the chairpersons of the Medical Council and the Nursing Council, one 
could argue that the minister through his appointments had control over the board.  
Sata also saw benefits in other areas in consequence of the health act. A participant 
in the working group which prepared the act remembered that it had been decided that 
the ministry would appoint a third of the members of the district health board. Kalumba 
had been slightly panicked at the prospect of Sata appointing these.53 Kalumba himself 
admitted that he had never considered the power base formed by these district health 
boards until he had seen Sata’s insistence on signing each and every one of the ap-
pointment letters to the boards around the country.54 We will later see the political use 
that Sata, and possibly also Kalumba, would make out of this newly created political 
support base.  
The passing of the health act by no means meant an end to the confrontation between 
Sata and donors. Later in the year, Sata was reported rejecting donor demands in the 
media. After an annual consultative review with donors, he railed at what he called 
“donor benchmarks” to privatise the Medical Stores. Donors had claimed that this 
would improve procurement procedures and that they were under pressure from their 
governments to account for how funds were spent. Sata, however, asserted that this 
would kill the health reforms and that in the financial sector it had been seen that 
benchmarks do not work.55 The controversy over Medical Stores, which had dogged 
Sata since the start of his posting at health, would develop into something even more 
sinister, a case which will be given ample attention later.  
Building Katele’s kingdom 
For Katele Kalumba, Sata’s tenure at the Ministry of Health led to the worst moments in 
the health reforms. It is clear that Kalumba considered the health reforms a matter of 
personal pride. He took an active role not only in designing the reforms but also in 
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selling them to various audiences. Numerous media articles explaining the health 
reforms to the public extensively quoted Kalumba. As we have seen earlier, Kalumba 
also played a key role in engaging donors in their support for the reforms. His public 
profile was far more pronounced than any subsequent deputy minister of health. Seeing 
Sata mess around with his own prestige project will have been a threat to Kalumba. He 
said that after Kawimbe, with Sata ‘a politician had been brought in’, as ‘health was 
seen as an instrument for winning political power’.56 He did not suggest, however, that 
the same applied to himself. 
One observer of the health sector informally told me about the politics of health 
reform over lunch in an Indian restaurant which was frequented by Chiluba and his 
cronies in the later years of his presidency, where they would come to drink Blue Label 
whisky. He said that both Sata and Kalumba had used the structures created in the 
health reforms as a patronage machine for the MMD in the run-up to the 1996 elections. 
Vehicles belonging to the health ministry were used to transport district health board 
members and local health officials to party conferences. As many of these people owed 
loyalty to Sata or Kalumba for their appointments, they could influence them to rally for 
the party – and for themselves. Meanwhile, they would use the flying doctor service to 
travel the country doing political footwork for the MMD. An article by a Zambian 
organisation involved in socio-economic health research provided further insight into 
the politicisation of health structures. This article looked at the development of local 
planning in the health sector and as such studied health centre committees that had been 
formed to get the community’s input. The article quoted an opposition councillor’s 
impressions of the committee: “As area councillor from the opposition, I am heavily 
sidelined by the HCC (Health Centre Committee). They have brought a lot of politics. 
They think and say that all programmes in this area must be initiated and run by the 
ruling party without looking at their abilities to perform. The HCC members here have 
closed up against me. They don’t consider me as their civic leader. I have always been 
open but they don’t want me to associate with them just because I am not from the 
ruling party”. On the basis of other impressions also, the article concluded that the 
health reforms had become viewed as a project that was owned by the ruling party. 
Moreover, as expectations of the process with the associated donor funding grew, other 
parties were systematically discouraged from being involved in the process at local 
levels.57  
Two interviewees gave another illustration of ruling-party politics in the health sector 
around the time of the 1996 elections. One former government health worker said that a 
few months before the elections he had been posted as a senior member of the district 
health management team in a certain district. At that time there was a nurse at the local 
rural stage-two health centre who was “a very staunch MMD-supporter”. She had 
wanted to become the in-charge of the facility, although according to the establish-
ment,58 the in-charge should have been a registered nurse. She had tried to use her 
political influence to assert the claim, but our respondent refused because, according to 
the establishment, she was not properly qualified. She then went to the provincial MMD 
chairman and the case was discussed in political meetings. The respondent was accused 
of belonging to the new opposition party, recently established by Dean Mung’omba. 
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The former district health manager, however, claimed he was not even active in politics, 
but was still visited by an officer of the Office of the President (the intelligence service) 
who asked him about the vacancy and why he had not posted that specific candidate. 
Then the provincial health director intervened in support of the respondent and pre-
vented him from being sent to a rural health centre; instead, he was re-posted to the 
health management team in a different district. “He knew that I was a Christian and had 
no political duties”.59 Another respondent’s account suggested that this issue was not 
just simply a party-political one. She had, as a registered nurse, been in charge of the 
stage-two clinic in question. She had been made signatory of a German-funded project 
at the clinic. Around election time, however, other people at the district had wanted to 
become signatories themselves, “to be able to chew the money”. She, the previous 
respondent, and three others were removed to make it easier to get access to the project. 
She remembered that her letter was “written in a nice way, but it was political”. Her 
husband, who was also in government service, was transferred elsewhere so she had to 
follow. Subsequently, the project was terminated.60  
 
 




The telling of these anecdotes from the local level is not meant to suggest a direct 
connection between these anecdotes and the rumours cited above of the political 
behaviour of key individuals in our narrative; there is no evidence to support such a 
suggestion. These anecdotes are merely intended to illustrate the prevailing impression 
that in the run-up to the 1996 elections, when Chiluba was fighting for re-election, the 
distinction between the government and the party was blurred and that this also affected 
the health sector. In Chapter 10 we will examine witness testimony on the 2001 
elections, which will again illustrate this phenomenon. In this context, Kalumba’s 
assertion that Sata used the reforms for political mileage seems convincing. However, 
the path Kalumba’s own political career took suggests this might not have been unique 
to Sata. 
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When Kalumba became a deputy minister, he had been appointed as a nominated 
Member of Parliament rather than having been elected in a constituency in his own 
right. However, in the 1996 elections, he stood as a candidate in the constituency of 
Chienge in the very north of Luapula, bordering on the Congo and Lake Mweru. The 
previous Member of Parliament for this constituency had been fired as Minister of 
Works and Supplies after an investigation by the Anti-Corruption Commission.61 Al-
though he was never prosecuted, it can be deduced that he did not have the political 
clout to survive these incriminations. Kalumba, on the other hand, must have gained 
considerable political credit for the progress made in the health reforms, not least for the 
donor interest it generated, but also for the political mobilisation that the district health 
structures could be used for. Regardless of the dynamics between Kalumba and the 
political leadership of Chiluba’s regime, it appears that locally Kalumba had mobilised 
considerable support as a parliamentary candidate. We can recall that Kalumba had a 
matrilineal connection to the Bwile Royal Establishment. In fact, chief Puta of the 
Bwile people was commonly referred to as Kalumba’s uncle in the media.62 In addition 
to relationships, Katele had by the time of the elections in November 1996 influenced a 
political decision that was a direct and immediate benefit to the people of Chienge. 
In 1996 the local government act had been revised, allowing for the creation of 
several new districts in the run-up to the elections. Whereas there were previously 58 
districts, there would now be 72. Chienge had hitherto been a sub-district of Nchelenge, 
but after a ‘quiet but effective lobby’ by Kalumba, by October 1996 it had been decided 
to make it a separate district. Then in December, after having been newly elected, he 
together with a trusted associate from the Ministry of Health and other government 
officials witnessed the inauguration of the council chairman of the newly established 
district.63 Creating a new district was not merely an administrative action, but it was 
followed by considerable investment in the area to create the needed administrative 
infrastructure. A district council building would need to be constructed, as well as local 
departments for ministries such as agriculture, education, and health. This meant extra 
employment opportunities for locals, and it also meant people from outside the district 
coming in to spend part of their government salaries in the district. When asked why 
Chienge had been created as a separate district, a district health official who had been 
working in the area in 1996 said that there were a lot of political issues involved but that 
“basically Katele Kalumba was creating employment by demarcating Chienge”.64 
Kalumba’s enterprise of securing his own power base is a interesting example of 
patronage politics, as he created benefits such as jobs not for individuals per se but for 
the people of his ‘home village’. In subsequent years, he would continue to serve the 
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interests of his rural home and political power base. As shown in Figure 8.1, political 
graffiti in his constituency urges people to ‘Vote Kaka Wesu the Developer’.65 Many in 
his home province informally credited Kalumba with building schools and clinics and 
particularly with connecting Chienge to the national electric grid. This support even 
continued when his electorate’s presidential preferences shifted away from Kalumba’s 
MMD and towards Sata. It thus becomes clear that besides being an academic and a 
technocratic deputy minister, Kalumba was also a political entrepreneur who looked for 
and seized opportunities to further his own political ambitions, despite his own attempts 
to present himself as merely a technocrat who reluctantly found himself in politics.66  
Within the Ministry of Health, Kalumba also managed to strengthen his own pos-
ition. While Kalumba may have been irked by the disruptions Sata caused to his reform 
process, donors’ concerns about the progress in the health reforms must have been a 
huge boon to Kalumba, in view of their rivalry. Kalumba has been eager to present a 
negative image of Sata’s time at the Ministry of Health, even more than a decade later.67 
Sata in an interview equally downplayed Kalumba’s profile as a reformer. He claimed 
that he was the one who politically directed the reformers within the ministry, while 
Kalumba was just trying to “highjack the limelight.”. He also suggested that Kalumba 
was very much influenced by donors, saying “the young man was a conduit for his 
masters’ voice: The donor community”. At the same time, Sata claimed Kalumba was 
“trying to be a good boy with the president”.68  
Indeed, it was a combination of these two factors – Kalumba’s relations with donors 
and Chiluba – that led to Sata being off-staged in the health sector. Kalumba suggested 
in an interview that because of Sata’s undermining of the health reforms, cooperating 
partners were beginning to backtrack. He gave the examples that Sweden was not keen 
to move and that the Americans did not want to join the district basket over related 
issues. Indicators (of performance), he added, were slowing. Kalumba admitted that he 
had convinced Chiluba of the threat and that the ministry had to deliver. Then in May 
1996, ahead of the elections, Sata was moved from health and appointed as a minister 
without portfolio, a job that allowed him to focus on his role as national secretary of the 
party while keeping a foot in government. This allowed him to become known as 
‘Chiluba’s chief-fixer’. Kalumba, meanwhile, took over as Cabinet minister responsible 
for health. Sata, though certainly not free from controversy himself during his time in 
health, claimed that after him it became a ‘free for all’ in the health sector. Regardless 
of Sata’s self-aggrandising opinions, it is true that by the end of Kalumba’s time in 
health and thereafter, the health reforms had run into a debilitating hurdle and that 
political distractions became more than a mere annoyance but seriously disturbed 
cooperation between donors and the ministry.  
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A mid-term review of health reforms 
Before turning to the imminent stagnation of the health reforms at the end of Kalumba’s 
tenure at the Ministry of Health, let us take the time to assess the accomplishments of 
the health reforms up to that point in time. Equally, we will see where the reforms fell 
short of expectations. In September 1996 a multi-disciplinary team of seven inter-
national and three Zambian experts under the leadership of a retired director-general of 
the World Health Organization, Professor Mahler, conducted an independent external 
review of the health sector. According to the report itself, the ministry had requested 
this in 1995.69 Needless to say, there must have equally been a strong demand for such a 
review on the donor side. The report was balanced and pointed our several critical 
issues in the reform process. Nevertheless, as is the case with such evaluations, the team 
took an aggregated and abstracted perspective, not zooming in on political dynamics 
and certainly not on personalities. The report’s tone was mainly diplomatic, as stake-
holders from the side of donor agencies as well as the ministry would have the oppor-
tunity to comment before the final draft.  
The Mahler report described the Zambian health reforms as ‘something remarkable 
in Africa’. This was attributed to the spirit that permeated the reforms and had led to 
‘many good things (being) accomplished’. In some in the health sector this had lit a 
spark ‘which enabled them to express their latent skills and begin the fulfilment of their 
hopes for the nation’. These people were seen to be ‘grappling with problems, deter-
mined to solve them’. The team, however, had also seen confusion and misunder-
standing, with some in the health sector sitting on the fence and others possibly 
involved in the reforms ‘for what they can gain’. The preface to the report suggested in 
hindsight that after a period in which the momentum was strong in order to ‘take 
advantage of the favourable conditions for as long as they persist’, the reforms were 
momentarily ‘blown off course when political obstacles were thrown in its path’.70 
Though not naming names, the report stated that after 1993 the reforms had slowed 
under ‘a new Minister who was much less committed’. It referred to Sata’s blocking and 
weakening of the health services act, indicating that it was only ‘thanks to heavy 
prodding from the donors’ that the hurdle had finally been taken. After Sata was re-
moved in May 1996, ‘the pace of reforms picked up rapidly’.71 The ministry, however, 
was on the whole seen to be taking an incremental approach to reform, seizing on some 
opportunities though avoiding conflict by inaction in other areas. This instrumentalism 
itself, the report felt, led to new problems, as achievements had created an uncertain 
patchwork of intended and unintended consequences with lack of clarity on details of 
the further reform process, despite consensus on the general vision. While the review 
team welcomed the reformers’ attitude to take a learning, experimental approach and to 
embrace error,72 one wonders whether the reforms had not been caught up in the ‘dis-
jointed incrementalism of the past’, which Kalumba in the foreword of the strategic 
health plan had intended to avoid.73  
The Mahler report went on to list a number of achievements, noting that some 
achievements were still on the drawing board, while others were just being imple-
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mented. The primary achievement of the reforms was the decentralisation of health 
service management to the district level and further down towards the neighbourhood 
level, closer to the family. The report credits the ministry for seizing the opportunity to 
make grants available to the districts when additional donor funding became available. 
Another achievement, though controversial until its reversal a decade later, was the 
institution of user fees. Cooperation with donors was described as unusual and success-
ful because of the innovativeness of ‘basket funding’ and the ‘rare degree of donor 
cooperation in support of the nationally led reform strategy’. Though the report re-
marked on the tentative nature of some achievements and described the ministry as 
sometimes proceeding very rapidly and sometimes very slowly, it concluded: ‘Because 
the reforms have taken place during a period of turbulence both within and without the 
Ministry (economically, politically, structurally, and personally) it is sometimes aston-
ishing that as much change has taken place’.74 
Of course, the review team still found many areas wanting. For instance, while it 
acknowledged that extensive preparatory work had been put into defining essential care 
packages, this approach had serious shortcomings in its implementation. While lists of 
essential services appeared to exist, calculation of the operating cost of these packages 
per person did not include the costs of the system that was required to support service 
delivery. The actually available resources for universally providing these packages of 
care were thus not enough. In addition, the designers of the package failed to seize other 
advantages of this package-approach, such as using it as the basis for developing guide-
lines and protocols – in short, standardisation and norm-setting. The team concluded 
from observations in the field that very little of the package was actually operational. 
They spoke of ‘business as usual’ in the clinics they visited. They generally found no 
treatment schedules in place, no standardised equipment lists, and little attention to the 
improvement of clinical care.75 The team appreciated that much focus had gone on 
management issues, but less attention had been paid to the quality of care.76 This 
argument that too much attention was given to systems and too little to service delivery 
would later be central to the rhetoric of those opposed to the health reforms.  
Zambia’s drug policies were another area of concern, an area seen by patients as an 
indicator of ‘health reforms at work’. Many essential elements of this policy area were 
in need of attention, such as drug selection, procurement, and distribution mechanisms 
as well as guidelines on rational drug use. This contributed to ‘poor and erratic avail-
ability of drugs’.77 This in effect influenced popular acceptance of user fees, as people 
were loath to pay for services when drugs were unavailable. The main reason the report 
cited for the lack of progress in this area was that opposition to reform in this area was 
strongly entrenched. The reformers were thus seen to be strategically avoiding direct 
conflict as they thought they might not win on this issue.78 The report was positive, 
however, about the ministry’s initiatives to address such issues, pointing out the draw-
ing up of an essential drug list and plans for the privatisation of Medical Stores. It 
warned, however, that failing to address these issues risked compromising the imple-
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mentation of the essential package.79 Despite its convincing diagnosis of these drug 
problems, the report did not foresee the difficulties to which the drug distribution issue 
would later lead.  
A further issue that was equally important to the public perception of the reforms 
was the contentious issue of user fees. For some, health reforms were nearly synony-
mous with user fees, as can be seen in the numerous studies on this issue.80 The con-
troversy in this issue was that it threatened to deny access to health services for those in 
need. The political leadership of the ministry had seen the sensitivity of this issue. 
Kawimbe, for example, proposed and piloted a scheme that allowed rural people to pay 
their fees upfront in-kind with maize that could be sold to the food reserve agency. 
Following Kawimbe’s departure from health, this scheme was never fully implement-
ed.81 Sata was very much in favour of a monetary pre-paying scheme. One former 
official claimed this was because of the money this would generate.82 In addition, he 
could micro-manage the implementation and management of prepayment schemes and 
user-fee collection, publicly contradicting and warning his staff. Media, for instance, 
reported that he ordered UTH to revise the terms of its pre-payment scheme as it 
covered only certain costs and not others, arguing that this favoured the rich.83 In 
another instance, the Times reported that boards had decided to raise fees from 750 to 
1,000 Kwacha.84 Several weeks later it reported that following Sata’s intervention, it 
had been lowered to 800.85 In yet another case, Sata publicly warned staff they would be 
punished if they were found to charge children.86 It is clear that Sata was aware of the 
political ramifications of these policies. Donors such as the World Bank felt that the ill-
designed pre-paying scheme and ad hoc adjustments were contrary to the letter and the 
spirit of the reforms. The fear was that the ministry would have to raise subsidies to 
hospitals.87 The Mahler report concluded that user-fee policies had been controversial 
and inconsistent, and there was ambiguity about the principle aim. Was this policy 
aimed at generating revenues or at fostering popular involvement in health care? The 
implementation of exemptions was considered ‘to leave much to be desired’ owing to 
lack of administrative capacity and an effective information system. Finally, user fees 
were, together with drug shortages and broader socio-economic factors, linked to a trend 
of decreasing use of health services by patients.88  
Notwithstanding the achievements of the decentralisation process, in this area also 
the review team had serious issues to address. It was found that while district directors 
of health were active in districts, this was much less the case for district health boards. 
Many district health management teams were found to lack planning capacity and were 
hard pressed to maintain financial accountability, let alone supervise health facilities. 
The relations between management teams and boards, meanwhile, were sometimes 
difficult, in part because district health directors would have to cede newly won aut-
hority to the boards that were being established. Moreover, the review reported ‘acute 
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anxiety among some staff’ over the planned transfer of the authority to ‘hire and fire’ to 
local health boards.89  
The most serious point of criticism in this field, particularly if we look through the 
neo-patrimonial lens, was that in some places ‘new elites’ seemed to have been formed 
in district health management that were seen not to ‘respect the rules of accountability 
and transparency’.90 In the technical volume of this review, this allegation was de-
scribed in more detail. It was explained that some health centres could not access funds 
because the district health management team told them that there was ‘no money’. No 
further information would be given. The reviewers argued that this could affect moti-
vation and the willingness to show initiative, as well as lead to distrust, rumours, or 
conflict. They recommended supervision and technical support.91 A former Dutch tech-
nical advisor at the provincial level supported this picture when he reported on the faults 
of the reform process. He complained of badly selected district directors and deputies 
who had started to act autocratically. In fact, some district health boards had become 
small politbureaus. This advisor attested that in a number of districts he had en-
countered petty corruption, which could be seen as ‘decentralised stealing’.92 There is of 
course no data to allow us to draw general conclusions on how widespread such behav-
iour was. However, considering also our previous narrative on the alleged behaviour of 
certain political actors and the anecdotal illustrations provided, it does seem likely that 
such forming of new elites, who did not respect the rules of accountability and trans-
parency, occurred – at least, if the people involved had the inclination, and loopholes in 
the systems allowed them to get away with it.  
Going back to the assessment of the decentralisation process, the review team con-
cluded that more was to be done in overseeing and supporting the process, not least by 
setting standards. This was a major set of tasks that the Central Board of Health, which 
was just about to be established, would take over from the HRIT. In addition to further 
developing instruments to monitor and support districts, more work was to be done. 
This included further establishing local management boards. Also, in 11 newly created 
districts, such as Kalumba’s new constituency of Chienge, staff and structures needed to 
be put in place before they could start receiving grants in 1997. To ensure the success of 
the decentralisation process, the Central Board would require the necessary policies, 
standards, and staff. The review team considered the design for the new Central Board, 
which was then in its final stages before its establishment in 1997, as a major step 
forward in ‘the drive to separate normative and policy related functions from the exe-
cutive operational tasks’. The team voiced its support for the sweeping changes this 
‘purchaser-provider split’ would entail. It was less supportive, however, of the changes 
that had been made to the institutional autonomy of the Central Board. This focussed 
particularly on the changes Sata had insisted upon. Tellingly, the team recommended 
that the members of the Central Board and its director-general be appointed by the 
president.  
With respect to human resource management, the review team found that this was 
one of the most complex issues for the reforms to tackle, but that it had been hitherto 
left behind. This was because the focus had been put on structural, financial, and legal 
frameworks for the reforms. One ambition of the reforms was to staff health centres 
                                                 
89  Ibid. 15. 
90  Ibid. 13. 
91  Sukwa & Chabot, ‘Summary’, 12-13. 
92  ML0810/01. 
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with public health practitioners rather than the various traditional cadres. This came 
from the idea that cadres trained in line with Western-modelled training programmes 
may not be culturally competent for working in the Zambian context. However, the 
report concluded that this ambitious plan had not fully taken into account the impli-
cations in terms of costs, the effort required for developing a new curriculum, and the 
clashes this could imply with vested professional interests and established identities.93  
An even more far-reaching initiative was also set to be launched. With the expected 
establishment of a Central Board apart from the civil service, other staff would also 
have to be transferred from the public service to employment by health boards. The 
reviewers reported that while the extent of boards’ autonomy to set conditions of service 
was yet to be determined, it was clear that boards would receive the authority to 
appoint, transfer, promote, discipline, and terminate the contracts of their staff. Among 
the staff affected, the review team found ‘total ignorance and a lot of anxiety’ about 
what this de-linkage would entail and how it would affect staff. People were worried 
about what this would mean if they were ‘unwanted’ by a board, about what would 
happen to pensions, salaries, and other benefits. There was also uncertainty about the 
possibilities to seek redress if people were unfairly treated. Moreover, the team reported 
perceptions of lack of openness and transparency in the appointment of staff to the 
Central Board. These findings by the review team about the uncertainties and anxieties 
are crucial for our understanding of how the reforms would fare from here on. As we 
will see shortly, the de-linkage process – essential on the drawing board of the health 
reformers to give the boards the autonomy to adjust their staffing to their local needs 
and also to be able to set better conditions of service for staff – would run up against the 
perceptions, anxieties, and short-term interests of those who would be affected. This 
would lay the seeds for the near-fatal blow the Zambian health reforms would later 
sustain, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
In response to a colleague about the initial draft of this review report, a Dutch em-
bassy representative wrote that he had seen much of his own criticism of the reform 
process reflected in this report. Crucially, there was insufficient data about the impact of 
the reforms. The ministry was piqued by this criticism from the review team. They felt 
it was too early in the process to expect any impact. The Dutch representative partially 
agreed with this response, as districts had not received direct funding until January 
1994. This, however, underlined the need to pursue the development of a health man-
agement information system to measure progress. The representative also reflected on 
some faults of the decentralisation process district management guidelines: Job descript-
ions were lacking, and the divisions of roles for local committees and hospital and 
district boards were unclear. He also reflected on the fact that early on in the process, as 
districts were trained in planning and budgeting, the Dutch model from Western Prov-
ince for planning and quality assurance had been badly incorporated into the national 
approach. Finally, he commented that the financial and administrative management 
systems had been poorly developed.94 The Dutch embassy representative drew a con-
clusion that was quite consistent with the review report: concerns remained about the 
quality of care at health centre level, and perhaps there was a little too much learning-
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94  Fax RNE Lusaka to RNE Harare on health reforms review, 16 January 1997; (EKN files, ISN 4966).  
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by-doing.95 Nevertheless, in 1996 the Netherlands began to contribute to the district bas-
ket, following an audit of the financial and administrative management systems.96 
Conclusions 
This chapter saw the health reforms reach their zenith. We also saw most markedly 
during this episode how rational-legal and patrimonial logics not only compete, but also 
interact and can even reinforce each other. A rational-legal process of institutional 
reform directly offered opportunities for patrimonial interests to exert themselves. This 
exertion of patrimonial power did not undermine the rational-legal process but rather 
reinforced it because of the opportunities and resources the process generated. This 
argument is most clearly reflected in Michael Sata’s positioning towards the process of 
drafting the Health Services Act. The process of setting up a National Health Council, 
and later its alternative Central Board of Health, appeared as if it would undermine the 
power vested in the office he held; therefore, he opposed it. However, he was not the 
dominant player in this arena. Instead, he faced the combined power of bilateral donors 
and the World Bank, technocrats in the sector, and one of his rivals, Katele Kalumba. 
As he could not block the process, he forced concessions. These concessions strengthen-
ed the institutionalised patronage power of the Minister of Health, he being the ap-
pointing authority for various boards. Moreover, this not only offered power to his of-
fice but also to his person, as he generated political loyalty by appointing district board 
members nationwide. At the same time, however, the minister also lost operational 
control over many of the resources in the health sector, both financial and human.  
Katele Kalumba also instrumentalised the health reforms to build his political stature. 
He used the political capital he had gained with the political project of the health 
reforms, reforms which attracted donor resources and represented to the public that the 
MMD was making good on the promises it made when it came to power. In this way, he 
pulled off a remarkable feat of political patronage by creating a district in his home area 
and thus building a strong political support base, based on the personal loyalty of his 
constituents. Thus, the intellectual technocrat became a ‘big man’ politician, albeit one 
who performed by attracting resources for his people. Moreover, as Kalumba was so 
successful in playing to divergent constituencies – local, national, and international – he 
was apparently able to win the struggle for political dominance in the Ministry of Health 
by negotiating a transfer for his rival, Sata.  
The role played by donors was also essential to this neo-patrimonial narrative. It is 
beyond doubt that the heterogeneous group of donors were a significant force in the 
arena in which the health reforms were negotiated. Their advisors played key roles in 
designing the various components of the reforms. Their influence, backed up by their 
financial clout, forced politicians like Sata to concede to reforms. At the same time, as 
we saw in this episode, they cannot be seen as the dominant actors. We saw how Katele 
Kalumba, as a broker of discourse, displayed a remarkable performative capacity in 
convincing donors to open their purse strings. Moreover, by directly targeting donor 
interests using their discursive logic, this even contributed to renegotiating the con-
ditions under which this support was given. Significantly, this did not remain merely a 
rhetorical exercise; rather, this demonstrates how discourse is able to influence practice, 
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not only between donors and the recipient government, but also within the sector. It 
would thus be an abuse of empirical reality to argue that either local political (perhaps 
even patrimonial) interests or the interests of ‘foreign powers’ were dominant in shaping 
the institutional reality in the Zambian health sector.  
This episode supports a key argument central to this dissertation on the essential role 
played by rational-legal institutions and logic in neo-patrimonial settings. The object of 
struggle and negotiation in this episode was the design of institutional arrangements and 
the formal division of power. Zambian political actors like Sata and Kalumba (and, as 
can be inferred, also others in Cabinet) followed the process of redesigning the legal 
framework governing the sector with interest. The renegotiation of these rules, as 
argued above, created opportunities for patronage, clientalism, and electoral success. 
This is thus not merely an issue of subverting formal rational-legal order. This order is 
thus significant and more than a façade. In other words, this points towards instrument-
alisation of order and towards the argument that rational-legal and patrimonial interests 
can converge and be concurrently served.  
This is not to deny, however, that in practice formal rules and rational-legal logic are 
not ignored or violated. Numerous credible accusations have been reported in this chap-
ter and elsewhere against specific political actors. It is accepted that an instrumentali-
sation of the discourse of corruption can partly explain such allegations, that is, that 
political actors may use allegations of corruption to discredit a rival. At the same time, 
the fact that numerous suspicions appeared grave enough to prosecute but that such 
prosecution was not pursued because it was not politically opportune, suggests that the 
rule of law was frequently violated in order to protect influential politicians such as 
Michael Sata.  
This chapter ends by reflecting interim conclusions on the health reforms. By this 
time, while instrumentalised, the reforms could not be considered ‘partial reform’ but 
rather ‘health reforms at work’. The decentralistion of power to the district level, 
combined with the channelling of grants to that level, managed to significantly alter the 
power structure of the health sector. This thus amounted to a partial reversal of the trend 
of centralisation of power which is often associated with neo-patrimonialism. The 
review of the reforms justified some of the enthusiasm that characterised these flagship 
reforms. At the same time, many shortcomings were highlighted, including the instru-
mentalisation of the process illustrated by the concessions forced by Sata. It is also 
evident that Kawimbe’s jesting defence of the reforms, “let us decentralise stealing”, 
was indeed partially realised. The review concluded that local elites had been created 
and doubts existed about accountability. Most significantly, however, the independent 
review of the health reforms pointed towards two of the reforms’ shortcomings which 
contributed to making these reforms reflective of Van de Walle’s syndrome of partial 
reform. One was the discursive argument – which opponents would later use – that too 
much effort went into systems, too little into service delivery. The other concerned a 
point of interest and power. There was anxiety among health workers about the con-
sequences of these health reforms for the security of their livelihoods. This threat to the 
collective interests of a horizontally linked group would, as we will see in the next 





Health reforms grind to a halt 
In this chapter we describe how the momentum of the health reforms appears to have 
dissipated. This chapter shows that not only donors are factors of importance in this 
arena, but also health workers’ collective interests. At the same time, we will see the 
failure of a minister to effectively shape the health reforms to suit her own aims. 
The structural changes resulting from the implementation of the health reforms were 
perceived by health workers as being a threat to their conditions of service, particularly 
their job security and their pension rights. Consequently, the labour unions used the 
formal means provided by the judicial system to challenge the health reforms. The 
courts sent the Ministry of Health, headed by Kalumba, back to the drawing board to 
provide better guarantees to health workers. Kalumba, however, had by this time be-
come mired in public controversy linked to the unrest the health reforms had generated. 
Having been moved to another ministry, he was no longer able to rescue the reform 
process. This effective challenge by the trade unions shows how group interests blocked 
the reform process, thus refuting arguments that in neo-patrimonial contexts horizontal 
social linkages lack influence.      
Kalumba, who had lost his position owing to his failure to reconcile his loyalty to his 
constituency with loyalty to his superiors, was succeeded by Zambia’s first lady pro-
fessor, Nkandu Luo. Luo, a micro-biologist was more of a micro-manager than the 
political strategist some of her predecessors were. Having inherited a major corruption 
scandal, she became embroiled in a conflict with donors, which led to a breach of trust 
between the donor community and her ministry. This struggle for control related to an 
episode in which the process of out-sourcing the management of the drug distribution 
company was apparently instrumentalised to the benefit of a criminal organisation, in 
return for financial support to the MMD’s re-election.      
Luo’s abrasive style not only alienated donors, it also set various cadres of health 
workers against her. By asserting her authority, she appeared to be trying to regain some 
of the power the position of Minister of Health had lost owing to the reforms. In doing 
so, she echoed the discourse of the Mahler report that too much emphasis had been 
placed on systems instead of health care. She effectively disrupted the health reform 
process by disbanding individual district health boards and banning workshops. How-
ever, she was not able to reshape the balance of power in the sector. In fact, having 
alienated the donors, she in effect strengthened the Central Board of Health, as donors 
opted to exert their influence by bypassing the ministry to work directly with the Central 
Board. This thus signifies a counterproductive attempt by Luo to manipulate the health 
reform process to her own ends.  
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Health workers’ disgruntlement further flared under Luo’s tenure as she got mired in 
public controversy. Soon she would be shifted from the ministry, but not before taking 
the opportunity to preside over the organisation of an international AIDS conference, 
which was marked by irregularities and corruption, representative of the large-scale 
looting characterising the last years of the Chiluba regime. Even though donors had 
bypassed the ministry, ministry officials nevertheless found a means to siphon off 
resources for other ends. The labour unrest with which Luo was confronted further 
escalated under a succession of ministers who followed her. Doctors’ and other health 
workers’ claims for better entitlements gradually generated broader public support and 
were translated into protests against the failings of Chiluba’s government in general. 
Donors meanwhile insulated themselves from this chaos dominating the health sector. 
They continued their support to the sector through the Central Board of Health, further 
strengthening its capacity as a rational-legal enclave in a neo-patrimonial context. 
Around this time they also agreed on a memorandum of understanding which would 
provide the basis for further harmonised support for the sector for the next five years. 
Health workers finally effectively used their power to disrupt the operation of the sector 
and cause disorder to strengthen their claims for better entitlement. Thus, besides priv-
ate and political interests, professional interests had also been effective in instrumentali-
sing the health sector for its collective ends. 
Human resource trouble 
The de-linkage process in which health workers would be transferred from the civil 
service to employment under the boards on a contract basis turned out to be the 
Achilles’ heel of the health reforms. This hit a raw nerve of anxiety and led to oppo-
sition from those representing health workers’ interests. This process of transferring the 
authority over personnel management to the boards meant that health workers would 
lose their permanent and pensionable civil service status in exchange for three-year 
contracts with higher salaries. Although some staff reportedly welcomed the expectation 
of higher salaries and better job satisfaction associated with working with better-
motivated colleagues, others were concerned about their pensions and end-of-service 
benefits.1  
The de-linkage process was set against the background of wider public sector re-
forms that had the goal of trimming down the public workforce. Throughout the public 
sector there had been retrenchments to weed out unproductive staff and redistribute 
personnel from towns to more remote areas.2 According to an observer working for a 
non-governmental organisation, in most retrenchment processes redundant staff would 
normally get a retrenchment package. In the context of the economic instability wit-
nessed in Zambia at the time, this would provide a considerable sum for consumption 
and investment. However, a statutory instrument had been presented to Parliament, 
which would absolve the government of the responsibility to pay termination of re-
trenchment packages. It was argued that there were sufficient jobs in the sector, albeit 
not always in town. As many health workers were reluctant to move to rural areas, the 
lack of a retrenchment package limited opportunities to work elsewhere. Many health 
                                                 
1  Gerritsen, M., ‘Key-actors in the Zambian health reforms’ (unpublished term essay, London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 1998). 
2  Bennett, ‘Health’. 
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workers thus felt cheated and demotivated. This in turn further compromised the quality 
of care.3 
This anxiety and the perceived threats to health workers’ interests were taken up by 
two major public service unions. They took the ministry to court, calling for a review by 
the High Court of the statutory instrument that would allow for de-linkage of staff to the 
boards. The unions claimed that they had not agreed on de-linkage. They expressed 
concern that their members would no longer fall under the conditions of service they 
had negotiated with government. Another complaint was that the ministry had threat-
ened to withhold funds to hospitals and districts that did not proceed with the de-linkage 
process.4 Various people involved in the process or observers from within the sector 
suggested that the unions were essentially motivated by their organisational interest 
rather than their members’ needs. De-linkage of health staff from the public service 
would mean that the civil service union would lose a considerable number of its 
members as well as their contribution fees.5 One district health manager even con-
sidered the possibility that union members might have been bribed to support the case.6 
Regardless of the unions’ true intentions, they were effective in delivering a legal blow 
to the health reforms, though perhaps not a definitive one.  
Kalumba later admitted in an interview that he had realised too late how health 
workers had the capacity to resist change, while the reforms had presumed they would 
be the agents of change. Even if they technically understood the reforms, their per-
ceptions of their individual and collective interests impacted on the process. Especially 
lower in the hierarchy, people felt more threatened by the prospect of change. Kalumba 
felt that nurses in particular were critically vulnerable to unionised politics. They argued 
and fought against de-linkage even though the de-linkage process had been strategically 
designed to improve their conditions of service. That would not have been possible if 
the boards remained part of the civil service, Kalumba argued.7  
Apparently, at the time, Kalumba had also had the perception that health workers did 
not sufficiently understand that de-linkage would be to their benefit. He announced to 
the Post that he had been on a countrywide tour to explain the process and remove 
health workers’ concerns.8 A media report of the confrontation between Kalumba and 
health workers, however, did not suggest improved understanding per se. From a report 
of a meeting in Livingstone printed below (Box 9.1), it appeared that at least the 
journalist did not fully understand all of Kalumba’s explication. This was particularly 
the case when he was discussing traditional views on sexuality, making reference to 
more cosmopolitan images of topless sunbathing, leaving some of the audience embar-
rassed. Apparently, the intellectual Kalumba did not always strike the right, locally 
sensitive cultural chord. In his defence of de-linkage and the reforms, the article gave 
the impression that he was evasive. By dwelling on a technical lecture about maternal  
 
                                                 
3  Munro, M., ‘Health sector reform in Zambia: Benefits and constraints for service delivery’. In: John-
ston, T. et al., eds., Report of the meeting on the implications of health sector reform on reproductive 
health and rights (Washington, 1998). 
4  Post, ‘CSUZ seeks judicial review’, 11 August 1997. 
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6  ML0811/15. 
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8  Post, ‘CSUZ seeks judicial review’, 11 August 1997. 
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Box 9.1 “Kalumba disappoints Livingstone health workers” 
Kalumba disappoints Livingstone health workers 
 
The Post, August 18, 1997  
By Ruth Banda, Lusaka  
 
Livingstone workers who were expecting health 
minister Katele Kalumba to clarify their de-linkage 
from the public service were on Friday disappoint-
ed when he refused to discuss the subject.  
Kalumba told Livingstone workers to seek de-
linkage clarifications from their employers and 
went on to address them on professionalism.  
Kalumba, addressing more than 200 health 
workers in Livingstone on Friday, said “profession-
alism is a paper licensed by law to practice”.  
From talking about professional, the minister 
then switched to high maternal mortality rate He 
said the high maternal mortality rate was due to 
heavy workloads, limited access to health services, 
inadequate diet and rest.  
Kalumba then spent two hours talking about sex 
and how breasts are so exposed in beaches whilst 
breastfeeding mothers here in Zambia hide them 
from their babies.  
This made some of the people in the meeting 
bow down their heads in embarrassment while 
some walked out of the hall which the minister 
noticed and remarked: "Don't worry they are going 
to answer the call of nature. This hall is protected 
by the Holy Spirit."  
A clinical officer, Renford Nkunika, from Liv-
ingstone General Hospital brought the minister into 
the right topic when he asked him what will happen 
to the clinical officers and Zambia Enrolled Nurses 
who were phased out on the document carrying 
proposals of Livingstone Hospital Management 
Board establishment. 
The minister referred the question to the 
executive director of the hospital Dr. Elicho 
Bwalya who answered that the clinical officers 
will be transferred to run district health centres.  
The minister added that ZEN will not lose 
their jobs but will be re-trained into registered 
nurses.  
The meeting unanimously demanded that 
they be paid their packages before joining 
boards.  
The minister answered that anyone who 
won't join the board will be handed back to the 
public service commission and that any worker 
will be free to go to the Pensions Board to de-
mand for their gratuity of which the board will 
only pay back the employees contribution unless 
where the worker has reached the age of 55.  
Clinical officer Emmanuel Nkatya said that 
life expectancy is 46 whilst retirement age is 55, 
meaning that most workers will lose their money 
as they would want to retire when they are still 
young and energetic.  
Kalumba charged that low life expectancy 
must be a challenge as the health policy says 
people should prolong their lives.  
"Our friends in Japan are fighting to reach 
100 years whilst I am losing a lot of doctors and 
nurses due to the scourge of AIDS," he said.  
One of the unsatisfied workers asked the 
minister to allow the Public Service Commis-
sion who are their employers and the Pensions 
Board who are in charge of their gratuity to 
address them.  
"I am here advocating for my health board. 
You are free to call others to explain to you," 
Kalumba said. 
 
Source: The Post, August 18, 1997. 
 
 
health, he certainly did not appear to go out of his way to address health workers’ 
concerns. Perhaps he was struck by the vehemence of opposition to his grand ideas.  
Despite Kalumba’s attempts to explain the health reforms, the opposition presented 
by the unions’ litigation was a serious blow to the credibility of the reforms. The court 
ruled in favour of the unions’ request for a judicial review of the reforms. When Ka-
lumba showed a lack of progress in complying with the previous judgment, the unions 
tried to have him cited for contempt. The court, however, struck off the unions’ 
application.9 In the court of public opinion, however, Kalumba had a tougher trial. 
Within a period of two weeks at least three opinion pieces seriously criticised the 
reforms. The first, a satire piece on the health reforms by Roy Clarke,10 was published 
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10  Who would later get international media attention by facing expulsion for a satirical piece on Mwa-
nawasa, before being cleared by the courts.  
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in the Post. It depicted an interview with Bulkele Bukalamba, the Minister for Health 
Reforms. In response to a question about rising infant mortality, Minister Bukalamba 
argued that infant mortality was indeed rising, as in fact it was the result of a successful 
government policy to reduce the number of dependents per wage-earner from fifteen to 
five. “Under our policy of Health Deforms, funded by the Global Bank, we have suc-
cessfully increased the child death rate by diarrhoea, measles and malaria. Child deaths 
are now running at 50,000 per year! Washington is delighted!”11  
This was followed by a venomous piece by a columnist who ridiculed Kalumba’s 
recent appointment as a special advisor for health issues to World Bank president 
Wolfensohn. She sarcastically argued that the only way he could achieve this was if he 
indeed attained ‘zero infant mortality’, in reference to Clarke’s satire piece. This in her 
view would ‘earn Katele Kalumba and Zambia first prize in implementing Dr Mengeles 
Nazi Medical reforms to abolish the weak, destitute, poor of Zambia’. Based on field 
level impressions from working for an NGO, she drew a distressing picture of human 
suffering, of a mother carrying her fifteen-year old son to a clinic. Meanwhile, she 
claimed, ambulances were busy ferrying family and relatives and transporting ‘game 
meat or even a cache of psychotropic substances’. She also accused the Central Board 
of planning to create hospitals for tourists and investors, rather than providing care for 
the people.12 The last opinion piece in this series was a letter from a reader commending 
Clarke on his satire piece. He contended that the health reforms were indeed not 
working, judging from the worsening indicators, despite the vehicles bought by the 
ministry, the upgrading of health centres, and recruitment of expatriate doctors.13 Of 
course, these three opinion pieces lacked nuance and used hyperboles to convey their 
criticism. They are also reflective of the discourse used by Zambian activists and their 
advocates abroad, which put much of the blame for the social conditions ordinary 
Zambians were facing on the World Bank and the reforms they had been advocating 
since structural adjustment. Equally, they conveyed a growing sense of cynicism among 
the public concerning the impact of health reforms, while at the same time one could see 
people in the sector looking out for themselves. Moreover, as Kalumba had personally 
been promoting the health reforms, he was personally attacked for the health reforms’ 
perceived failure, thus tarnishing his image as a ‘golden boy’ of Zambian politics.  
Returning to the de-linkage process, the court-case itself did not block the process as 
it merely called for a judicial review to see if the statutory instrument allowing for de-
linkage contravened other legislation. Nevertheless, in effect it did lead to the blocking 
of the de-linkage process as it became clear that staff could only be de-linked if civil 
service contracts were properly dissolved, meaning that terminal benefits were paid. 
This would be a costly venture. According to later estimates, this would have cost 400 
billion Kwacha.14 At a certain point, it was decided to indeed offer voluntary separation 
packages to facilitate the de-linkage process. This led to a significant exodus of staff, 
with over 1,400 professional health workers being lost from the sector.15 This contro-
versial and costly process was, however, finally halted after Kalumba’s time in the 
ministry had come to an end.16  
                                                 
11  Clarke, R., ‘Health reforms’. Post, 9 October 1997. 
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14  Koot & Inambao, Institutional, 32. This was roughly € 67 million. 
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16  Munro, ‘Health’, 41. 
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Luo takes over 
In his last period at the ministry, Katele Kalumba was not as effective as when he had 
been the deputy. According to a former donor representative, during that final period he 
tended to micro-manage things.17 By then a new political figure had entered the health 
sector who would become effective in taking over Kalumba’s job at health. In the 1996 
elections, Nkandu Luo, professor of micro-biology at the University of Zambia, was 
elected to Parliament. According to Kalumba, she had been picked as a parliamentary 
candidate because Chiluba had wanted to rehabilitate the family of a certain politician, 
Chibesa Kankasa, who had been influential in the Kaunda era.18 Luo, a relative of 
Mama Kankasa, was thus selected to stand as an MMD parliamentary candidate in 
Mandevu constituency in Lusaka. As she was highly qualified in a medically related 
field, being Zambia’s first woman professor,19 a post of deputy minister of health seem-
ed logical. Nevertheless, her posting at health, especially later as a full Cabinet minister, 
became so controversial in many areas that it can hardly be considered to have been a 
success for the sector.  
Prior to becoming deputy minister, Luo had been a lecturer and researcher at the 
university and had headed laboratory services at the UTH. She was also involved in 
non-governmental activities in the field of AIDS prevention. Together with Kawimbe 
and Kalumba, she had been a member of the MMD health committee around the time of 
the 1991 elections. Nevertheless, she was not supportive of the reform efforts, but was 
rather more concerned about clinical care, which seemed to have been neglected during 
the early stages of reform. This concern did not so much come to the fore at the time 
when she was deputy minister. One researcher and former technical advisor described 
her as having had a low profile at that time.20 Naturally, this became different when she 
became minister. One former health official claimed that Luo had borne a grudge 
against Kalumba, as Kawimbe and he had earlier blocked her appointment as dean of 
the Medical School. This had motivated her to do what she could to dislodge Kalumba. 
The respondent even went so far as to suggest that Luo had been successful in getting 
Kalumba out because she had been Chiluba’s lover. He said that Kalumba himself had 
told him it was ‘bottom power’ which removed him from health.21 Of course, it is 
unclear to what extent this rumour reflects reality. Perhaps this was an example of 
masculine discourse refusing to acknowledge that a woman could get ahead by merit 
rather than by sexuality.  
Regardless of whether these rumours were accurate, this will not have been the only 
factor that led to Kalumba’s replacement as minister. We saw that in his last year as 
minister, he had attracted public controversy tarnishing his image. Although he too 
suggested that Luo had been seen lobbying at State House, Kalumba explained that in 
his view the reason he had been moved from health was that he had fallen foul of vice-
president Christon Tembo. In February 1998, floods had hit Kalumba’s constituency. 
Kalumba publicly accused the disaster relief committee of complacency in responding 
to the emergency by offering food-relief. He also mentioned that visits to the area, 
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including one by Tembo, who as vice-president was responsible for disaster relief, had 
yielded nothing.22 According to Kalumba, Sata had used this as pretext for allying with 
Tembo to get rid of Kalumba. In March, Kalumba was transferred to the Ministry of 
Tourism, which he considered a demotion.23 However, within months he was again 
moved, this time to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and later again even to Finance, 
suggesting that he had not permanently fallen from grace.24      
Opinions of Luo as a minister vary, though those with a stake in the health reforms 
say she did little to further the reforms. Kalumba said she was a good micro-biologist, 
but a bad manager. He claimed that she had started dismantling the reforms. Her 
preoccupation had been to get back control of the ministry following the establishment 
of the more independent Central Board. This was exemplified by her decision to 
physically move the ministry headquarters from Woodgate House in the centre of 
Lusaka to Ndeke House, where the Central Board had its offices. Her leadership style 
was also abrasive, acting in a directive rather than a consultative way. Kalumba said that 
she had difficulties with professional identities, implying that she did not get along well 
with doctors. She would put down colleagues, thus demotivating them and driving them 
away.25 Others echoed this impression. A former ministry official who had not directly 
worked with Luo himself admitted that as a woman in a ministry dominated by doctors, 
Luo had not been well received. Having come from a laboratory background, she 
wanted to prove to doctors that she was on top; as a result, she gave the impression of 
being arrogant.26  
Some people who had interacted with her on a personal level were mild in their 
assessment of Luo as a person, though admitting the damage she did to the reforms. One 
health worker who had received a prize from Luo for his performance in a course 
remembered Luo as a strict and action-oriented minister ‘like Sata’. He found her 
principled, wanting to see things being done.27 A former donor representative felt that in 
her heart Luo was a good person. When she started as minister, she had invited him for 
an informal conversation to get his views on various issues. At such moments, she was 
very friendly. However, as soon as she was with more than two people she started 
acting bossy and directive, at times ranting and shouting. She also looked at the sector 
like a micro-biologist wanting to control details. As a consequence, she threatened to 
halt the decentralisation and considered the Central Board too independent.28 A medical 
doctor who had attended an international conference with Luo found her a vibrant and 
determined minister. She had wanted to put more emphasis on aspects of the system that 
were neglected, such as service delivery and hospitals. However, with respect to the re-
forms, Luo was seen as reactionary, which led to the undoing of some reforms.29  
Luo herself, in an interview later, denied being opposed to the reforms per se. She 
believed the initial vision had been correct in addressing people’s health through 
primary health care – particularly in the face of epidemics such as cholera, AIDS, and 
the outbreak of bubonic plague that she would successfully face during her time in 
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office. Instead, she felt the need for a reform within a reform.30 Indeed, Luo felt that too 
much emphasis had been placed on developing systems rather than on delivering 
services. She seemed to share the impression also suggested by the Mahler report: That 
there had previously been a concentration on administrative and management proce-
dures, neglecting issues of, and information on, output and impact of service delivery.31 
In fact, in a speech to donors, Luo stated that “priorities will shift from the invisible to 
the visible, from structures to services, and from development to delivery”.32 In a later, 
joint donor-government mission to appraise the sector, this was termed a ‘paradigm 
shift from systems development to services delivery’.33 In essence Luo held similar 
concerns to donors: There was a need to show results on the ground and to consolidate 
existing reforms rather than to implement new initiatives. However, in the implement-
ation of these views, unfortunately Luo got caught up in confusion, conflicts, and other 
political distractions.  
During the first three months of her tenure, Luo called for a total ban on capacity-
building workshops and training. After this period, the policy of discouraging work-
shops remained.34 The rationale behind this was clear and reflected a valid criticism of 
the workshop and allowance culture in Zambian public service. To this day, many 
health workers are frequently away from their posts following workshops, driven by the 
incentives offered by allowances. At the micro-level this can be a real disruption of 
service delivery. On the other hand, this decision also slowed down the implementation 
of reform initiatives, such as the roll-out of various guidelines, for instance on cost 
sharing. Policy processes, such as the completion of the draft health financing policy 
which was almost completed, were also discontinued, while the de-linkage was halted. 
Luo, however, did undertake a review of all structures that had been put in place, such 
as the Central Board, regional offices, and health boards.35 She felt these had been 
designed by ‘a lot of technical thinking not connected to reality’. Again, too much 
emphasis had been placed on financial management rather than actual health care.36 We 
will later examine to what organisational changes these reviews led. 
As was the case with earlier ministers, in her few months as a minister, Luo came up 
against the power of the health workers’ vested interests. At a meeting of health workers 
in Livingstone, she called on them to leave general unions as these did not directly 
relate to their professions. Apparently, this was an attack against the two unions who 
had blocked the de-linkage process by calling for a judicial review. This quickly 
prompted representatives of the union to react fiercely. One said, “If professor (Luo) 
goes ahead to interfere with the individual and collective rights of our members, we will 
be forced to teach her a lesson she will never forget .... While we understand and ap-
preciate how excited the professor is for being appointed a full Cabinet minister, she 
should be cautioned against having a wrong impression that she personally owns the 
workers in the Ministry of Health”.37  
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A few months later she would also have direct run-ins with her staff. In May 1998 
the Resident Doctors Association called for better conditions of service for Zambian 
doctors. They felt that doctors were permanently placed on-call, while not getting 
enough for the extra hours worked. They also asserted that compared with certain 
expatriate doctors who were equally qualified, they earned far less for the same work. 
“What we want is equal pay for equal work ... I know that the Minister of Health 
Professor Nkandu Luo has said we should give priority to patients but we should also be 
paid for the work”, a representative of the association was quoted as saying.38 Shortly 
afterwards, a circular on on-call allowances caused anxiety among doctors. Doctors 
were reported to have ‘threatened to withdraw labour since it was these allowances that 
kept them in Government (service)’. Luo, however, clarified to the media that her 
ministry had no intention of removing these allowances, although she admitted she did 
want to streamline the arrangement “so that it gave the best benefit to the communities”. 
For instance, doctors who were on-call would have to be at a specific location rather 
than having to be searched for.39  
Regardless of these clarifications, health workers remained fearful of the suspension 
of on-call allowances. Obviously, they felt that the conditions of this ‘entitlement’ 
should be more beneficial to them rather than more stringent. The same day, the doctors 
at the UTH downed their tools. According to the hospital director, even emergency 
cases were not seen to and death certificates were not signed. In response, Luo rushed to 
add that the previous circular on on-call allowances had been unclear and incorrect and 
that a new one had been issued calling for a mere streamlining of the allowance.40 
Doctors, however, were not impressed by Luo’s clarifications and attempt to avert a 
strike, saying that she was ‘spoiling for a fight’. They also added other issues to their 
demands, drawing attention to outstanding issues from the last time they had called a 
strike two years earlier, such as the issue of accommodation and conditions of service. 
They also undertook to bypass Luo by going directly to Cabinet Office, as Luo had not 
consulted them.41 The strike subsequently continued and spread to other hospitals, while 
the ministry did not seem eager to meet with doctors’ representatives.42 Then the 
ministry asked heath workers for a three-month grace period to attempt to meet health 
workers’ demands, to which a health workers’ union threatened that if demands were 
not met within a month they would go on strike.43 Then, as government was posturing 
about preparing legislation to ban health workers from striking,44 further strike action 
appeared to have been postponed, at least for the moment.  
In addition to clashing with health workers, Luo also clashed with donors. While 
donors had in part been happy with Luo’s intentions to focus on service delivery and the 
quality of health care, there was also concern that she was less committed to the re-
forms. In April 1998, a Zambian–Danish annual consultation meeting was held, at 
which Denmark announced its suspension of contributions to the district basket. They 
also announced, however, that they would be prepared to continue their support if a list 
of 14 ‘relative conditions’ were met. The first of these conditions perhaps illustrated the 
                                                 
38  Times of Zambia, ‘Doctors want equal pay for equal work’, 18 May 1998. 
39  Times of Zambia, ‘Doctors overtime perks stay, says Luo’, 26 May 1998. 
40  Times of Zambia, ‘UTH doctors down tools’, 27 May 1998. 
41  Post, ‘UTH operations in disarray’, 27 May 1998. 
42  Times of Zambia, ‘Kitwe docs join strike’, 29 May 1998; Post, ‘UTH doctors' strike enters day three’, 
29 May 1998; and Times of Zambia, ‘Doctors body battles to meet State’, 2 June 1998. 
43  Post, ‘UTH workers reject govt’s “3 months grace period”’, 9 June 1998. 
44  Times of Zambia, ‘ZCTU slams State for punitive law’, 2 July 1998. 
238 
 
key to their concerns, namely that the ministry would guarantee the future autonomy of 
the Central Board. Other conditions referred to financial and administrative manage-
ment, the transfer of staff responsibilities and equipment to the Central Board, and 
estimation of the cost of the de-linkage process.45 While official Danish reports on the 
issue were extremely formal, sterile, and impersonal, according to a Dutch donor repre-
sentative these discussions became quite personal and erupted into a ‘shouting match’. 
Conflict between donors and Minister Luo would, however, only get worse. This con-
flict spread to most of the donor community, as a skeleton emerged from the bureau-
cratic closet Luo had inherited.  
Criminalisation of the Zambian health sector 
The case of Medical Stores Limited would explode and disrupt donor–government 
relations in the health sector for years to come. Although we will not dwell on this in 
this dissertation, the narrative fully reflects the worst of the criminalisation of the 
African state that analysts had focussed their attention on at the end of the twentieth 
century. Rather than an analysis of public administration, the episode we will now 
explore had elements more befitting a political thriller, such as arms’ dealing, former 
apartheid-era spies, an Italian mafia connection, and even, indirectly, the assassination 
of a European head of government.46 In this section we will not describe the complex 
criminal networks behind the façade of health policies and the discourse of donor–
government dialogue, but rather concentrate on how policies and administrative pro-
cesses were instrumentalised for political, personal, and even criminal gain.  
As we recall, by the time of Sata’s tenure at the Ministry of Health, Medical Stores 
had become a prime object of donors’ concern. Medical Stores was a parastatal com-
pany, with the Ministries of Finance and Health as shareholders, responsible for pro-
curing, distributing, and even producing drugs. During Sata’s tenure, accusations of 
political appointments and corruption involving Medical Stores hit the media. Reports 
of drug shortages had also become common, and there were accusations of misman-
agement within the parastatal.47 As the erratic supply of drugs jeopardised service 
delivery as well as the public’s perception of the health reforms, donors had urged that 
Medical Stores be privatised, an idea fully consistent with the prevailing policies of 
structural adjustment. As mentioned before, Sata had been opposed to such a privati-
sation, refusing to bow to “donor benchmarks”. The argument he put forward was that 
Medical Stores provided an essential service by distributing drugs to remote areas.  
Gradually, full privatisation was postponed as an option for Medical Stores. Instead, 
in July 1997 after Kalumba had taken over the ministry from Sata, Cabinet took the 
decision to restructure Medical Stores into an essential drugs and medical supply stores. 
Shortly afterwards, a consultancy study was carried out to examine options for Medical 
Stores. One option was to contract out all services to a private party; another was to 
dissolve the existing Medical Stores and establish new essential drugstores; and the 
third option was to restructure Medical Stores. Donors and the ministry reportedly 
agreed upon the option to restructure, which had been recommended by the consultants. 
This would mean a significant down-sizing of Medical Stores from some 200 to less 
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than 50 staff, as well as revitalisation and recapitalisation. Donors would support this 
process and establish a drugs’ and supplies’ fund, pledging over a million US dollars in 
support. Only when the company became viable would privatisation become the ob-
jective again.48      
However, early in 1998, Kalumba rejected previous agreements on restructuring 
Medical Stores and let a private company carry out a ‘diligence study’. This was done 
without consulting with donors or sharing either the terms of reference or the findings 
with donors and those within the health sector who had hitherto been involved. This 
study recommended that rather than restructuring Medical Stores, its operations should 
be contracted out to a private company. Reluctantly, donors accepted this option and 
agreed with the ministry that the management of Medical Stores would be contracted 
out under a transparent process of international competitive bidding. In March of 1998, 
donors discovered that a tender procedure had been held for the contracting out of the 
management of Medical Stores and that a company named GMR had won the tender.49 
Further investigation of the process sparked serious concerns among donors. In letters 
addressed to the ministry, donors led by the Swedish and the British clearly asserted that 
the tender process and the contract drafted between the ministry and GMR were un-
acceptable to donors.50  
The first point of criticism about the tender process was that the ‘diligence study’ 
carried out to advise the ministry on how to deal with Medical Stores had been per-
formed by a consultant who also represented GMR during the bidding. Also the tender 
that had been ‘floated’ to 14 international and 8 national companies by the national 
tender board had no pre-qualification phase to allow potential bidders to inform them-
selves about the process. Moreover, the period in which interested companies could 
submit their proposals was extremely short. Whereas standard practice, according to the 
Zambian government’s own guidelines, was to allow for an eight-week period, in this 
case only four weeks were given. This meant that unless a firm had anticipated the ten-
der before its formal announcement, it would have had insufficient time to prepare for 
submitting a good proposal. Clearly, this was an advantage that GMR had over other 
companies. Donor concerns also extended to the conditions of the contract, which were 
disadvantageous to the Zambian government. There was no performance clause in the 
draft contract stipulating what could be expected from GMR, whereas GMR was guar-
anteed a turnover of 10 million US dollars and would get a commission of 15 per cent 
of the value of the goods distributed.51  
As the government did little to address donors concerns, donors formulated a coor-
dinated response – initially on the level of health experts, although later also at the 
‘political level’, meaning that ambassadors and the British High Commissioner were 
involved. Following a donor meeting, the Swedish ambassador and her British counter-
part had a tense meeting with Minister Luo. In reaction to a statement in which donors’ 
concerns were outlined, she emotionally accused donors of pursuing a merry-go-round 
of issues. While some donors were telling her to get on with the job, now she was con-
fronted with a dictatorship of donors lined up against her. This was just one of the areas 
of criticism. Everything she did seemed to be wrong. If donors felt so strongly about the 
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issue of Medical Stores, they should forget so-called cooperation. She complained she 
had met the Swedish and the British numerous times over the issue, wondering how 
long they would go on about it. She concluded that her concern was the health of mil-
lions of Zambians, implying that donors concerns were different. The donor represent-
atives then reacted by saying that the minister had no monopoly of concern about the 
health of ten million Zambians. Donor agencies would not be involved in health care if 
that were the case. Moreover, the British High Commissioner was surprised by accusa-
tions of a merry-go-round of issues and a dictatorship of donors. He defended donors’ 
position by asserting that the donors had based themselves on agreements with govern-
ment about transparent and competitive bidding and that in this case neither local nor 
international procurement rules had been followed. Luo maintained that donors were 
‘ganging up’ on her by meeting on these issues without representation from the min-
istry. She indicated that Cabinet would take a decision on this issue. If Cabinet approved 
the contract with GMR, donors would merely be informed. If there was room for further 
discussion, donors ‘should be prepared to quote chapter and verse’.52  
Indeed, a month later, despite donor concerns a contract was signed between GMR’s 
managing director Leonardo Mordini and the Zambian government, represented by the 
permanent secretaries of the Ministries of Finance and Health. Donor representatives 
appeared powerless on this issue. A Dutch donor representative admitted that a cloud of 
mystery surrounded the issue and that donors only gradually learned about certain de-
tails. Some colleagues were startled and intimidated by the issue, fearing that their 
phones were tapped. “We knew too much, but a lot we couldn’t prove”.53 Some donor 
representatives, however, did informally piece together some details about GMR’s repu-
tation. It emerged that this was not only a case of non-transparent procurement, but also 
apparently a more sinister case of international organised crime. The historian Stephen 
Ellis had in 1996 written an article detailing GMR’s history, tracing it to a company set 
up as a vehicle for an Italian entrepreneur based in the Seychelles. The company, which 
eventually set up a South African branch run by apartheid-era secret operatives, was 
allegedly mixed up in sanctions-busting, gun smuggling, and a coup attempt in the 
Seychelles.54 In the period GMR was running Medical Stores, there were indications 
that Medical Stores’ logistical capacity was used for the guns-for-diamond trade with 
Angola and possibly the DRC.55 However fascinating, this murky part of Zambia’s con-
temporary history would remain outside of the official discourse on the health sector – 
though as we will see later, it did significantly affect donors’ attitude to the Zambian 
health sector.  
Unknown to donors, however, this case had its roots in the Chiluba regime’s quest 
for political survival. The path leading up to the contracting of GMR happened before 
Luo took over from Kalumba in March 1999. Kalumba gave the order for the ‘due 
diligence study’, and his permanent secretary, Bulaya, would have had a major role in 
this. This is also apparent from the account of a former ministry official. He claimed 
that following the elections of 1996, the permanent secretary at the time, Bulaya’s pre-
decessor, was unexpectedly retired in the national interest. This meant he was hon-
ourably discharged by the President, after which he got a job for the World Bank in 
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Lesotho. It appeared, however, that President Chiluba had personally insisted on this 
removal and that Kalumba had accepted it. The reason seemed to be that a certain 
company had supported the MMD during the elections and in return wanted the contract 
for exploiting Medical Stores.56 The retired permanent secretary was seen as a man of 
integrity. One former colleague suggested that he was the last permanent secretary who 
followed systems correctly, as after him it became a free-for-all.57 Indeed, the incoming 
man, Kashiwa Bulaya, was to spark much controversy. He became known as ‘Quick 
Silver’ for the money he controlled and as a ‘banker for the MMD’.58 As we will see 
later, he apparently played this role in subsequent elections and would later be sen-
tenced to five years’ hard labour for corruption in his role as permanent secretary. One 
colleague remembered, “Bulaya had nerves of steel. He wouldn’t think twice before he 
did anything”. After Bulaya became permanent secretary, “He succumbed to problems. 
He was knowledgeable, and politically, socialist inclined, but he was overpowered and 
took advantage. He gave favours and took his reward”.59 Thus, with Bulaya as con-
trolling officer of the ministry, GMR could be given the chance to profit from illicit 
opportunities in exchange for support to Chiluba’s regime. 
The case of Medical Stores was thus more than the instrumentalisation of procedures 
for private and criminal gains, though this certainly played a part. Significantly, this 
case served the interests of regime survival. This strategy of regime survival, however, 
came at a cost as the scheme emerged from the shadows in which it was hatched, a cost 
which impacted on relations between the donors and the government and left the health 
reform process in limbo.  
Muddling through 
As we saw above, due to their involvement in the health sector, donors had picked up on 
the dubious selection of GMR as the contracting party for managing Medical Stores. 
They had also seriously confronted the Zambian government over the issue. The Danes 
suspended their contributions to the sector, as did the Swedes. The British, meanwhile, 
appeared even less inclined to join the district basket than before. The Dutch also 
considered ending their support to the health sector. The Netherlands Embassy’s health 
advisor, however, strongly opposed this decision. He felt that they should continue 
supporting the district basket, as without money, districts would be making plans in 
vain. In fact, he even argued in hindsight that in the context of a minister hostile to 
reforms and deteriorated relations between donors and the ministry, the district basket 
saved the decentralisation of power to districts. Donors’ reaction to the row over 
Medical Stores was therefore not unambivalent, with some donors taking serious actions 
and others – in the words of this donor representative – burying their heads in the 
sand.60  
This ambivalence becomes clear in a Dutch report from September 1998, presenting 
arguments as to why support to the health sector in Zambia should be continued. At the 
time, the Netherlands was re-evaluating its development programme, focussing on a 
smaller number of partner countries and selecting a limited number of sectors per 
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country to further focus support. The organising principle for this exercise was the 
implementation of the sector-wide approach, which would aim to support a recipient 
governments’ poverty-reduction policies at a macro-level, rather than implement donor 
projects and fielding technical assistance at a micro-level. The striking part of this 
report, however, is that only the faintest reference is made to the difficulties the health 
reforms were experiencing at the time, with no allusion to the row that was brewing 
over Medical Stores. As such, the paper is an interesting example of how donor agen-
cies use their own policy discourse to create a façade to sanitise issues of personality, 
conflict, abuse, and failure.  
The paper began by describing the principles of Dutch health-sector policy for dev-
elopment cooperation at the time, which took an integrated approach to strengthening 
basic health care from a curative and preventative perspective. A link was also drawn to 
international agreements on health care as well as a recent pronouncement of the Dutch 
Minister for Development Cooperation to support social sectors with twenty per cent of 
the aid budget. The paper went on to describe the health situation in Zambia on the basis 
of health indicators, which were considered to be poor and showing little improvement, 
especially in the face of the AIDS epidemic. These poor indicators were seen as the 
reason health reforms had been implemented, following the collapse of the system of 
free health care at the end of the 1980s. The reforms were subsequently presented as 
innovative policy. In reference to the problems donors were at that time encountering 
with Minister Luo, the paper argued: ‘The implementation of the reforms is a process of 
trial and error, but despite the recent problems the policy is still standing’. Details of 
these ‘recent problems’ were, however, not given. To argue that the reforms still had a 
positive impact, the paper stated that the strategic plan was still used as the basis for 
these policies and that ‘the decentralisation of authorities to districts is a positive affair, 
which can never be fully reversed’. It was also argued that the health reforms had 
created a sector that fitted with the available capacity and recourses, arguing that it was 
by no means a ‘white elephant’. Other positive results named were the improvement of 
capacity at district level, the ‘relatively’ transparent planning and implementation sys-
tem, and the monitoring and evaluation tools of HMIS and FAMS. In fact, it was argued 
that the health reforms were seen as a ‘good practice’ and were used as an example for 
reforms in other countries. On the negative side, however, the report mentioned that 
total government and donor funding were insufficient to deliver the essential packages 
of care, leading the authors to argue for an expansion of the long-term commitment of 
donors and the government to supporting a ‘sector-wide approach’.  
Subsequently, the paper argued that the Netherlands had a ‘comparative advantage’ 
in their involvement in the health sector. The long experience in Zambian health care 
was credited as giving the Netherlands good insight into what happens in the sector at 
all levels and not just at the central level, as was the case for other donors. This allowed 
for a pragmatic and informed contribution to dialogue with government on the health 
reforms. As a case in point, the primary health care programme in Western Province 
was cited as an important source of experience and innovations. For example, the devel-
opment of monitoring systems, the design of the district basket fund, and the develop-
ment of a district health management course, which was supported by the Dutch, were 
considered to have drawn on experiences from Western Province. It was also argued 
that despite questions about their relevance to development, the Dutch technical experts 
were considered to contribute to the implementation of the health reforms. Strikingly, 
the paper listed comparative advantages in the health sector which were derived from 
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precisely those activities the Dutch were in the process of abandoning in pursuit of the 
new mode of working: The sector-wide approach. In conclusion, this paper argued that 
despite concerns about the progress of the health reforms (which again were not sub-
stantiated), there were ample arguments to continue the Dutch support to the health 
sector.61  
Of course, it is clear that the purpose of this report was to legitimate Dutch in-
volvement in the health sector. This goal would not be served by emphasising the 
relational problems between donors and the government, a decline in the minister’s 
commitment to reform, or especially the suspicions of illicit practices. Instead, a dis-
cursive pattern that is common to development cooperation was presented. Simplified, 
this can be read as follows: The problems are big; there are promising policies in place 
to solve these problems; the main thing needed is money to cover the financial gap 
between intentions and available resources. In other words, despite the problems the 
health reforms were facing, there was a strong motivation inherent to those working in 
donor bureaucracies to continue being involved in the health sector. On the other hand, 
owing to a lack of confidence in the ministry, donor contributions to the district basket 
dropped to just 57 per cent of what had been pledged, whereas in previous years this 
had been around 80 per cent.62 
The next few years would see particular donor interest in the operation of the Central 
Board of Health. A consultant later reported that during this period, donors had become 
more focused on the Central Board and had established firm working relations, by 
means of which they could disburse funds under their own conditions for procurement, 
accounting, and reporting.63 However, doing this required further strengthening of the 
Board. One health advisor remembered that the Central Board was a good idea on 
paper, and ideas developed in the Central Board on, for example decentralisation or 
performance-based management, were promising. However, he recalled that staffing of 
the Board was not in line with reality. Salaries for existing staff had been increased, 
which made it difficult budget-wise to recruit new staff for functions such as procure-
ment, planning, and monitoring and evaluation.64 Other donors shared these concerns. 
As we saw above, the Danes made the autonomy and the proper functioning of the 
Central Board a prerequisite for continued support. However, apparently from within 
the sector also, there was an incentive to reorganise the Central Board. In a report on the 
restructuring of the Central Board of Health, the criticism we saw coming from Pro-
fessor Luo earlier was presented as the rationale for this restructuring. ‘Lower than 
expected individual quality health programme outputs have led many individuals and 
communities to question health sector reform in general and the role of CBoH in 
particular. Mid-1998, in response to community concern and personal visits to most 
parts of the health system, the Minister of Health appointed a MoH-CBoH Joint Task 
Force to review the mandate and organisation of the Central Board of Health”.65 As this 
report was authored by the Central Board, and considering Luo’s sensitivity to the role 
played by donors, it is possible that the presentation of this rationale appeared to be a 
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more palatable representation for the political leadership than acknowledging the in-
fluence of the donor pressure to beef up the Central Board. 
In the restructuring report, the Central Board was described as an ‘agent’ of the 
ministry and was made responsible for implementation. As it had no health-care pro-
viding staff itself, it contracted these services from management boards. It was also 
mandated with advisory and supervisory tasks and also with the responsibility to set 
standards and financial objectives, and to provide technical support. The most signifi-
cant element of this restructuring report is that it reversed the establishment of regional 
offices which had been insisted on by Kalumba. Instead, provincial health offices were 
re-established as a decentralised part of the Central Board. The rationale presented for 
this was that it would be more effective and efficient to manage health care as close to 
the delivery point as possible. It was also argued that the province was a key organi-
sational level in other ministries. The fact that this would create provincial-director 
positions with associated staff, providing lucrative new appointment opportunities, was 
not explicitly mentioned. Another area of focus for the restructuring was the strengthen-
ing of the financial management functions of the Board. Various financial management 
functions would be merged into one financial unit. In total, the report suggested forming 
four directorates and three units. This included a Directorate of Technical Support 
Services, which had management responsibility over the provincial offices, one for 
Clinical Care and Diagnostic Services, one for Public Health and Research, and a 
Directorate of Human Resource and Health Planning. In addition to a finance unit, there 
would be an administrative and an internal audit unit. In total, the structure catered for 
221 positions, of which 95 were to be at Ndeke House.66 In subsequent drafts of this 
report, which would finally be approved by Cabinet in 2000, the Malaria Control Centre 
was also added to the Central Board. As such, the total establishment came to 266, of 
which 122 positions were at Ndeke House.67  
While the Central Board was being restructured, a similar process was set up for the 
ministry headquarters, though this process was reportedly very slow. While a revised 
structure was proposed in 1999, it took until 2002 before the restructuring was com-
pleted, resulting in an establishment of 88 members of staff.68 A consultant later con-
cluded that for certain functions for the ministry, no rationale had been provided in the 
restructuring report. It also appeared that rather than reflecting the ministry head-
quarters’ new roles since the establishment of the Central Board of Health, old 
organisational structures had been followed. As such, there were units for procurement, 
accounts, and internal audit, while the Central Board had similar units to support service 
delivery.69 This could be seen as a duplication of functions. Moreover, some units at 
headquarters, such as the procurement unit, were reportedly not fulfilling their func-
tions, owing to understaffing and lack of equipment. As a consequence, the Central 
Board and other technical units carried out procurement activities. According to a re-
view mission in 2000, donor concerns on cost-effectiveness and transparency in pro-
curement were partly justified, and executive procurement should be shifted to the 
Central Board. Nevertheless, the ministry retained final responsibility for procurement 
and continued to be at the centre of procurement decisions.70 We will later examine an 
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instance in which the ministry’s procurement system was abused by Bulaya in a cor-
ruption scandal that would attract wide-spread public attention. Donors in part added to 
this duplication, as the Netherlands continued to allow the rural health kits which they 
funded be procured through the ministry, even after Sweden had discontinued its sup-
port over the Medical Stores’ issue, and others channelled their equipment through other 
procurement channels such as the Central Board.  
In addition to procurement, there were other areas where the ministry seemed reluc-
tant to transfer control. As we saw in Chapter 8, the Health Services Act of 1995 had 
provided for a management board for the Central Board of Health. This board would 
advise on policy issues. However, after board members had been appointed in 1996, the 
board was dissolved after its term ended and its members were not reappointed in 1998. 
Instead, the new structure of the ministry set out to consolidate its role as the policy-
making organ of the sector, for instance by providing for a director of health policy.71 
This is consistent with the impression given of Luo’s tenure at the ministry: She strived 
to take back power for the ministry, which had been lost in the original health reforms. 
This impression is strengthened by accounts of her treatment of district health boards 
during her tours of the country. Various people interviewed remembered that Luo would 
go around the country dissolving boards without appointing new ones. A fellow trav-
eller on a bus to Mongu, for instance, told me he had been the member of a district 
health board. During the visit by Luo, the board had advocated that a new district 
hospital be opened in Mongu apart from the provincial hospital. Luo had reacted 
fiercely that the board should first make sure their existing hospital was functioning, as 
currently that hospital was filthy. Then, on the way to the airport, she had signed an 
order to dissolve the board, without prior consultation or notification. It thus appears 
that, as relations between donors and the ministry had become acrimonious and while 
donors were turning to the Central Board to continue their programmes, the ministry 
was reclaiming its sources of power or debilitating the popular structures that could 
pose a rival authority.  
On the other hand, beyond power issues, some criticism of the functioning of district 
health boards arguably had a technical validity. Experiences with district health boards 
were mixed. The former Mongu board member, referred to above, admitted that board 
members were not always extremely knowledgeable, which led to difficulties with 
doctors, who would consider board members laymen. One former district health director 
from a peri-urban district, however, looked back more favourably on her board. After a 
previous board had been dissolved as a result of political influence of the local Member 
of Parliament, who was also a medical doctor, a later, newly appointed board was com-
petent and supportive. A colleague also remembered he had a board that functioned 
extremely well. It held influential people who could help the district arrange issues. 
Other health managers were less impressed with their board. One agreed that, especially 
in the beginning, many boards had members who were “apparently ignorant”. He sug-
gested that many were there mainly “for allowances or something”. Board members 
apparently had little concept of what they were supposed to do, not having been well 
oriented towards their responsibilities, as, at least in the beginning, there were no work-
shops for board members. Another district director of health suggested that the board 
members coming from the community did not understand how doctors work. In addi-
tion, “they weren’t progressive”. He recounted that the chairman was not ‘timely’ and 
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demanded to use the district’s transport, which was meant for the doctors’ duties.72 He 
also suggested that local politics were involved in the selection of appointees to the 
board. Yet another doctor interviewed had a similar opinion: The Central Board had not 
done its groundwork on how to appoint boards and what qualifications were required. “I 
could have gotten my brother in (the board) with only a six-week crash course ... Then 
how do you expect a system to tick?” 
Indeed, in August 2000 new guidelines were issued for the selection and appointment 
of board members as well as a handbook for board members to guide them in their 
tasks. Bulaya’s foreword admitted earlier ‘challenges’. ‘The first crop of boards has 
lived their full life, each with its own accomplishments and challenges. It is time now to 
put in place new boards with a fresh mandate’. With reference to Luo’s motto he added, 
‘These boards should move the reform process from the invisible to the visible, having 
learnt from the challenges of yesteryears’.73 These guidelines stipulated that board 
members should include community leaders, skilled community members, represent-
atives of churches, and local health committee members and that they should be able to 
communicate in English. On the other hand, the district administrator, a controversial 
semi-political cadre instituted by Chiluba, would have a central role in selecting can-
didates and submitting them to the Ministry of Health through the provincial permanent 
secretary. While such a formal process could add objectivity to the process, it also 
formalised the political influence on the appointments.  
Luo’s ad hoc dismissal of the boards, as well as her tendency to reassert the minis-
ter’s power, may thus well have been influenced by genuine concern over the capacity 
of boards and the integrity of members. It is thus difficult in this case to clearly distin-
guish technical interests: concerns about effectiveness and efficiency from what could 
be regarded as patrimonial interests or behaviours. Both Luo’s attempts to personally 
control boards by dismissing those that displeased her and her ministry’s attempts to 
take back relinquished powers can be phrased as patrimonial endeavours. These behav-
iours reflect both the autocratic leadership style and the centralising tendency associated 
with patrimonialism. On the other hand, these behaviours can also be seen in terms of 
strengthening rational-legal control, as boards were apparently prone to local politics 
and abuse of authority for private interests – in short, patrimonial behaviour. Neverthe-
less, regardless of the rationale behind the decisions taken, the result of the ministry’s 
challenge against the loss of its powers would prove to be a burden on the sector: While 
the reforms had intended a purchaser-provider split to enhance efficiency, a less-than-
efficient system of two partially parallel structures had been created instead. In this 
period, the seeds were thus sown for subsequent criticism of the health reforms, which 
would lead to the dissolution of the Central Board in 2006.  
Exit Luo 
As the proposals to restructure the Central Board of Health were waiting for Cabinet 
approval, Luo was moved from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Transport in 
November 1999.74 Kalumba suggested that Chiluba by then realised the negative impact 
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Luo was having on the health reforms.75 No doubt the acrimony between her and donors 
had reached the president. But other factors are also likely to have played a role. During 
her tenure, Luo had attracted public controversy. In addition to going round the country 
to dismiss boards, it was alleged, “(s)he moved in the night and when she found nurses 
sleeping she fired them”.76 Her aloof and authoritarian attitude vexed health workers 
and made headlines. At the end of May 1999 health workers at the UTH had been 
striking and staging a ‘go-slow’ as they demanded to be paid allowances due since 
January. The negative consequences of the partial de-linkage were also showing them-
selves. While health workers under the ministry had received salary increments of 
around 33 per cent, those employed by hospital boards were expecting similar raises.77 
A few days later the General Nursing Council threatened that nurses who did not get 
back to work could be de-registered. Obviously, the powers sought by ministers and the 
Medical Council through new legislation during earlier episodes of labour unrest had 
now been granted. When Luo visited the hospital a week after the unrest had broken 
out, health workers were expectant, chanting “ndalama za bwela” (“money has come”). 
When Luo snubbed them, however, by refusing to address them, the crowd reportedly 
became rowdy, shouting that Luo had failed.78 A similar incident had transpired a day 
earlier when Chiluba himself visited the UTH and he too was jeered for refusing to 
address disgruntled health workers.79  
Luo also frustrated doctors when she announced a change in the system for pre-
scribing drugs. This would entail new prescription pads and stamps making it im-
possible for doctors and clinical officers to prescribe drugs outside their places of work. 
The rationale was that some medical practitioners took advantage of flaws in the exist-
ing system to divert government-procured drugs ‘for their own selfish needs’.80 This 
proposal, however, was rejected by doctors, who, besides practical objections, felt that 
using the pads was tantamount to admitting that medical practitioners pilfered drugs.81 
At the same time, another controversy had erupted when the director of the UTH con-
firmed a directive issued by Luo to ban relatives from wards outside of visiting hours, to 
avoid crowding. This would not have been controversial were it not that in Zambian 
hospital wards the tradition had developed of relatives caring for patients, as under-
staffing meant nurses were unable or unwilling to perform these tasks.82 Ironically 
enough, months earlier Luo had been publicly criticised for asserting that government 
was not obliged to feed patients, as some hospitals were cutting down on patients’ meals 
to reduce costs.83 Luo, however, defended her ban on relatives in wards, saying that it 
was prompted by doctors’ and nurses’ indiscipline. She claimed that patients were not 
properly cared for by hospital staff as the staff would be sleeping to recover from work-
ing in private clinics. The only problem the health sector was facing, she suggested, was 
that staff were resistant to change. In the same article she defended her new prescription 
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policy despite resistance from staff.84 Shortly afterwards, the ban on relatives in wards 
turned into a huge embarrassment for Luo. As the director of the UTH, a confidante of 
Luo, patrolled the wards to enforce Luo’s dictate, she was alleged to have kicked and 
slapped the mother of a one-year old baby who was sleeping on the floor beside her 
baby’s cot.85 Columnists and readers wrote appalled pieces in The Post. One public let-
ter submitted to The Post drew a parallel between the way Luo had issued the directive 
on a new prescription system and the ban on relatives in wards, saying that the common 
denominator in these issues was ‘a lack of communication whose foundation is a total 
disrespect for other people’. Luo was accused of harbouring an ‘I am clever, you are 
stupid’ attitude. As such, the anonymous commentator argued, Luo and the hospital 
director disqualified themselves for public service.86 Again, it appears that despite Luo’s 
declared intentions to oppose abuse and indiscipline (in short patrimonial practices), her 
autocratic leadership style not only made her ineffective by alienating stake holders, but 
arguably also revealed her own autocratic, patrimonial tendencies.      
Before Luo was removed from health, she had one more opportunity to shine. In 
September 1999, Zambia hosted the international conference on AIDS in Africa 
(ICASA). Luo had been appointed to head a Cabinet committee to organise the inter-
national conference.87 The conference was to be a grand affair. Fourteen-hundred 
foreign delegates and 1,600 Zambians were expected to attend the conference in Mu-
lungushi Conference Centre and side-events at other locations. Seven-hundred million 
Kwacha (€ 280,000 at the time) had been budgeted to renovate conference locations and 
5,000 conference bags and badges had been procured. The theme of the conference was 
‘Looking into the future: Setting priorities for HIV/AIDS in Africa’.88 Of course, many 
important things were discussed at the conference. Luo took the opportunity to draw on 
yet another controversy surrounding her to make a valid statement on sexual behaviour 
and AIDS. She dismissed the notion that casual and forced sex were caused by the way 
a woman is dressed. The media quoted her as saying, “I want to say it now although I 
am on camera, that African men should understand that one does not control sex from 
the trousers but from the head. I like the way I dress, it is controversial, but I like ... that 
is the way I am”.89 Indeed, female ministers’ attire had in recent years been a public and 
parliamentary point of discussion, as both Luo and Finance Minister Nawakwi had been 
blocked from addressing Parliament, wearing a mini-skirt and trousers respectively.90 
In addition to the content discussed, the conference also drew attention to issues of 
budgeting and management. A Post columnist described the conference, pointing out 
that far fewer delegates had come than the number of conference bags that had been 
prepared. She also described how various renovations had not been completed and con-
tracted workers had not been paid.91 A report circulating among embassies dealing with 
corruption allegations in the ministry concluded that in the tender for bags, badges, and 
other conference paraphernalia, a billion Kwacha (€ 400,000) had been held back by 
two senior officials. One of these senior officials, who had reportedly invested his share 
of the loot in a car import company, was also involved in another case together with 
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Bulaya and Luo. In that case, the three split close to a billion Kwacha siphoned off from 
a tender for HIV/AIDS-related drugs destined for the National AIDS Programme.92 Six 
years later a report was issued to Parliament concluding that 13 billion Kwacha spent on 
the conference had not been accounted for. Eighty million Kwacha had been issued to a 
car dealer for a transaction that was never effected. For expenditures worth more than a 
quarter of a billion Kwacha, no expenditure returns were available and no decision had 
been taken over a special account holding a balance of a similar amount of money. 
Moreover, according to the article detailing this report to the House of Assembly, ‘(t)he 
House also heard how a controlling officer at the Ministry of Health the then Dr. 
Kashiwa Bulaya was excluded on the ad hoc committee appointed to oversee the suc-
cess of the conference saying the donors suggested so because they had no confidence 
in the officer’.93 Thus, unfortunately, despite Bulaya having been excluded from 
involvement under donor pressure, the conference had not escaped the controversy of 
fraud and lack of transparency. Two months after the conference, Luo was moved to the 
Ministry of Transport. A media report suggested that her transfer was attributed to the 
‘alleged shoddy preparations for the conference’, which resulted in accommodation for 
delegates not having been completed two months later.94 There is, however, no reason 
to believe that anyone was ever prosecuted for this case of plunder.  
Luo was replaced by Commerce Minister David Mpamba, an accountant without 
medical experience.95 Previous to his posting at commerce, he had served as Inform-
ation Minister and was the elected Member of Parliament for Nangoma in Central 
Province. Mpamba would be one of three ministers to occupy health during the last two 
years of the Chiluba regime, spending only a year in the job before being transferred to 
Tourism in November 2000. There he would spend only three weeks before again being 
moved to Commerce.96 In Mpamba’s first month as a minister, it appeared as if steps 
would be taken to clear up the confused situation following the failed de-linkage pro-
cess. Cabinet had approved restructuring plans and all posts in the ministry and the 
Central Board would be declared vacant and be re-advertised in the next year. Report-
edly, an agreement had been reached with unions on the de-linkage. A statutory in-
strument was also passed to allow civil servants to be seconded to health boards on 
three-year contracts. As such, a dual employment situation was formalised, with civil 
servants and board employees working side by side, which would later be an argument 
for dissolving the Central Board, Moreover, Mpamba indicated that when civil servants 
were seconded to boards, they would ‘carry the same conditions of service’.97 This 
prompted the health workers’ union to react with concern. A union representative ar-
gued that the boards had the right to set their own conditions of service. That implied 
that having civil servants move with their existing conditions would lead to two differ-
ent standards in practice, with board employees having better conditions of service. 
With a sense of premonition, he concluded that this was bound to create problems.98 
At the same time, a new spate of strikes had started. A strike by junior doctors at the 
UTH would grow into the most severe labour unrest the health sector had seen to date, 
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which was referred to in Chapter 5. According to the hospital’s executive director, the 
doctors had only demanded extra on-call allowances, which she argued were not due. 
The full list of concerns put forward, however, not only included entitlements such as 
accommodation, salaries, allowances, and transport, but also broader concerns linked to 
hospital conditions, such as shortages of drugs and supplies, nursing staff and support 
staff, and limited laboratory facilities.99 Then, several weeks later in early January 2000, 
as the strike had spread to health workers in most major hospitals and was also 
spreading to senior doctors, government backed up their threats to use their legal power 
against doctors: 300 junior doctors were suspended and banned from leaving the coun-
try.100 Meanwhile, the ministry prepared to bring in more Cuban doctors to fill the 
shortage caused by firing the junior doctors,101 further vexing Zambian doctors who felt 
they were disadvantaged compared with expatriate doctors.  
Health workers were slowly gathering broader public support for their strikes. 
Medical students, civil society activists, and even Catholic nuns joined the protests. 
Catholic bishops, trade unions, and other civil society groups voiced their support for 
the health workers who were protesting for better health care conditions. The Post wrote 
several editorials on the strike and published several concerned citizens’ letters in sup-
port of health workers. The issue also became political as it was debated in Parliament, 
and opposition cadres joined the protests. At times, it seemed that the protests were 
aimed at the Chiluba regime in general instead of merely targeting health issues. Over 
the months that the strikes lasted, the police regularly blocked protests, protestors 
clashed with riot police, and protestors were arrested. The government even called in 
the support of regional governments by working on a protocol to prevent dismissed 
Zambian doctors from working in neighbouring countries. 102  
Although meetings were agreed upon and held, it took the ministry many months to 
resolve the labour unrest. The government’s reaction to strikers’ demands was again a 
mixture of repression and appeasement. Minister Mpamba said government was trying 
to find funds to improve conditions of service but that doctors could not profit in 
isolation from other staff. “If we only improve conditions of service for doctors we will 
create a crisis because the nurses and other workers including cleaners will be up in 
arms”.103 As Mpamba accused doctors of demanding salaries of five million Kwacha, 
doctors reacted angrily. A junior doctors’ representative denounced this as “a very 
feeble propaganda attempt at dissuading the public from the main issues affecting the 
quality of health care at Zambian public hospitals”.104 Obviously, the question of 
whether private interests or public concern were at stake in the strikes was very much 
contested and with it the moral legitimacy of the protests. At the same time, doctors 
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bemoaned the difference in pay between expatriate doctors and Zambians as govern-
ment brought in 39 Chinese doctors to work at hospitals throughout the country. Doc-
tors reacted that it would be a bad policy to favour foreigners over citizens, as this 
would not improve Zambia's health care delivery.105 Meanwhile, Mpamba admitted that 
various doctors who had been fired had gone abroad, although the possibility of going 
to neighbouring countries had been blocked.106  
By August some of the doctors had gone back to work, while fifty doctors had let for 
‘greener pastures’. 107 However, the matter would not be fully resolved during 
Mpamba’s tenure at health. It was not until former Commerce Minister and former 
UNIP-stalwart Kavindele assumed office and early in the election year offered pay rises 
between 15 and 155 per cent to health workers that doctors appeared at least moderately 
content. While nurses’ salaries would improve from 120,000 to 300,000 Kwacha, doc-
tors would earn a minimum of 1.5 million Kwacha108 per month. The rationale offered 
was that this would help stem the brain drain of emigrating Zambian doctors and 
nurses.109 For similar reasons Kavindele had halted the voluntary separation scheme, 
saying, “We cannot continue to educate our people for other countries”.110 The pay rise 
offered to health workers was admittedly made possible owing to renewed donor sup-
port. Kavindele stressed that government had impressed on donors that support should 
include attention to human resource development and retention of health workers. 
Donor confidence in the health sector had indeed been somewhat restored since Luo 
left the ministry. In November 1999, a memorandum of understanding was signed, a 
remarkable agreement marking Mpamba’s time as a minister and leading to further 
development of the mode of cooperation between the government health sector and 
donors. Following extensive consultations, 13 donors111 out of the 15 active in the 
health sector signed this legally non-binding document, which stipulated the way donors 
and the government should cooperate. The memorandum of understanding presented 
guidelines and an institutional framework on which this co-operation would be based 
and designated common systems for planning, reporting, disbursement, accounting, 
auditing, and procurement that ideally all partners should use. Central to this coop-
eration would be the ministry’s own national strategic health plan, and various forums 
were identified in which donors and government would discuss issues related to these 
areas. The document also made it clear that the preferred means of channelling mone-
tary support to the sector was through the district basket and other baskets that would be 
established. As we saw before, this type of ‘on-budget’ support was significant as it 
bundled the resources available for the ministry to implement the strategic plan, with the 
assumption that this would increase efficiency and effectiveness. One notable condition 
was placed on budgetary allocations. The memorandum spelled out that sixty per cent of 
donor contributions should be used at the district level and that fifty per cent of the 
government’s own resources should be spent at that level.112 This memorandum thus 
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signified a further formal step in the mode development of donor–government coop-
eration, or what at the time was known as the sector-wide approach. While this memo-
randum was symbolically important to signify donors’ and the government’s mutual 
commitment, in reality for some donors it was little more than a declaration of intent. 
By 2003 only 9 of the 13 participating donors had actually contributed to the baskets. 
The memorandum of understanding led to a process of several further documents 
being produced. The memorandum of understanding called for a joint identification and 
formulation mission which would chart the problems the sector was facing, as a basis 
for drafting a new national health strategic plan for 2001–5. Chansa, in an analysis of 
the sector-wide approach in the Zambian health sector, quoted donor representatives to 
indicate that donors had not been comfortable with earlier national health strategic 
plans, but that due to increased involvement in this process it was felt that this plan had 
been developed with the confidence from most donors. The apparent result of donor 
cooperation in the formulation of the national health strategic plan was that this third 
strategic plan was more systematic and specific in its listing of objectives, strategies, 
and expected outputs than previous plans. In this new plan, basic health care packages 
remained an important planning tool, though they were in need of revising and further 
implementation. One notable strategic objective of the plan related to the sector-wide 
approach. It was envisioned that within five years the district basket would be trans-
formed into a broader health-sector basket. This was closely connected to the idea that 
earlier health reform policies had ignored the role of hospitals as an essential link in the 
referral system. As such, the plan aimed at reforming the hospital sector on the basis of 
basic health care packages that would be formulated for this level. This would allow for 
‘right sizing’ of hospitals. Another example of the renewed focus on hospitals was that 
the financial and administrative management system would now be rolled out on this 
level. A minor but notable element of this plan was that yet another element of previous 
plans was abandoned as it was not feasible. The plan to build, equip, and staff thousands 
of health posts, which had featured prominently in the national health plan of 1995-
2000, was now deemed not to be possible ‘under the resource envelope’ of this strategic 
plan. With regards to human resources, the plan would focus on planning human re-
source development in line with the needs of the basic package. Emphasis was also 
placed on resolving outstanding issues from the de-linkage process and on issues of 
staff retention.  
In response to the strategic plan, a small group of donors – the British, the Danes, 
and the European Commission – carried out a joint appraisal of the strategic plan. This 
document stands out from most health sector documents, particularly those produced by 
the government or jointly by government and donors, in that it contained a critical 
assessment of what had been achieved and the challenges that still lay before the sector. 
Moreover, problems were also attributed to management issues at the ministry, rather 
than being seen as the result of external factors. In analysing the achievements and 
challenges of service delivery, the glass was seen as being half empty rather than half 
full. The only achievement of the health reforms that was not qualified with points for 
further attention was that there was a more capable and decentralised authority to 
manage health services. Participatory structures had admittedly been created, but were 
deemed to need further strengthening to become more effective. Resources had been 
shifted to the district level, although the report noted that this shift was based more on 
estimates of allocations than what was actually spent at district level. Furthermore, 
whereas the concept of the basic health care package had been developed in the pre-
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vailing economic context, this was deemed to be unaffordable. Finally, the mission 
found that the purchaser-provider spilt had occurred theoretically, but the provider was 
not considered to be fully empowered to provide services or to be fully accountable.  
The joint appraisal mission also summarised the problems the sector was facing. First 
of all, it concluded that the overall socio-economic environment was not conducive to 
achieving great progress in improving people’s health status, due to poverty and AIDS. 
More specifically for the health sector, the document concluded that the health reforms 
had yet to show a substantial improvement in service delivery, again echoing the point 
put forward by Luo. Many groups of the population remained with insufficient access to 
quality health services, as resources remained inequitably distributed geographically. In 
addition, the decentralised authority to manage health services was deemed incomplete 
as districts still lacked authority over human resource management and lacked resources 
for buying drugs and supplies. Moreover, support systems such as procurement and 
financial systems were deemed to lack effectiveness and transparency, while technical 
support to deal with specific health priorities was insufficient. Finally, the donors also 
criticised the fact that the Ministry of Health lacked control, owing to its dependency on 
donors, and remarked that the paradigm shift from project support to sector support was 
only partial. In order to manage these problems, the donors formulated a list of con-
ditions that needed to be met in return for donors’ contributions. It is striking that all 
these conditions referred to processes within the sector rather than to the results of 
service delivery. It thus appears as if donors’ shift away from their own projects towards 
sector support gave them a greater involvement in the day-to-day management of the 
sector, while the presented aim of the sector-wide approach was to increase govern-
ment’s ‘ownership’.  
Other donors were not directly involved in this joint appraisal. Some donors were 
unable or unwilling to compromise on their own appraisal processes. In the case of the 
Netherlands, however, this was due to the fact that they had already conducted their 
own appraisal of their support to the health sector. This appraisal formed the basis for 
repackaging various individual projects into one sector-support programme for an 
unprecedented six-year period. From the perspective of the embassy, which managed 
this programme, this was a big step forward as it reduced the administrative burden of 
administrating various small programmes with shorter programme cycles, and it also 
insulated the health-sector support programme from the ever-shifting policy priorities at 
headquarters’ level. For the embassy’s counterparts in the ministry, it was also a step 
ahead as it signalled the Dutch commitment to Zambian systems rather than the parallel 
support given in the primary health care programme in Western Province, which had 
been finalised by 1998. To the great surprise of the health adviser at the embassy at the 
time, and to the embarrassment of some of his Zambian counterparts, Mpamba seemed 
not to realise the golden opportunity that this six-year support programme presented.113  
Kavindele’s tenure at the Ministry of Health was even shorter than those of any of 
his predecessors. Kavindele was a UNIP die-hard and member of its central committee 
when in the run-up to the multi-party elections he tried to replace Kaunda as UNIP 
leader. It was not until after the 1996 elections that he eventually joined the new ruling 
party.114 Then, after having served as Minister of Science and Technology for a few 
months and as Minister of Commerce, he was fired by Chiluba in September 1998. 
According to Kavindele, he had differed with Chiluba over the taxation of Coca-Cola, 
                                                 
113  ML0810/01. 
114  Post, ‘I’m the right man for President – Kavindele’, 23 July 2001. 
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proposing to ease the burden on the company to prevent mass lay-offs. According to an 
opposition politician, this showed that ‘anyone who served the interests of the people 
and not President Chiluba risked losing his job’.115 Then, in November 2001, Kavindele 
surprisingly ‘bounced back’ into Cabinet, taking up the Ministry of Health.116 Kavindele 
was also a businessman, having amassed considerable wealth and declaring total assets 
of 11 billion Kwacha (€ 5.85 million) in 1998. According to Kalumba, Kavindele had 
also been mainly interested in the business side of health, though these accusations were 
not substantiated. Barely a year after assuming the health portfolio, however, Kavindele 
was promoted to vice-president in May 2001, as Chiluba was fighting dissidents within 
his own party in an attempt to ensure a third term as president.117  
Owing to the brevity of his tenure at the health ministry, Kavindele failed to put 
much of a stamp on policy at the ministry. However, archive material does shine light 
on two meetings between donors and Kavindele in January 2001, in which a number of 
practical issues were discussed and also the issue of Medical Stores. From the minutes 
of these meetings it becomes clear that government was still not prepared to cancel the 
contract with Medical Stores, while donors were looking for alternatives to distribute 
drugs. At the time, serious consideration was given to by-pass Medical Stores by 
establishing a parallel distribution system through the Churches Medical Association. 
Kavindele seemed inclined to accept this decision, although he stressed that it was 
controversial and emotive within the ministry. Donors, however, would have to foot the 
bill for a parallel system. The minister also confirmed that in future the responsibility 
for preparing and approving drug tenders would be shifted from the ministry to the 
Central Board, in response to donor concerns. A final point mentioned in one of the 
minutes concerned staff changes of unnamed senior officials. It suggested that the 
minister had ‘pushed for change’, but that this would be difficult ‘considering the 
political connections and activities of some officials’. It appears that donors were 
inclined to solve not only the issue of Medical Stores but also the issue of Bulaya, as 
was also suggested by his exclusion from the ICASA organising committee.118  
After Kavindele left the ministry, the last months of Chiluba’s regime passed with 
Levison Mumba at the helm of the ministry. Mumba had been a backbencher from 
Eastern Province, who had attracted attention by being accused by Sata of being op-
posed to Chiluba’s plans for securing a third term. Shortly afterwards, he had been 
recruited by Chiluba to lobby on his behalf among Eastern chiefs. This loyalty was soon 
rewarded when Mumba was appointed as provincial minister in March 2001. A few 
months later, as Kavindele was promoted to vice-president in May, Mumba became 
Minister of Health. Mumba’s tenure, however, made little impression on those in the 
health sector, other than what would emerge after his tenure. Various officials strained 
to remember him, owing to the number of changes in ministers at that time. One former 
official claimed he was invisible at the ministry. Be that as it may, it can be assumed 
that in the last half of 2001 all eyes were on the third-term debates and on what would 
happen in the elections that would come to Zambia at the end of the year. Would this 
lead to a change of power or an extension of Chiluba’s disappointing regime? In other 
                                                 
115  Post, ‘I differed with Chiluba, says Kavindele’, 22 September 1998. 
116  He was reportedly ‘the first MP to bounce back in cabinet since the dawn of the third republic’. Times 
of Zambia, ‘Kavindele bounces back in cabinet’, 22 November 2000. 
117  Post, ‘Kavindele Appointed Vice-President’, 5 June 2001. 
118  Minutes of the meetings between Honourable Minister of Health Mr. E. Kavindele and cooperating 
partners, 11 and 30 January 2001 (EKN files, ISN 5066). 
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words, after these elections would Zambia and its health sector get a new deal, or would 
it be business as usual for those with political connections.  
Conclusions 
This chapter traced the events leading to stagnation of the health reform process. Key to 
this stagnation was the failure to de-link health workers from the civil service. Unions 
effectively challenged this process in court. While proponents of the health reforms 
have tried to de-legitimise the unions by alleging that they were afraid to lose mem-
bership or by claiming they were bribed, the fact is that they were effective in arti-
culating health workers’ anxiety about their livelihood security. The effective role 
played by the unions conflicts with the view that in neo-patrimonial settings 
horizontally linked groups lack relevance. These events are also somewhat at odds with 
Rakner’s conclusions that domestic interest groups were marginalised in the Zambian 
reform process. Indeed, while the unions did not appear to have been taken seriously in 
earlier stages of the health reform process, collectively health workers eventually man-
aged to effectively block the process of de-linkage and thus de-rail the health reform 
process. At the same time, however, we can also attribute a patrimonial logic to this 
challenge to the de-linkage process. Moving people from civil service employment to 
three-year performance contracts managed by an autonomous agency can be seen to 
conflict with the logic of a state patronage system. Under state patronage, as long as one 
does not air dissent or disloyalty, issues of performance are not enforced. As managing 
loyalty appears a greater priority than managing performance, the political system likely 
had as much vested interest in the status quo as health workers who apparently priori-
tised livelihood security. 
The court challenge to the de-linkage process need not have been conclusive. How-
ever, it is evident that after this blow, the health sector no longer had the leadership to 
keep the reforms on course as Kalumba soon lost his position of stewardship over the 
sector. His successor Luo was made of different leadership material. She had different 
priorities and intentions. Moreover, she appeared to lack the performative capacity to 
broker between various interest groups. Instead, her style estranged herself from various 
domestic and international constituencies. Part of the challenges faced by Luo came 
from gender power relations within the health sector. To generalise, one could say that 
the power structure depended on male doctors and (at a lower level) clinical officers in 
positions of authority, while mainly female nurses played more subservient roles. For a 
woman who unabashedly flaunted her femininity it may have been difficult to challenge 
the gendered expectations of leadership.  
In this chapter we were also confronted with the criminalisation of the health sector. 
The case of Medical Stores linked the health sector to the world of international 
organised crime. This case of grand corruption also linked some of the protagonists in 
the health sector with the social network making up Chiluba’s matrix of plunder.119 The 
case illustrated the instrumentalisation of health sector institutions for private and 
criminal interests. At the same time, we also saw that this served political interests, as 
                                                 
119  On Chiluba’s Matrix as a social affair, see Leenstra, ‘Dark’, for a social network analysis in the 
MLS/GMR case and J.K. van Donge, ‘The plundering of Zambian resources by Frederick Chiluba and 
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granting the management of Medical Stores to GMR was obviously a return favour for 
campaign funding in the 1996 elections.120  
The episodes described in this chapter had serious repercussions for relations with 
donors. Donors had invested heavily in the health reforms; their stagnation thus harmed 
their interests. Moreover, donor confidence in the intent and integrity of the Ministry of 
Health was damaged by the Medical Stores’ saga. We saw how Luo’s lack of per-
formative capacity rather escalated this crisis, one that was not of her own making, than 
defused it. This turn of events impacted on donors’ ambiguous strategy towards the 
health sector. While there was some posturing and the overall level of funding declined, 
donors worked from the status quo to save certain benefits of the reforms. They 
focussed their funding and attention on the Central Board of Health, while by and large 
bypassing the ministry. Meanwhile, the ministry was loath to cede control over certain 
functions that had been built up at Central Board, which contributed to parallel system 
and inefficiencies. This situation would later contribute to the rational-legal argument 
that would be used to abolish the boards, as we shall see in the next chapter. Donors’ 
ability to shape the status quo as well as the modalities of working with the health sector 
were increased when Luo was succeeded by less-involved ministers. In this near ab-
sence of political leadership, donors codified their relations with the sector in a 
memorandum of understanding, embellished by the rhetoric of ownership. At the same 
time, this modus operandi was strongly linked to the Central Board of Health as a 
politically isolated parallel system within a context of neo-patrimonialism and political 
turbulence.      
It is striking how donors preoccupations in the sector at this time appeared dis-
connected from the political turbulence affecting the health sector and the country at 
large. In this chapter, we saw the labour unrest, encountered throughout this narrative of 
the health sector, at its most intense. On the one hand, this unrest, owing to the public 
support it generated, was translated into challenging the legitimacy of the Chiluba 
regime. On the other hand, it also appeared as an arena for renegotiating the pact 
between the state patronage system and health workers. Health workers’ loyalty was at 
stake as they aired their discontent and dissent, underlined by the credible threat of 
withdrawing from the health sector (and moving to greener pastures). The political 
system, meanwhile, attempted to discipline striking doctors by firing and deregistering 
them and bringing in expatriate doctors. This strategy to discipline those guilty of airing 
their dissent further underlined the argument on the importance of managing loyalty. At 
the end, as we saw in Chapter 5, the pact between health workers, particularly doctors, 
and the state was again sealed. Health workers’ loyalty, or at least an absence of dissent, 
was restored with promises of better entitlements. Moreover, the proposals Luo had 
made of linking allowances to performance were off the table for the foreseeable future. 
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A new deal for the health sector?  
The final chapter of the health sector forms the apotheosis for the health reforms. In this 
section we shall see how the Central Board of Health, a core feature of the reforms, was 
dismantled – ostensibly for rational-legal aims: To remedy a confused, top-heavy and 
inefficient set-up of the health sector, but in essence so that the Ministry of Health could 
regain control over the resources administered by the Central Board. Although this 
process followed the formal parliamentary route of decision-making, the process was 
clearly instrumentalised to guarantee the desired outcome. At the same time, however, it 
also created a situation of confusion and disorder which was used for personal gain 
while donors’ preoccupations lay elsewhere. 
The chapter begins with the period following Levy Mwanawasa’s ascension to 
power. The petition contesting his election clearly reveals how health-sector resources 
were shamelessly used by Maureen Mwanawasa to campaign for her husband, with the 
complicity of health-sector officials. This episode also illustrates how disloyalty is 
punished while loyalty leads to impunity. Levison Mumba, Minister of Health at the 
time, testified against the president, following which allegations of corruption and ex-
pulsion from the ruling party destroyed his political career. Permanent secretary Bulaya, 
however, changed his testimony in favour of the president. In turn, Bulaya was re-
warded by being saved from prosecution over a massive corruption scandal which 
involved the instrumentalisation of the procurement of AIDS drugs for private gain. In 
the end, however, Mwanawasa reversed his decision not to prosecute Bulaya, as a result 
of pressure from civil society, the media, and donors. This illustrates that decisions to 
instrumentalise formal procedures are taken and contested in an arena of conflicting 
powers and interests.  
The first Minister of Health under the Mwanawasa regime was Brian Chituwo a 
military doctor, who would use his tenure at the health ministry to invest in a consti-
tuency so as to strengthen his political base. During his tenure, Chituwo was very much 
occupied with the AIDS pandemic, which had started to generate considerable donor 
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attention. Another issue that drew attention from donors and the ministry was the so-
called human resource crisis: The shortage of health workers linked to the emigration of 
doctors and nurses in search of greener pastures elsewhere. While the prioritisation of 
these problems led to innovative and effective responses by the donors and the health 
sector, at the same time these discourses became an object of instrumentalisation. 
Health workers used the discourse of the human resource crisis to further legitimise 
their claims for entitlements. But in addition, as we shall see later, the sense of urgency 
surrounding the AIDS pandemic and the human resource crisis would be abused to 
siphon off resources for personal gain.  
Meanwhile, however, a process had been started to dissolve the Central Board of 
Health. Whereas Chituwo had formal responsibility for the initial decision, he did not 
appear to be the driving force. It was rather the permanent secretary, Simon Miti, who 
appeared to be the one steering this process. While Katele Kalumba as a backbencher 
participated in the parliamentary debates on the dissolution of the Central Board, at the 
end of the day he was not able to rescue his brainchild, as he had become ensnared in a 
major corruption scandal. He had to fight for his political survival by displaying loyalty 
to the president and by serving the MMD. Chituwo, meanwhile, had been moved to 
another ministry. The dismantlement of the Central Board and the decision to begin a 
long process to reintegrate it into the ministry was overseen by two other ministers in 
rapid succession: Sylvia Masebo, who used the ministry as a mere stepping stone in her 
political career, and Angela Cifire, who made little impact besides apparently serving as 
a scapegoat for a scandal in which Simon Miti figured.  
Miti had attracted controversy following a damning report by the Auditor General 
about the health sector, which was played out in Parliament. Despite this public con-
troversy, the permanent secretary, who was rumoured to enjoy the protection of the 
Mwanawasas, weathered the storm. During this period an earlier conflict between 
donors and the ministry about the drug distribution system had been finally laid to rest. 
Donors had invested heavily in creating a system to minimise instrumentalisation in the 
purchase and distribution of drugs. At the end of our narrative on the health reforms, 
however, a new scandal emerged. This had nothing to do with the issue of drugs, which 
was closely scrutinised by donors. It appeared that a human resource officer had been 
using the sense of urgency to enrich himself while claiming to train new staff in res-
ponse to the human resource crisis and the AIDS pandemic. The restructuring of the 
health sector had apparently created disorder and removed the accountability systems of 
the Central Board, which could have prevented this scandal. This led to several major 
donors suspending their support to the health sector. Miti, who had since been 
transferred to a new ministry, was also suspended pending investigation. Thus by the 
end of this narrative, not only Kalumba, who had been the midwife of the health 
reforms, but also Miti, who had been the agent of their demise, had finally fallen from 
grace – or so it seems.       
Change of power, change of leadership 
With a change of power at State House, a change of leadership was due at the Ministry 
of Health. Within the first month after the elections, a large number of permanent secre-
taries and other senior civil servants were fired or retired by Mwanawasa, including 
some who would be named and tried in the Zamtrop affair and other corruption cases, 
such as Stella Chibanda, James Mtonga, and Richard Sakala. According to an article in 
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The Post, Bulaya had opted not to continue as permanent secretary,1 though it could 
well have been that he realised his position had been controversial and he decided to 
jump rather than be pushed. He was replaced by the Director General of the Central 
Board of Health, Gavin Silwamba. Several months later, however, on the same day 
Mwanawasa announced that Silwamba’s brother, Eric, Chiluba’s former Minister of 
Presidential Affairs, was to be arrested for corruption, a new permanent secretary, 
Simon Miti, was appointed.2 While the media did not explicitly link one event to the 
other, it seems credible that the events are related. A former ministry official suggested 
that Gavin Silwamba had owed his job at the Central Board to his brother, who was 
close to Chiluba.3 Another respondent said that Silwamba was rumoured to be involved 
in misappropriation of anti-malaria funds.4 It would thus appear that one of the un-
official priorities for the health sector in Mwanawasa’s first months was to dismantle 
the remnants of Chiluba’s patronage network within the ministry.  
A new minister was also appointed. For the first time since Kawimbe, the minister 
was a medical doctor. In fact, Brigadier General Dr. Brian Chituwo was a military 
surgeon who had proceeded his career in the civilian health sector and was later to 
venture into politics. After having served as executive director of the hospital in Kabwe, 
Chituwo quit the civil service to stand as the MMD candidate in a by-election in 
Mumbwa, only to be defeated by a candidate of the oppositional UPND. Following his 
failure, Chituwo rejoined the civil service, serving as a director of clinical care at the 
orthopaedic department at the UTH before being appointed as minister. Chituwo 
became a nominated Member of Parliament, as he had no constituency of his own. 
However, as we have seen with Kalumba, Chituwo would use his time at health to 
invest in his own political support base. Prior to the 2006 elections, a financial specialist 
at the Central Board of Health told me that the allocation of funds to districts was 
sometimes manipulated for political reasons. He mentioned the minister’s constituency 
as an example.5 My confusion at this statement, knowing that Chituwo was a nominated 
Member of Parliament, was dispelled upon learning that Chituwo had won the parlia-
mentary elections in his home constituency Mumbwa in 2006. When driving through 
Mumbwa district a few months later, I asked a local hitchhiker what he thought of his 
new Member of Parliament. He answered: “He is very good; he built a hospital and 
clinics”.6 Regardless of whether he did in fact influence the resource allocation process 
of the ministry, he certainly was credited with delivering for his constituency. Another 
issue of controversy clinging to Chituwo was that he was named as an example of an 
official who owed his job to his belonging to the family tree. In a press statement by the 
president against the family tree publication, Chituwo’s familial connection was denied, 
as Mwanawasa was from a Lamba-Lenje background and his wife was a Lenje, while 
Chituwo was a Kaonde from Mumbwa.7 Among donors, Chituwo had the image of 
                                                 
1  Post, ‘Levy drops Sakala’, 24 January 2002. 
2  Post, ‘Chiluba left a mess which I’ve to clean up, says Levy’, 21 June 2002. 
3  ML0810/06. 
4  ML0810/01. 
5  ML0607/02. 
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being a man of integrity, a smart and pragmatic minister with whom it was easy to do 
business. However, he also gave the impression of being PR-savvy and ‘political’.8  
Mwanawasa snagged in Chiluba’s web 
Although Mwanawasa may have appeared to disband Chiluba’s network in the health 
sector – arguably creating a network of his own – his involvement in Chiluba’s network 
would nearly trip him off his pedestal, the reason being that it was this very network 
that had brought Mwanawasa to power in the first place. This became evident soon after 
the elections. In March 2002, three losing presidential candidates petitioned the 
Supreme Court to contest Mwanawasa’s electoral victory.9 Nearly three years later the 
Supreme Court ruled that Mwanawasa had been duly elected, to the dismay of the 
opposition, which claimed that the court had ‘sanctioned theft’. According to the chief 
justice, only 6 out of 36 allegations had been proven, and then only partially. Regardless 
of the ruling, which formally strengthened Mwanawasa’s legitimate hold on power, the 
judgement also shone light on how health officials used the health system to aid the 
ruling party in the elections. Furthermore, the events surrounding the petition process 
showed how Mwanawasa weighed witnesses’ testimonies and rewarded or punished 
them for their loyalty or disobedience, using the powers at his disposal. 
Former Minister of Health Mumba, who had been appointed by Mwanawasa to the 
Ministry of Sports after briefly serving as Minister of Tourism, had been called to 
testify in court on behalf of the petitioners. According to the final judgement of the 
presidential petition, Mumba gave detailed evidence on the use of government facilities 
and resources in the elections. The judgement highlighted the delivery of drug kits as an 
illustration. In his testimony, Mumba admitted that in the run-up to the elections, he had 
approached Mwanawasa to ask how the campaign was progressing. As Mwanawasa had 
indicated he was in need of extra transport, Mumba offered to make a suitable vehicle 
available. Earlier Mumba had been phoned by Maureen, Mwanawasa’s wife, who had 
asked him for rural health kits to distribute during a campaign meeting. Mwanawasa had 
thanked Mumba for his response to Maureen’s request and his offer to supply a vehicle. 
Mumba then testified that he told his permanent secretary, Bulaya, about his task of 
providing a vehicle and the drug kits to the Mwanawasas and had asked him to arrange 
a vehicle. Subsequently, Mumba wrote a letter to the managing director of Medical 
Stores to deliver the drug kits to Mwanawasa’s residence.10  
Another witness’s testimony corroborated Mumba’s account that rural health kits had 
been distributed during campaign activities. Katele Kalumba’s wife testified to the court 
that at a celebration of Mwanawasa’s appointment as presidential candidate for the 
MMD she had approached Maureen, given her phone number, and offered that she was 
available for campaign work. Later Maureen Mwanawasa did indeed call, inviting 
Kalumba’s wife to accompany her to campaign in a constituency. There they met with 
the district administrator and other local party officials and went to two health centres, 
where Maureen Mwanawasa addressed the crowd, urging them to vote for her husband 
                                                 
8  ‘Handing-over’ memorandum, health advisor RNE, 1 August 2006 (EKN-files, unnumbered), 
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and handing out the kits to health centre staff. Mwanawasa’s lawyers reacted to this 
testimony by stressing that the kits had been delivered to needy communities and had 
been handed over to no one but health centre staff. They concluded that ‘this fell within 
the realm of philanthropic activities and there was nothing wrong’.11 Mwanawasa’s 
defence team also reacted with what can be termed character assassination, arguing that 
Mumba had been disgruntled for being demoted to Sports Minister, adding that he had 
been appointed only because he was the only ruling-party Member of Parliament who 
had won a seat in Eastern Province. Mumba’s ‘evidence was therefore dangerous, 
suspect, biased and motivated by malice; and that it was given not in the interest of 
advancing justice,’12 according to the defence. A lawyer also suggested that Mumba had 
been removed from Tourism to Sports over allegations of corruption in issuing hunting 
licences. Mumba in turn argued during re-examination that, since Mrs. Mwanawasa was 
not in government, it had been “irregular” for her to hand out rural health kits. The court 
finally ruled that Maureen Mwanawasa had indeed handed out health kits during the 
campaign and that ‘(t)he timing of such public philanthropic activity must have had 
some influence on the affected voters’. However, the court ruled that regulations did not 
stipulate that this was improper, as it was ‘not directed at individual benefit’. In ad-
dition, these were national elections rather than constituency elections, leading the court 
to conclude that it was not satisfied that the handing out of drug kits ‘may have 
prevented the majority of voters in the country from electing the candidate whom they 
preferred’. While it is not the intent of this research to review the legal validity of the 
Zambian Supreme Court’s judgement, it is clear from the judgement that the ministry 
played a role in delivering public resources for a party political campaign. Whereas this 
was evidently not proclaimed to be illegal, it can be argued that this behaviour violated 
the principles of an impartial, non-partisan public service. This could thus be validly 
termed patrimonial behaviour. 
The same applies to the consequences Mumba faced as a result of his testimony. For 
his lack of loyalty, for being what Mwanawasa’s lawyer called a ‘witness who testified 
against his own President, when he was still a serving minister’, Mumba was dropped as 
a minister,13 and the ruling party expelled him.14 Shortly afterwards, the Supreme Court 
nullified Mumba’s election victory in the 2001 elections for ‘corrupt and electoral 
malpractices’, thus declaring the seat vacant and forcing a by-election. The case had 
been brought by the candidate who had stood against Mumba on a Heritage Party ticket. 
For the by-election, however, Mumba’s opponent switched to the ruling party and de-
feated Mumba, who had stood for the UPND.15 It thus appears that Mumba paid heavily 
for his disloyalty to the president and that he got snagged in a web of power struggles, 
allegations of electoral corruption, and counter-allegations of the same.  
Meanwhile, Mumba’s motives for testifying against the president remain unclear. It 
is clear that while Mumba testified, he was facing a humiliating court loss for his 
victorious election campaign in 2001. He had reportedly hired thugs to intimidate 
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voters.16 Mumba was also accused, as Minister of Health, of opening an unused clinic in 
his constituency days before the elections and giving it an ambulance and staff, which 
were then withdrawn after the elections. He was also alleged to have transferred one 
clinical officer because her husband was an opposition member, while another was 
removed for refusing to accept the maize the MMD was handing out during the 
elections.17 It would appear that, in such a situation, backing Mwanawasa was the most 
rational move, yet Mumba apparently aligned with Mwanawasa’s predecessor, Chiluba. 
By that time Chiluba had already turned against Mwanawasa, as he, Chiluba, was under 
investigation and facing both the loss of his immunity and criminal proceedings over the 
ZAMTROP affair. Shortly before Mumba testified, Chiluba announced in an interview 
to The Post that he was ‘working on some witnesses who could testify and link 
Mwanawasa to malpractice’.18 Chiluba explained that both Bulaya and Mumba, in a 
meeting with him, had admitted to delivering fuel and drug kits to Maureen Mwanawasa 
and that they had ‘raised cash and delivered it to Mwanawasa for use’.19 Bulaya, 
however, did not support Mumba’s testimony in court. According to Mumba, before the 
petition hearing took place Bulaya had convinced him to go to State House to meet with 
Mwanawasa’s legal advisors, ‘to discuss how to proceed with his subpoena in the 
petition’.20 Apparently, this had little impact on Mumba’s testimony,21 but Bulaya 
turned out not to be the witness Chiluba had expected. Bulaya testified for the de-
fendants and undermined Mumba’s testimony.22 He did not admit to the delivery of kits 
to Mrs. Mwanawasa but instead said that he had delivered a vehicle, fuel, and sub-
sistence allowances to Mumba, at his request.23 It thus appears that in this game of 
shifting alliances, Mumba moved to Chiluba’s side at his own peril, while Bulaya 
shifted to Mwanawasa’s camp. 
 Bulaya’s loyalty to Mwanawasa – and thus his betrayal of Chiluba, whose client he 
had been while he was still permanent secretary – turned out to be in his own self-
interest – though in the end it could not save him. In September 2003 an investigation 
by the task force investigating cases of plunder and corruption under Chiluba’s regime 
led to a case in which Bulaya was charged with ‘abuse of authority of office’ and later 
with corruption.24 He was alleged to have manipulated the tender procedure for the 
delivery of nutritional supplements worth just over 4 billion Kwacha (€ 720,000). The 
product was delivered by Butico, a company in Bulgaria,25 where Bulaya had studied. 
Payments were made to a company of which Bulaya was a shareholder, together with a 
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Bulgarian business partner, who owned Butico, and the wives of both gentlemen.26 
According to witness testimony, in August 2001, half a year before the elections, 
Bulaya put the issue on the agenda at a procurement meeting which he chaired, without 
supplying the proper documents.27 The nutritional supplements, which were controver-
sially seen as part of AIDS treatment, were delivered to Medical Stores. Subsequently, 
some of these drugs were delivered to a private clinic owned by Bulaya, from where 
they were sold. Other parts of this shipment were reportedly going to waste in govern-
ment storage as the drugs were not registered for use in Zambia.28 For services rendered, 
Bulaya was paid a hefty commission by Butico, of roughly 1 billion Kwacha (€ 
180,000). Also, 3 billion Kwacha was believed to have been diverted by the company of 
which Bulaya was a shareholder. In February 2007 Bulaya was sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment with hard labour.29 In December 2008 a High Court judge dismissed his 
appeal, saying, “I uphold the conviction and this appeal has no merit. I also uphold the 
seizure of assets ... He (Bulaya) must go to jail now”.30 Obviously, Kash ‘Quicksilver’ 
Bulaya had gone too far in ‘taking rewards’ and become a rare example of a high 
government official being convicted for corruption. However, the path towards this 
remarkable conviction was not so straightforward.  
In May 2005, Mwanawasa appeared to repay Bulaya for his favourable testimony 
during the presidential petition. The Post reported this as follows: ‘President Levy 
Mwanawasa's government has prevailed on the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 
Chalwe Mchenga to forgive former permanent secretary Dr. Kashiwa Bulaya in the 
Ministry of Health on his corruption charges. And Mchenga on Tuesday afternoon 
entered a nolle prosequi in favour of Dr. Bulaya, who was accordingly discharged by 
the court’. This led to a much greater controversy than Mwanawasa could have 
imagined. It had become a regular phenomenon that in public controversies such as 
Chiluba’s third-term challenge, the elections, and the Zamtrop affair, The Post gave 
such issues incessant publicity and provided a platform for civil-society commentators 
to voice their opinion. Reverend Japhet Ndlovu, General Secretary of the Zambian 
Council of Churches, aptly summarised the moral outrage: “They have shown us double 
standards and these double standards can mislead and misguide the nation”.31  
Diplomats also reacted. The Finnish ambassador, for instance, was quoted by The 
Post as saying, “Government's decision raises concern. If government is committed to 
the fight against corruption it would only be fair to explain why that kind of decision 
has been made ... Government announced its fight against corruption and each and 
every effort should be taken towards that resolve”. He publicly stated that he could not 
see any “painful consequences,” but he suggested donors were watching closely.32 The 
Swedish ambassador also steered clear of addressing potential consequences, stating, “I 
can only say that the case should go to court and let the court decide if he is guilty ... Let 
him pay back whatever he owes the people of Zambia. If he is not, that will mean that 
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the law has taken its course”.33 Behind closed doors, however, donors were certainly 
contemplating firm action. The seven bilateral donors supporting the Task Force on 
Corruption requested and were granted an audience at the highest level, with Mwa-
nawasa himself, at which they conveyed their grave concern at the political interference 
in Bulaya’s case. Basing themselves on the memorandum of understanding between 
donors and the government on budget support, which among its ‘underlying principles’ 
mentioned respect for the rule of law, donors were considering suspending their support 
to Zambia. Denmark even went so far as considering their entire aid relationship with 
Zambia. Donors were also contemplating ending their support to the Task Force on 
Corruption. This message from donors was deeply troubling to Mwanawasa. According 
to a report of this meeting by the Dutch ambassador, Mwanawasa was extremely dis-
appointed that even the donors, ‘his “all weather friends” – had started doubting his 
integrity and were threatening punitive measures’.34 He also appeared to be extremely 
troubled by the personal attacks he was facing from the opposition, alleging that he had 
let Bulaya go as a quid pro quo for his testimony. Finally, waving a copy of the 
constitution, he claimed that the attorney general had every right to suspend Bulaya’s 
prosecution.      
Mwanawasa also defended this position publicly, but he also stated his annoyance 
with donors, whom he accused of acting as opposition parties. The Post quoted him as 
saying, “Donor countries don't want me to respect the Constitution, they want me to do 
what they want me to do. But I have sworn to defend the Constitution and it's the 
Constitution I will defend”.35 Both civil-society commentators and the editor of The 
Post condemned Mwanawasa for this attack.3637 The editor of The Post defended 
donors: ‘Even when Levy knew he was lying, he started attacking donors whose only 
crime was to encourage him to do the right thing for his very poor country and poverty-
stricken people’.38 This is especially striking, as these commentators themselves have 
been equally prepared to attack donors for their conditionality and imperialism on 
issues, though when their interests converge with that of donors, apparently they support 
their temporary allies. Nevertheless, Mwanawasa soon U-turned on the issue. He 
obviously faced a very personal dilemma between the needs of power politics, with its 
patrimonial aspects, and the rational-legal principles that he publicly paid homage to. In 
this case, it seemed he was violating his own vision of being a government of laws 
rather than of men. By reversing this decision and by allowing Bulaya to be sentenced 
as an example of illegitimate greed, Mwanawasa apparently redeemed himself, main-
taining at least something of his image as the Mr. Clean of Zambian politics.  
The human resource crisis 
Chituwo’s tenure at the Ministry of Health was accompanied with similar labour unrests 
to those during his predecessors’ time. From February through August 2003, strikes and 
go-slows hit the health sector and much of the public service. The first unrest broke out 
in Ndola, with more than 1,200 health workers from various hospitals and clinics in the 
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city gathering at the central hospital in protest and being dispersed by riot police. The 
reaction from a representative of the Central Board of Health, however, was con-
ciliatory. He claimed that the authorities would look into health workers’ demands and 
that ‘the union’s cry was genuine and that they were not in conflict with CBoH or the 
Ministry of Health’. The spokesman also added: “The Minister of Health is aware about 
the strike and we are looking at the best way of improving the workers’ conditions of 
service’.39 Doctors joined nurses by holding a go-slow, which they then suspended to 
discuss ‘several unfulfilled promises’ with the Central Board.40 Shortly afterwards, 150 
nurses, paramedical staff, and general workers in Ndola were fired for striking.41 The 
permanent secretary called the strike illegal, singling out nurses and general workers.42 
By April, however, the Central Board announced that it had started paying higher 
salaries to nurses, which it had promised earlier.43 In the following month it was the 
doctors who asserted their entitlements. By May it was again the junior doctors who 
started a strike at the UTH, which spread to the Copperbelt.44 A few days later, the 
strikes were again called off as the Central Board of Health promised to pay the workers 
new salaries, backdated to April.45 After this issue had been resolved, doctors came 
back in August to defend other entitlements. For what were assumed to be budgetary 
reasons, on-call allowances to doctors had been suspended. This prompted a boycott of 
doctors’ services outside of regular working hours.46 This boycott would only be 
suspended after the ministry had released over one billion Kwacha to pay doctors’ 
allowances.47 This again prompted nurses and paramedics to strike over their housing 
allowances.48 It was not until the end of 2003 that this episode of labour unrest died 
down. As we have seen in earlier episodes of labour unrest, government again showed 
the same mix of repression and appeasement. In the end, it appeared that government 
more often than not gave in to health workers demands, although they often did not 
have the resources to do what was promised.  
This contest between the government and health workers, in which health workers 
had a particularly effective tool for asserting their influence – withholding their labour – 
cannot be seen in isolation from what was going to be known as the human resource 
crisis. The first public mention of the ‘human resource crisis’ by a senior official 
recorded by the media was in June 2005, when the permanent secretary was answering 
parliamentary questions. He declared that the health sector was facing a human resource 
crisis and that ‘the human resource situation in the health sector, especially in the rural 
areas, was pathetic’. The main causes for staff shortages were summed-up as the ‘brain 
drain’ (the out-migration of health workers), HIV and AIDS, and the barriers that 
existed against the government employing newly graduated health workers as a result of 
the conditionality of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries’ (HIPC) programme. The 
permanent secretary also stated that the establishments of the Ministry of Health and the 
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Central Board were insufficient.49 With this presentation, he drew a familiar image of 
the state of the health sector. However, despite the recent emergence of the discursive 
label of a ‘human resource crisis’, which was intended to guide policy decisions, the 
manpower shortages the sector was facing were certainly not new.  
In 1998 The Post printed an interview with a hospital director who decried “the 
serious cancer of brain drain”, which he explained as a scenario “whereby qualified 
people leave the country to work elsewhere in pursuit of greener pastures”. He claimed 
that out of 2,000 Zambian doctors trained locally and internationally, only 300 were still 
working in the country.50 Regardless of the accuracy of his figures, this opinion aptly 
illustrates the labour shortage the sector was facing. This is in no way surprising, 
considering the ever-present manpower shortages of the health sector. Already in 
previous decades, external observers identified the problem of the ‘brain drain’. The 
situation was also further impacted by the de-linkage process and associated separation 
packages, which were held responsible for losing the sector 1,400 workers.  
An opinion piece printed in the Times of Zambia claimed that ‘over 2,000 of Zam-
bia's trained nurses are working in the United Kingdom’, also citing unverified figures. 
The writer explained that ‘(t)he last half of this decade has seen Zambian nurses leaving 
the country in droves on recruitment schemes offering more lucrative salaries and 
conditions of service, the latest destinations being the United Kingdom and the United 
States’. The moral indignation of the article was raised beyond the impact on the sector, 
by stressing how professionals, ‘trained on hard-earned public resources’, were rather 
‘working in nursing homes as maids for the aged and terminally ill’ than in the areas 
that they were trained for. In line with the character of the state-owned Times, the 
opinion piece was not overly critical of the government. It agreed that the government 
admitted that resources were ‘simply not enough to beat the hefty packages offered 
abroad’. The writer also acknowledged the government’s new initiatives to provide 
better housing for medical staff and increase rural hardship allowance, but argued that 
‘(g)overnment has to take a more revolutionary stance to keep back its own. Half-
hearted measures and procrastination as was the case with the medical doctors' car loans 
will not help save the situation. Better incentives and funds to effect attractive packages 
have to be found or else the brain drain of not just nurses alone will continue to haunt 
us’.51 Obviously, it was a health worker himself who used the image of the human 
resource crisis to argue for better pay. This writer also addressed an initiative that 
resulted from cooperation between the Central Board of Health and a particular donor, 
the Netherlands.  
Already a few years prior to the permanent secretary’s mentioning of the human 
resource crisis to Parliament, the term had made in-roads in technical circles. In 
September 2003, the Cabinet had approved a pilot scheme managed by the Central 
Board of Health and financed by the Netherlands Embassy. The programme document 
presented ‘the crisis in human resources in health’, which it qualified as ‘acute and 
deepening’, as the problem statement on which the rationale of the scheme was based. 
This crisis was said to be caused ‘by worsening economic circumstances, heavy external 
migration of trained staff in search of better working conditions and quality of life, poor 
pay and low morale’, and exacerbated by HIV and AIDS. With the rural health worker 
retention scheme it was ‘envisaged that health workers be retained and attracted to 
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underserved communities of Zambia’.52 Initially the scheme applied only to doctors. 
The scheme involved a rural hardship allowance of 1 million Kwacha (€ 200) per month 
in some rural districts, and 1.3 million Kwacha (€ 250) in more remote rural districts. In 
addition to this allowance, a doctor would get up to 2.3 million Kwacha per term per 
child, for a maximum of four children, as education allowance. For the doctors’ own 
training, the scheme also provided a study grant. Finally, doctors could get a loan of 90 
per cent of 3 years’ rural hardship allowance, and the scheme provided funds for the 
renovation and upgrading of the doctors’ accommodation.53 However, not only entitle-
ments were addressed in this scheme, but also performance. Doctors would need to be 
appraised annually with an open performance appraisal system developed by Cabinet 
Office in 1997 under the Public Sector Reform Programme, which was in use in other 
government departments. The health sector, meanwhile,54 was still using the old annual 
confidential reports, which were not shared with the person who was being appraised. 
The health worker retention scheme project document stated: ‘Satisfactory performance 
shall be conditional to continued enrolment in the retention scheme’.55 It appeared that – 
at least in the project’s intentions – the entitlements were to be performance-based.  
By 2004, 56 doctors were on the scheme, of which 9 were in the most remote dis-
tricts. In total, 77 doctors had been projected to be on the scheme. The Netherlands 
government supported the programme with an initially budgeted 1.6 million euros for a 
four and a half year period, though this was adjusted to about 2 million euros when it 
turned out the allowances would be taxed by government, as is standard policy in 
Zambia.  
The rationale behind this project and Dutch concern for the brain drain or the human 
resource crisis were not new. Already in 1991, a report on the Zambian health sector by 
a Dutch health expert presented the problem of staff shortages associated with the brain 
drain. ‘The huge shortage of well-educated staff, especially doctors, is still alleviated by 
employing experts with foreign support. Locally trained Zambian doctors, who function 
well, aspire to a career abroad of quickly flowing through into further, often clinical 
specialisation. Bad pay and working conditions play a large role in this “brain drain”’. 
At the time, training clinical officers into medical assistants was seen as the answer to 
reducing dependence on foreign experts.56 It would not, however, be until the first years 
of the new millennium that this idea became reality with the launch of a training 
programme to upgrade some clinical officers to medical licentiates. The idea of a donor-
funded retention scheme was also not new. In 1993 a Dutch report on the British aid 
programme in the health sector reported on an initiative under development which 
would compensate the phasing out of the ‘expensive’ UK programme supplying experts 
to the health sector. It was envisaged that at the level of the School of Medicine and 
tertiary hospitals, Zambian professionals would be supported with ‘focussed incentives’ 
to keep them in-country. This meant that for new ‘development-relevant’ positions 
higher salaries would be paid. It is not clear from available documentation whether this 
initiative was actually launched, but, considering that in documentation on the later rural 
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retention scheme this preceding scheme was not mentioned, it is unlikely to have had a 
widespread impact.      
Despite the fact that the problem the rural retention scheme aimed to address had 
been recognised earlier and similar ideas had existed, it was not until a drastic change in 
overall Dutch development policy had occurred that the conditions were right for the 
scheme to be developed and implemented. Evelien Herfkens, the Dutch Minister for 
Development Co-operation, who was in office from 1998 to 2002, was responsible for a 
significant transition in Dutch development policy. Her tenure formalised a more 
implicit existing shift in the sector from a project approach to the sector-wide approach, 
which as we have seen above had taken root in practice in the Zambian health sector in 
the period leading up to 1998. This shift also meant a change in technical assistance 
policy. By the turn of the millennium, the Netherlands had stopped sending experts to 
their own projects such as the primary health programme in Western Province, as these 
were mainly phased out. The new rationale for technical assistance was that more 
attention would be given to capacity-building rather than providing technical assistance 
and that what technical assistance would remain would be integrated in the overall 
sector-support programme, for instance by means of ‘pooling technical assistance’.57  
As a result, in July 2002 the department in The Hague responsible for recruiting and 
deploying Dutch experts was disbanded. This meant that tropical doctors could also no 
longer be sent to Zambia and other countries.58 As mentioned earlier, throughout the 
1990s Dutch doctors had been working in Zambia. For most of the decade between 
twenty and thirty doctors were in Zambia at one time, on the payroll of the department 
mentioned above. These doctors were mainly working in rural district hospitals in the 
Western and Northern Provinces. Immediately ending this practice would have a 
significant impact on service delivery in the more remote areas where the Dutch were 
posted and few Zambian doctors would go.59 The rural retention scheme was specific-
ally conceived to deal with these consequences of the external policy change. As the 
health advisor at the Netherlands Embassy at the time, who was decisive in implement-
ing the scheme, often recounted, the choice for the embassy and the Zambian health 
system was clear. He could give the ministry the money to employ either Dutch or other 
foreign doctors. However, a Dutch doctor cost about ten times as much as a Zambian 
doctor. Alternatively, the embassy could give the money, which the ministry and 
Central Board could then use to make it more attractive for Zambian doctors to work in 
rural areas.60 
This change did not go unchallenged. Amongst Dutch doctors, there was a feeling 
that their contribution to health care was valuable. A survey carried out of doctors who 
had served in Zambia under the Dutch programme indicated that most doctors held the 
opinion that the Netherlands should continue sending out doctors, as there were not 
enough doctors to answer Zambians’ health needs. These opinions were taken into ac-
count in the assessment of whether to fund the retention scheme. In fact, the assessment 
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document presented an interesting account of the perceived problems ending the 
deployment of Dutch doctors. It mentioned that at the annual meeting of Dutch doctors, 
a video had been shown, made by one of the Dutch doctors in Western Province, which 
presented members of the local community who were reluctant to see Dutch doctors be 
replaced by Zambian colleagues. ‘Many of those interviewed were full of praise for all 
the work the Dutch doctors had done, especially the building projects, whereas they 
were fearsome of what to expect from Zambian doctors, voicing quite negative pre-
judices about their fellow countrymen and -women’. The health advisor who wrote the 
document, however, rejected this as an ‘inappropriate side-effect of protracted provision 
of expatriate long-term technical advisors to small communities’. As the retention 
scheme was operating, however, some individual stories emerged from the last remain-
ing Dutch doctors reflecting similar perceptions about their Zambian colleagues. In one 
case, Zambian doctors on the scheme were said to be drinking instead of working, away 
on private business for long periods without leave, and authoritarian and abusive to 
colleagues and patients. A representative of the Dutch doctors presented these anecdotes 
as criticism of the retention scheme. The health advisor at the embassy, however, dis-
regarded these rumours as minor annoyances, preferring to focus on the overall success 
of the scheme as was demonstrated by an evaluation.61 
The narratives above touch on the complex and sensitive area of cultural issues and 
clashes that play a role when expatriate development agents engage with local stake-
holders. These cultural issues are sensitive issues in post-colonial relations between 
Europe and Africa. Nevertheless, certain cultural differences between Dutch doctors and 
Zambian colleagues were indeed relevant to the shift away from deploying Dutch 
doctors in Zambia. A good example is the acceptability of criticism and the directness 
one has in issuing criticism. We saw earlier in the clash between Dutch doctors and 
Zambian trainers in Mongu how this major cultural difference was a source of conflict. 
It is clear that for Zambians the distinction between criticism and insults is different 
than for the Dutch. This became evident to a Dutch doctor when he was visited by an 
officer of the ‘office of the president’, the intelligence service. The doctor had publicly 
aired his dismay at the conditions in the hospital, comparing it to Zambeef, the national 
chain of butcheries. He was warned that by insulting a government institution he was 
insulting the president.62 It is likely that such experiences, which usually went unre-
ported, created an implicit sense of unease under both Zambian policy makers and their 
Dutch counterparts about the desirability of foreign experts in the Zambian system. 
Another cultural issue that is likely to have influenced the trend away from sending out 
foreign experts is the concept of Zambianisation. Although the issue was less pressing 
in the 1990s than earlier in Zambia’s history, there was still a strong sense of injustice at 
the idea of foreigners working in Zambian jobs, especially if they were paid more than 
Zambians. This frequently came to the fore in the complaints aired by striking doctors, 
most often targeted at Cubans. As the principle of ‘ownership’ found increasing cur-
rency in development policy, it can be expected that implicit Zambian concerns about 
insulting foreigners taking Zambian jobs may have influenced Dutch perceptions of the 
desirability of this practice.  
As we have seen in earlier chapters, for a policy plan to actually be implemented it is 
important that there is a convergence in the concerns, discourse, and interests between 
donor representatives and policy makers in the health sector, who both have political 
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and institutional backing. In this case, the collaboration between individual officials in 
the Central Board and the Dutch health advisor was essential for the success of this 
scheme. The Zambian health officials were under pressure from colleague health 
workers who were striking for better conditions of service. And the health advisor was 
under pressure to find a solution for the policy changes at headquarters. Moreover, this 
advisor and his predecessor had an intimate understanding of the conditions under 
which Zambian health workers operate in rural areas, having worked as expatriate 
doctors in Zambia themselves. But on a more aggregate level also, the human resource 
crisis in health became a joint discourse for donors and recipient governments.  
In fact, the rural retention scheme itself became an important attribute of this dis-
course. In various forums in Zambia and internationally, the scheme was used as an 
example of how the problem of brain drain and international labour migration could be 
countered. Also both the Zambian government as well as donors presented this as a 
‘best practice’.63 For instance, Chituwo presented the scheme in Parliament as a major 
and successful innovation:  
In the area of retention, this House might wish to know that Zambia has one of the first innovations in 
the Retention Scheme; thanks to our co-operating partners. We started the Rural Health Worker 
Retention Scheme, targeting the Western Province, North-Western Province and other remote areas 
where an education allowance, proper housing and fast-track car loan scheme was instituted in order 
to attract people to serve in the rural areas. At the time of its inception in 2002, we had less than ten 
young Zambian doctors serving people in remote areas. We now have over eighty Zambian doctors 
serving happily in remote areas.64 
In 2009 the scheme was recognised with an award given to the Dutch health advisor 
who had been behind the scheme’s development at a meeting on the worldwide shortage 
of health workers, organised by Dutch organisations working in health.65 Owing to the 
image of the scheme as a successful innovation, other donors even wanted to claim part 
of this success. This is illustrated by a British evaluation of its support to Zambia, which 
stated: ‘Although DFID (Department for International Development) has helped the 
government put in place a retention scheme, training and recruitment remain inade-
quate’66 (emphasis mine) To be fair, however, other donors had indeed joined the 
Netherlands in supporting the scheme, which by 2008 was expanded to also cover nurse 
tutors, non-doctors in the most remote locations, and rare medical specialists.  
The image of being a success story is in large part deserved, as the scheme had 
managed to get Zambian doctors deployed in areas where there previously were no 
Zambian doctors. It arguably also played a role in changing development discourse to 
recognise the importance of salaries and financial incentives in operating a health 
system. This change in discourse is illustrated by the successful challenge launched by a 
coalition of Zambian and international policy makers and activists, which forced the 
                                                 
63  See for example, International Organisation of Migration (2006), ‘Migration for development: Within 
and beyond frontiers’, 353.  
64  National Assembly of Zambia, ‘Daily Parliamentary Debates for the First Session of the Tenth As-
sembly’, Friday, 9th November, 2007 
  http://www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=617&Itemid=86 
(accessed 26 June 2009). 
65  Wemos, ‘World Health Day 2009: A report’, in  
http://www.wemos.nl/en-GB/Content.aspx?type=news&id=3142 (accessed 26 June 2009). 
66  Hooper, R. et al., ‘Evaluation of DFID country programmes Zambia’ (London, 2008). While the UK 
was a leading donor in the health sector, this was – at least initially – a Dutch initiative, yet it is still 
claimed that the UK helped the government put this in place.  
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International Monetary Fund to change its macro-economic conditionalities, condition-
alities which imposed a ceiling of eight per cent of the gross national product on what 
the Zambian government was allowed to spend on salaries. For several years, the health 
system had been unable to hire sufficient staff, while qualified staff was graduating and 
remained unemployed.67  
Despite the retention scheme’s merits, however, there were also unintended side-
effects in addition what could be euphemistically called ‘implementation issues’. For 
other health workers working in rural areas besides doctors, the rural retention scheme 
was seen as unfair. As we will see later, doctors had historically been more privileged 
and influential than nurses or clinical officers, and the scheme would add a further 
inequity to non-doctors. The nurses’ union therefore actively lobbied for a broadening 
of the scheme to include other cadres.68 Other issues concerned keeping track of doctors 
on the scheme. There was concern and anecdotal evidence that doctors receiving 
allowances had in some cases moved from their posting, while continuing to receive 
allowances. At the time of fieldwork, donors were contemplating outsourcing the 
management of the scheme to cover these risks.69 A final shortcoming of how the 
scheme was managed involved the lack of attention to performance. By the time the 
fieldwork for this research was being conducted, the annual performance appraisal 
system, on which participation in the scheme had been declared conditional, had still 
not been rolled out in the health sector – the reason being that the restructuring process, 
following the dissolution of the Central Board of Health, was first to be completed. 
Regardless of the precise reasons for these technical problems, and despite the overall 
merits of the retention scheme, this points to a more general pattern in the Zambian 
health sector. Health workers have been very effective in advocating for their en-
titlements, but less attention is paid to their responsibility to earn these entitlements.      
Dismantling the boards 
In the middle of the Mwanawasa era a decision was taken that would have a profound 
impact on the way the health sector functioned and was organised. The Central Board of 
Health and all other boards were dissolved by repealing the National Health Services 
Act of 1995. In part, this decision was a reaction to the confused institutional set-up in 
the health sector, following the failed de-linkage and competing restructuring processes 
at both Central Board and the ministry. Another factor, however, was one of power over 
resources. The Central Board of Health appeared to lie outside the control of the 
leadership of the ministry and formed a rival centre of power. Paradoxically, both 
rational-legal arguments and interests as well as a patrimonial desire for control over 
                                                 
67  For more on this, see Verhoeven, M. & A. Segura, ‘IMF Trims Use of Wage Bill Ceilings’, in 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/pol095a.htm (accessed 26 June 2009); M.B. 
Chitah, ‘Expenditure ceilings, human resources and health: The case for Zambia’, in  
http://www.wemos.nl/Documents/zambia_report.pdf (accessed 26 June 2009); and Goldsbrough, D. & 
C. Cheelo, ‘IMF Programs and Health Spending: Case Study of Zambia’, in http://www.cgdev.Org 
/doc/IMF/Zambia.pdf (accessed 26 June 2009). 
68  Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation, ‘Views on migration of health workers vis-à-vis the govern-
ment’s retention scheme in Zambia, presented to the parliamentary committee on health, community 
development and social welfare, March 14, 2008’ (Lusaka, 2008). 
http://www.zuno.org.zm/downloads/200803271947260.NATIONAL_ASSEMBY_PRESENTATION 
_-_ZUNO.doc, (accessed June 26 2009). 
69  ML0804/01, ML1106/01. 
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money and people drove the decision to abolish what could be seen as a technocratic 
enclave in the politicised public bureaucracy. Again, this was an example in which the 
interests and the discourses of politicians and donors converged, making the decision to 
abolish the boards possible. At a casual glance, this decision put an end to the visionary 
‘flag-ship’ reforms that had long since lost their reputation as a pioneering example to 
the rest of Africa.70  
The first public mention of the intention to dissolve the Central Board came from the 
mouth of Mwanawasa himself in June 2004. After a private meeting with traditional 
leaders in Mkushi, Central Province, he briefed journalists on the issues discussed. 
Reacting on the chiefs’ concerns over the neglect of their hospitals, Mwanawasa an-
nounced that the Central Board would be abolished to ‘avoid disparities with the 
Ministry of Health in the recruitment of nurses and other medical personnel’. He was 
quoted as saying: “There has been an unsatisfactory arrangement with CBoH and the 
ministry in their responsibility of recruiting personnel. CBoH employs over 10,000 
workers who are not taking care of the sick”.71 He explained that the board had been 
given money by the ministry, which was used to employ 10,000 “non-core workers”. 
Mwanawasa went on: “When the Ministry of Health went to ask for money, they could 
not get it; for this reason, the government has decided that we will abolish the Central 
Board of Health and remain with the Ministry of Health, which will be doing job 
recruitments”.72 The line of argument Mwanawasa used was not very clearly articulated. 
He appeared to allude to a complex discussion he could not fully explain in this press 
briefing. Nevertheless, a decision had obviously just been taken that was important 
enough to mention. What was also clear was that regaining the power of recruitment 
was a key objective of this decision. The main justification given, however, was that 
because of the “duplication of duties between CBoH and the Ministry of Health,”73 the 
sick were not being cared for.  
Two days later, Chituwo showed his mettle as a PR-sensitive professional in a press 
briefing. He appeared to try to legitimate the decision to abolish the Central Board and 
take away uncertainty over the implications. Chituwo argued that donors supported the 
idea and would not withhold funding over the issue. “We are assured that the proposal 
to abolish CBoH will not affect donor funding and that it shall not alter what we agreed 
upon in the memorandum of understanding we signed with donors,” he said, explaining 
that donors were in favour of this decision, as it would cost around 400 billion Kwacha 
to completely de-link boards from the public service. “Government does not have this 
kind of money and donors are (not) willing to assist. It is for this reason that CBoH 
cannot continue,” Chituwo argued. He also legitimated the ministry’s desire for control 
over certain key functions of a bureaucracy. “Surely it is only prudent that audit pur-
poses and human resource issues should be left to the ministry, unlike what was ob-
taining”. Finally, he further assuaged concerns over the consequences of this decision 
by explaining that “systems developed over the years, especially at district level, would 
remain in place to ensure delivery of primary health care to the people at all levels”.74  
                                                 
70  This was admitted by Chituwo in a speech to donors, although he equally claimed that the reforms 
were ‘sustainable and would improve equity, effectiveness, efficiency and quality of our health care 
delivery system.’ Post, ‘Lusaka is no longer a pioneer of health reforms – Chituwo’, 28 April 2002. 
71  Times of Zambia, ‘Central board of health to be abolished – Mwanawasa’, 26 July 2004. 
72  Post, ‘Govt to Dissolve CBOH’, 26 July 2004. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Times of Zambia, ‘CBoH abolition won’t affect donor funding – Chituwo’, 28 July 2004. 
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The decision in the second half of 2005 to abolish the Central Board of Health, by 
repealing the act that had established it, may have led to some resistance, although this 
was rarely strongly voiced publicly.75 Perhaps the arguments for dissolving the board 
and restructuring the sector were convincing enough. In some interviews, respondents 
showed their displeasure at the dissolution, although these were primarily those who 
previously worked for the board or who had taken a role in the reforms from a techno-
cratic perspective. Interestingly, some senior health officials placed the responsibility 
for the dissolution of the Central Board with the opposition. While we will see that this 
is partly justified, in part this may also have been intended to shift the responsibility for 
this controversial decision away from the MMD, who had begun the health reforms in 
the first place. Nevertheless, some months before Mwanawasa had made his pronounce-
ments, opposition politicians called in Parliament for “scrapping” Central Board. In a 
parliamentary discussion of the ministry’s budget in February 2004, UPND parliament-
arian Robert Sichinga challenged Chituwo to explain the 11.7 billion Kwacha that had 
been budgeted for ‘health system governance. Sichinga argued: 
I would like the Hon. Minister in his response, to indicate to us what this is all about. My concern is 
that there is a duplication of responsibilities between the Ministry of Health and the Central Board of 
Health. I think that all of us in this House agree that there is duplication of work and, as such, it is 
time we rationalised this issue in order to save on costs of administration and put the money in more 
deserving programmes. 
Another opposition politician, former Minister of Finance Nawakwi, now parlia-
mentarian for the FDD, formulated this more bluntly and explicitly. She put forward: 
Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important to define our direction. It is important to be specific and 
exact in our prescription of what we want this Government to do. I, personally, would urge this 
Government to scrap the Central Board of Health for the following reasons. They are taking more 
money than all district hospitals in this country. Their allocation is K5 billion. They are not even a 
ministry; it is just top-heavy for nothing. I would like the Government to come forward and propose 
the scrapping of the Central Board of Health. 
Nawakwi bashed the MMD, claiming that the health sector was a Man-Made 
Disaster (MMD). “It is also the New Deal and that is the deal they are giving to the 
people of Zambia”. Nawakwi then proposed deferring the vote on the budget item that 
was being debated. 
Katele Kalumba, who following recent scandals had been reduced to the status of a 
mere backbencher, tried to defend ‘his’ health reforms, articulately as ever.76 
I really have difficulties in debating this vote, but I feel compelled to make a few remarks. Sir, Hon. 
Members have alluded to the mission statement and the importance of the concept of equity, cost 
effectiveness and quality health care and family centeredness of the health service. These are very 
important ideals. As they are ideals, we seek to aspire to achieve them. Like all other ideals, like the 
American dream, it is not something that you can achieve in a day or two. It requires the investment of 
effort and time. Sir, to help Zambia requires political commitment and technical understanding of the 
issues involved. There are many unfinished businesses in this particular sector. 
Kalumba then went on to reflect on some issues the sector was facing, such as stalled 
investment programmes, a lack of health financing policy, and unsuitable legislation. He 
strongly defended the Central Board, however: 
                                                 
75  From an analysis of media reporting on the dissolution of CBoH, few strong feelings from stake-
holders can be determined, other than the occasional anxiety over consequences for conditions of 
service. Times of Zambia, ‘Ex-CBOH employees anxious to know their fate’, 24 April 2006. 
76  ‘Daily Parliamentary Debates for the Third Session of the Ninth Assembly’, 26 February 2004. 
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I see no particular institutional reason why there should be conflict between the Ministry of Health 
and the Central Board of Health. It is a leadership issue and must be understood as such. Technically, 
the understanding I have, Sir, is that ministers are responsible for policy formulation. The Central 
Board is an implementing arm of the ministry. It is responsible for the technical health service. When 
we have politicians and administrators doing technical work of the Central Board, you have a 
difficulty.  
Thus, Kalumba had obviously retained the point of view that it was important to 
technocratically insulate the Central Board of Health from too much political inter-
ference.  
During this particular debate Chituwo showed no desire to abolish the Central Board. 
He gave a detailed, technical, and ‘politically correct’ presentation of the challenges the 
health sector was facing and the policy priorities the ministry had adopted to overcome 
these challenges. He did not react to Nawakwi’s intervention, and in response to 
Sichinga’s questions on the ‘health system governance’ item, he merely indicated that 
this budget item referred to information technology: 
We need to have data upon which we can make decisions for better expenditure of our monies. 
Donors put this money into this Budget line so that we have no excuse of planning because we have 
data. 
During this particular debate, this ended the discussion on the Central Board, and the 
vote on the budget item was passed.  
It is unclear what happened in the months following this debate. Katele Kalumba in 
an interview later reflected that Mwanawasa or the people around him had used a ‘hit 
man’ from the opposition to undo the health reforms: “They knew I would be difficult 
as a backbencher”. He suggested, as did a senior health official interviewed separately, 
that the opposition had sponsored a private members’ motion challenging the Central 
Board. Kalumba realised, however, that he was seen as a ‘problem person’, so he stayed 
away from the issue.77 Indeed, Kalumba’s reputation had by that time become severely 
damaged by a string of corruption allegations, in addition to an embarrassing episode 
when he was caught by police hiding in the bush, despite the protection of magical 
charms, and was subsequently jailed. Although openly Mwanawasa had apparently 
rehabilitated him, Kalumba still maintained that he was the victim of a strategy by 
Mwanawasa against him.78  
Before Mwanawasa had publicly announced the dissolution of the Central Board, 
steps had already been taken at the technocratic level to prepare for this decision, with a 
view also to ensuring that donors supported the idea. In May 2004 a consultancy team 
consisting of a former coordinator of the Dutch primary health care programme in 
Western Province and a Zambian public health consultant resident in South Africa 
carried out an ‘institutional and organisational appraisal’ to analyse the structures cre-
ated under the health reforms with a view to streamlining these. This consultancy was 
financed by the Netherlands Embassy, facilitated by the consultancy bureau that had 
                                                 
77  ML0812/01. Kalumba mentioned opposition chief whip Sibeta of UPND as the ‘hit man’ who 
attacked the reforms. He could well have spurred Nawakwi and Sichinga to speak out on the issue. 
However, no account of him addressing the issue of the Central Board has been found in a search of 
the on-line archives of the National Assembly, nor has a formal reference to a private member’s 
motion been found on the issue.  
78  Kalumba would continue to be an important power-broker in the MMD. In 2005 he defied Mwa-
nawasa by being elected as National Secretary, beating Mwanawasa’s preferred candidate. All the 
while, the court case against him and several others continued. It was not until 2010, however, that he 
was convicted. At the time of writing, the process of appeal against this conviction was ongoing.  
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been contracted to take over the Dutch provision of technical assistance and formally 
commissioned by the Ministry of Health. The resulting report was used as evidence to 
support the need for dissolution of the Central Board. For instance, when Chituwo’s 
successor, Sylvia Masebo, defended the bill in Parliament repealing the National Health 
Services Act of 1995, she referred to this report: 
Mr. Speaker, an independent consultant was engaged by the Government through the Ministry of 
Health and donors to conduct an institutional and organisational appraisal for the Ministry of Health 
and the Central Board of Health. The report alluded to organisational inefficiencies in the public 
health sector and recommended the need to totally restructure the health sector, if the delivery of 
services was to be effective and sustainable.79 
In the perception of some observers of the health reform process, this report was also 
instrumental in demonstrating the need to dissolve the Central Board. As one former 
senior official in an interview said: “Consultants came to demonstrate that which was 
pre-determined”.80  
While the consultants’ mission was indeed intended by senior technocrats to 
demonstrate the pre-determined decision to abolish the Central Board, the report itself 
was not so straightforward in arguing the need for the Boards’ dissolution. In fact, the 
team was rather negative about the prospects of this option: 
Dissolving or abolishing the CBoH was considered as an option given the high level of political 
pressure exerted by parliamentarians upon the Minister of Health, as well as the Cabinet’s concerns on 
the level of resources currently used to support the personnel emoluments of CBoH. In the views of 
the appraisal team, immediate dissolving or abolishing the CBoH will have severe negative impli-
cations on the whole of health service delivery and is not worth the gains that would be mainly the 
reduction of high salaries of one institution in the system”.  
Instead, the team proposed two options that would place some of the Central Board’s 
roles and functions with various agencies outside the ministry headquarters.81 
From interviews with two people involved in conducting and facilitating the assess-
ment, it appears that the process of carrying out the assessment was fraught with 
conflict and disagreements between the appraisal team and ministry officials. At the 
start of their mission, the team was briefed by the permanent secretary on the terms of 
reference of the assessment. According to an eyewitness, the permanent secretary “in-
dicated, ‘I want this, this, and this to come out of the research’”. The lead consultant 
replied three times that he would do research and on the basis of this research would 
draft his report. The respondent suggested that the atmosphere was uncharacteristically 
tense at the briefing. The debriefing, however, took place in an even more unpleasant 
atmosphere. The permanent secretary had not attended the meeting but had instead sent 
a senior official to berate the consultant, as the report did not recommend the dissolution 
of the Central Board. The official was quoted as saying: “What a useless consultant you 
are. What a waste of money. I regret we ever hired you for this job”. The report was 
never formally finalised and the consultant was not fully paid for the task.82 Obviously, 
                                                 
79  National Assembly of Zambia, ‘Daily Parliamentary Debates for the Fourth Session of the Ninth 
Assembly’ Wednesday, 10th August, 2005, 
  http://www.parliament.gov.zm/press/news/viewnews.cgi?category=1&id=1124107417 (accessed 17 
July 2009). 
80  ML070603. Kalumba argued the same point. However, he discredited the report by erroneously attri-
buting it to a consultant who knew nothing about health but was specialised in forestry. ML0706/04, 
ML0812/01. 
81  Koot & Inambao, Institutional, 48-50. 
82  ML0812/04 and ML0805/01. 
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the consultant did not feel that the reality justified the decision for which he was 
expected to deliver the evidence.      
Nevertheless, the process took its course as had been ‘pre-determined’. The Dutch 
health advisor supported this decision because the problems facing the structure of the 
public health system were felt to be too great to be overcome otherwise. Informally, the 
strategy of dissolving the Central Board had been discussed between the permanent 
secretary and himself,83 and the embassy was instrumental in funding and facilitating 
the appraisal mission.84 Eventually, when the bill repealing the Health Services Act was 
guided through Parliament by Chituwo’s successor in 2005, donors generally consented 
to the decision. Only the Danish were opposed, considering this the final straw, and they 
ended their cooperation in the health sector.85 Otherwise, this decision was regarded as a 
logical result of the problems the sector was facing. A joint Dutch-Swedish appraisal 
memorandum, for instance, did not question this logic but rather looked ahead, sketch-
ing the risks of mismanaging the reorganisation that would follow the decision to 
dissolve the Central Board.  
Chituwo did not remain in the Ministry of Health long enough to see the decision to 
abolish the Central Board be approved by Parliament and to guide the implementation 
of this decision. In August 2005 he was moved from health to education.86 This was just 
a few weeks before the bill to repeal the 1995 Act was passed by the National As-
sembly.87 It is unclear what motivated this re-shuffle. Chituwo, who had a good rapport 
with donors, was welcomed at education, where it was felt performance was lagging.88 
Neither in the media nor in Parliament did Chituwo appear a strong advocate for the 
dissolution of the Central Board, but it would be mere speculation to argue that this 
issue had a role to play in his transfer and replacement by Sylvia Masebo.  
In the 1990s Sylvia Masebo served as deputy mayor of Lusaka and later became 
deputy national treasurer for the MMD. Allegedly, she had been politically groomed by 
Michael Sata.89 This closeness was illustrated by reports that she was entertained by 
Sata at his residence on the evening on which Mwanawasa resigned as vice-president.90 
However, in 1999 she led more than 760 MMD cadres who were resigning from the 
ruling party. She criticised the party’s executive committee for only coming together to 
discipline party members rather than initiating programmes. Sata reacted with disap-
pointment to the loss of such a senior party member.91 Masebo then played a role in 
merging various small opposition parties, such as Kapita’s Lima Party and 
                                                 
83  ML0X13/01. 
84  In fact, this was the second organisational and institutional assessment, as it followed on a less in-
depth mission by two other Dutch consultants some months earlier.  
85  According to its formal policy discourse, however, Denmark withdrew from the health sector as a 
result of the joint assistance strategy which rationalised donor division of labour by reducing the 
number of donors in congested sectors’. 
http://amg.um.dk/en/menu/PoliciesAndStrategies/CountryRegionalStrategies/ProgrammeCountries/Za
mbia.htm (accessed 17 July 2009). This does not correspond with the fact that Denmark had already 
decided not to sign the 2006 MoU between the MoH and Cooperating Partners, while the joint 
assistance strategy was not finalised until 2007.  
86  Post, ‘Levy explains use of bad language’, 4 August 2005. 
87  Post, ‘Cboh spending a lot on administration, says Masebo’, 13 August 2005. 
88  Personal communication with education advisor, EKN 2005. 
89  Africa Confidential, ‘The Titanic sails at dawn’, 20 October 2006; Vol 47, No 21. 
90  Post, ‘Sata accused of helping DPP in acquiring a house’, 8 July 1994. 
91  Post, ‘762 Ditch MMD’, 25 January 1999. 
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Mung’omba’s Zambian Democratic Party, into the Zambian Alliance for Progress.92 
This party in turn was merged with Ben Mwila’s Republican Party to form the Zambian 
Republican Party in 2001.93 Then, in the 2001 elections, Masebo won the only seat in 
Parliament for the ZRP, which was attributed rather to her own local support base than 
the strength of the party.94 In 2003 Masebo became one of the Members of Parliament 
elected on opposition-party tickets who were invited, or some would say co-opted, into 
government by being offered ministerial posts. Masebo became Minister of Local 
Government.95 Whereas other parties such as FDD had expelled their parliamentarian 
who had taken up government positions, Masebo’s ZRP approved her ascension to 
government. 96 Masebo, however, did fall out with party president Mwila, who took part 
of the party into one of the two opposition alliances formed in the advent of the 2006 
elections. At that time, Masebo herself took other elements of the party along and de-
clared they would support Mwanawasa and his MMD during the elections.97 Subse-
quently, she successfully defended her seat in Chongwe on an MMD ticket.98  
One of Masebo’s first tasks at the Ministry of Health was to defend the dissolution of 
the Central Board of Health in Parliament. Being new to the dossier, she apparently read 
what had been drafted by her senior officials. One wonders how similar Masebo’s pre-
sentation would have been to what Chituwo would have presented if the recent Cabinet 
reshuffle had not come to pass. However, considering that in later parliamentary debates 
he himself took credit for having put the bill to repeal the 1995 Act before Parliament,99 
there is little reason to consider this would have been much different. The root of the 
problems necessitating the dissolution of the health boards was found in the failed de-
linkage process. Masebo particularly stressed the ‘(f)ailure by both the Government and 
our co-operating partners to raise the K400 billion required to pay separation packages 
in order to de-link 26,000 health workers from the Civil Service to fall under the Central 
Board of Health’, as a key factor urging the dissolution of the Central Board. This 
partially laid the blame for the failure of a key tenet of the health reforms with donors. 
The description of the problems put forward provided a picture of a bloated central 
bureaucracy, duplication of functions, lack of clarity about the division of roles, and 
multiple employment conditions for health workers.100 A central point in the govern-
ment’s argument concerned the equity principle, stressing the need ‘to get rid of 
iniquities and a situation where the minority of health workers based at the Central 
Board of Health Headquarters, totalling 240, are enjoying better conditions of service at 
the expense of 26,000 health workers providing health services to the Zambian popu-
lation’. The language used by Masebo to defend this decision contained a heavy dose of 
rational-legal discourse. For instance, she described the confusion in employment 
                                                 
92  Times of Zambia, ‘Parties submit merger papers’, 4 May 1999. 
93  Times of Zambia, ‘Zambian Republican Party born’, 26 February 2001. 
94  Neo Simutanyi, ‘One country, one nation’. In: The Post, 6 February 2002. 
95  Times of Zambia, ‘Mwanawasa cautions new appointees’, 10 February 2003. 
96  Times of Zambia, ‘ZRP nods Masebo appointment’, 14 February 2003; Times of Zambia, ‘Expelled 
MPs illegally in Parliament, says Nawakwi’, 8 June 2005.  
97  Post, ‘ZRP Backs Mwanawasa’, 27 March 2006. 
98  Post, ‘MMD Gets 72 Seats’, 4 October 2006. 
99  National Assembly of Zambia, ‘Daily Parliamentary Debates for the First Session of the Tenth 
Assembly’, Friday, 9 November 2007: 
http://www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=617&Itemid=86 
(accessed 21 July 2009). 
100  This description corresponded with Koot & Inambao, Institutional. 
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conditions prevailing in the health sector as ‘a serious anomaly, which cannot be 
allowed to continue under the New Deal Administration … which stands for the rule of 
law’.101 Ruling party members refrained from contributing to the debate, other than by 
shouting ‘hear, hear’ in support of the government.  
Whereas the opposition had earlier criticised the structure of the health system, many 
appeared less supportive of the government at this final debate on the repealing of the 
National Health Services Act of 1995. The parliamentarian for Sata’s Patriotic Front, 
who took part in the debate, supported the bill, however. This did not restrain him from 
criticising the government for depending too much on donor: 
One of the reasons why the Central Board of Health has failed is because the donors who promised to 
give us money to run the boards have now refused to do so. Therefore, the Government’s existence 
depends on the charity of foreigners. Why not go back to colonialism and ask the British to come 
back? I would not be surprised if, one day, this Government called a press conference to repeal the 
Independence Order Act so that Zambia reverts to colonialism. 
An independent Member of Parliament took a more constructive tone to address 
Masebo as Minister of Health. He appealed to her to mend fences with doctors and other 
health workers:  
Have a human face. You are a mother and we are happy that you are in this ministry. We are not 
saying that Hon. Dr. Chituwo did not perform well. He did, but as a mother, my challenge to you is 
that you should seek audience with the doctors who will be affected ... Shifting a person from one 
organisation to another like a robot is not allowed after having been independent for forty years. They 
are not robots, but human beings who have children to look after”.  
The most serious accusation against the government came from Given Lubinda, who 
at that time had not yet joined Sata’s party but belonged to UPND. Lubinda questioned 
the government’s motives for dissolving the boards: 
It is on record that the Central Board of Health has been meeting the minimum standards set by the 
donors, to whom the Government always likes going to ask for money, and I hope those systems will 
be transferred to the Ministry of Health. Unless that is done, there will be a lot of speculation that the 
Central Board of Health was abandoned not because it was a monster, but because its financial 
systems were so tight that the Government could not dip its fingers into its money to finance its 
campaigns. 
He then went on to warn about the possibility of ‘asset stripping’ during the process 
of re-integrating the Central Board into the ministry, adding: 
I hope that this will not create an opportunity for the big fish at the Central Board of Health to create 
conditions for themselves which they do not deserve. Not too long ago, this House was informed 
about … 
Another parliamentarian interjected, “Ba Bulaya!”102 This evoked laughter from the 
house and prompted Lubinda to thank his colleague for the interjection.103  
Of course, any suggestions or concerns that the dissolution of the Central Board was 
motivated by the interest to plunder the sector were countered and assuaged with the 
declaration of good intent on the part of the government. However, this would not be 
                                                 
101  National Assembly of Zambia, ‘Daily Parliamentary Debates for the Fourth Session of the Ninth 
Assembly’, Wednesday, 10 August 2005: 
http://www.parliament.gov.zm/press/news/viewnews.cgi?category=1&id=1124107417 (accessed 17 
July 2009). 
102  Using the Bemba pre-fix Ba, which refers to a person.  
103  National Assembly of Zambia, ‘Daily Parliamentary Debates for the Fourth Session of the Ninth 
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the last time that the suggestion was made that the dissolution of the Central Board was 
motivated by a desire on the part of ministry officials to get their hands on the purse 
strings of the sector. A contemporary health official, interviewed during the course of 
fieldwork, suggested that indeed there may have been personal interests motivating the 
controlling officer of the ministry. This district health official declared, “The reason the 
reforms were reversed is because the DG of CBoH was seen as a threat to the PS. They 
had more money and more power. Miti was the DG, so when he was transferred, he felt 
he was demoted. He lost out in terms of money”.104 We will later look at further 
evidence, which emerged at the time of writing this dissertation, of serious plunder in 
the ministry, as well as allegations that this was linked to the dissolution of the boards. 
Scrapping user fees 
Another reversal of the health reforms consisted of the decision to abolish user fees. In 
January 2006, at the start of an election year, President Mwanawasa announced: “My 
government has decided to change the policy on accessing medical facilities. From 1st 
April, 2006, user fees will be abolished in rural areas as a first step in allowing our 
people there to visit medical facilities free of charge”.105 As was the case when the 
health reforms were conceived and implemented, this decision became possible owing 
to a convergence of domestic political and donor interests.  
Within the international health community, the focus had gradually shifted to the 
concept of universal access to health care, rather than health care reform based on new 
public management and a greater role of the market in health care provision. This was in 
part influenced by the Millennium Declaration, in which donor and recipient govern-
ments set targets for poverty reduction. For health, this led to a stronger focus on 
fighting AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and on mother and child health. The UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) played a particularly strong role in 
advocating for the removal of user fees. Within DFID, a policy was emerging in favour 
of the removal of user fees as a policy goal to promote universal access to health, 
following earlier experience in countries such as Uganda and in-line with the pro-poor 
policies espoused by the ruling Labour government.106 Various studies by NGOs and 
research projects had already appealed for reform of the cost-sharing policies.107 
Masebo also appeared to be a strong proponent of removing user fees as part of the 
MMD’s electoral campaign.108 In fact, civil society, such as the churches, reacted with 
delight to this announcement,109 as they had previously been opposed to user fees.110  
Technocrats in the health sector, however, were less enthusiastic about the removal 
of user fees.111 At the shop-floor level this had provided an extra source of income that 
aided day-to-day operations of districts and hospitals.112 Among donors, such as the 
Dutch, there were also concerns about the impact of rushing this proposal through in 
                                                 
104  ML0810/07. 
105  Post, ‘Polls to be held under new electoral law, says Levy’, 14 January 2006. 
106  Clarke, J. et al., ‘DFID Influencing in the health sector’ (London, 2009) DFID working paper, 52.  
107  Mogensen, H. & T.J. Ngulube, ‘Whose ownership – which atakes? Communities and health workers 
participating in the Zambian health eeform,’ In: Urban Anthropology, 30: 1 (2001): 71-104. 
108  Clarke et al., DFID Influencing. 
109  Post, ‘Access of medical services in rural areas increases’, 24 June 2006. 
110  ML0810/06. 
111  Times of Zambia, ‘Don’t scrap users fees – HWUZ’, 14 October 2005. 
112  ML0706/11, ML0810/09. 
280 
 
view of the extra demand for care linked to the shortage of funding.113 Reportedly, the 
initial idea had been to remove user fees altogether; but only after Miti interceded, it 
was decided to limit the measure to rural areas.114 Finally, this measure negated the 
concept of user fees as a central part of the original health reforms, which would 
empower the beneficiaries of health care to demand quality services. However, as one 
of the architects of the health reforms remarked, the plans of creating a system of 
exemptions for the poorest had failed.115 Apparently, theoretical arguments or practical 
concerns were not strong enough against a coalition of electoral and donor interests, 
which had so conveniently converged.  
Siphon mighty 
Following the dissolution of the Central Board, Simon Miti had seen his position within 
the ministry strengthened. Undoubtedly, the transfer of Miti’s fellow physician and 
minister, Chituwo, further boosted Miti’s power. Although there is no evidence for this, 
Miti’s interests might have motivated him to lobby for Chituwo’s replacement. It is 
clear that there was a personal connection between Miti and the Mwanawasas, although 
he did not belong to any of the ‘four Ls’ that in casual talk were said to denote the 
groups for which Mwanawasa had a bias: Lamba, Lenje, Lozi and Lawyers. Before 
working as a bureaucrat in Lusaka, Miti was based in Ndola, working as the director of 
public health for the city council and later as executive director at the central hospital. 
Mwanawasa had been Member of Parliament for Ndola from 1991 to 1996. It is likely 
that in the small professional and political elite of Ndola, Miti and Mwanawasa had 
regular contact. As permanent secretary, he served as personal physician to the presi-
dent. Miti must also have interacted with Maureen Mwanawasa, whose charity initiative 
made donations of medical kits to communities and of drugs and supplies to hospi-
tals.116 These contacts with the ‘first family’ are thought to have helped Miti when he 
got into trouble with the Auditor General in 2007.117  
During his time as permanent secretary, Miti was never convincingly linked to acts 
of corruption or embezzlement. In the notes with which he handed over his tasks to his 
successor, a donor health advisor gave a short description of Miti. 
Simon Miti is the permanent secretary. He is a medical doctor and personal physician to president 
Levy Mwanawasa. He has an imposing physique and is an old hand at chairing meetings. We 
regularly played golf together. (He has a handicap of 19: ‘risk taker’ very daring and powerful, 
sometimes way off course). In the four years we worked together, I have had my suspicions, but I 
never managed to find something demonstrably corrupt: It might have been me ...118 
A district public health officer in an informal chat suggested that an opaque cloud 
hung around the permanent secretary, shielding him from too much transparency. He 
said that friends of his were internal auditors at the ministry. Once they were in-
vestigating imprests and allowances. It appeared that certain senior individuals in the 
ministry had over a billion Kwacha outstanding in un-retired imprest: Advances they 
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had received but never accounted for. Moreover, when they confronted Miti with the 
fact that he had attended four meetings in a day, striking up allowances for each, he 
merely laughed and stared them out of the office.119  
Miti’s perhaps bullying character combined with his imposing physique would 
suggest that he tackled problems head-on. That is indeed what he did when he was 
confronted by an Auditor General’s investigation. This investigation was extraordinarily 
thorough, and the parliamentary debate that ensued was extraordinarily robust. This was 
due to a combination of factors. First, the Auditor General herself exhibited a resolute 
drive to fulfil her mandate. Second, the Office of the Auditor General had been boosted 
by a Norwegian- and Dutch-funded capacity-building programme, having better staff, 
transport, and a revamped provincial presence. Thirdly, parliamentarians were em-
powered with a better understanding of audit reports, influenced by the book, Show me 
the money, produced by Transparency International Zambia. Finally, all the media gave 
a detailed account of the debate.  
On an April day in 2007, the caption on a Times of Zambia article read, ‘PAC sends 
Health permsec away’. The parliamentary accounts committee had called Simon Miti to 
respond to ‘queries raised in the Auditor-General's report for the financial year ending 
December 31, 2005’.120 The long meeting ended when Miti was sent away for ‘failing to 
give satisfactory answers’.121 The committee ‘resolved to call in the Secretary to the 
Cabinet to appear before it to intervene in the misunderstandings that arose between 
Ministry of Health permanent secretary Dr. Simon Miti and Auditor General Annie 
Chifungula’. This came after the two protagonists had ‘differed after (Miti) disputed 
most of the observations in the Auditor General’s report and tried to defend the alleged 
financial misappropriations in his ministry. But Chifungula said accountability in the 
Ministry of Health left much to be desired’. A minor issue on which Miti differed with 
the Auditor General and certain parliamentarians was whether it was wasteful for the 
ministry to spend 21 million Kwacha (€ 4000) on Christmas cards for donors and other 
partners while clinics needed drugs. Miti also defended getting a monthly 350 US dol-
lars in mobile phone ‘talk time’ while the minister and his deputy did not.122 Following 
his denials the Auditor General exclaimed, “Mr. Chairman, I must state here that the 
Ministry of Health is the most difficult Ministry to audit, and I am surprised that Dr. 
Miti has come here to reject everything raised in the report when for the past one year 
his ministry failed to respond to our queries”.123 This tied in with her general feeling 
that her ‘office found it difficult getting information from the Ministry of Health be-
cause officers were not cooperative’.124  
Some of the accusations against Miti were more serious than talk-time or Christmas 
cards. According to the report, Sunrise International, a holding company based in 
Panama, which in name had taken over running Medical Stores from GMR Africa,125 
had been overpaid 1.5 billion Kwacha (€ 285,000) at the end of the contract to manage 
Medical Stores. Miti, however, distanced himself in what he explained as a debt swap at 
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the end of the contractual relation, saying it was the Ministry of Finance who was 
responsible, though it appeared he had written a letter on the issue. Strikingly, it 
appeared that it was Eric Silwamba,126 the brother of Miti’s predecessor as permanent 
secretary, who was mentioned as the local agent for Sunrise. The Post observed that the 
directors of Sunrise were the same as those of Medical Stores and Pharco, the com-
mercial pharmaceutical company based on the terrain of Medical Stores.127 While this 
did not directly implicate Miti in corruption, he apparently got snared in the process of 
winding up one of the biggest scandals of the Zambian health sector, failing to convince 
the Auditor General with his evasive answers.      
About a week later the Secretary to the Cabinet, Miti’s direct boss, came to the 
public accounts committee. According to an article in The Post, he shielded Miti, 
arguing that the Auditor General had been unfair to him. The Post quoted an anonymous 
source128 which was outraged at this intervention as the Auditor General should be 
supported for her work rather than being frustrated. It was added that there was ‘a need 
to destroy the “culture” ... of defending controlling officers when they were wrong’. The 
source further reported that Miti had sent a reconciliation letter to Chifungula, which 
had been copied to Maureen Mwanawasa. It was unclear why he had done this, but the 
suggestion was raised that this might have helped shield Miti. ‘At health, Miti has been 
a problem ...we don’t know, maybe he has certain connections to the President Mwa-
nawasa and he is so arrogant and he extended that arrogance to us. He had no regard for 
PAC. Unfortunately the Secretary to the Cabinet was on his side’.129 Although The Post 
continued following the case, and the satirist Roy Clarke spoofed the affair, referring to 
the permanent secretary as Siphon Mighty, the case died down and Miti was not held to 
account, while he remained permanent secretary at health. It would not be for another 
two years after he had been transferred to the Ministry of Science and Technology by 
President Banda that Miti would get into trouble for alleged involvement in corruption. 
While Miti was unaffected by this scandal, it appeared that his minister might have 
been sacrificed as a result of the affair. Since Chituwo’s transfer away from health, there 
had been significant changes and gaps in the political leadership of the ministry. As 
Masebo took the step to formally join the MMD, she had officially ‘crossed the floor’, 
meaning she would have to re-contest her seat. Since she was no longer a Member of 
Parliament, she was forced to abandon her position as Minister of Health in June.130 
This position would remain vacant and be covered by another Cabinet minister until 
after the elections in October. Apparently, Masebo’s political career and the political 
value she had for the MMD outweighed the necessity of political leadership at the 
ministry. The next appointee as Minister of Health would raise some eyebrows because 
she was relatively unknown and had no medical expertise.131 In the elections, Angela 
Cifire, formerly a public relations officer for the electricity company, won a parliament-
ary seat in Eastern Province. She would spend only seven months at the ministry, 
however, during which time she failed to make much of an impression on health policy. 
During a Cabinet reshuffle, which took place a few weeks after the confrontation in 
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Parliament between Miti and the Auditor General, Cifire was dropped from Cabinet. 
The reasons for this were unclear, and people from Eastern Province were upset by the 
decision. To the relief of donors, Chituwo was brought back in. Perhaps this transfer 
was related to the public commotion about perceived lack of transparency in the health 
sector. As an alternative explanation, a rumour suggested that Cifire had had contact 
with Pharco, the successors of GMR. As this company was informally ‘blacklisted’, she 
had apparently involved herself in too-sensitive affairs.132 Although this rumour cannot 
be confirmed, it appears as if the spectre of the GMR / MSL affair would continue to 
hang over the health sector.  
Despite donor concerns, GMR and later Sunrise had been allowed to continue its 
management of Medical Stores until the contract expired in October 2003. Donors in the 
meanwhile had been bypassing Medical Stores and were commissioning studies for a 
parallel drug distribution system. In the end, on the basis of these studies, a new bidding 
procedure was started for the operation of Medical Stores.133 Eventually, the tender was 
granted to the reputable British company, Crown Agents.134 This re-won some con-
fidence on the part of donors, although they continued monitoring procurement issues 
and issues of ‘good governance’.135 In the meantime, various consultancies were fielded 
by donors to support the operations of Medical Stores under management of Crown 
Agents.136 
Donors’ closer scrutiny of the procurement process led to further irregularities com-
ing to light. However, it appears that donors had more success in formulating steps for 
preventing fraud than in appealing for investigation of corruption allegations and 
prosecuting those involved. In 2005 and 2006 two Dutch consultants were seconded to 
the Ministry of Health for short-term missions. Following reports of exceptionally high 
prices having been paid after the tender of drugs under a Canadian-funded project, one 
of the consultants was tasked by the permanent secretary as the ministry’s procurement 
advisor to look into this suspicion of corruption and formulate lessons learned. In the 
process, the consultant also investigated an emergency tender for drugs funded by the 
British aid department. In this second case, the consultant found that two documents 
submitted by the UK-based company that had won the tender were false. For instance, 
an accountant’s declaration had been issued by a firm that did not exist. The company 
had also invoiced the ministry for airfreight although the drugs were shipped by sea. 
Finally, there were some quality problems with the drugs. Two products in the shipment 
were rejected after laboratory tests, while the other drugs in the shipment were found to 
be in order.137 During the investigation, the consultant experienced similar difficulties to 
those of the Auditor General’s office. He reported that he could not prepare a complete 
report as staff at the Central Board did not offer the needed support and information. 
This led him to conclude: 
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It is the advisor’s opinion that CBoH procurement staff were, and still are, reluctant to share docu-
ments and information regarding the tenders under discussion and procurement in general ... With the 
dissolution of CBoH, MoH will get the control and action may be taken to start an inquiry into 
CBoH’s procurement ... (A) full inquiry by auditors may reveal more flaws and is strongly recom-
mended, if not alone to take away the current suspicions that CBoH staff may be involved in corrupt 
practices.  
The tentative results of this investigation led donors to discuss steps to be taken by 
the ministry. Shortly afterwards, it appeared that while the tender and the company 
involved were under investigation, the company was paid the remaining ten per cent of 
the contract sum, against the wishes of donors. To authorise this, reportedly the per-
manent secretary’s signature had been forged. According to a report by one donor to its 
headquarters, this led donors as well as the permanent secretary to withdraw their 
confidence in the central procurement unit of the Ministry of Health that had been 
merged with the procurement unit of the Central Board. Donors pressed to continue 
investigation of this issue and to complement an investigation by the National Tender 
Board with an external forensic audit. It is unclear what has become of this investi-
gation, as further information was not accessible to this research.  
More was apparently done with donors’ desire to reform the drug procurement and 
distribution system. To do this, a special drug supply budget line was created with a 
secretariat and a manager who would control the entire drug supply process. This 
manager was recruited internationally through an intermediary agency and on inter-
national terms of service in order to ensure confidence on the part of both donors and 
the ministry.138 In an open selection procedure, a highly qualified Zambian pharmacist 
who had worked in the private pharmaceutical sector in the UK and subsequently for 
international organisations, was selected for the job. He would have to oversee a more 
transparent and planned procurement process, rather than one based on emergency 
tenders spurned by urgency and characterised by a less-than-thorough approach. He 
would also liaise between donors and the ministry, participating in the technical 
working group on procurement in which donors monitored and approved procurement 
decisions. It is beyond the scope of this research to evaluate the changes to the pro-
curement system this led to. However, according to a mid-term review mission in 2008, 
these planned changes to the drug supply system have been implemented and it appears 
that the drug supply manager recruited does inspire confidence on the part of stake-
holders. In an interview, this Zambian professional, who had came back from the dias-
pora, indeed made a more than capable impression. He conveyed the impression that the 
system had improved since these changes. He said that the permanent secretary was 
under pressure from donors as well as Zambian agencies, such as the Tender Board and 
the Anti-Corruption Commission, to meet expectations on improving transparency, 
adding, “Some CPs139 have an intelligent way of managing the sector, in reflection of 
failures of the past”.140 It thus appears that lessons have indeed been drawn from the 
procurement scandals of the past and the Medical Stores’ saga. Whether these lessons 
will have a lasting impact on the sector, however, is a question for future research. 
Nevertheless, the next big corruption scandal to hit the health sector would indeed be 
unrelated to drug procurement. Perhaps this was because drug procurement was more 
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under the scrutiny of donors than other functions in the ministry. Instead, the next 
scandal would centre around a human resource officer.  
The K 27 billion scam 
In 2009 a new corruption scandal emerged which suggested that in light of the urgency 
of the human resource crisis, attention to transparency had apparently become a sec-
ondary concern. Although the full network of those complicit in the scandal is not clear, 
it appears that the dismantlement of the Central Board of Health and the instrument-
alised confusion of the restructuring that followed created a conducive environment for 
opportunistic theft of public resources. The case reportedly came to light only because 
of a dramatic love affair, yet the affair would spark vehement public debate and deal a 
serious blow to the fragile trust donors had in the Ministry of Health. This affair further 
fills a black page in the obituary of Mwanawasa, the ‘Mr. Clean’ of Zambian politics, as 
he had allowed the Central Board to be dismantled and his ‘client’ Miti had been 
responsible for driving this process.  
In May 2009 Zambian newspapers reported on the seizure of various vehicles and 
other property of a certain Henry Kapoko, formerly a human resource officer at the 
Ministry of Health. The seizures included a luxurious Mercedes, a BMW, and a Hum-
mer.141 Shortly afterwards, Kapoko and 22 other ministry officials were arrested and 
charged for participating in a ‘K 10 billion scam’.142 Soon, however, newspapers began 
referring to a ‘K 27 billion scam’, after the Auditor General claimed that this was the 
amount of money stolen from the Ministry of Health.143 Kapoko was charged with 
‘obtaining money by false pretences amounting to K1.9 billion’ and denied bail. 
Allegedly, he had been paid this amount for the delivery of mother-baby kits by a 
company he owned, but the delivery never took place.144 Another allegation reported in 
the media was that over 7 billion Kwacha had been channelled to a nursing school 
managed and owned by an employee of the Ministry of Health.145 Money had appar-
ently been paid for workshops for the Ministry of Health that never took place.146  
As the media first began reporting on this emerging scandal, a mysterious document 
began circulating among civil society and researchers. This anonymously written paper 
analysed the recent allegations and placed them in a broader political context. The 
material seems well informed although sloppy mistakes suggest it was a ‘quick and 
dirty’ product. It was also published on the Internet.147 This report alleged that donor 
funding and money from the national budget destined for awareness-raising and training 
health workers had been diverted through a nursing school and that a lodge owned by 
Kapoko was used for Ministry of Health workshops. Remarkably, this report described 
how the case had in fact come to light. 
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Thanks to a jilted lover, the lid has been blown that exposes the worst corruption cases in Zambia … 
(A) planner at the Ministry of Health (who) has a child with Henry Kapoko vowed to bring Kapoko 
down after a “marital” dispute in February 2009. When Kapoko broke her arm in an ensuing fight, she 
reported him to the Police for assault and occasioning serious bodily harm. She lamented at the Police 
that she had been in a longstanding relationship with Kapoko would not allow him to leave her for his 
other numerous girlfriends. She cried that she was only expected to fight with Kapoko’s wife and not 
fight about his girlfriends! She promised to bring his arrogant “ass” down and bring his financial 
empire and that of his “bosses” to the drain. She took matters in her own hands and made frequent 
visits to Kulima House (where the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is housed). This resulted in a 
sensational case where Kapoko has been exposed. ACC picked Kapoko and restricted and seized his 
newly acquired assets. 
This rejected lover, however, obviously got caught in the trap that she herself had set, 
being among the 32 Ministry of Health employees to be suspended and investigated.  
At the time of writing, no verdict had yet been handed down to Kapoko, in a case 
that has dragged on for some two years.148 However, detailed allegations have begun to 
surface, ensnaring not only Kapoko but also others such as Simon Miti. Following 
Rupiah Banda’s election as president, Miti had been transferred to the Ministry of 
Science and Technology. As the corruption allegations emerged, Miti was summoned 
by police for questioning. Subsequently, he was suspended from his position to help the 
investigation by the ACC and the Drug Enforcement Committee.149 Indeed, Miti author-
ised many of the transactions in question. The question, however, is whether he was 
duped or complicit.150 Miti retaliated against allegations of his guilt by writing a letter to 
President Banda to deny the charges.151 Apparently, this proved effective because no 
charges were pressed against him. In fact, according to an anonymous report presented 
as a follow-up to the report cited above, Banda purportedly interceded to prevent Miti’s 
arrest.152 Well-informed insiders speculate that Miti was being protected because he was 
in a position to incriminate individuals close to the presidency. This would also explain 
why he was not mentioned in a forensic audit into this case, while allegedly being 
named as a culprit in an earlier draft.153 Thus, much to the outrage of commentators 
from civil society and the political opposition, Miti continued to benefit from impunity 
while drawing a salary despite being suspended.154 However, notwithstanding whether 
or not he was guilty, his involvement in this scandal, his transfer, and his suspension 
have damaged his reputation and destroyed the power base he had held as permanent 
secretary for the better part of a decade.  
The emergence of this corruption scandal had serious implications for donor support 
to the health sector. Within a week, Sweden, followed by the Netherlands, publicly 
announced that they would suspend their aid to the sector. It appeared that the money 
embezzled under this scandal came from the ‘extended basket’ to which Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Canada contributed.155 Soon other donors, such as Canada, the UK, 
the Global Fund, and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI), 
suspended or reprogrammed their support to the health sector; only the European Union 
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did not pursue this corruption case with the same sense of urgency as others.156 How-
ever, in the months following the emergence of this case and donors’ first reaction, 
donors and the Ministry of Health negotiated a Governance Action Plan that would lead 
to a gradual resumption of aid. This plan consisted of three phases of corrective and 
preventative measures against corruption. After completion of each phase, a tranche of 
funding would be released.157 In November 2009, the first phase of immediate actions 
had been completed and verified by external auditors. These actions included agreeing 
on the recovery of funds and repayment to donors, strengthening internal audits within 
the ministry, and prosecuting and replacing implicated staff. This led to Sweden and the 
Netherlands each releasing € 4 million by the end of 2009.158 The second phase com-
prised the actual repayment of funds159 and the execution of three large audits: A 
systems audit, a financial audit, and a procurement audit. By June 2011 this phase had 
been completed and donors were waiting for completion of the external assessment in 
order to pay a second tranche of the suspended aid. This process had been far more 
tedious than had been initially planned, as initially it had been hoped that the plan of 
action would be completed and aid to the sector resumed by the end of 2009.160  
Zambian reactions to the suspension of aid were mixed. Civil society and public 
opinion appear to have been positive about this signal.161 The case and donors reactions 
were followed in The Post newspaper and on various blog sites. This included the 
coverage given to the removal of the director-general of the Swedish Development 
Agency as a direct result of this scandal.162 The government’s reaction, however, shifted 
from an initial urge to appease donors to increased irritation with donors’ stance. For 
instance, within weeks of Sweden and the Netherlands having suspended their aid to the 
health sector, President Banda convened the donor community to reassure them of his 
determination to fight poverty.163 The Ministry of Health also appeared eager to nego-
tiate a plan of action. However, several months later, when former President Chiluba 
had been cleared of corruption charges, President Banda reacted more irritatedly to 
donors’ concerns about the political leadership in the battle against corruption.164 This 
irritation became more hostile as the president publicly complained about donor black-
mail and interference in airing their concerns about corruption.165 At the Ministry of 
Health, irritation also grew at donor’s continued scrutiny in following up on corruption 
issues, as the ministry, in the words of one donor representative, “tried to shift blame” to 
                                                 
156  ML1106/01. Though admittedly the EU was facing a corruption scandal in the roads sector which 
caused them to suspend aid. See also, A. D. Usher, ‘Donors lose faith in Zambian Health Ministry’. 
In: The Lancet, 376: 9739 (2010), 403-404. 
157  EKN communication with HQ, 29 May, 12 June, 17 June, and 3 July 2009; Adopted plan of action, 
and EKN memo to SIDA HQ and DGIS of 3 July 2009, all in EKN files 279/09/10083. 
158  EKN communication with HQ, 27 November 2009 in EKN files 279/09/10083.  
159  Indeed, by July 2010 the Netherlands had been repaid close to € 1 m., which had been its share of the 
embezzled funds (EKN communication with HQ, 9 July 2010 in EKN files 279/10/42750).  
160  ML1106/01. 
161  See for instance, Post, ‘Govt shouldn’t downplay donors’ concerns on accountability – EFZ’, 3 
January 2011 and the blog reactions http://www.zambian-economist.com/2009/05/corruption-watch-
ministry-of-health.html (accessed 29 June 2011); also ML1106/01. 
162  Post, ‘Sida director general loses job over Zambia’s corruption’, 31 May 2010. 
163  ENK communication to headquarters, 26 May 2009 (EKN files 279/09/10083). 
164  ENK communication to headquarters, 4 September 2009 (EKN files 279/09/10083). 
165  Reuters, ‘Zambian president says donors must not interfere’, 26 June 2010. 
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donors for the slow process of implementation in the Governance Action Plans and the 
corresponding resumption of aid.166  
This scandal is a bleak, yet fitting end to our narrative on the Zambian health re-
forms. It cannot be seen as an isolated case of corruption but is apparently linked to the 
dissolution of the Central Board of Health, that enclave of accountability and effective-
ness which had been a by-product of the health reforms and donor involvement within 
the sector. Whereas it is difficult to convincingly prove this connection, various ob-
servers have argued that the dissolution of the Central Board created an environment 
conducive to corruption, as systems for accounting and controlling funds were weaken-
ed in the process. This argument had already been brought to the fore by the opposition 
during parliamentary debates cited earlier in this chapter. The anonymous report on the 
K27bn scandal also claimed that the Central Board was dissolved by people like Simon 
Miti, as ‘(c)rime thrives in chaos not in transparent and accountable systems. CBoH was 
a clear danger to them!’167 Remarkably, this view was also espoused by a former min-
ister, who in her time had not shown herself as a strong supporter of the Central Board 
and the systems it represented. Professor Nkandu Luo was quoted in the media as 
attributing the corruption within the Ministry of Health to the demise of the Central 
Board. “CBoH should have never been removed. It was set up primarily to monitor the 
prudent management of resources and it had started achieving that. So I hope that they 
have learnt that they need structures that have very minimal bureaucracy where they can 
easily track resources and how they are being used”.168  
In a sense this scandal also refocused the attention of donors and that of technocrats 
in the ministry on the need for accountability systems beyond the area of drug procure-
ment, an area which appeared to have been overtaken by the sense of urgency about the 
human resource crisis and the AIDS pandemic. The Governance Action Plan aimed to 
again strengthen financial management, accounting, and procurement systems by carry-
ing out a systems’ audit and following up on the recommendations. This again illus-
trated the ongoing and unrelenting battle between the rational-legal order and patri-
monial behaviour in the arena of the health sector. It is unlikely that the measures 
adopted following this scandal will completely prevent future theft of public resources. 
At the same time, these measures force opportunists to further adapt and refine their 
strategies to steal from the public health sector, just as Kapoko cum suis pursued refined 
strategies to plunder and bypass rational-legal arrangements and control.  
Ultimately, however, this scandal had a serious impact on consolidating Zambia’s 
reputation as a corruption-prone aid recipient. Although there is no relation formally, 
this arguably impacted on the decision of the Netherlands government to finalise its 
development cooperation with Zambia after more than forty years of aid. In 2011 the 
contours of a new Dutch development policy, comprising a reduced list of partner 
countries and priority themes, became clear.169 The selection of partner countries was 
based on various considerations, including the extent to which there is ‘action to fight 
corruption’.170  
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167  Anonymous, Corruption. 
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169  Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Letter to the House of Representatives presenting the spear-
heads of development cooperation policy’ (The Hague, 2011). 
170  This was not without criticism since decisions to end cooperation with specific countries were not 




This brings us to the end of our narrative on the Zambian health sector and particularly 
the health reforms. This chapter showed that the ‘New Deal’ promised by the Mwa-
nawasa administration may not have provided the best deal for the health sector. This 
period saw the dismantling of many of the achievements of the health reform era. This 
not only included the partial abolition of the user fees policy but also the dissolution of 
the Central Board of Health and other boards. It is clear that this was a case of partial 
reform, but the motives appear much more ambiguous and muddled. Paradoxically, the 
reversal of the health reforms appears to be both a case of instrumentalisation of dis-
order as well as a logical consequence of the failure of the health reforms themselves. 
As is befitting in a neo-patrimonial setting, this is the messy, negotiated outcome of a 
process in which rational-legal factors and interests competed with patrimonial, oppor-
tunistic factors and interests.  
The argument used for these decisions to reverse elements of the health reforms were 
clearly formulated in rational-legal and international technocratic terms. The conse-
quences of the incomplete delinkage between the Central Board and the Ministry of 
Health were real and problematic. In addition, the fact that exemption schemes for user 
fees were never been fully implemented made cost-recovery problematic for the most 
vulnerable. There were thus genuine rational-legal and equity considerations behind 
these decisions. For some actors, however, these arguments may have been used more 
as justifications rather than being the genuine motivators.  
It is more likely that the motivation involved the desire to retain and expand political 
and personal power, which we can imperfectly label as patrimonial interests. The 
abolition of user fees clearly had an electoral motivation. This would reinforce the neo-
patrimonial bond of political patronage by offering free services for political support; at 
the same time, however, the abolition of user fees also denies a political client the right 
to make demands concerning the quality of a service.171 Regarding the abolition of the 
Central Board of Health, this decision reflects the pattern of centralisation of power. 
The Central Board had been created and in part served as an autonomous enclave of 
authority, arguably a pocket of efficiency in a neo-patrimonial setting. This was a 
situation that conflicted with the logic of how neo-patrimonial power politics is 
practised. The abolition of the Central Board thus brought the Central Board back under 
control of President Mwanawasa and his circle.  
The argument here is not that Mwanawasa himself agreed to dissolve the Central 
Board of Health to allow for the corruption scheme that would come to light shortly 
after his demise. There are no indications that would support such a conclusion. Rather, 
Mwanawasa’s decision to appease his political clients by regaining control over the 
Central Board of Health can be explained by his need to perform in the political arena. 
We have seen in this chapter how from the beginning of his presidency, Mwanawasa 
had to engage in power politics to expand his fragile political power base. This required 
him to compromise the image he had tried to cultivate throughout his career, that of 
being a man of integrity. This got him snagged in Chiluba’s webs and required him to 
                                                 
April 2011, and Schulpen, L., R. Habraken, & L. van Kempen, Landen-selectie knapen: Willekeur 
troef? (Nijmegen, 2011). 
171  Such an argument has been followed by columnists, for instance on free universal primary education 
in Uganda: Marcia Luyten, ‘Gratis onderwijs en gezondheidszorg zijn slecht voor Oeganda’. In: NRC, 
21 March 2009; Andrew Mwenda, ‘Why Uganda has no citizens’, Independent, 1 September 2009.  
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rely on the services of political hit-men such as Bulaya. At the same time, Mwanawasa 
was an actor in an arena in which others also wielded influence, as was illustrated by the 
reversal of Mwanawasa’s decision to drop the prosecution of Bulaya. For Katele 
Kalumba, the need to survive in politics also forced him to compromise his image as a 
technocrat, as he relented in his opposition to the dissolution of his brainchild.  
For others, however, the dynamics of dissolving the Central Board and reintegrating 
it into the ministry did create opportunities to siphon off public resources. This had 
severe consequences, however, for donor confidence in the health sector and the Zam-
bian state in general. Whereas donors did little to oppose the reversal of the health 
reforms, the K27bn scam that emerged amidst the re-merger of the Central Board and 
the ministry refocused the attention of many donors on financial and accountability 
management systems. Donors had earlier invested much attention into such systems 
during the implementation of the health reforms. Then, after the Medical Stores scandal 
had impacted on donor confidence, a long trajectory was begun to focus on creating 
accountability and transparency in the drug procurement and delivery chain. This 
showed the capacity of donor agencies to react to the context of their recipient and to 
contribute to the strengthening of systems of oversight and prevention. Arguably, this 
narrowed the margins for opportunistic abuse of public resources.  
Those instrumentalising the public services for their private interests, however, in 
turn also adapted their strategies. As the margins for manipulating systems apparently 
narrowed in one area, another area provided more opportunities. These were the areas of 
human resource development and maternal health, notably areas which donors prioriti-
sed in their endeavour to achieve the Millennium Development Goals in the context of 
the AIDS pandemic and the human resource crisis. In fact, one could even go so far as 
to argue that because these were donor priorities and donors were under pressure to 
deliver results in a context of perceived crisis and urgency, less scrutiny may have con-
tributed to creating opportunities to manipulate the system.  
What becomes clear from this analysis, however, is that in the context of the Zam-
bian health sector, donors are an important influence – but at the same time, they are 
prone to being manipulated. Donors have in effect influenced, demanded, and contri-
buted to the creation of various institutional arrangements and systems that have con-
tributed to the rational-legal management of the sector. At the same time, we saw 
frequently how the discourse used by donors was appropriated by their counterparts in 
the health sector and instrumentalised to suggest a convergence of interests. In doing so, 
Zambian politicians, technocrats, and even health workers as a group shaped and 
reshaped the formal institutional reality of the sector, while in the process creating 






Having presented various narratives about the Zambian health sector and the health 
workers populating and driving the sector, it is time to draw some concluding lines to 
pull together these narratives. I do this with some trepidation. The narratives presented 
are specific to their context, their histories, and their place in time and space. At the 
same time, the insights and reflection that these narratives provoke may provide some 
contribution to the generalised debates of academic theory and policy formulation. 
Many of the pieces of data on which these narratives are based are fragmentary, 
anecdotal, and subjective. Nevertheless, through a process of induction and deduction, 
and cross-checking and weighing the credibility of statements conclusions can be drawn 
from the amalgam of data collected. At the same time, as is the case with nearly all 
social-science theory, these are soft ‘second-best’ conclusions rather than hard truths.  
These conclusions will be presented as follows. We will again start at the level of 
health workers. What do their accounts and their representations of their own behav-
iours and those of their colleagues on and around the ‘shop-floor level’ of the state-run 
health sector contribute to the discussion on neo-patrimonialism and the ‘African state’ 
that this dissertation began with? Subsequently, we will shift our focus to the macro-
level by re-examining the discussions on the African state in light of the narratives 
presented in this dissertation. Conclusions will then be drawn about the Zambian health 
sector specifically. Finally, we will reflect on what these insights could mean for 
development policy.  
On the human factor 
This analysis of the Zambian health sector began by focussing on the actors that make 
the health sector work. In doing so, an attempt was made to do justice to the fact ‘the 
State’ is more than an abstract theoretical concept. Rather, as a structural feature of 
human society, it is the aggregate product of the actions of generations of individuals 
stretched over geographic space and time. However, the decision to begin this analysis 
by observing health workers and drawing up their accounts complicated the endeavour 
to make sense of the neo-patrimonial nature of the Zambian health sector. It is a 
challenge to confront structural macro-theories such as neo-patrimonialism with human 
behaviour at the micro-level. One specific challenge encountered in conducting field 
work was to directly observe any of the behaviours associated with patrimonialism, 
such as clientalism and bribery, by venturing into the field. Another challenge was that 
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health workers’ accounts are a weak indicator for their actual behaviour and only 
slightly better for learning about others’ behaviour. 
The neo-patrimonial paradigm was certainly reflected in health workers’ accounts, in 
their discourse. On the one hand, people tend to attack and delegitimise others with 
accusations of corruption or nepotism (behaviours which we could label as patrimonial). 
At the same time, they tend to use rational-legal discourse to defend and legitimise their 
own actions. We saw this both in Chapter 3, when health workers explained why they 
were promoted, and also in the chapters dealing with the health reforms, when poli-
ticians defended their decisions. This reflects the normative nature of neo-patrimoni-
alism as a discourse: Patrimonial behaviour is negatively considered and rational-legal 
often has a positive connotation. This creates a gap between discourse and actual 
practice. As such, behaviour in practice is more banal and ambiguous than what is said. 
This gap between professed ideals and practical reality thus contributes to the notion of 
the façade that characterises the neo-patrimonial paradigm.  
Health workers’ accounts, however, provide more insight into behaviour than merely 
reflecting subjective discourse. The accounts collected and presented point towards the 
incentives and social patterns affecting health workers’ behaviour. These incentives and 
social patters may be conducive to behaviours associated with patronage and corruption, 
which we could indeed discern from the accounts analysed. For example, as we saw in 
Chapters 3 and 4, in health workers’ career paths there are moments in which decisions 
are made about scarce opportunities for advancement, such as access to (further) 
education or promotion. From health workers’ accounts, it can be concluded that such 
decisions create opportunities for decision makers – gate keepers – to illicitly profit 
from the power such decisions impart to the decision maker. At the same time, we 
clearly saw how ‘qualifications matter’ in determining access to positions or promotions 
in the Zambian health sector. Thus, the institutional arena in which decisions about 
appointment and promotion are taken is essentially shaped by the rational-legal logics of 
merit and achievement. Of course, such decisions remain prone to patrimonial manipu-
lation, but this is not the dominant logic at play. This conclusion supports the premise 
that in describing such a contemporary bureaucratic setting, one should not exaggerate 
the patrimonial aspects of neo-patrimonial reality. 
Our analysis of the human factor set out to answer the question whether health 
workers were driven by ‘pre-industrial cultural values’ or rather by a desire to contri-
bute as professionals to the formal objectives of the health sector. While some health 
workers professed a sense of the vocation to provide health care, the primary motivator 
appeared to be to improve and secure their livelihoods in a social context characterised 
by poverty. In their pursuit of qualifications, employment, and further professional 
advancement health workers demonstrated considerable upward mobility. It was notable 
that health workers’ livelihood strategies extended far beyond their professional roles. 
They juggled various consumptive aspirations and investment opportunities with kin-
ship and other social claims. Such claims and aspirations provided pressure to engage in 
extra-income generating activities. For some this led to ‘stealing government time’ or 
even government resources. Such strategies can be qualified as conflicting with the 
public interest, in violation of rational-legal order, and thus patrimonial.  
At the same time it would be overly simplistic to qualify health workers’ extra-
professional livelihood strategies as a contradiction between Western rational-legal 
principles and ‘pre-industrial cultural values’. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 5, part of 
the demands faced by health workers related to honouring kinship claims, which can be 
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considered as upholding traditional values.1 At the same time, we saw that this formed 
merely one set of demands next to the consumption patterns aspired to by health 
workers as well their desire to invest, accumulate capital, and contribute to their own 
and their relatives’ education. These livelihood demands can more easily be described 
as modern, or at least contemporary, rather than as pre-industrial. In fact they fit into a 
broader strategy that balances investing in social capital, by responding to kinship 
claims, with investing in human capital, physical capital, or conspicuous consumption. 
As such, the aim of such expenditure strategies is to achieve one’s aspirations of upward 
mobility and socio-economic progress. The fact also that kinship claims often involve 
the costs of schooling dependents, in a bid to allow them to progress in order to make 
them less dependent, points towards a strategy of contributing to the socio-economic 
advancement of a broader group. On the basis of how health workers appeared to 
balance various claims and aspirations, one could even conclude that civil servants’ 
livelihood strategies that comprise patrimonial behaviours such as ‘stealing government 
time’ and resources contribute to a process of capital accumulation and class formation.  
It is important, however, to stress the variation in the patterns displayed by different 
individual health workers. Some may have valued investment in social capital over 
material consumption, while others may have prioritised investment in real estate or 
accumulating capital to start a business. In Chapters 3 and 4, we also saw such variation 
in the way health workers reacted to postings and transfers. While some were resigned 
to their fate, it was at least as common for people to take charge of their future by 
seeking opportunities. In some cases this even meant subverting and manipulating for-
mal procedures to suit their interests. In other words, health workers display consider-
able agency in planning and implementing their career and livelihood strategies, if 
circumstances allow. The same applies to decisions about whether or not to break rules 
and violate official ethics. In Chapters 3 and 5, we clearly saw that some respondents 
vigorously denounced others’ patrimonial behaviour, while others resignedly accepted it 
as a matter of fact. We also saw from circumstantial evidence that others practised acts 
of corruption or patronage. It is clear that individual agency matters and that Zambian 
health workers are not predetermined to a primordial culture of corruption, contrary to 
what more extreme views of neo-patrimonialism may suggest. 
At the same time, however, it would be misleading to stress agency without giving 
attention to structural or circumstantial factors limiting or contributing to such agency 
First of all, health workers’ ambitions and pursuits have in many instances been limited 
by adversity – natural, economic, or otherwise – both as a result of external factors or 
personal failure.2 Equally, others have benefited from sheer luck as well as personal 
merit. But beyond circumstantial factors, there may also be more structural social 
factors that influence health workers to follow common patterns of behaviour. The 
accounts explored showed strong parallels between the aspirations, goals, and career 
decisions of different health workers. A clear pattern is the pursuit of qualifications and 
government jobs providing a platform for seeking other opportunities for income gene-
ration or assets’ accumulation. It can be assumed that health workers follow such stra-
tegies in emulation of others. On the other hand, such a strategy is also a reaction to 
possibilities and risks offered by the political and economic environment. In a situation 
of macro-economic and political uncertainty, which has characterised much of Zambian 
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post-colonial history, specialising in a specific field of business may be too risky and 
too-little rewarding compared with following the beaten path described above. As such, 
individual agency may not necessarily be constrained by, but certainly is influenced by, 
contemporary3 patterns of behaviour.  
It could be argued that patrimonial practices such as stealing government’s time and 
even resources are also contemporary social patterns that health workers may choose to 
follow. If health workers see politicians and their peers work the system for their own 
personal benefit with impunity, they might also be tempted to look for and exploit 
opportunities. At the same time, patterns of denouncing patrimonial behaviours equally 
influence health workers. Such behaviours are denounced because they are perceived as 
being inequitable, or simply put: Unfair. Such behaviour is also widely seen to go 
against the common good and the official goals set by political and bureaucratic dis-
course. Zambian health workers, like many others, are thus caught between conflicting 
cultural patterns, having to an extent the agency to decide between one or the other 
pattern or even opportunistically to combine them.  
Another aspect influencing behaviour comes from the institutional context in which 
health workers operate. From health workers’ accounts in Chapter 3, an impression 
emerged that it is difficult to discipline health workers, particularly for lack of per-
formance, but also for patrimonial behaviour. This means that there is a lack of disin-
centives for people to engage in acts of corruption or personalisation of government 
resources. In part this has to do with the relative scarcity of qualified health workers, 
which is a structural factor strengthening health workers’ individual agency. On the 
other hand, as has been argued in our analysis of political narratives in the health 
sector,4 this is also related to the way in which bureaucratic and political power is 
exercised in the Zambian context. This political culture is more geared towards man-
aging loyalty than managing performance.  
On the state 
The conclusions presented above on the human factor will be taken as the starting point 
for formulating conclusions on the state. This seems appropriate because many of the 
behaviours identified in health workers’ accounts reappeared in the narratives tracing 
the developments of the health sector at the national political level.5 This includes the 
drive to accumulate assets and income for personal progress, the ambiguity between 
discourse on corruption and patronage and actual practice, and the entrepreneurial 
instrumentalisation of opportunities even at the expense of the public interest. Equally, 
at the level of national politics we saw an inability of institutions to provide sufficient 
disincentives to prevent such behaviour, as the need to manage loyalty rather than 
performance seems to be the priority in the political management of the Zambian state 
in the period in focus. At the same time, we should remain wary of exaggerating the 
patrimonial side of the neo-patrimonial coin also at this level.  
                                                 
3  Perhaps it would be appropriate to emphasise the adjective ‘contemporary’ used here, to stress that the 
culture referred to need not be determined as either traditional or modern.  
4  And also in Leenstra, M., ‘Managing loyalty or performance?’, forthcoming. 
5  Whereas our previous conclusions also had relevance for the state, albeit at the shop-floor level of 
state bureaucracy, here conclusions will be drawn at the ‘higher level’ of national politics and policy. 
This is the more macro-level on which the debate on the African state is generally focussed.  
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One way of exaggerating patrimonialism is by over-emphasising the instrumental-
isation of disorder, a concept launched by Chabal and Daloz. From our analysis we can 
conclude that this is indeed a phenomenon that occurs in contemporary Zambia. Poor 
record-keeping and information management are evident in the health sector and reduce 
opportunities for accountability.6 At the national level also, the instrumentalisation of 
disorder helps explain why atrophic, non-performing institutions persist, especially 
those which should contribute to transparency and accountability. The dismantling of 
the Central Board of Health and the confusion this created is a case in point.  
However, paradoxically the instrumentalisation of disorder goes hand in hand with 
the instrumentalisation of rational-legal order. The formal legal and bureaucratic struc-
ture provides opportunities for consolidating power, diverting resources, and accumu-
lating assets. In the words of Van de Walle, cited in the introductory chapter of this 
dissertation, rational-legal order is public good on which patrimonial interests free-ride. 
This notion of instrumentalising order corresponds with our earlier conclusion that 
rational-legal discourse is instrumentalised by actors in their own defence and legitimi-
sation. We saw the instrumentalisation of order occur in the legislative and political 
debates and struggles about the health reforms. In Chapter 8 we saw how Health Min-
ister Sata used the framing of formal rules on how the health sector was to be organised 
as an opportunity to legally consolidate the power due to his office. This was similar to 
what we know from Zambia’s broader political history about President’s Chiluba’s 
successful, and less successful, attempts to change the constitution to ensure his political 
survival.7 In other words, this instrumentalisation of formal rules gives power and 
importance to these rules and is part of negotiating the State.8  
Another refinement to be made on the basis of the analysis in this dissertation re-
gards the notion of personalisation of power. It is not only strictly personal interests that 
undermine or instrumentalise rational-legal order in a neo-patrimonial setting. The be-
haviour of political actors in our narratives was not only driven by personal interests but 
also by group interests as well as regime interests: contributing to regime survival and 
consolidation of regime power and, by extension, also consolidating state power. We 
saw how group interests were served by doctors as a sub-group of health workers, 
guaranteeing positions of power as well as exceptional entitlements for themselves on 
the basis of their qualifications. The broader group of health workers have also through-
out our narrative agitated for better conditions of service. As such, they have negotiated 
their position as clients in relation to their patrons (the politicians representing the state), 
using their collective power and agency. In doing so, they have arguably shaped the pact 
between them and the state, in a way in which loyalty9 was managed rather than per-
formance, since these confrontations consistently focussed on health workers’ entitle-
ments rather than their duties. This conclusion thus weakens the premise that in neo-
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value relative to the interests of those in power, rather than an intrinsic, universally applicable value.  




patrimonial power relations horizontal linkages such as professional or class distinction 
lack relevance.  
The importance of regime interests as a motivator for instrumentalising rational-legal 
order became particularly apparent in election campaigns. In these campaigns resources 
were illicitly diverted from the public sector to benefit the campaign of the ruling party: 
Public resources and state appointments were used to mobilise support. Of course, the 
motivation for political actors to partake in such activities was based on the fact that in 
serving regime interests they would serve their private interests. In view of the role of 
presidentialism in Zambian politics, regime interests are also easily equated with the 
personal interests of the president. At the same time, strategies and institutional arrange-
ments aimed at maintaining and expanding the power of the regime – and to an extent 
even political alliances – have in part survived the transition of power from one 
president to another. We saw this not only in the presentation of the Zambian context in 
Chapter 1, but also in our analysis of Mwanawasa’s attempts to consolidate his power in 
Chapter 10. This implies that regime interests and interests of the political elite are 
broader, more complex, and more institutionalised than personal interests in a strict 
sense.  
In our exploration of Zambian politics, we saw the influence of the president’s domi-
nant exercise of power. At the same time, it was also clear that the power of a president 
was not absolute, as these presidents had to satisfy various domestic and international 
interests and were regularly caught in struggles for power, some of which they lost: For 
Kaunda, his concession to allow a referendum and subsequent multiparty elections, 
which he lost; for Chiluba, his failed attempt to change the constitution to stand for 
another term, characterised by mutiny within the ruling party, health workers’ strikes, 
and public protests; and for Mwanawasa, his struggle to build his own political power 
base and emancipate himself from Chiluba’s network as well as his succumbing to 
public and donor pressure to allow his crony Bulaya to be prosecuted – are all cases in 
point.  
The transfer of power that Zambia has now experienced three times points to a 
political system that is characterised by political competition and dynamism. The 
transition of power led to seismic shifts in power centres and power brokers. These 
shifts in power were in part characterised by the settling of scores against the former old 
guard. This has allowed former office-holders to be tried and even sentenced for cor-
ruption, signalling an apparent departure from the prevalent impunity for corrupt offi-
cials. The cases against Chiluba and Katele Kalumba’s conviction for corruption sup-
port this argument. On the one hand, it is clear that there are political motives driving 
such cases and that political entrepreneurs can be seen to protect themselves from 
persecution by becoming ‘recycled elites’ who switch loyalty to the president of the 
day. At the same time, this has raised the cost for blatant and open corruption, since this 
would be tantamount to arming one’s political enemies. Thus, it can be argued that these 
political dynamics have narrowed the margins for excessively corrupt behaviour.  
The arguments presented above on the instrumentalisation of order, patrimonial 
behaviour serving group interests and regime interests and the accountability of political 
competition support a conclusion that a narrative of a contemporary African state need 
not be a narrative of stasis or even of decay and collapse. Rather, the state can be a 
dynamic arena in which rules and access to resources are contested and negotiated. As 
we saw in our analysis of health workers’ accounts, the state is a valuable source of 
livelihoods and an avenue for socio-economic emancipation and class formation. As 
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such, the Zambian state has gradually been expanding, if the health sector can be taken 
as a representative example. The health sector has clearly been an important tool for 
expanding the geographic presence of the state, by building increasing numbers of 
clinics in remote locations as well as increasing the number of staff on the government 
payroll, staff who thereby profit from state patronage. This has depended, however, on 
the fluctuating economic fortunes of the country and the ability of the government to 
generate resources through control of mining incomes, from donor transfers, or through 
taxation of economic activities resulting from foreign and domestic investments. As 
such, the Zambian state and its people have been progressing10 over the period and in 
the area that this dissertation has focussed on, albeit along an erratic curve.  
The conclusion that Zambia during the two decades around the turn of this century 
was not a state in the process of decay or collapse is yet another challenge to a narrow 
interpretation of the neo-patrimonial paradigm which sees the African state descend 
back into the ‘Heart of Darkness’. This underlines the fact that though the concepts 
associated with neo-patrimonialism are useful in making sense of contemporary African 
socio-political realities, one should not simplify the paradigm, apply it as a deterministic 
straight-jacket, or exaggerate the patrimonial aspects of neo-patrimonialism. In other 
words, neo-patrimonialism and its associated concepts have descriptive merits, rather 
than prescriptive merits. A context in which personalisation of power and the instru-
mentalisation of disorder occur is not by definition heading towards state collapse.  
At the same time neither is the reverse true. Indeed, rational-legal systems have 
intrinsic value in Zambian reality, Zambian officials profess to uphold rational-legal 
principles, and the country is undergoing a progressive historical experience. This does 
not imply, however, that the Zambian state is in fact a developmental state on a uni-
linear path to becoming an industrial country following the path of European countries 
or, alternatively, Asian ‘Tigers’. Rather, the Zambian state appears to have other 
immediate priorities than state-led growth and service delivery. The primary objective 
of the state appears to be expansion of state control; the primary objective of its regimes 
appears to be regime survival; and the primary objective of the elites who have qualified 
for state employment is self-advancement. This supports the argument that in this neo-
patrimonial setting, managing loyalty takes priority over managing performance. In 
consequence, the formally professed goals of serving the population at large – for 
instance, by giving them access to ‘affordable health care as close to the family as 
possible’ – are clearly secondary in importance.  
On the health sector 
In the section on the health sector, we followed the narrative of the health reforms from 
their origin to their much-lauded prime and up to their reversal. Here we will take stock 
of these reforms, which reflect the generic diagnosis drawn by Van de Walle: ‘the 
syndrome of partial reform’.11 We saw how the health reforms were the product of the 
convergence of interests and actions between politicians, technocrats, international 
technical advisors, and donors. In part, this was possible because a new government had 
come to power, which was eager to consolidate its support among the international 
                                                 
10  Note: Progress here does not imply a unilinear path to an idealised end state, but rather a cumulative 
socio-economic process of problem solving and satisfying needs that can take a myriad of trajectories, 
comparable to Ferguson’s ‘bush’. See Chapter 1.  
11  Van de Walle, African Economies. 
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community and domestically demonstrate a willingness to change the status quo. This 
coincided with a period in which the international community was very much focussed 
on the need to reform African states, in view of the ‘permanent economic crisis’.12 At 
the same time, this experience of reform was also due to visionary leadership, which can 
be deconstructed to mean proficient brokering between technical, political, and 
international stakeholders to shape a discourse which satisfies different constituencies. 
From early on in our narrative, we saw how the health sector and the health reform 
process were instrumentalised to gain access to resources for private or political gain. 
These were state resources augmented with additional resources provided by inter-
national donors. These donors saw the health sector as a tool to bring development and 
alleviate poverty – or at least to satisfy their professed policy intentions to do so. This 
behaviour of instrumentalisation by political actors approaches the health sector from a 
different perspective than the formal view of the sector as reflected in policy documents. 
Such formal discourse sees the health sector as a means for curing the population and 
preventing disease and thus contributing to the well-being and productivity of the 
Zambian people. Instead, the health sector is seen by the political elite as a reservoir of 
money and political power. This not only refers to the financial resources that flow 
through the health sector, but also to the control over a sizable educated workforce. 
Providing people with jobs potentially generates political loyalty. Moreover, the health 
sector also symbolises the power of the state. The ability to reach the remotest parts of 
the country with infrastructure, staff, and equipment13 shows the presence and the rele-
vance of the state vis-à-vis a population which is still very much socially, economically, 
and politically self-reliant. Closely linked to this, the health sector provides a conduit 
for distributing state patronage: Jobs, drugs, construction materials, and transport – far 
more than just abstract curative and preventative medical services.       
Donors have also been the object of instrumentalisation by recipients, not only be-
cause of the resources donors provide, but also because of the international legitimacy 
and access to the rest of the world which cooperation in the endeavour of development 
implies.14 Discourses espoused by donors – whether such discourses reflected new 
public management, primary health care, HIV awareness, or universal access to health – 
have been adopted and employed in documents and speeches to generate confidence on 
the part of donors. However, actors in the Zambian health sector have shown varying 
styles and degrees of competence in dealing with donors. During the glory years of the 
health reforms, the strategy of generating donor confidence was at its most effective, as 
the convergence of discourse and interests led not only to words but also to action. This 
caused excitement among donors and a willingness to contribute extra resources to the 
sector. Strikingly, however, even the conditions under which aid was provided were 
challenged and changed in the negotiation process between the brokers of discourse on 
both Zambian and donor side. Paradoxically, this both decreased donor control in the 
health sector and increased donor influence. Through the district basket, aid was no 
longer exclusively linked to donors’ financial control, but was controlled by Zambian 
systems. At the same time, donors gained greater influence over policy matters and the 
design of institutional arrangements within the kitchen of the health sector.  
                                                 
12  Ibid. 
13  Notwithstanding the limitations. 
14  Separate arguments can be made about the instrumentalisation of recipients by donors, but that is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
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Another development in the Zambian health sector that demonstrates Zambian agen-
cy in shaping donor behaviour refers to furthering Zambian ownership of the health 
sector. In the immediate post-colonial period, much of the skilled workforce in the 
health sector, including decision-making positions, still comprised expatriates. Gradual-
ly, however, such positions were taken over by Zambians. The last significant enclave 
of foreign control remained in Western Zambia, where under the Dutch Primary Health 
Care Programme and the Dutch technical assistance programmes, Dutch doctors 
controlled much of the day-to-day management in the sector. The paradigm shift of the 
health reforms and the institutional processes involved led to a clash over authority and 
control. The ultimate consequence of this clash, again influenced by a convergence of 
interests and discourses, was the phasing out of the Dutch provincial programme and a 
phasing out of the provision of Dutch technical assistance.15  
The instrumentalisation of the health sector is likely to have had negative conse-
quences for the technical performance of the sector, particularly where cases of cor-
ruption were involved. However, such instrumentalisation has not impeded fundamental 
changes to the structure of the health sector. Some changes have in fact strengthened 
rational-legal logic in the sector. The creation of the Central Board of Health is a case in 
point. Even as corruption cases such as the Medical Stores’ scandal emerged and donor 
confidence was at a low point, the Central Board continued to function as a pocket of 
efficiency in a neo-patrimonial context. During this time financial, accountability, plan-
ning, and information management systems were developed on which the systems used 
today are based.  
At a certain point in our narrative on health reforms, in Chapter 9, the momentum for 
institutional change subsided. This was partially due to the failure of the leadership of 
the health sector to be seen to satisfy different political interests. Health workers felt 
that their livelihood security was at risk owing to the proposed de-linkage of staff from 
the public service to the Central Board of Health. Donors felt that their interests of 
getting value for money were jeopardised by the emergence of corruption scandals such 
as the case of Medical Stores. This led to a period of distrust and inaction between 
donors and the Ministry of Health. This distrust was only overcome when donors, in 
effect, bypassed the ministry by working through the Central Board.16  
As donors were bypassing the ministry by working with the Central Board, it became 
clear that this new institutional configuration of a semiautonomous service-delivery 
body controlling significant resources challenged the neo-patrimonial logic of central-
ised control over state resources. Thus, as a new government came to power and had to 
consolidate its political base, a process was started which undid this pocket of effi-
ciency. This was made possible, however, by the persistence of a situation of disorder 
and confusion, as the health reforms and the associated processes of institutional change 
were never finalised. In such a situation of confusion, it was easy for the proponents of 
the dissolution of the Board to use rational-legal arguments to convince donors to 
reverse part of the reforms. What also helped was that donors had departed from their 
                                                 
15  The argument here is by no means that the incidents described in this dissertation are in themselves 
responsible for changing Dutch development policy. However, it is fair to argue that they are 
illustrative of a broader struggle for control between donors and recipients, which in turn influenced 
the policy changes leading to the withdrawal of technical assistance from Dutch projects and, in 
effect, the withdrawal of Dutch development cooperation in general.  
16  For this they needed the assent of the ministry rather than its full cooperation, as illustrated by the fact 
that at the point in which the Chiluba government suffered the deepest crisis of legitimacy, an MoU 
was signed guiding donor support to the health sector over the next five years. 
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orientation towards reform of the health sector and were preoccupied with other issues, 
not least the challenge to treat the effects of the AIDS pandemic and the urgency of the 
human resource crisis. 
As a consequence, though possibly not as an intention of the decision to dissolve the 
Central Board, a new period of bureaucratic flux, uncertainty, and confusion emerged in 
the health sector. While the sector was being restructured and donors were preoccupied 
with getting results in the face of the HIV/AIDS and the human resource crises, the 
situation of disorder in the sector was instrumentalised by actors within the sector who 
took the opportunity to siphon off public and donor resources. Donors, however, were 
quick to react to the scandal that emerged. Although relations between donors and the 
government were again put under pressure and Zambia’s international reputation suf-
fered, this again created a momentum to strengthen rational-legal arrangements and 
transparency within the Zambian health sector.  
This narrative of the Zambian health reforms has failed to paint a flattering picture of 
the Zambian health sector. It is a narrative of instrumentalisation of rational-legal sys-
tems and discourse and abuse of public resources – even corruption. Political interests 
of a neo-patrimonial regime and the private and group interests of politicians, techno-
crats, and health workers seemed to eclipse the public interest, or at least the official 
policy goals of the sector. Both the implementation of the health reforms and their 
subsequent reversal were instrumentalised to serve other aims. At the same time, it is 
also not justifiable to exaggerate these aspects of the narrative. We have also seen that 
the sector and the agents shaping the sector have undergone a unique institutional 
historical experience. In the process, rules and principles were negotiated, renegotiated, 
violated, and reaffirmed. We have seen how with external assistance institutional 
systems were designed, implemented, discarded, and redesigned. In these processes a 
lot of money and human energy were spent. Undoubtedly, much of this was not well 
spent: There was a great deal of inefficiency. Much money and energy were apparently 
spent on words rather than action, or on action which was later undone. Moreover, 
energy was squandered by stealing government’s time, and money was squandered 
through wastage or downright theft.  
Nevertheless, this is a sector that, despite the obvious misappropriation, misappli-
cation, and inefficient use of resources, has grown and expanded under Zambian 
government management and under donor support – though not enough by far in view 
of the needs of an ever-growing population.17 It is also clear that the health sector 
continues to offer services and even improve its performance in certain areas. In short, 
whereas there is a huge chasm between the rational-legal rhetoric of health service 
delivery and actual practice, and it is clear that the formal goals of the sector are 
secondary to the personal goals of those driving the sector, it is equally clear that the 
Zambian health sector is far more than the vacuous façade which Chabal and Daloz 
made the African State out to be.18 
On development policy 
Having drawn conclusions on the trials and tribulations of the Zambian health sector, let 
us draw some conclusions on what this could mean for policy makers. These con-
clusions are primarily aimed at development policy but may also be insightful for 
                                                 
17  See Annex VI. 
18  Chabal & Daloz, Africa, 14. 
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broader policy aimed at managing public affairs in a country like Zambia. Throughout 
the narrative on the health reforms, we have witnessed the failure of policy-planning 
and policy implementation both on the part of the Zambian government as well as on 
the part of donors. At least, this can be considered failure if the aim was to fully achieve 
the lofty aims formulated in the plans in question. The argument here is that the seeds of 
such policy failures lie in a too-narrow technocratic planning approach with too little 
attention on the human factor of the system that should deliver the results and this 
factor’s socio-political context. Yet, paradoxically, beyond this failure the same poli-
cies, investments, and negotiations involved did augment dynamics which arguably con-
tributed to the progressive historical trajectory in Zambia that we identified earlier. 
These processes of policy-making and the investment of resources in the Zambian 
health sector have had secondary effects, specifically on the human factor within the 
sector and its socio-political context. Ideas and discourses have been exchanged and 
health workers have been trained. This has shaped their life-world and their technical 
understanding of the problems they face and the options they have to solve them. Health 
workers have been provided incomes through salaries, allowances, and other opportu-
nities, which have allowed them to accumulate assets and to further invest in their own 
human and social capital and that of their kin. This has also contributed to the creation 
of markets for drugs and health services outside of the health sector. These secondary 
benefits will not have been the direct aim of the policies and investments in questions, 
but these achievements are not dead-weight losses per se. In fact, as was argued above, 
this has contributed to the further formation of a Zambian middle-class.  
A middle-class is often seen as key to the emergence of democratic states that are 
responsive to their population. This is due to the accountability they demand in return 
for the contributions they are making to the state in the form of taxes. The growing 
bureaucratic class formed by our health workers and other state employees in a country 
like Zambia, however, does not yet play this role. Moreover, they only partially achieve 
the objectives they are paid for. This is due to the implicit pact that exists between them 
and politicians, which is focussed on managing loyalty rather than performance. On the 
one hand, this is because health workers are not sufficiently incentivised to internalise 
rational-legal principles in their behaviour rather than only in their discourse. As we 
saw, there are disincentives for managers to sanction lack of performance. At the same 
time, as public servants are dependent on state patronage through employment and as 
disloyalty and dissent are sanctioned, they will be unlikely to hold the system account-
able through their criticism. Since neither the peasant class nor the urban poor, who are 
the clients of the Zambian public health sector, demand accountability from the govern-
ment health service, there is an accountability gap. In our narrative we have seen in 
several instances that donors, through their positioning, have – however imperfectly – 
tried to fill this gap.  
In Zambia, donors are an important factor in political and policy arenas. As has been 
previously argued elsewhere, the relevance, effectiveness, and legitimacy of this in-
volvement need not be an issue, provided ‘they connect to broad political movements or 
sentiments that are widely felt’.19 Many political tussles between donors and the govern-
ment took place beyond the health sector, but some affected the health sector, or the 
health sector played a role. For instance, in the Mandrax scandal, while the Health 
                                                 
19  Van Donge, J.K. & M. Leenstra, ‘Donors and governance in Southern Africa: The case of Zambia 
with Zimbabwe as a counterpoint’. In: Dietz, T., A. Habib & H. Wels, eds, Governance and develop-
ment in Southern Africa (Amsterdam, 2010). 
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Minister Kavindele was fired over his disloyalty to Chiluba, the ministers accused of 
drug smuggling resigned under donor pressure. In the Medical Stores’ saga, a struggle 
emerged between donors and the Ministry of Health. The consequence of this struggle 
was that medical procurement and distribution systems improved in the long run . At the 
same time, another reaction by donors, namely bypassing the ministry in favour of the 
Central Board, may have influenced the reactionary response on the part of government 
to dissolve the Central Board. In the Bulaya case, donors were seen to back up public 
opinion, forcing Mwanawasa not to drop charges against Bulaya. Perhaps the most pub-
lic struggle between donors and government over the health sector was donors’ reaction 
to the recent K27bn scam. In this case, donors withheld their aid, only to continue 
funding on the basis of a plan of corrective and preventative action. In such situations, 
donor action contributes to an arena in which various Zambian interests negotiate rules 
and the allocation of resources. Donors have the opportunity to weigh in to enforce 
rational-legal principles. This can be effective in the sense that donor influence helps 
shape reality. At the same time, the results of such interaction can never be planned or 
foreseen: The arena is complex, made up of competing and conflicting interests, and 
what is articulated is never a complete and accurate representation of real interests.  
Policy makers have difficulty in giving informal reality, particularly opportunistic 
behaviour such as patronage and corruption, an appropriate place in their policies. It is 
likely to be seen as an external risk factor rather than something inherent to the 
functioning of a social system. If such behaviour does draw policy makers’ attention, 
issues such as corruption and patronage are generalised or aggregated in such a way that 
the personalised human factor is erased. However, in recent years among some donors, 
political economy analyses have become more prevalent, while at the same time dom-
estic tolerance towards spending aid in corrupt countries is low. This may explain why 
some donors such as the Netherlands want to be seen to take action against corruption. 
In the Zambian health sector, we have seen various strategies used interchangeably. One 
strategy is to take a business-as-usual approach and ignore the problem in practice, 
while rhetorically stressing rational-legal discourse and denouncing corruption. Alter-
natively, donors can attempt to address the problem by investing in arrangements to 
combat and prevent corruption. Finally, donors can attempt to avoid corruption by either 
moving back into their own projects in which they have more financial control or by 
abandoning a sector and moving elsewhere, in the hope that the socio-political dyna-
mics will be different there.  
The realisation that bureaucratic settings such as the Zambian health sector are 
arenas in which rational-legal systems are instrumentalised for personal and political 
gain is problematic for the aid effectiveness paradigm. This paradigm became influen-
tial in donor policies throughout the first decade of this century. Some donors gradually 
moved towards full alignment with the systems of the recipient government. This meant 
that they gave budget support and conducted policy dialogue with the recipient govern-
ment about results. Measuring results and making the level of funding dependent on 
whether the results are achieved was then assumed to provide an incentive for the 
system to prioritise service delivery over other interests. The argument for harmonisa-
tion and alignment is that it will reduce transaction costs for the aid recipient and allow 
the recipient to spend more energy on doing its work rather than satisfying donors’ 
reporting requirements. At the same time, such strategies rather seem influenced by 
donors’ own efficiency drive: Spending more money with fewer staff. Such an approach 
conveniently treats the socio-political complexity within recipient institutions as a 
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‘black box’. Again, this refers the behaviour of actors within the black box to the realm 
of external risks. Furthermore, such an approach presumes that financial resources are 
the main constraint preventing a system such as the Zambian health sector from achiev-
ing its formal goals.  
Based on the arguments drawn from the narratives presented in this dissertation, it 
can be argued that such a ‘just-add-water’ or ‘development-by-remote-control’ ap-
proach is not enough to coax a human system like the Zambian health sector to pursue 
its formal objectives. Of course, the discourse of managing for results that accompanies 
the aid effectiveness paradigm makes an effort to focus the attention of the recipient 
system on managing performance. However, it cannot be presumed that performance-
management systems and accountability systems will be strengthened endogenously 
under the influence of such discourse. As long as such systems are not strengthened in 
practice, the influx of aid will merely induce entrepreneurial opportunists within the 
system to exploit opportunities to steal, while covering their tracks with politically 
correct, rational-legal discourse. This we have seen regularly, especially in the latter 
part of our narrative.  
It can be argued that donors’ trajectory towards so-called aid effectiveness overshot 
its goal. It overcame some of the shortcomings of previous insular project approaches, 
but at the same time, the process reduced donors’ involvement and interaction within 
the sector, which can contribute to designing rational-legal systems appropriate to the 
Zambian context. In the Zambian health sector, this trajectory reached its zenith in the 
mid-1990s, when donors were heavily involved with their Zambian counterparts in 
designing, implementing, and ‘panel beating’ systems within the health sector. On the 
other hand, they contributed to the district basket fund, guaranteeing that resources 
reached the district level. The significance of development cooperation is not so much 
the transfer of financial resources, though this does provide legitimisation for their 
involvement in the kitchen. In addition, as seen with the district basket, in designing 
funding modalities, donors can contribute to re-prioritising marginalised parts of a 
sector that are ignored by a neo-patrimonial system.20 As is implied above, the real 
benefit of development cooperation is rather the socio-cultural interaction between pro-
fessionals, which provides and proposes alternatives to existing patterns of behaviour. 
This is the tinkering in the kitchen of the health sector that we saw during the prime of 
the health reforms, which led to the development of a bottom-up planning system, the 
financial and accountability systems, the health management information system, and 
later the performance appraisals. Such systems are aimed at creating legibility, trans-
parency, and promoting accountability. As such, they can strengthen rational-legal order 
and narrow the margins for opportunistic behaviour. At the same time, such systems are 
also prone to instrumentalisation or neglect, as they provide a threat to interests better 
served by disorder.  
Such tinkering in the kitchen can be stimulated with the deployment of expatriate 
‘technical advisors’. The primary reason for this is not because foreigners are neces-
sarily better trained or more capable than locals, which was a motivation for technical 
assistance in the past. At that time the lack of trained Zambians was more pronounced 
than it is nowadays. Rather, the advantage of these professionals is that they are not as 
much a part of the domestic socio-political system as their Zambian colleagues. More-
                                                 
20  The district basket contributed to a more equitable allocation pattern, which empowered institutional 
structures at the district level. As such, it thus mitigated the urban–rural divide that Kalumba agitated 
against in his dissertation.  
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over, they can play the role of brokers of ideas, sharing alternative institutional arrange-
ments and ideas which could add value to the local context. Finally, they can play a role 
in assessing to what extent systems are actually followed, providing a watchdog role – 
although this may jeopardise their position vis-à-vis their Zambian colleagues as they 
may be perceived as spies. Nevertheless, if they have the opportunity to partner with 
Zambian colleagues eager to change the status quo, they may straddle the donor–
recipient divide and contribute to rational-legal institutional change.  
The disadvantage of increased donor involvement and the deployment of foreign 
technical assistance is the resistance this evokes from the recipients. As we have seen in 
the narratives presented above, conflicts between donors and the government led 
Zambian officials to voice their irritation about donor interference. In the most extreme 
cases, donors can be accused of neo-colonialism and pushing Western values at the 
expense of African traditions. Such accusations are one-sided, however, and tend to 
reflect an instrumentalised discourse aimed at playing on perceived historical grievances 
on one side and on post-colonial guilt on the other. Such discourse can be used by the 
corrupt to excuse their behaviour. At the same time, it reflects an inverse racism in its 
implicit argument that rational-legal approaches are Western and ‘patrimonial’ behav-
iours traditionally African. This dissertation argues instead that principles such as 
rational-legal order, public service, and bureaucratic discipline are universal values 
which are essential for a complex society to equitably satisfy its population’s demand 
for public goods. Furthermore, the role of donors is negotiated and accommodated: If 
Zambians desire foreign assistance, they should accept donors’ demands that assistance 
should serve agreed goals.  
At the same time, donors would do well to be more consistent in their approach and 
build on experience and knowledge of the socio-political context to which they are 
contributing. Donors have been seen to follow ever-changing fads and fashions. In our 
narrative we have seen an orientation on reform, new public management, and primary 
health care shift to sector-wide approaches and health systems, and then on to an ori-
entation on universal access to health, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and the human re-
sources crisis. In a broader systemic sense, this suggests responsiveness to problems in 
recipient countries. However, such changes in focus led to large ruptures in donors’ 
approaches, and donors failed to sufficiently build on previous experiences and 
expertise. Such ruptures, of course, also lead to clean breaks with previous programmes, 
which may be convenient in closing a chapter on dubious accountability relations. At 
the same time, initiating new activities with a new drive and a new sense of urgency 
may create opportunities for entrepreneurial opportunists to profit from, as we saw with 
the K27bn scam.  
Another aspect of the changing fads and fashions is the decision by a donor to leave 
one sector and refocus elsewhere, such as the Danes and the Dutch have done, who both 
withdrew from the Zambian health sector. Whereas these decisions were motivated by a 
desire on the part of donors to decongest sectors with a heavy donor presence, it also 
meant that both donor agencies terminated a long learning curve of institutional 
experience. For the Dutch, the decision to end its involvement in the Zambian health 
sector ended a decade-long experience in which Dutch primary and public health 
experts worked in various parts of the Zambian health sector, at the hospital level, the 
district level, and the provincial level within the ministry, as well as on the other side 
within the embassy and at headquarters in The Hague. Institutional relations also existed 
between institutes in the Netherlands and institutes in Zambia. Some individuals went 
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on to provide technical advice to the sector as consultants, and the Dutch private sector 
also learned of business opportunities through the contacts this Dutch involvement 
entailed. Such knowledge and experience benefited the ability of the Netherlands to be 
an influential player in the Zambian health sector. Notwithstanding the policy consider-
ations behind the withdrawal decision, it is ironic that the Netherlands actively disin-
vests from a field of work at a time when Dutch development policy proposes focussing 
on areas in which the Netherlands has expertise and an added value. This raises the 
suspicion that for donor countries also the true impact of their policies is secondary to 
hidden motivators. Being seen to be involved in global problems is apparently more 
important than effectively pursuing the objectives of pro-poor, democratic change. 
Further research and analysis could shine more light on the gap between professed 
objectives and informal, geo-political, domestic political, and even personal interests of 
actors and institutions on the donor side.21 As such, the neo-patrimonial nature of donor 
agencies may provide an interesting topic of further discussion beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.       
To sum up, the narratives presented on the health sector and the conclusions drawn 
from it suggest that international development partners can be effective, relevant, and 
legitimate in contributing to the development rational-legal order within a sector such as 
the Zambian health sector. Such contributions, however, are most effective if donors are 
actively involved in the kitchen. As such, they can contribute to shaping and strengthen-
ing rational-legal arrangements and systems that can narrow the margin for opportunis-
tic behaviour which undermines the public good. This will also allow them to acquire an 
intimate knowledge of the local socio-political context and the human factor that will 
allow or impede a system from achieving its goals, a knowledge which is vital for don-
ors to be truly effective.  
 
                                                 
21  One step in this direction has been taken by Van Gastel, J.N., ‘The purification of aid’ (PhD disser-
tation, Wageningen University, 2011). This dissertation proposes that ‘Dutch development aid is in-
















Annex I  





In this annex we present and analyse a specific policy document that captured the spirit 
and intent of the health reforms at their conceptual maturity, the National Health 
Strategic Plan 1995-1999. This plan, which was first drafted in 1994 and of which a 
revised third edition was published in July 1996, covered the main aspects of the 
implementation of reforms conceived over the previous years, as the MMD came to 
power. The Foreword to the plan, presented in Box I.1 was written by a remarkable 
character who figures prominently in this dissertation, Dr. Katele Kalumba, the deputy 
minister and later Minister of Health, who was credited as being one of the theoretical 
and political architects of the reforms. He began the Foreword by looking back at the 
history of Zambia’s health sector in colonial times.1 Kalumba reflected on the tur-
bulence that ambitious reform plans face and the imperfect nature of government action 
anywhere. As we will see later, with this presentation, Kalumba not only looked back at 
the past of his colonial ‘predecessor’, but also to the future of his own reforms failing to 
bypass the ‘pitfalls of the past’ that he was determined to avoid.  
From here, Kalumba proceeded to describe what is required for this process of im-
plementing and fostering a shared vision for reform. He stressed the need to increase 
choice by creating a plural health policy environment, decreasing central government 
bureaucracy, and creating partnerships with private actors in the health sector. Kalumba 
saw this as an appropriate reaction against ‘a stifling background of socialist tradition ... 
which assumes a classless society’. He thus felt that there was a need to ‘negotiate the 
health order’, sketching a harmonious image of dialogue, shared values, and win-win 
situations as elements of this process. To guide the partners in this process Kalumba 
stressed the need to ‘formulate a futurist vision of health’ so as to overcome the pitfalls 
caused by ‘the practice of disjointed incrementalism in health planning’. Furthermore, 
the reform process was to be based in influence instead of control, interactive learning 
processes, and greater respect for individual and local autonomy.  
This foreword is exceptional in the tradition of usually bland planning documents. It 
demonstrated the intellectual, theoretical, and ideological inclinations of this specific 
political actor. The discourse used by Kalumba was influenced by his own empirical 
assessment of previous reform efforts,2 but also based on the ideology of the new MMD 
government that had started out as a democratic movement, before entrenching itself as 
                                                 
1  This came from Kalumba’s dissertation: Kalumba, ‘The practice’. 
2  It was also influenced by the social science tradition in which he fitted, drawing heavily on names 
such as Bourdieu, Foucault, and Giddens in his dissertation. This influence is apparent in his use of 
terms such as ‘adaptive response repertoire’, ‘corporatist interventions’, ‘symbiotic interactions’, and 
‘a multiplicity of nodes of power’ in this foreword. As is common in such scientific traditions, to an 
extent the use of such terms in this eloquent prologue may have served to ‘intimidate people with 
difficult words’. That this indeed happened is suggested by the fact that the next national health 
strategic plan (1998-2000) contained roughly the same foreword, albeit summarised and simplified. 
Recollections by Zambians and expatriates alike also attest to Kalumba’s theoretical prowess. 
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a ruling party. Finally, this discourse and its operational translation resonated with the 
international donor community, as it tied with the contemporary neo-liberal discourse 
on the role of the state, which was seen ideally to be more a facilitator and a regulator 
than a provider of goods and services that could be produced by the market.  
 
 
Box I.1 Statement by the Deputy Minister of Health3 
 
“To achieve anything, there must be a shared vision, a preferred future that is not simply stumbled into 
but deliberately chosen. This must be a morally preferred vision chosen not only because it seeks to 
make things better for us today but rather because it forces us to take tough decisions now in the service 
of our collective responsibility to ensure the positive interests of our future generations. 
We are determined to avoid the pitfalls of the past. Witness the observation of Dr Haslam, then 
Director of Medical Services between 1933-1946 as he introduced his Ten-Year Health Services Devel-
opment Plan (1945-1955):  
Sitting down at the age of fifty-seven, to write the memorandum on development of health services 
in Northern Rhodesia, I am reminded of Captain Hook in Peter Pan saying: “Something moves me 
to make my dying speech, for it seems certain that I shall never carry out the plans, dearly as I 
should like to do so.” Like others who have done a great deal of planning, I have been at times, 
somewhat cast down when many hours of work and thought have served no more useful purpose 
than swelling the bulk of a file called Health Department; Future Development. Like others too, I 
have smiled sadly when turning the yellowing pages of an ancient file recording the plans of a 
predecessor which, after a full, carefull and hopefull period of gestation either failed of delivery and 
died in utero or succumbed soon after birth to the east wind of financial stringency. (Dr. J.F.C. 
Haslam, Director of Medical Services, HDS 1945) 
Haslam’s Plan suffered the same fate that many attempts at reform in the health sector have suffered 
many years after colonial rule.  
Recent political, social and economic changes in Zambia as in most African countries have em-
phasized the growing awareness of the turbulent environment within which such health reforms have to 
be developed and implemented. Further, the turbulence involved in these changes has re-affirmed our 
understanding that government intervention anywhere is self-evidently partial, incoherent, and provi-
sional in nature.” 
 
 
The plan articulated the vision that drove the health reforms. Since it was launched in 
1991, this vision or mission statement has featured in many health policy documents in 
Zambia, even to this day. This vision, which many health workers still refer to when 
reflecting on their work is the following: ‘The Government is committed to providing 
Zambians with equity of access to cost-effective, quality health care as close to the 
family as possible’. In addition to this vision, health reform documents such as this one 
consistently stress three principles: Leadership, accountability, and partnership (com-
monly abbreviated to LAP). Finally, to justify the health reforms, a metaphor was used 
that came back in numerous speeches and policy documents4 in the gestation and early 
implementation period of the health reforms:  
                                                 
3  While this foreword was signed on 17 July 1996 by Kalumba as minister, erroneously his title in the 
caption was not changed after he had been promoted from deputy minister to minister several weeks 
earlier.  
4  See for instance, Kalumba, Towards; World Bank, Staff (EKN files, ISN 442); and Martínez, J. & T. 
Martineau, Human resources and health sector reforms (Liverpool, 1996). 
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The health system in Zambia has been likened to a Cadillac which was maintained by a relatively 
wealthy family for years. The family’s economic situation has changed, and it can no longer afford to 
maintain this expensive vehicle without seeking assistance from cousins and relatives who could help 
fuel, repair and maintain the vehicle. The design and construction of an affordable and effective health 
care system, and defining the strategy for transforming the existing system into the more affordable 
one, is the purpose of this Strategic Health Plan.5 
This metaphor clearly explains not only the aims of the health reforms but also the 
zeitgeist of the period and the context in which they were formulated. It reflects the 
rationale behind ‘structural adjustment programmes’ of slimming down public bureau-
cracy to focus on core tasks in line with what a country can afford. The provenance of 
this metaphor is unclear. In a staff appraisal report, the World Bank attributes the 
metaphor to a speech to Parliament by Michael Sata as Minister of Health in 1994.6 
Katele Kalumba, on the other hand, attributes the metaphor to a World Bank support 
mission in 1992 that advised the Ministry of Health on the reforms’ process. The bank 
had felt that the ministry had no clear vision of the health sector after reform: In other 
words, what the Zambian car would look like. Instead, the ministry had been making 
plans for individual reformed components: In other words, designing individual car 
parts.7 What is striking here is to see is how the World Bank pushes the metaphor and 
with it the health reform as a product of Zambian ‘ownership’, whereas, according to 
Kalumba’s detailed description, it was the bank itself that launched this metaphor that 
took such a central place in the creational mythology of the health reforms. On the one 
hand, this highlights the ambiguity in the origins and ownership of policies and 
programmes in donor-dependant countries; on the other hand, it shows a measure of 
mutual adaptation between donors and recipient government in the language used in 
policy-making.  
Now let us go further in describing what these health reforms entailed. A starting 
point in the health reforms was the assertion that resources needed to be redistributed 
from a focus on expensive care in central hospitals to more cost-effective primary health 
care at the level of health centres and district hospitals. In order to define which medical 
services needed priority attention, essential packages of health care were formulated. On 
the basis of information about the disease burden and the loss of productivity owing to 
various diseases, packages of health care services were put together.8 The focus on the 
essentials of primary health care in governmental health service delivery was exemplary 
for this period in the health reforms. As we shall see, later the feeling arose that this 
attention to the lower levels of care had neglected hospitals. Although this was not made 
explicit in this plan, the rationale behind the essential care packages was that those 
fields of care that lay beyond the essential would be left to private providers or so-called 
‘high-cost’ units of government hospitals.  
An element in the health reforms addressed in this plan was the issue of health care 
financing and cost-sharing. The government realised that even with donor support, it did 
not have the means of financing the essential health care package. This meant that user 
fees were to be collected from patients at hospitals and clinics. However, because of 
‘equity considerations’ and the fact that the majority of Zambians lived in poverty and 
                                                 
5  MoH, NHSP 1995-1999, 1. 
6  World Bank, Staff (EKN files, ISN 442). 
7  Kalumba, Towards. 
8  Whereas this strategic plan for 1995-9 was not specific in defining these essential care packages, in 




would perceive user fees as an impediment to accessing care, various initiatives, ranging 
from compulsory health insurance up to prepayment schemes in which the rural popu-
lation could pay in kind (for instance, by contributing a bag of maize), were conceived 
and sometimes even piloted. In this strategic plan of 1996, several options were pre-
sented, but no strategic decisions were taken.  
A groundbreaking innovation in financing the health sector that was presented in this 
strategic plan was the setting up of ‘district basket funding’. This meant that donors 
gave their financial contribution directly to the Ministry of Health, instead of supporting 
their own projects and vertical programmes. Together with the government’s own 
contribution to this basket through the Ministry of Finance, these funds were divided 
over the district health boards by a basket-steering committee. This committee was 
composed of staff from the ministry, the Central Board, and donor representatives. In 
return for the cheque district boards would receive to cover the recurrent costs of health 
service delivery at district level, they would have to provide financial reports and pro-
gress reports. The ministry would then consolidate these reports into quarterly reports 
on the disbursement of funds and boards’ performance. The plan indicated that this 
basket funding was the result of an ongoing consultative process between the ministry 
and ‘cooperating partners’ to replace technical assistance with financial assistance, al-
though it was admitted that most donors still funded specific activities in line with their 
own priorities (what the plan called ‘project-mode’). 
As a prerequisite to the decentralisation of funds, financial and administrative man-
agement systems (FAMS) had to be developed and implemented to ’make transparency, 
accountability and effective use of funds prevail in the Zambian health sector’. These 
systems were meant to rationalise and streamline the planning, implementation, and 
monitoring cycle within the health system. The strategic plan reported that the devel-
opment and implementation of these FAMS was a step-by-step process that had started 
at the district level in areas such as planning, budgeting, accounting, store-keeping, and 
reporting. Later it would be expanded to other levels (provincial, central, and hospital 
level) and cover other areas such as the management of assets, equipment, personnel, 
transport, and buildings. The core of implementing FAMS was designing formats and 
building the capacity of officials to use these systems. Another system that had been 
designed and was being implemented at the time of this report was the health manage-
ment information system (HMIS), which had formulated indicators for monitoring the 
performance of the health sector and would provide formats for collecting and reporting 
this information.  
As the metaphor of the Cadillac suggests, the health reforms were not intended to 
focus only on specific policy areas in isolation (merely designing new auto parts), but 
aimed at a complete organisational overhaul of the health sector. The national strategic 
health plan presented a new organisational structure that placed special emphasis on the 
district level. This was illustrated by the vision that was presented for this reorganisation 
in the chapter dealing with the organisation of the reformed Ministry of Health: ‘To 
provide for a strong decentralised system in which the District Health Management 
Teams are enabled to offer efficient quality and community based health services’.9 In 
operational terms this reorganisation was characterised by the institution of health 
boards as a means of combining popular and political concerns together with technical 
expertise at district and hospital levels. This plan also foresaw the establishment of area 
                                                 
9  MoH, NHSP 1995-1999, 54. 
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health boards dividing districts into smaller units, although these boards were never 
implemented. These district and hospital boards, which were designed to represent 
popular and political concerns, were given major functions and responsibilities pre-
viously lying with the Ministry of Health. This included planning, management, service 
delivery, resource allocation, and revenue generation. District health offices,10 led by a 
district director of health, were to serve as secretariats to the boards and as their exe-
cutive arms, just as the hospital management teams, led by an executive director, related 
to the hospital boards.      
At the central level a new institutional entity was created that also took over many of 
the roles of the ministry: The Central Board of Health. The plan described the Central 
Board as the national administrative agency, responsible for overall technical manage-
ment of the health sector and, as such, responsible for health service delivery. This 
meant that the Central Board was responsible for supervising health boards, setting 
financial objectives, and providing technical support not only to boards but also to non-
governmental health service providers. The creation of the Central Board opposite a 
slimmed-down ministry headquarters was in other documents referred to as the pur-
chaser–provider split, although this concept did not appear in this strategic plan.11 The 
purchaser–provider split implied that the Ministry of Health would purchase services 
from the boards, which as semi-autonomous entities were responsible for providing 
these services. The Ministry of Health itself was to be restructured into a small core 
department responsible for developing long-term policies and legislation for the sector 
and ratifying technical policies. It was also responsible for contacts with donors, other 
ministries, and private organisations. Finally, the ministry was to be responsible for 
monitoring the performance of the Central Board.  
The Central Board of Health would have an extension at the regional level to audit 
the districts and provide technical, legal, and political support to the districts. Before the 
health reforms, provincial medical officers had played an intermediary role between the 
central ministry and the service delivery level. Initially, their offices were restructured 
into provincial health offices. However, in July 1996 a decision was taken to restructure 
these nine provincial offices into four regional health offices. This meant that the geo-
graphic areas covered by these offices increased greatly for some parts of the country: 
For instance, North-Western, Copperbelt, and Luapula provinces would be served from 
Kitwe, and Southern and Western Provinces would be served from Livingstone.  
Of course, the direct provision of services remained with hospitals and clinics under 
the responsibility of the boards. At the top of the service delivery pyramid stood the 
UTH in Lusaka and other tertiary hospitals, followed by secondary hospitals, mainly 
located in provincial towns. In the initial phase of the health reforms, however, more 
attention was given to the lower level of health care in accordance with the concept of 
primary health care. At the lowest level, service delivery was to be provided at health 
posts and health centres (also called clinics). Health posts were to be staffed by one 
qualified staff member and be the focus of outreach activities. The focus for health posts 
lay primarily on preventative services and detection and referral of cases. For minor 
afflictions, health posts could offer treatment, but there were no beds to offer care. Rural 
and urban health centres were seen as the first point of contact with the formal health 
care system. They had a small number of beds and were supposed to operate on a 24-
                                                 
10  Also referred to as district health management teams. 




hour basis. Health centres would provide first-line clinical services and back up support 
to health posts. More complicated cases that could not be treated at the health centre 
level would be referred to first-level hospitals. According to this national health stra-
tegic plan, health posts and health centres would be staffed by a polyvalent, multi-
disciplinary cadre – the public health practitioner – instead of clinical officers, environ-
mental health officers, and nurses. The emphasis placed on health posts and these public 
health practitioners in this national health strategic plan is illustrative of the focus on 
primary health care that was characteristic for this phase of the health reforms.  
A further element of the health reforms as they were presented in the National Health 
Strategic Plan 1995-1999 was the de-linkage of staff from the civil service to the 
boards. In this plan, this process was mentioned only briefly, but as we will see this 
became the primary obstacle the health reforms would face. Since service provision 
would be split off from the political role of the Ministry of Health as a provider, de-
linkage would entail boards assuming authority over the personnel required for service 
delivery. Health workers would thus no longer be civil servants falling under the ‘gene-
ral orders’ of the public service but rather be working on contract for a board. At the 
time this strategic plan was written, the decision to undertake this de-linkage was taken 
and it was planned to be completed by 1997. In fact, up to the point when plans for de-
linkage were finally abandoned halfway through the next decade, this de-linkage never 
progressed past the stage of partial completion.  
The National Health Strategic Plan 1995-1999 has been presented here as it served as 
an introduction to the Zambian health reforms. It presented the conceptual framework 
with which the reforms were justified and ‘sold’ to donors and health sector staff. Our 
analysis of the plan also serves to introduce the major elements that formed this reform 
process. On the other hand, analysing a planning document such as this in isolation 
offers only limited insight into the reality of the health sector. In large part this is due to 
the fact that it is unclear from the document itself which plans would eventually be 
realised and which would not. Looking back at this 1996 plan with an awareness of the 
current policies and structures in the health sector, it becomes apparent that certain 
elements of the planned health reforms have indeed, in the words of Dr. Haslam, ‘failed 
of delivery and died in utero or succumbed soon after birth’. One example is the plans 
to staff health centres with polyvalent public health practitioners, which had been aban-
doned by the time of the National Health Strategic Plan 2001-2005. Another example is 
the emphasis on health posts as the lowest level for service delivery. In the National 
Health Strategic Plan 2006-2011, mention is made that whereas there had been the 
intention to build 3,000 posts, only 20 had in fact been built.12 Finally, while the 
decision had been taken to establish regional health offices in 1996, by 1999 the de-
cision had been taken to dissolve them and to re-establish the provincial health offices, 
as this fit in better with the structure of the rest of the Zambian government.13 Never-
theless, the health reforms also led to certain systematic changes that have had a more 
lasting impact on the management of service delivery, and the balance is not entirely 
negative. At a later stage, we will conduct a more detailed discussion of the net benefit 
of the health reform process. 
A further factor limiting the analytical usefulness of planning documents is that they 
present an aggregated and generalised official discourse that tends to gloss over the 
context-specific and political factors as well as issues of personalities. The issues facing 
                                                 
12  MoH, NHSP 2006-2011 (Lusaka, 2005). 
13  CBoH, Report on the restructuring of the Central Board of Health (Lusaka, 1999). 
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the bureaucracy in question are presented in a sterile technical language that conceals 
the fact that the health sector is in fact a human system based upon the interactions of 
numerous individuals inside and outside the system. This makes it difficult to ascertain 
the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of decisions. Problems are also generalised and presented as 
consequences of external factors rather than the result of human failure. One could thus 
say that policy documents such as this present a sanitised façade that conceals the 
messiness of human interaction on which real-life political and bureaucratic processes 
depend. Because of the limitations, in subsequent sections of the dissertation we will 
attempt to look beyond mere policy intentions and analyse the health reforms as a 
process that is part of its historical and political context. In doing so we will examine 
the origins of the health reforms in the structure of the health system before the political 
transition of the early 1990s and look at a number of key political actors in the process 
and the influence of international donors on the health reforms. 
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Annex II  





STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF HEALTH 
“One of the main functions of the Ministry of Health is to provide direction for Health 
Services, to set policies and to translate these into strategies and priorities. 
In order to discharge this overall responsibility in January 1991 a National Confer-
ence was convened to review the National Health Policies and Strategies. The Con-
ference took stock of the current situation in the Health Sector, it reviewed the current 
performance of the Ministry of Health and attempted to realign resources and com-
mitments towards objectives which would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the Health Care System. 
The Movement for Multiparty Democracy Government (MMD) has developed a 
radical and reforming policy for the future direction of health services. The ruling party 
manifesto amounts to a fundamental change towards improvements in Primary Health 
Care and in Hospital Services. The main thrust of the reforms is for better management 
and improvements in quality of service. 
We wish to avoid adopting an autocratic approach and for this reason extensive 
powers for operational management have been delegated to the new autonomous 
District Health Boards and Boards of Management in certain hospitals. This process 
will provide opportunities to eliminate waste, to achieve better value for money – and 
above all improvements in quality and quantity of services. We wish to see more ini-
tiative, more enterprise and much greater flexibility. We expect to achieve greater 
involvement of people in the provision of services. 
One impact of this change is to reduce the size of the Ministry of Health whose role 
will be revised. The main responsibility of the Ministry of Health in the future will be 
policy development, setting national goals and targets, review of performance, overall 
control and financial audit, quality assurance and statutory compliance. 
The policies in this document define the future direction. Very soon the programme 
of activity to implement the reforms will be published. This will contain the timescale 
and action plans. 
The policies define the vision and the goals. The implementation programme will be 
difficult and will take many years to complete. During this period we will regularly 
review our progress to ensure that we are still on course. 
For the first time in our history we have a comprehensive set of policies in which all 
the aspirations of the Zambian people for improvements in Health Care are expressed. I 
believe it is an inspiring document which will be a constant source of strength.” 
 
Hon. B. Kawimbe, MP. 
MINISTER OF HEALTH 
20 December, 1991 
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STATEMENT BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF HEALTH 
“The overriding feature of the current health situation in Zambia appears to be the gap 
which exists between the increasingly severe health problems faced by the population, 
and the limited resources available to the public health system to respond to them.  
Underlying our current health policy reforms is the desire to build effective leader-
ship, accountability and partnership in order to provide cost-effective quality health care 
as close to the family as possible. 
This policy document is designed to reflect multiple policy concerns that follow from 
our focus on managing for quality in health care. 
There is need to define and implement actions that are feasible in the short term, and 
sustainable in the long term, with respect to the availability of needed human and finan-
cial resources. 
We need capacity building to overcome the constraints of manpower (technical, 
managerial and support staff) to implement health programmes, and reform weak 
support systems that reduce the productivity of existing human resources. 
The need to improve service effectiveness is also central to the proposed reforms. 
This would entail preventing the decline and enhance the quality of services provided. 
Quality assurance schemes are essential features in such an effort. 
Without adequate and sustainable financing, health services cannot be produced. The 
need to improve the relative value of resources available to the health sector is crucial. 
While external assistance will continue to fill many gaps, the basic needs of our national 
population must be met on the strength of our national government to come up with 
locally sustainable modes of financing. At local level, many communities make contri-
butions to health services, but these are often uncoordinated inputs and vary throughout 
the country. We are proposing a comprehensive system of health sector financing.  
In view of the need for health management to focus on support of services in direct 
contact with people, the district as the lowest unit of governmental administration and of 
health service management is the key point of attention and strengthening. Health man-
agement must be decentralized fully to the District not merely as a political imperative 
but as practical health necessity. Substantial training and support is needed, however, 
for monitoring, supervision and logistical support to health centres. 
Experience in Zambia as well as in other countries demonstrates clearly the impor-
tance of service integration. Providing services together rather than separately is a way 
to respond more cost-effectively to people’s health problems, by enabling multiple 
needs to be treated on a single visit, and allowing health staff to have a better under-
standing of the overall health situation of patients. Integration also improves the pro-
ductivity with which services are implemented by joint planning for common activities 
carried out in different programmes. Particular attention must be made to integration at 
the higher levels where services still remain to a large extent separately planned and 
managed. 
Effective health program implementation requires on-going mobilization and advo-
cacy to help maintain political commitment and create an effective demand for specific 
services. Advocacy at all levels must be strengthened by the effective use of all chan-
nels to raise public awareness of key health issues. 
A positive concept of popular participation which does not serve to conceal govern-
mental intentions in health care provision must be the cornerstone of community in-
volvement in public interventions. There is need to strengthen the linkage between the 
318 
 
lowest point in the health system and the communities they serve. Communities contri-
bute to services, but are not directly involved in their development and support. Area 
Boards of Health have been proposed to act as Boards of Directors for community 
health services. 
New efforts to encourage the formation of local Health NGOs and of attracting 
foreign ones who share our vision is essential. Further efforts at improved coordination 
and collaboration through workshops etc. would facilitate a cross-fertilization of inno-
vative ideas. 
Open policy formulation and planning with regard to enriching public contributions 
to the solution of the most important health problems would distinguish the MMD-
government's approach from previous practices. 
Managing for quality in health care is a challenge that promises fruit. It is an anti-
thesis to dogmatic and mechanical thinking about how a healthy nation can be built. I 
am hopeful that individuals, their families, communities, institutions both public and 
private and our core-partners in the international community will join together in shar-
ing this challenge that our new emerging democracy has set itself to meet.” 
 
Hon. Dr. Katele Kalumba, MP. 
DEPUTY MINISTER OF HEALTH, ZAMBIA. 










Presidents of Zambia 
 
Kaunda, Kenneth: 1964-1991 
Kenneth Kaunda was born at Lubwa mission in Northern Province as the son of a 
protestant missionary from Nyasaland (currently Malawi). In the 1940s he trained and 
worked as a teacher before becoming fully involved in nationalist politics in the 1950s 
under the African National Congress (ANC). During this period Kaunda was im-
prisoned for several months and led the Chachacha civil disobedience campaign. In 
1962, having split from ANC under the newly formed United National Independence 
Party (UNIP), he served as a minister in the last government of the colonial era. When 
UNIP won the 1964 elections, he briefly served as prime minister before Zambia 
became independent several month later with Kaunda as Republican President.  
Kaunda’s presidency was characterised by left-leaning African nationalist policies, 
which Kaunda gradually ideologically formulated as Zambian Humanism. His govern-
ment endeavoured to increase the access to free public services, particularly in educa-
tion and health. This period saw a significant expansion of the number of schools and 
universities, and hospitals and health centres. Economically, Kaunda’s government pur-
sued a centralised government-driven economic policy. This was characterised by the 
nationalisation of the copper mines and other industries and government control over 
various commodity markets. Politically, Kaunda became increasingly averse to opposi-
tion and dissent, leading to the establishment of the one-party state in 1972.  
From the late 1970s throughout the 1980s, the Zambian economic situation became 
increasingly dire. The nationalisation of the copper mines coincided with a slump in 
global copper prices. This led to a balance of payments’ crisis and accumulating debts. 
Throughout this period, relations between Kaunda’s government and its international 
lenders was tense. Kaunda reluctantly agreed to macro-economic reforms, which among 
others entailed the unpopular step of removing various subsidies on food and fertiliser. 
This fed public disenchantment with the Kaunda regime and led to public protests and 
the rise of an oppositional coalition urging for multiparty democracy. Against the 
backdrop of the collapse of authoritarian communist regimes in Europe and a wave of 
protests against authoritarian regimes in various African countries, Kaunda agreed to a 
referendum on multi-partyism and subsequent elections in 1991, both of which he lost. 
Resigned, he handed over the presidency to Frederick Chiluba of the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD). 
In the run-up to the 1996 elections, however, Kaunda appeared determined to regain 
the presidency. Regardless of his slim chances, Kaunda was blocked in this attempt by a 
change of the constitution, which disqualified him as a candidate on account of his 
parents’ ‘non-Zambian’ heritage. Subsequently, Kaunda eased into the role of elder 
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statesman, became active in the campaign against AIDS, and was gradually rehabili-
tated as the father of the nation.  
 
Chiluba, Frederick: 1991-2001 
Frederick Chiluba was a trade union leader who became Zambia’s second president on 
the back of a popular movement which ended the Kaunda / UNIP regime and brought 
about a multiparty electoral system. Chiluba was born in Kitwe and spent much of his 
youth on the Copperbelt, apart from several years which he spent schooling in Ka-
wambwa, Luapula. His descent is disputed, as some political opponents claimed his real 
father came from Zaire. A more politically accepted version places Chiluba’s ancestral 
‘home village’ in Mwense district, in Luapula.  
Following a patchy educational career interspersed with employment as a clerk, 
Chiluba became active in local politics and the trade union movement. In 1974 he was 
elected chair of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). ZCTU played a lead-
ing role in mobilising public dissent against economic conditions in Zambia. These 
protests over ‘bread and butter’ issues gradually became political, and Chiluba used 
ZCTU’s organisational network to contribute to the formation of the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy, a broad-based coalition of diverse interests and actors, including 
civic activists, businessmen, and politicians. Chiluba beat several seasoned ex-UNIP 
politicians for the chairmanship of MMD. As the MMD’s presidential candidate, Chi-
luba won the October 1991 elections. 
Chiluba’s presidency was marked by a significant economic and political trans-
formation of the one-party state. At the same time, the consolidation of power by 
Chiluba reinforced the pre-existing neo-patrimonial political culture. On the one hand, 
the opening of the democratic space which had allowed the MMD to come to power 
was consolidated. This referred not only to the multiparty electoral system but to room 
for the media to express views critical of government. Perhaps more significantly, the 
previously controlled economy was liberalised. The government withdrew from many 
economic functions, subsidies on maize and petrol were abolished, the trade in foreign 
exchange was liberalised, and a range of government parastatal companies were sold 
off, including eventually the copper mines. On the other hand, however, Chiluba equally 
set to work consolidating his hold on power and neutralising perceived threats. In 1993 
he jailed several UNIP leaders over a perceived coup attempt. In the run-up to the 1996 
elections, he had the constitution changed to bar Kaunda from challenging him for the 
presidency. After the elections, he called a state of emergency and had Kaunda arrested 
only to release him later. At the same time, Chiluba employed a strategy of patronage to 
win popularity and elections. Before the 1996 elections several new districts were 
created and civil servants were allowed to buy the government houses they occupied. 
Before the 2001 elections the position of district administrator was re-established. These 
were officials appointed by and accountable to the president, which were abolished after 
the UNIP era. Chiluba also had a considerable ‘slush fund’ at his disposal, which he 
could use to hand out ‘brown envelopes’ at his convenience.  
The pinnacle of Chiluba’s strategy to retain power was his attempt to change the con-
stitution to remove the two-term limit for a president’s tenure. This attempt, however, 
was met with huge popular opposition. Civil society organisations managed to mobilise 
the public to voice their opposition, church leaders and ministers spoke out against these 
attempts, and finally Parliament blocked the proposed changes. After much speculation 
about who would succeed Chiluba, Levy Mwanawasa was chosen as MMD’s president-
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ial candidate. It appeared that Chiluba, who would retain the position of MMD presid-
ent, expected that he would be able to remain in power by manipulating Levy, who was 
seen as a rather weak politician.  
During Chiluba’s presidency the issue of corruption led to increasing controversy. 
Initially this concerned Chiluba’s apparent unwillingness to rein in the veteran politici-
ans in his cabinet, accused of corruption and drug smuggling. This led a number of 
progressive ministers to quit Chiluba’s government. Eventually, however, particularly 
towards the end of Chiluba’s second term, it appeared that Chiluba himself had become 
a spider in a web of corruption. This would get him into particular trouble after his hold 
on power ended. After Mwanawasa was elected, a process was begun to remove Chi-
luba’s immunity and prosecute him for corruption, both in civil as well as in criminal 
court. In 2007 Chiluba was found guilty of defrauding the Zambian population and was 
ordered to repay tens of million dollars to the Zambian state. In 2009, after Rupiah 
Banda had become president, however, Chiluba was acquitted in the criminal trial 
against him.       
 
Mwanawasa, Levy: 2001-2008 
Levy Mwanawasa was a lawyer who joined politics at the same time as the MMD 
challenged Kaunda’s regime. Born and raised on the Copperbelt, Mwanawasa was the 
son of a mixed marriage: His father was Lenje and his mother Lamba. Mwanawasa 
briefly served as solicitor-general in the mid-1980s. He gained public recognition as the 
lawyer who successfully defended Lt. Gen. Tembo, who was charged with conspiracy 
and treason against the Kaunda regime.  
Following the MMD ascent to power, Mwanawasa was appointed as vice-president 
of Zambia. In 1994, however, Mwanawasa resigned in outrage at the corruption of some 
of Chiluba’s ministers, most notably Michael Sata. In 1996 Mwanawasa unsuccessfully 
challenged Chiluba for the MMD presidency. He then resigned from politics to focus on 
his legal practice, until he surprisingly emerged as Chiluba’s appointed successor.  
Mwanawasa’s electoral victory in 2001 was narrow and disputed. According to the 
official results, Mwanawasa received a mere 29 per cent of the votes, 2 per cent more 
than his nearest challenger, Anderson Mazoka of UPND. A subsequent petition of the 
electoral process declared the elections flawed, but not so substantially as for the results 
to be invalid. Nevertheless, with only minority support in Parliament, Mwanawasa 
started out his presidency with an uphill task to win both domestic and international 
legitimacy as well as to gain an effective hold on power. This meant that Mwanawasa 
needed to rid himself of the perception that he was Chiluba’s puppet. After several 
months in power, two of Chiluba’s power brokers, derided as corrupt in the media, were 
dropped from the Cabinet. Mwanawasa also moved to strip Chiluba of his immunity 
from prosecution and initiated investigations against him. At the same time, Chiluba 
conspired against Mwanawasa by influencing the petition challenging Mwanawasa’s 
electoral victory and supported unsuccessful attempts to have Mwanawasa impeached.  
Gradually, however, Mwanawasa’s strategy of bringing Chiluba’s old guard to face 
justice over corruption charges, his strategy of co-opting a number of opposition parlia-
mentarians into Cabinet, and the banal attraction of incumbency led Mwanawasa to 
consolidate power and legitimacy. Donor confidence was also re-gained by the anti-
corruption drive and the willingness to undertake the needed reforms to qualify for debt 
relief under the IMF’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. During the 
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2006 elections, Mwanawasa comfortably beat a spilt opposition and got a narrow parlia-
mentary majority.  
Mwanawasa’s tenure ended prematurely when mid-way through his second term he 
suffered a stroke while attending an AU summit in Egypt. This led to several month of 
public political confusion as Mwanawasa was being kept alive in a military hospital in 
Paris as a succession scuffle was unfolding back in Lusaka. Eventually, Rupiah Banda, 
an old-school politician who had surprisingly been appointed vice-president two years 
earlier, emerged as MMD’s presidential candidate.  
 
Banda, Rupiah: 2008-2011 
Rupiah was one of the legendary one hundred Zambians with university education by 
the time the country became independent. He was born of Northern Rhodesian parents 
and raised in what is now Zimbabwe, before he went back to Lusaka to complete 
Munali Secondary School. During this time he became active in politics as a UNIP 
youth-winger. Through UNIP scholarships, he managed to study abroad, initially in 
Ethiopia and then in Sweden, where he became UNIP’s representative in Northern 
Europe. When Zambia became independent, he was appointed to the diplomatic corps. 
He became ambassador to Egypt at age 27 and subsequently ambassador to the US. 
Banda’s career was a patchwork of diplomatic posts, management positions in para-
statals, and ministerial positions. He was subject to frequent re-shuffles.  
When the MMD came to power, he lost his parliamentary seat to future Minister of 
Finance Ronald Penza. Subsequently, he was one of the UNIP politicians arrested by 
Chiluba’s regime under allegations of attempting to stage a coup. In 1996 he supported 
Kaunda’s boycott of the elections and stood down as a parliamentary candidate. For the 
next decade, he withdrew from politics to concentrate on business and farming.  
In 2006 Banda made a surprise reappearance in politics when Mwanawasa appointed 
him vice-president as a reward to Eastern Province for voting for the MMD. This made 
him the designated person to take care of the presidency when Mwanawasa was felled 
by his stroke and passed away. In the position of acting president, Banda had the 
benefits of incumbency to emerge from the internal succession struggle within the 
MMD. Subsequently, in interim presidential elections, Banda narrowly beat opposition 
leader Sata.  
At the time Banda assumed the presidency, the spectre of past corruption scandals 
continued to impact on Zambia’s international reputation. The emergence of a scandal 
in the health sector led to several donors suspending their aid to the sector, and this led 
to strained relations between Banda and donors. The first years of Banda’s tenure also 
saw two notable acquittals in corruption trials, namely of Chiluba and his wife. At the 
same time, Katele Kalumba, who had challenged Banda’s hold on power within the 
MMD, was convicted on corruption charges. In 2010 Banda was selected unopposed as 
MMD’s candidate for the 2011 elections. These elections led to Banda’s defeat. After a 
tense period of vote counting, Banda admitted defeat and congratulated Michael Sata.  
 
Sata, Michael: 2011 to date  
A policeman in the colonial period, Sata became politically active as a trade unionist. 
Under the UNIP government, Sata served as District Governor of Lusaka and State 
Minister of Local Government. After the MMD came to power, he served as Minister of 
Local Government, then as Minister of Labour before moving to health, his third minis-
try in as many years. At the Ministry of Health, Sata demonstrated his controversial 
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character and his political acumen. After two years, however, in the immediate run-up 
to the 1996 elections, he was moved from health to allow him to concentrate on his 
service to the MMD party as national secretary, and he became minister without port-
folio: Chiluba’s ‘chief fixer’. After falling out with Chiluba over the president’s suc-
cesssion and his successor Mwananwasa, Sata left the MMD and founded the Patriotic 
Front (PF). As PF leader, Sata would grow to be the opposition’s primary challenger to 
the MMD’s hold on the presidency in 2006, 2008, and beyond. Sata, an urbanised Bisa 
from Mpika District, has his power base mainly in urban areas and the Bemba-speaking 
north. In 2011, on his third attempt, political evergreen Michael Sata won the presid-
ential elections. His cabinet included Prof. Nkandu Luo as Minister of Local Govern-
ment.  
 
Ministers of Health 
 
Kawimbe, Boniface: November 1991-January 1994  
A surgeon with a history in opposition activism, Kawimbe was chair of the MMD’s 
health committee. After the MMD came to power, he became Minister of Health. As 
minister, Kawimbe was very much focussed on tertiary hospitals, while overseeing the 
advent of the health reforms. He was fired after a conflict of loyalty with President 
Chiluba. After an attempt to bounce back as an MMD cadre, Kawimbe became a found-
ing member of Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), an opposition party 
filled with MMD members disenchanted by Chiluba’s attempts to secure a third term. 
By the turn of the century, he had vanished from the political scene, having relocated to 
the US as a practising doctor. Days after Rupiah Banda’s inauguration in 2008, he sur-
prisingly re-appeared as Minister for his Northern Province.  
 
Sata, Michael: January 1994-May 1996 
See the section on President Sata. 
  
Kalumba, Katele: May 1996-March 1998 
Katele Kalumba was an academic and consultant who became politically active in the 
transition to multiparty politics. He had been able to translate technical and academic 
ideas on health reform into a political programme for the health sector. Subsequently, he 
got the opportunity to put this programme into practice as Deputy and later full Minister 
of Health. Having initially been appointed to Parliament by Chiluba, he was elected as 
Member of Parliament in his home constituency of Chiengi in 1996, holding the seat 
ever since. After being moved from Health, Kalumba became Minister of Tourism, then 
Minister of Home Affairs before becoming Minister of Finance under Chiluba. Ka-
lumba was one of Chiluba’s very few ministers who also appeared in Mwanawasa’s 
first Cabinet. Enjoying good working relations with the international community, he 
was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. After several months, however, he resigned 
amid public controversy and criminal investigations into allegations of corruption. 
Following a protracted manhunt for Kalumba, who had gone into hiding, he was 
arrested and sent to prison on remand. While a protracted court case remained pending, 
Kalumba was exonerated by President Mwanawasa and retained his parliamentary seat. 
In return, Kalumba changed his stance on a motion to impeach Mwanawasa. In 2005 he 
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stood in elections to become MMD National Secretary and was elected. In 2010, 
however, he was finally sentenced for corruption.           
 
Luo, Nkandu: March 1998-November 1999 
Nkandu Luo, a micro-biologist, became Zambia’s first female professor. In addition to 
her work heading laboratory services at the UTH, she was also active in civil society. In 
1996 she embarked on a political career, being elected to Parliament and subsequently 
appointed Deputy Minister of Health. When Katele Kalumba was transferred from the 
Ministry of Health, Luo became a full Minister of Health. During her tenure at the 
ministry, the momentum of the health reform process abated. In 1999 Luo was trans-
ferred from Health to the Ministry of Transport. Then, as the third-term debates flared 
up, Luo joined the newly emerged FDD party. Since the end of the Chiluba era, Luo has 
not featured in national politics. Instead, she has continued a career in civil society and 
academia, primarily as an expert on HIV/AIDS-related issues. 
 
Mpamba, David: November 1999-November 2000 
David Mpamba was an accountant who ventured into politics as Member of Parliament 
for Nangoma constituency in Central Province. Before his brief stint as Minister of 
Health, he served as Information Minister and subsequently Minister of Commerce. 
After a year, Mpamba was again moved to the Ministry of Tourism. Mpamba’s political 
career effectively ended when he too crossed over to FDD.  
  
Kavindele, Enoch: November 2000-May 2001 
Kavindele was an evergreen politician-businessman. He had been a UNIP die-hard and 
member of the central committee, who in the run-up to the multiparty elections tried to 
replace Kaunda as UNIP leader. After the MMD came to power, he focussed on his 
business activities before joining the MMD around the 1996 elections. Subsequently, he 
was appointed Minister of Science and Technology and then Minister of Commerce. In 
1998 he fell out with Chiluba and was fired, only to bounce back as Minister of Health 
in 2001. There he served only several months, after which he became vice-president 
when his predecessor Christon Tembo was expelled from the MMD with several other 
ministers for opposing Chiluba’s third-term bid. In the 2001 elections he was elected 
Member of Parliament for Kabompo West in North-Western Province and was re-
appointed as vice-president by Mwanawasa. In 2003 he was dismissed in connection 
with corrupt business dealings. Following Kavindele’s support for an unsuccessful 
motion to impeach Mwanawasa, his MMD membership was suspended and the position 
he held as MMD vice-president remained unfilled. In 2005 Kavindele unsuccessfully 
challenged Mwanawasa for the MMD presidency. A year later in 2006 he retired from 
Parliament, only to unsuccessfully stand as an independent candidate in his former con-
stituency. Subsequently, he continued to pursue business interests and at the time of 
writing has not yet vanished from the political and public scene.  
 
Mumba, Levison: May 2001-January 2002 
Mumba had been a backbencher from Eastern Province. After campaigning for Chiluba 
in Eastern Province, he was appointed minister for that province. A few months later, 
Mumba became Minister of Health, to replace Kavindele. After the 2001 elections, 
Mwanawasa appointed Mumba as Minister of Tourism before moving him to the Minis-
try of Sports shortly afterwards. At the end of 2002, however, Mumba was dropped as a 
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minister and expelled from the MMD, after having testified against Mwanawasa. Sub-
sequently, the Supreme Court nullified Mumba’s 2001 election victory on account of 
electoral malpractices. During the by-elections, Mumba had switched to the UPND but 
was defeated, which ended his national political career.  
 
Chituwo, Brian: January 2001-August 2005 and April 2007-November 2008 
Before venturing into politics, Brig. Gen. Dr. Brian Chituwo had worked as a military 
surgeon and later as a manager in the civilian health sector. In 2000 he resigned as 
executive director of the hospital in Kabwe in order to be allowed to stand for political 
office. He stood as the MMD candidate in a by-election in Mumbwa constituency, only 
to be defeated by the UPND candidate. He subsequently re-joined the civil service and 
worked as a director of clinical care at the orthopaedic department of the UTH. Chituwo 
was then appointed as Minister of Health in Mwanawasa’s first cabinet. As he had not 
been elected, he was one of the eight members nominated to Parliament by the 
President. In 2005 Chituwo was suddenly transferred to the Ministry of Education and 
replaced by Sylvia Masebo. In the 2006 elections, Chituwo used the profile he had at-
tained as minister to be successfully elected to Parliament for Mumbwa constituency. 
Following the elections, he was appointed to hold the Science and Technology portfolio 
in Cabinet. In 2007 he was again moved to Health, following controversy over the 
Auditor General’s report on the Ministry of Health. Then, as the struggle to succeed 
Mwanawasa as MMD leader unfolded, Chituwo declared his willingness to lead the 
party but was unsuccessful. After Banda came to power, Chituwo was again moved, this 
time to Agriculture.  
 
Masebo, Sylvia: August 2005-October 2006 
Sylvia Masebo came to public prominence in the 1990s as deputy mayor of Lusaka and 
MMD deputy treasurer. Even before the mass defections from the MMD in response to 
Chiluba’s third-term ambitions, Masebo had led a large group of dissatisfied MMD 
members out of the party. By the time of the 2001 elections, she had joined the newly 
established Zambian Republican Party (ZRP), headed by former Minister of Defence 
Ben Mwila. On the ZRP ticket, she was elected as a parliamentarian in Chongwe 
District. In 2003 Masebo was one of the opposition parliamentarians who were co-opted 
by Mwanawasa into Cabinet, becoming Minister for Local Government and Housing. In 
August 2005 she was transferred to health to succeed Chituwo. Masebo was instru-
mental in politically defending the reversal of the health reforms in Parliament. Her 
tenure, however, was cut short when she decided to formally cross over to the MMD, 
forcing her to vacate her seat in Parliament and her ministerial position. This allowed 
her, however, to defend her seat on an MMD ticket in the 2006 elections. Following the 
elections, she returned to her old post as Minister of Local Government, which she held 
until Banda came to power in 2008. She failed to be appointed minister for opposing 
Banda’s succession of Mwanawasa. By the time of the 2011 elections she had joined 
Michael Sata’s camp but failed to retain her parliamentary seat.  
 
Cifire, Angela: October 2006-April 2007 
Angela Cifire was a public relations officer at the national electricity company before 
she was selected as the MMD candidate for Luangeni constituency in the 2006 elec-
tions. After having been elected as part of the MMD victory in Eastern Province, she 
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was appointed Minister of Health. After less than half a year, she was dropped and 
replaced by Brian Chituwo, as it appeared that the ministry was too politically sensitive 
to be run by a political novice. Cifire was demoted to deputy minister of Sports, a 
position she retained after Banda came to power. 
 
Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Health 
 
Njelesani, Evaristo: early 1980s-1992 
Dr. Njelesani was permanent secretary and President Kaunda’s personal physician 
throughout much of the 1980s. He was the first Zambian to hold this post, succeeding a 
Nigerian, Dr. Paul Chuke. Shortly after the MMD government came to power, he joined 
the regional office for Africa of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Brazzaville. 
He would later serve as WHO country representative to Zimbabwe.  
 
Kamanga, Kawaye: 1992-1996 
Kawaye Kamanga was a medical doctor who had been responsible for public health at 
Kitwe city council and later Lusaka city council. Kamanga was suggested for the 
position of permanent secretary by Minister Kawimbe, owing to his experience with 
public health. Kamanga oversaw much of the health reform process. He was retired in 
the national interest in December 1996. He went on to join the World Bank and later the 
WHO.      
 
Bulaya, Kashiwa: 1996-2001 
Dr. Bulaya had been trained as a Marxist economist in Bulgaria and allegedly also as a 
intelligence operative. Later he worked at UNIP headquarters. He was appointed by 
Chiluba to serve as deputy permanent secretary, until replacing Dr. Kamanga in 1996. 
Bulaya resigned as President Mwanawasa came to power in 2001. After Bulaya’s 
resignation, various controversies came to light, notably a corruption case in which he 
was the prime suspect. Eventually, this led to Bulaya’s conviction to five years’ hard 
labour for corruption.  
 
Silwamba, Gavin: 2001-2002 
Dr. Gavin Silwamba was a director-general of the Central Board of Health. When Bu-
laya resigned, he served as permanent secretary for several months before being re-
placed by Simon Miti.  
 
Miti, Simon: 2002-2008 
Before becoming the chief civil servant in the Ministry of Health, Dr. Simon Miti was 
director of public health at the Ndola City Council and executive director of Ndola 
Central Hospital. He played a key role in the reversal of the health reforms. Following 
Rupiah Banda’s inauguration as president, Miti was transferred to the Ministry of 
Science and Technology. He was suspended following the emergence of a major cor-








The Danish International Development Agency, part of the Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, has played an important role in the Zambian health sector. Under its Health 
Sector Support Program, DANIDA set up a Health Reform Implementation Team 
(HRIT) in 1992-3. This team was instrumental in moving forward the health reform 
process by, among other things, district-planning and management, capacity-strengthen-
ing, and the development of appropriate financial systems. HRIT was housed in a 
building next to the Ministry of Health and comprised Danish technical advisors along-
side Zambian professionals. The Danish intention to provide block grants to district 
health offices contributed to the creation of a district basket fund supported by various 
donors. In 1998 DANIDA suspended its support to the health sector over accountability 
issues. It made resumption of support conditional on restructuring of the Central Board 
of Health. In 2005 Denmark ended its support to the Zambian health sector following 
the decision to dissolve the Central Board of Health. Its formal justification, however, 
was that it responded to the division of labour between donors.  
 
United Kingdom: DFID (formerly ODA) 
The Overseas Development Administration of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
had a longstanding history of involvement in the Zambian health sector. By the early 
1990s it was engaged in various projects, for instance in urban health in Lusaka, 
reproductive health, and providing technical assistance in referral hospitals. Gradually, 
however, it became more involved in programmatic support, including health systems’ 
strengthening and policy development. By the time ODA had been restructured into the 
Department for International Development in 1997, it was one of the partners con-
tributing to the sector-wide approach, having been one of the first four agencies to join 
Denmark in the district basket fund. DFID played a driving role in advocating for the 
removal of user fees, in line with its policy towards universal access to health care. By 
2007 DFID was selected as one of the lead donors in the sector as a result of the Joint 
Assistance Strategy for Zambia. 
 
Ireland: Irish Aid  
Irish Aid was one of the smaller bilateral donors in the health sector. Initially, its focus 
lay very much on maternal health care. By the late 1990s Irish Aid had joined the dis-
trict basket fund. With the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia, however, Irish Aid (the 
Development Cooperation Ireland) decided to withdraw from the health sector.  
 
Netherlands: RNE/DGIS 
For much of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the Netherlands, through the Royal 
Netherlands Embassy (RNE) and the Directorate General for International Cooperation 
(DGIS), focussed its health assistance primarily on the Western and, to a lesser extent, 
Northern provinces. This support was in the form of Dutch medical doctors working as 
technical assistants and practitioners. There were also primary health care programmes 
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in these provinces, which engaged in capacity- and systems’-strengthening. Further-
more, the Netherlands funded the direct procurement of drugs for a tuberculosis pro-
gramme and drug kits for community health workers and rural health centres. In the 
course of the 1990s, the Netherlands joined other donors’ transition to the sector-wide 
approach. Its primary health care programmes acted as field labs to develop systems to 
underpin the health reforms, before phasing them out by 1998. By 1996 RNE contri-
buted to the district basket. In the same period, the Netherlands also invested in 
strengthening district health managers through a specialised training course in Kabwe. 
By the turn of the century, Dutch development policy had moved beyond isolated pro-
grammes and saw no more place for bilateral technical assistance. However, to mitigate 
the problem of withdrawing the scores of Dutch doctors working in Zambia in the 
context of a human resource crisis in the health sector, RNE developed a retention 
scheme for rural doctors. With the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia, the Nether-
lands was designated an active rather than a lead donor. However, with its new Multi-
Annual Strategic Plan, it was decided to reduce this role into that of a background donor 
channelling its funds through delegated cooperation with SIDA (see below). In 2009, 
the Netherlands and Sweden suspended their support to the health sector over a cor-
ruption scandal.  
 
Sweden: SIDA 
The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) had a Health Sector Support 
Programme since the late 1980s, which comprised various activities in areas such as 
reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. Sweden also became a prominent supporter of the 
provision of essential drugs and supported policy development in that area. In the 
mid1990s Sweden moved from providing technical assistance through individuals to tri-
partite institutional collaboration. A particular area in which SIDA provided such 
support was health financing and planning and management at the national level. SIDA 
was one of the first donors who supported the district basket fund in support of the 
health reform process. SIDA also had a health economist seconded to the HRIT. 
Sweden also contributed to the health reform process by providing consultants to 
provide training for the Central Board of Health on the basis of experiences of the 
Swedish National Board of Health. Following a crisis of confidence with the Ministry 
of Health over the scandal within Medical Stores Limited, Sweden temporarily sus-
pended its support to the health sector. However, by 2001 Sweden again supported the 
health sector through the sector-wide approach and flanking activities on sexual and 
reproductive health and institutional development. In 2005 Sweden conducted a joint 
assessment with the Netherlands of the National Health Strategic Plan, which eventually 
resulted in Sweden being the active partner in a silent partnership with the Netherlands. 
In 2009 Sweden again suspended its support to the health sector over corruption.      
 
United Stated: USAID 
USAID’s involvement in the health sector initially primarily concerned isolated inter-
ventions in reproductive health. Gradually, however, as the health reform process 
gained momentum, USAID broadened its scope of activities in support of the health 
service delivery. Owing to rather stringent conditions of American support, however, it 
stopped short of becoming a regular contributor to the district health basket. Neverthe-
less, by the turn of the century, USAID had seized the issue of health reform, as 
illustrated by its Partnerships for Health Reform, which generated several in-depth 
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studies on Zambia. In the 2000s, the US supported various programmes in the health 
sector, which were coordinated with but not aligned to the National Health Strategic 
Plan and other donor support. These included the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) and the Health Services & Systems Program (HSSP). The latter 
programme continued to contribute to systems’ strengthening of the health sector even 





In the early 1990s the European Commission was involved in the construction and 
rehabilitation of physical health institution infrastructure as well as a blood transfusion 
project. The European Commission was among the first donors to contribute to the 
district basket and continued to provide basket support and later budget support to the 
health sector, in addition to more distinct projects. However, the Commission rarely 
appeared to play a prominent role in the political or policy dialogue affecting the health 
reforms. 
  
UN system  
Various UN organisations have mandates that involve the health sector. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) has long been a provider of technical advice and assistance 
to the Zambian health sector. In 2006 the WHO was selected as one of the lead donors 
in the health sector. Notable about WHO’s positioning, however, is a reluctance to 
touch on political factors affecting public service effectiveness, a reluctance which it 
shares with most UN organisations. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
played a particularly active role in the health sector in the mid-1990s. Its technical 
advisors contributed to systems’ strengthening associated with the health reforms, and 
UNICEF was one of the first four donors to support the district basket. By the end of the 
1990s, UNICEF’s role had become less prominent, however. Other UN organisations 
which have played a role in the health sector include the United Nations Development 
Programme and the United Nations Population Fund.  
 
World Bank 
The World Bank has been an important promulgator of the discourse behind the Zam-
bian health reforms. In 1994 the World Bank and the government of Zambia negotiated 
a loan which was to support the health reform process. Particularly around this time the 
World Bank played an important role by facilitating policy discussion between donors 
and the Ministry of Health on the design of the health reform process. Following the 
turbulence in the health sector in the late-1990s, the World Bank’s role appeared to be-
come less pronounced.  
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Annex IV  
Organisational changes in the health sector 
 
 
Figure V.1 Organisational structure before 1991 
 
Source: Lake et al. (2000) adopted from O’Connell (1999)  
 
 
Figure V.2 Organisational structure after health reforms (mid-1996) 
 
Source: Lake et al. (2000) adopted from O’Connell (1999) 
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C. Dir. Central Director(ate)s 
R. Dir. Regional Director(ate)s 
PS Permanent Secretary 
DTSS Directorate of Technical Support Services 
DHRA Directorate of Human Resource & Administration 
DPP Directorate of Policy and Planning 
DPHR Directorate of Public Health & Research 
DCCD Directorate of Clinical Care & Diagnostic Services 
PU Procurement Unit 
AU Accounts Unit 









The types of cadres in the health sector have undergone frequent reformulation, for 
instance during the health reforms and the recent restructuring. Below are the cadres 
with their scales, as per the recent restructuring.14 
 
a) Medical Doctor Scales 
 
Posts applicable  Scale 
 
Consultant (Hospital)  MDS/1  
Director (National Level) 
Provincial Medical Officer 
Medical Superintendent (2nd Level) 
Senior Medical Superintendent 
(Third Level & Specialised Hospitals) 
 
Senior Registrar (Hospital) MDS/2 
Deputy Director (National Level) 
Chief Medical Physicist 
District Medical Officer 
 
Registrar/General Medical Officer MDS/3 
Case Management Officer 
Chief PMTCT Officer 
Medical Officer in Charge (1st Level) 
Child Health Specialist 
Clinical Care Specialist 
National Epidemiologist  
Principal Pharmacist 
Senior Lecturer I 
HIV/STI Specialist 
Communicable Diseases Control Specialist 
Non-Communicable Disease Specialist 
TB/Leprosy Specialist 
 
                                                 
14  Source: MoH, Organisation Structure Report (Lusaka, 2006). 
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Senior Resident Medical Officer  MDS/4 
Junior Resident Medical Officer 
Chief Leprosy/TB/HIV (Pro-Test) 
Chief TB Officer – Public 
Chief TB Officer – Special 
Dental Surgeon  
Senior Pharmacist 




b) Nursing & paramedical scales 
 
Physiotherapy cadre 
Chief Physiotherapist  MS/1 
Principal Physiotherapist  MS/2 
Senior Physiotherapist MS/3 
Physiotherapist MS/4 
Chief Physiotherapy Technologist MS/4 
Principal Physiotherapy Technologist MS/5 
Senior Physiotherapy Technologist MS/7 
Physiotherapy Technologist MS/8 
 
Medical equipment 
Chief Medical Equipment Officer MS/1 
Principal Medical Equipment Officer MS/2 
Chief Medical Equipment Technologist MS/4 
Principal Medical Equipment Technologist MS/5 
Senior Medical Equipment Technologist MS/7 
Medical Equipment Technologist MS/8 
 
Radiography 
Chief Radiographer MS/1 
Principal Radiographer MS/2 
Senior Radiographer MS/3 
Radiographer MS/4 
Chief Radiography Technologist MS/4 
Principal Radiography Technologist MS/5 
Senior Radiography Technologist MS/7 
Radiography Technologist/ MS/8 
Ultra Sonographer 
     
Bio-medical science/Medical laboratory cadre 
Chief Biomedical Scientist MS/1 
Principal Biomedical Scientist MS/2 
Senior Biomedical Scientist MS/3  
Biomedical Scientist MS/4 
Chief Medical Laboratory Technologist  MS/4 
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Chief Medical Laboratory Technician MS/5 
Principal Medical Laboratory Technologist MS/5 
Principal Medical Laboratory Technician MS/6 
Senior Medical Laboratory Technologist MS/7 
Senior Medical Laboratory Technician MS/8 
Medical Laboratory Technologist MS/8 
Medical Laboratory Technician MS/9 
 
Nursing cadre 
Deputy Director, Nursing  GSS/2 
Chief Nursing Officer  MS/1 
Principal Nursing Officer  MS/2 
Principal Tutor MS/2 
Senior Tutor MS/3 
Senior Night/ Theatre Superintendent MS/3 
Senior Nursing Officer       MS/3 
Tutor MS/4 
Theatre Superintendent  MS/4 
Nursing Officer MS/4 
Night Superintendent MS/5 
Public Health Nurse MS/6 
Nursing Sister MS/6 
Centre-in-Charge MS/6 
Registered Midwife MS/7 
Registered Specialist Nurse MS/7 
Registered Nurse MS/8 
Enrolled Midwife MS/8 
Enrolled Nurse (Psychiatry, Theatre) MS/8 
Zambia Enrolled Nurse MS/9 
 
Clinical Officer  
Medical Licentiate  MS/3 
Principal Clinical Officer MS/4 
Senior Clinical Care Officer MS/3 
Clinical Care Officer MS/4 
Principal Clinical Officer (General) MS/5 
Senior Clinical Officer (specialised) MS/6 
Senior Clinical Officer (General) MS/7 
Clinical Officer (specialised) 
Clinical Officer MS/8 
 
Pharmacy 
Principal Pharmacist MDS/3 
Senior Pharmacist MDS/4 
Pharmacist MDS/5 
Principal Pharmacy Technologist MS/5 
Senior Pharmacy Technologist MS/7 
Pharmacy Technologist MS/8 
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Pharmacy Technician MS/9 
Pharmacy Dispenser MS/10 
 
Environmental health 
Deputy Director MS/1 
Chief Environmental Health Officer MS/3 
Chief Environmental Health Technician MS/4 
Principal Environmental Health Officer MS/5 
     (Principal Health Inspector) 
Principal Environmental Health Technologist) MS/5 
Principal Environmental Health Technician MS/6 
Senior Environmental Health Officer 
     (Senior Health Inspector) MS/7 
Senior Environmental Health Technologist MS/7 
Environmental Health Officer  MS/7 
Senior Environmental Health Technician MS/8 
Health Inspector MS/8 
Environmental Health Technologist MS/8  
Environmental Health Technician MS/9 
 
Nutrition 
Chief Nutritionist MS/3 
Principal Nutritionist/Dietician  MS/5 
Senior Nutritionist/Dietician MS/7 
Nutritionist/Dietician MS/8 
Nutrition Demonstrator GSS/15 
 
Oral/dental health 
Chief Dental Therapist MS/3 
Chief Dental Technologist MS/3 
Principal Dental Therapist MS/5 
Principal Dental Technologist MS/5 
Senior Dental Therapist MS/7 
Senior Dental Technologist MS/7 
Dental Therapist MS/8 
Dental Technologist MS/8 
Dental Attendant MS/11 
 
Health education 
Chief Health Education Officer MS/1 
Principal Health Education Officer MS/2 
Senior Health Education Officer MS/3 
Health Education Officer MS/4 
 
Training schools 
Head  MS/1 
Principal Lecturer MS/2 
Senior Lecturer MS/3 
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Principal Lecturer 1 (Senior Registrar) MDS/2 
Senior Lecturer 1 (GMO / Registrar) MDS/3 
Lecturer MS/4 
 
c)  General Salary Scales (GSS) 
 
Director  GSS/1 
Deputy Director  GSS/2 
Assistant Director, Chief Subject  GSS/3 
Specialist, Head of Unit 
Principal Subject Specialist  GSS/4 
Chief HR, Subject Specialist GSS/5 
Procurement and Supplies  
Senior Subject Specialist  GSS/6 
Administrative Officer,  GSS/7 
Senior HR, Subject Specialist  GSS/8 
Social Worker 
Psychologist 
Senior Registry Officer,  GSS/9 
Senior Executive Officer 
Personal Secretary  GSS/10 
Executive Officer, Stenographer, Transport GSS/11 
Officer, Assistant Accountant, Registry 
Officer, Purchasing & Supplies Assistant 
Cashier/Accounts Assistant  GSS/12 
Typist  GSS/13 
Registry Clerk, Records Clerk  GSS/14 
Head Office Orderly, Revenue  GSS/15 
Collector  
 


















Infant mortality rate 
(probability of dying 
between birth and 
age 1 per 1000 live 
births) 
Under-5 mortality  
rate (probability of 
dying by age 5 per 
1000 live births) 
Neonatal  
mortality rate  







at birth  
(years) 
2009 86 141 35 527 48 
2000 99 166 39 640 42 
1990 108 179 40 506 46 
Source: WHO data 
 
 
Table VII.2  Selected health care delivery indicators: 2000-8 
Indicator 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 
Health centre outpatient per capita attendance 0.42 0.77 0.73 0.86 0.76 0.86 1.22 1.10 
First antenatal coverage (%) 81 88  89  95  97  92  92  98 
Average antenatal visits (times)  3.6  3.6  3.4  3.3  3.1  2.9  2.8  2.6 
Supervised deliveries (%)  39  44  49  55  61  61  62  60 
Fully immunised children under 1 year (%)  76  86  76  74  80  87  85  90 
Underweight prevalence (% weight)  23  23  22  21  17  14  10  6 
Health centre staff load (patients/staff) 17  14  16  17  17  18.2  17.8  18.6 
Drug kits opened per 1,000 patients 0.73  0.75  0.69  0.73  0.93  0.98  0.75  0.97 
Source: MoH, NHSP 2006-2011 (Lusaka, 2005); MoH, 2008 Annual Health Statistical Bulletin (Lusaka, 2009) 
 
Table VII.3  Historical overview of health facilities in Zambia: 1959-2008 
 1959 1964 1982 1990 2008 
Health facilities 213 384 875 1024 1564 
Hospitals 20 48 81 82 99 
Rural health centres 250 577 1029 
Urban health centres 189 56 202 942 265 
Mission facilities 68 82 93 101 117 
Private / mine facilities 7 27 78 105 92 
Beds and cots - 10,850 21,043 24,572 26,961 
Beds per 1000 people 6.5/2.5* 3.02 3.37 3.02 2.31 
Facilities per 1000 
people - 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.13 
* Beds for whites and beds for Africans, respectively. 
Compiled from: Kalumba, Symbolic Power, p 112a, 112b, 270a; MoH, National Health Policies and Strategies 
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Dit proefschrift biedt een reactie op de academische en populaire discussie rond het 
begin van de 21 eeuw over de Afrikaanse staat. In deze discussie werd een proble-
matisch beeld geschetst van de Afrikaanse staat. Deze staten zouden ten onder gaan aan 
corruptie en patronage. In plaats van het brengen van ontwikkeling zouden allereerst de 
belangen van de politieke elite gediend worden. In sommige gevallen zou dit leiden tot 
voortdurend conflict en falende staten. Deze discussie bekritiseerde ook ontwikkelings-
samenwerking, aangezien staten van nature het eerste aanspreekpunt zijn voor multi- en 
bilaterale ontwikkelingsorganisaties. Deze organisaties zijn in meer of mindere mate 
afhankelijk van het functioneren van Afrikaanse staten voor de resultaten die zij beogen 
te behalen.  
Neo-patrimonialisme is een begrip, dat in de academische discussie over de Afri-
kaanse staat een toenemende rol is gaan spelen. Dit begrip gaat er vanuit dat de Afri-
kaanse staat gedreven wordt door twee tegengestelde, concurrerende, doch met elkaar 
verweven logica’s. Enerzijds is er het patrimonialisme dat gekenmerkt wordt door 
persoonlijke machtsuitoefening. Deze logica maakt geen onderscheid tussen publiek en 
privaat en wordt derhalve gekenmerkt door patronage, corruptie en nepotisme. De 
keerzijde van het patrimonialisme is de rationeel-legale logica die een ideaaltypische 
onpersoonlijke bureaucratie karakteriseert. Hoewel het paradigma van het neo-patri-
monialisme uit gaat van een onderlinge verwevenheid van deze twee logica’s, is er een 
neiging van sommige theoretici of analisten om het vermeende patrimoniale karakter 
van de neo-patrimoniale Afrikaanse staat te overdrijven.  
Het onderzoek dat hier wordt gepresenteerd poogt de geldigheid van het neo-patri-
monale paradigma te toetsen door het te confronteren met een voorbeeld uit de praktijk, 
met een specifiek onderdeel van een specifieke Afrikaanse staat: De Zambiaanse 
gezondheidssector. Om dit te doen is het nodig verder in te zoemen op de menselijke 
factor van de staat. Het zijn immers mensen die de staat vormgeven, besturen en zelfs 
ondermijnen om zo hun individuele en collectieve aspiraties te verwezenlijken. Een 
specifiek doel van dit onderzoek is daarom om te bezien of in het gedrag van gezond-
heidswerkers patrimoniale kenmerken te ontdekken zijn. Omdat patrimoniaal gedrag 
doorgaans als maatschappelijk of politiek onwenselijk afgeschilderd wordt, wordt het 
verhuld. Het is dus een methodologische uitdaging om zicht te krijgen op hoe dergelijk 
gedrag in de praktijk uitgeoefend wordt (Practice). Het is daarom nodig om dergelijk 
gedrag af te leiden uit discours: Mondelinge of schriftelijke weergaven van de werke-
lijkheid. De beperking van dergelijke data is dat discours deels gebruikt wordt om 
legitimiteit te verschaffen en daarom subjectief is. Daarom neemt dit onderzoek een 
eclectische aanpak die verschillende type bronnen, mondeling, schriftelijk, informeel en 
officieel, naast elkaar zal leggen. Zo kunnen we zicht te krijgen op het gedrag van 
enerzijds gezondheidswerkers op de werkvloer en anderzijds de politici en technocraten 
in politieke arena van de Zambiaanse gezondheidssector.  
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit twee afzonderlijke onderdelen. Het eerste kijkt naar de 
menselijke factor van de Zambiaanse gezondheidssector (the Human Factor), het 
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tweede naar de gezondheidssector als onderdeel van de nationale politieke arena (the 
Health Sector). Het eerste deel neemt een meer antropologische aanpak en kijkt naar de 
carrières en de sociaaleconomische context van gezondheidswerkers op de werkvloer 
van de gezondheidssector. In dit deel wordt gepoogd onder meer op basis van ge-
sprekken met gezondheidswerkers, zicht te krijgen op de vraag of het mogelijk is een 
patrimoniale logica te ontwaren in de beschrijvingen die gezondheidswerkers geven van 
hun levenswereld. Worden zij gedreven door ‘pre-industriële’ culturele waarden of door 
een professionele motivatie om bij te dragen aan de officiële doelstellingen van de 
gezondheidssector? Allereerst wordt de casus van een specifieke gezondheidswerker 
gepresenteerd om zo zicht te krijgen op de uitdagingen waar gezondheidswerkers op 
hun werk en in hun carrière mee te maken krijgen. Zo krijgt de lezer een eerste indruk 
hoe de publiek-private tegenstelling die het neo-patrimonialisme kenmerkt zich mani-
festeert op de werkvloer van de staat.  
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt het pad ontdekt dat iemand moet bewandelen om een aanstel-
ling in de gezondheidssector te bemachtigen. Hier zal onderzocht worden wat mensen er 
toe zet om gezondheidswerker te worden. Voor sommigen is het een roeping, maar in 
belangrijker mate blijkt dit de basis te leggen voor iemands levensonderhoud en wel-
vaart. Vervolgens staan we stil bij de rol, die formele kwalificaties spelen bij het krijgen 
van toegang tot de gezondheidssector. Hoewel persoonlijke contacten een rol spelen om 
een baan te bemachtigen, zijn kwalificaties als teken van verdienste essentieel. Tenslotte 
onderzoekt Hoofdstuk 3 de spanning tussen de belangen van gezondheidswerkers en de 
belangen van het systeem van publieke gezondheidszorg. Het blijkt lastig om gezond-
heidswerkers te dwingen in afgelegen gebieden te werken of hen te disciplineren. 
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de mogelijkheden voor gezondheidswerkers om carrière te 
maken. Wederom wordt gekeken of persoonlijke contacten of verdienste een rol spelen 
en wederom blijkt dat kwalificaties en het volgen van opleidingen een essentiële rol 
spelen. Tegelijkertijd blijkt bij het onderzoeken van aantijgingen van clientalisme, dat 
ook loyaliteit een belangrijke factor is. Tenslotte wordt er stil gestaan bij de bijzondere 
positie van artsen. Hieruit blijkt dat in tegenstelling tot wat vanuit het neo-patrimoniale 
paradigma verondersteld kan worden, horizontale professionele verbanden in sommige 
gevallen belangrijker kunnen zijn dan verticale verbanden gebaseerd op persoonlijke 
relaties of identiteit.  
In het volgende Hoofdstuk (5) worden gezondheidswerkers beschouwd in hun soci-
aal-economische omgeving. Hoewel zij tot de weinigen behoren met banen in een om-
geving van armoede, kampen ze naar eigen zeggen met grote financiële uitdagingen. Zij 
hebben te maken met verwachtingen vanuit hun omgeving om steun te bieden, zij 
hebben consumptiebehoeften en willen investeren en ondernemen. Zo blijken zij erg 
actief om ‘voorbij het loonstrookje’ inkomen te vergaren. Dit leidt vervolgens tot span-
ning tussen hun belangen en die van het systeem. Hoewel dit niet noodzakelijkerwijs het 
geval hoeft te zijn, verklaart deze sociaal-economische druk ten dele waarom sommigen 
patrimoniaal gedrag vertonen. Dit is niet uitsluitend te wijten aan de behoefte om te 
voldoen aan ‘traditionele waarden’, maar veeleer een afweging van ‘vandaag de dag’. 
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift is een historische analyse van de politieke arena 
van de Zambiaanse gezondheidssector in de periode van ongeveer 1990 tot 2008. Hier 
wordt met name stil gestaan bij de gezondheidshervormingen, die in deze periode hun 
beslag kregen, stagneerden en uiteindelijk deels werden teruggedraaid. Hiermee zijn 
deze hervormingen een voorbeeld van het ‘syndroom van gedeeltelijke hervorming’, dat 
Afrika in de jaren negentig teisterde. Bovendien wordt in dit deel beschreven hoe de 
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hervormingen, net als andere aspecten van de gezondheidssector geinstrumentaliseerd 
werden door zowel politieke sleutelfiguren als gezondheidswerkers. Deze instrumenta-
lisering vond niet alleen plaats om de privé belangen van individuen na te streven, maar 
ook vanwege de politieke doelen van het regime, zoals machtsbehoud. Bovendien blijkt 
dat door steeds terugkerende stakingen, en een cruciale rechtszaak, gezondheidswerkers 
collectief niet alleen het lot van de gezondheidshervormingen bepalen, maar ook in-
vloed hebben op de verdeling van macht en middelen binnen de sector.  
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt teruggeblikt op de conceptuele oorsprong van de gezondheids-
hervormingen. Hoewel deze ideeën gevoed zijn door het discours van internationale 
samenwerking, zijn ze geworteld in Zambiaanse historische en politieke ervaringen. In 
Hoofdstuk 7 wordt duidelijk hoe de oorspronkelijke ideeën over gezondheidshervor-
mingen in het proces van uitvoering onder invloed van verschillende belangen worden 
aangepast. Dit betreft zowel de belangen van Zambianen binnen de sector als van 
buitenlandse donororganisaties. Bovendien wordt er stil gestaan bij de persoonlijkhede, 
die politiek verantwoordelijk waren voor de hervormingen en die een persoonlijk stem-
pel hebben gedrukt op de ontwikkeling van de sector.  
Vervolgens staan we in Hoofdstuk 8 stil bij een episode waarin de hervormingen hun 
hoogtepunt bereikten, terwijl tegelijkertijd de instrumentalisering van de hervormingen 
het meest geprononceerd was. De politieke leiders van de sector gebruikten de hervor-
mingen en andere mogelijkheden, die de sector biedt om de kansen van de regerings-
partij in de verkiezingen van 1996 te vergroten. Tegelijkertijd verstevigden zij hun 
eigen machtsbases. Ook ontstond in die periode het idee om een agentschap, de Central 
Board of Health op te richten, die verantwoordelijk werd voor beleidsuitvoering en 
dienstverlening en op afstand stond van het ministerie van Gezondheid. Dit was geen 
onderdeel van het oorspronkelijke idee van de hervormingen, maar het resultaat van een 
politiek samenspel, waarin verschillende binnenlandse en donorbelangen een rol speel-
den. In deze periode zien we ook hoe donoren hun aanpak geleidelijk aanpasten van het 
financieren van individuele projecten in eigen beheer tot sectorbrede progamma’s, 
beheerd door het ontvangende ministerie. In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd, dat dit niet 
een eigenstandige beslissing was is van donoren, maar het resultaat van een onderhan-
delingsproces, waarin het Zambiaanse belang om controle te krijgen effectief nage-
streefd werd.  
Vervolgens, in Hoofdstuk 9, wordt beschreven hoe de hervormingen stagneren. 
Hiervoor zijn rationeel-legale verklaringen terug te vinden in het discours van de 
toenmalige minister. Ook zijn er andere verklaringen af te leiden, die gebaseerd zijn op 
belangen van macht en inkomenszekerheid. De relatie met donoren stond in deze 
periode ernstig onder druk door een corruptieschandaal. Vanwege het gebrek aan ver-
trouwen van donoren in het ministerie, richtten zij zich op samenwerking met de 
Central Board. Zo isoleerden zij zich van de politieke turbulentie, die in die periode niet 
alleen de gezondheidssector, maar het hele land raakte. Tegelijkertijd droegen zij zo bij 
aan een institutionele machtsverdeling, die haaks stond op neo-patrimoniale belangen, 
en die uiteindelijk zou leiden tot het opheffen van de Central Board. 
In het laatste Hoofdstuk (10) over de Health Sector, worden ervaringen van de 
gezondheidssector in een nieuwe politieke constellatie beschreven. Hier zien wij dat, 
hoewel machtsverhoudingen en persoonlijkheden verschoven, sommige elementen van 
de politieke cultuur voortduurden. Om de macht te consolideren, zou het nieuwe bewind 
gebruik moeten maken van oude allianties en machtspelletjes, die haaks stonden op de 
waarden die het nieuwe bewind openlijk beleed. De gezondheissector werd een voor-
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werp in deze machtsstrijd. Zo werd in deze periode de Central Board of Health ontman-
teld om wederom controle te krijgen over de menselijke en financiële middelen, die de 
sector rijk was. Dit zou uiteindelijk leiden tot een situatie van onzekerheid en ondui-
delijkheid, waarvan bepaalde individuen binnen de sector misbruik zouden maken. Met 
wederom een vertrouwenscrisis tot gevolg, maar ook een verschuiving in de strategie 
van donoren tegenover hun Zambiaanse tegenspelers in de sector.  
Dit proefschrift sluit af met tentatieve conclusies over de menselijke factor en wat die 
betekenen voor de discussie over de Afrikaanse staat. Er wordt geconcludeerd dat de 
ijver waarmee gezondheidswerkers hun inkomenszekerheid nastreven opmerkelijk is. 
Hiermee bouwen zij niet alleen aan hun eigen sociale mobiliteit maar ook aan het 
vormen van een bureaucratische middenklasse in Zambia. Tegelijkertijd zien wij dat de 
sociale en economische druk waaraan zij blootstaan, ten dele gedrag, dat wij als patri-
moniaal kunnen aanduiden, verklaart. Zulk gedrag is echter noch onbetwist, noch uni-
verseel; het staat haaks op de bureaucratische waarden, die gezondheidswerkers hebben 
meegekregen en het wordt bestempeld als oneerlijk. Ook zijn er bureaucratische proce-
dures, die proberen dergelijk gedrag aan te pakken, al ontberen die ten dele effectiviteit. 
Dit komt mede vanwege een cultuur van straffeloosheid in de hoogste regionen van de 
macht, die ook op de werkvloer zijn weerslag lijkt te hebben.  
Dit proefschrift betoogt verder dat ondermeer door deze drang naar opwaartse mobi-
liteit, de Zambiaanse staat in de bestudeerde periode is uitgebreid en gegroeid. Dit is 
weliswaar geen unilineair pad van vooruitgang, maar het voldoet eveneens niet aan de 
voorspellingen van desintegratie, die sommigen Afrikaanse staten toedichten. Wel blij-
ken de formele doelstellingen van ‘goed bestuur’ secundair aan het belang van de staat 
om macht uit te breiden en te handhaven; net als dat het primaire belang van gezond-
heidswerkers is om zich zelf en hun families vooruit te helpen. Dit brengt ons bij een 
nuancering van het neo-patrimoniele concept van personificatie van de macht. In het 
gedrag van Zambiaanse politieke actoren worden niet uitsluitend individuele doelen 
nagestreefd, maar ook collectieve doelen en politieke doelen. Een andere nuancering 
van het neo-patrimoniaal paradigma is dat niet alleen de instrumentalisatie van wanorde 
een rol speelt, dat ook instrumentalisatie van orde relevant is. Deze conclusie is van 
belang, omdat het een afhankelijkheid van patrimoniele belangen suggereert ten op-
zichte van rationeel-legale instituties. Dit geeft aan dat beide logica’s kunnen conver-
geren en paradoxaal genoeg zelfs elkaar kunnen versterken.  
Van de gezondheidssector is gebleken, dat het een lucratieve bron van macht en 
middelen is voor politici en voor de staat als geheel. De sector is een middel om de 
doelen van staatsvorming, patronage en herverdeling te dienen. Tegelijkertijd is het ook 
een arena, waarin donoren gezien willen worden hun geo-politieke agenda van beleden 
altruïsme vorm te geven. In dit verhaal van instrumentalisatie van hervormingen, ratio-
neel-legaal discours en zelfs van plundering van publieke middelen, leken de formele 
doelen, de zorg voor het welzijn van de bevolking op de tweede plaats te komen. 
Tegelijkertijd is met het verhaal van de gezondheidshervormingen ook een vormende 
geschiedenis beschreven. Machtsverhoudingen zijn bedongen en heronderhandeld, de 
sector is uitgebreid, en rationeel-legale arrangementen zijn ontworpen, uitonderhandeld 
en geinstitutionaliseerd. Hoewel deze processen vermoedelijk verre van doelmatig 
waren, waren zij werkelijk. De Zambiaanse gezondheidssector is daarmee meer dan een 
holle façade van een illusoire staat.  
Tenslotte worden in dit proefschrift enkele bespiegelingen gepresenteerd over ont-
wikkelingssamenwerking. Het relaas van de gezondheidshervormingen geeft een indruk 
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van beleidsplannen, die gefaald hebben en doelstellingen, die niet gehaald zijn; zowel 
aan Zambiaanse kant als aan de kant van donoren. Toch blijkt dat de steun van donoren 
wel degelijk onvoorziene secundaire effecten heeft gehad. Zo heeft deze hulp een bij-
drage geleverd aan de Zambiaanse geschiedenis van staatsvorming en maatschappij-
opbouw. De gezondheidswerkers, die in dit proefschrift een prominente plaats hebben 
gekregen, hebben mede dankzij donorsteun mogelijkheden gehad om hun toekomst te 
verbeteren en die van hun kinderen. Deze bureaucratische middenklasse, is daarentegen 
niet een onafhankelijke middenklasse, die verantwoording eist van de regering. Tege-
lijkertijd kunnen donoren wel een rol spelen om de roep om verantwoording van Zam-
biaanen te versterken. In dit relaas hebben we gezien dat donoren in verschillende cor-
ruptieschandalen door hun kritische positionering een rol van belang konden spelen.  
De werkelijkheid, die in dit proefschrift is beschreven, sluit niet goed aan bij het 
beeld dat donor organisaties graag van hun werkveld schetsen. Het sluit ook niet goed 
aan bij het traject waarin donorbeleid zich het laatste decennium heeft ontwikkeld, dat 
streeft naar het uitgeven van begrotingssteun met een minimum aan menselijke inzet. 
Dit gaat uit van een aanzienlijke mate van politieke wil om armoede problemen aan te 
pakken met ‘goed bestuur’. Echter in werkelijkheid ontstaan verantwoordingssystemen 
en verhoudingen niet zo maar; ze moeten worden ingepast in de lokale context en daar 
worden uitonderhandeld. In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd, dat donoren een bijdrage 
kunnen leveren aan het versteken van overheidsinstituties die hun formele doelen na-
streven. Dit vereist echter wel menselijke betrokkenheid. Met het afschaffen van 
technische assistentie en de blinde koers naar begrotingssteun is dit doel voorbij ge-
schoten. Om een effectieve bijdrage te kunnen leveren moeten donoren politiek betrok-
ken zijn met technische kennis en kennis van de lokale politieke context.  
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